# Ezeibe v. City of York

> District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania · November 27, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10408017

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** November 27, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10408017

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding the plaintiff had sufficiently stated a claim for municipal liability based on failure to train where allegations were supported by identified departmental deficiencies in a consent decree between the city and United States
- noting that “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

VICTOR UKADIKE EZEIBE, :
Plaintiff : No. 1:19-cv-00189
:
v. : (Judge Kane)
:
CITY OF YORK and :
JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, :
Defendants :

MEMORANDUM
Before the Court is Defendant City of York (“Defendant City”)’s motion to dismiss.
(Doc. No. 8.) For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion will be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
Plaintiff Victor Ezeibe (“Plaintiff”) initially filed this action on February 4, 2019. The
complaint asserted federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and state law
tort claims against Defendants John/Jane Does (“the Individual Defendants”) in addition to a
Monell claim against Defendant City for failure to train and supervise the Individual Defendants
and failure to create or implement policies requiring the documentation of incidents in which
police officers draw firearms. (Doc. No. 1.) Defendant City filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint against it (Doc. No. 8) on April 4, 2019, along with a brief in support thereof (Doc.
No. 10). Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to Defendant’s motion on April 18, 2019 (Doc. No.
11) to which Defendant City responded on May 2, 2019 (Doc. No. 12). Having been fully
briefed, the motion is now ripe for disposition.1

1 Upon consideration of the briefing in this matter, the Court views Defendant City’s motion
(Doc. No. 8) as seeking to dismiss only claims against Defendant City. Therefore, this
B. Factual Background 2
On the evening of December 16, 2018, Plaintiff was followed by a police cruiser driven
by one of the Individual Defendants as Plaintiff drove his vehicle from the Shell Gas Station on
Roosevelt Avenue to the Turkey Hill Mini Market on West Market Street in York, Pennsylvania.
(Doc. No. 1 ¶ 6.) After Plaintiff parked his vehicle, one of the Individual Defendants shouted at

Plaintiff, “Stay in your car! Do not come out of your car!” (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff waited in his car,
as instructed, and was surrounded by approximately four to five other police cruisers and the
Individual Defendants. (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff was ordered to drop his car keys out the window, after
which Plaintiff observed three Individual Defendants aiming firearms at him. (Id. ¶¶ 9-11.)
Plaintiff was then ordered to exit the vehicle and was handcuffed. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.) The
Individual Defendants searched Plaintiff, including in his underwear and pockets. (Id. ¶ 15.)
Following the search of his person, Plaintiff was confined in the back of a police cruiser while
the Individual Defendants searched his personal vehicle. (Id. ¶ 16.) When Plaintiff was escorted
out of the police cruiser after the completion of the vehicle search, the Individual Defendants

caused a cut or abrasion to Plaintiff’s person. (Id. ¶ 17.)
Approximately three days after the aforementioned incident, Plaintiff contacted the City
of York’s Police Department to inquire about information related to the incident and was
informed that there were no records of the incident. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff alleges that he has
suffered mental and emotional suffering as a result of the incident, including panic attacks and
nightmares. (Id. ¶ 18.)

Memorandum does not address the sufficiency of claims asserted against the Individual
Defendants.
2 The following factual background is taken from the allegations of Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc.
No. 1).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide the defendant notice of
the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,
232 (3d Cir. 2008). When reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint pursuant to a motion to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept as true all

material allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them,
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618
F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). However, the Court need not accept legal conclusions set forth as
factual allegations. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, a
civil complaint must “set out ‘sufficient factual matter’ to show that the claim is facially
plausible.” See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Twombly and Ibqal, the Third Circuit has
identified three steps a district court must take when determining the sufficiency of a complaint

under Rule 12(b)(6): (1) identify the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify
any conclusory allegations contained in the complaint “not entitled” to the assumption of truth;
and (3) determine whether any “well-pleaded factual allegations” contained in the complaint
“plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F. 3d
121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). A complaint is properly
dismissed where the factual content in the complaint does not allow a court “to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff’s Monell Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I)
1. Applicable Legal Standard
Count I of Plaintiff’s complaint asserts a claim against Defendant City for false arrest in
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.3 In

Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court established that
municipalities can be held liable for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. at
690. However, municipal liability is limited to those actions for which the municipality itself is
actually responsible. See Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986). Specifically,
liability attaches when “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts
the injury.” See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. That is, a municipality is subject to Section 1983
liability to the extent it maintained an unconstitutional custom or policy that caused the
constitutional violations alleged by the claimant, but is not liable for injuries on the sole basis

that they were inflicted by its employees. See id.
A municipal policy is a “statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted
and promulgated by [a local governing] body’s officers.” See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 385 (1989). A custom is “an act ‘that has not been formally approved by an appropriate
decision maker,’ but is ‘so widespread as to have the force of law.’” See Natale v. Camden Cty.
Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Bd. of the Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty.
v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)). In order to recover from a municipality under this theory

3 The Court notes that although Plaintiff’s complaint includes allegations of excessive force
(Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 10-12, 17), Plaintiff only identifies a claim for false arrest under Section 1983.
of liability, a Plaintiff must show “a direct causal link between the municipal policy or custom
and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385. Complaints
alleging municipal liability under Section 1983 are not subject to heightened pleading standards.
See Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168
(1993). However, a plaintiff attempting to establish a Monell claim must “identify a custom or

policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was.” See McTernan v. City of York, 564
F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009).
In the alternative, a municipality may be liable under Section 1983 for a failure to train,
monitor, or supervise; however, the failure alleged in such a circumstance must amount to
“deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons with whom the police come in
contact.” See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. In order to establish deliberate indifference, a
plaintiff must generally show the failure alleged “has caused a pattern of violations.” See Berg
v. Cty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 276 (3d Cir. 2000). Where a failure to train claim is alleged
based on a single incident, the complaint must contain allegations that policymakers “kn[e]w to a

moral certainty” that the alleged constitutional deprivation would occur and the need for further
training “must have been plainly obvious.” See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10. Further,
“[l]iability cannot rest only on a showing that the employees ‘could have been better trained or
that additional training was available that would have reduced the overall risk of constitutional
injury.’” See Thomas v. Cumberland Cty., 749 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Colburn v.
Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1030 (3d Cir. 1991)).
2. Parties’ Arguments
Defendant City argues that Plaintiff “fails to allege any facts to suggest, let alone
establish, the existence of an official municipal policy that caused his injury as required by
Monell.” (Doc. No. 10 at 7.) Defendant City further notes that “Plaintiff does not allege more
than a single incident.” (Id.) In response, Plaintiff argues that the severity of this single incident
supports a finding that a failure to train Monell claim should survive a motion to dismiss at this
stage. (Doc. No. 11 at 10.) Additionally, Plaintiff would have the Court infer a failure to
supervise because “[m]ultiple police officers reported to the Turkey Hill Mini Market driving

four or five police cruisers” and “[n]otwithstanding the number of police officers involved,
Defendant City made no record of such incident.” (Id. at 10-11.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that
any lack of specificity in the complaint regarding a municipal policy or custom should not lead to
dismissal pre-discovery. (Id. at 11-12.)
3. Whether the Court Should Dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell Claim
Upon review of Plaintiff’s complaint, the parties’ arguments, and the applicable law, the
Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claim against Defendant City because Plaintiff has failed to
sufficiently allege the existence of a municipal policy or custom or the existence of a pattern of
prior similar constitutional violations that would put Defendant City on notice as to a need for

additional training. A review of Plaintiff’s complaint reveals the following allegations ostensibly
in support of a single-incident failure to train Monell claim:
York City failed to take steps to properly train and supervise
Individual Defendants.

Specifically, York City failed to create or implement policies
which would require that York City Police document all incidents
where officers draw firearms. Alternatively, York City failed to
ensure that such policies, if in existence, were carried out.

Specifically, York City failed to ensure that officers were
instructed on the constitutional prohibition on the use of force or
the threat thereof to seize or arrest a person in the absence of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
Specifically, York City, upon information and belief, was aware
that Individual Defendants and/or other police officers arrested
individuals in violation of the U.S. Constitution and failed to train,
provide proper supervision, or otherwise protect against such
abuses.

Accordingly, York City is liable for the unconstitutional conduct of
Individual Defendants within the meaning of Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

(Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 24-28.) In this case, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations consist largely of
conclusory assertions echoing the appropriate legal standard without providing factual support.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (noting that “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of
his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do”). The complaint fails to identify an affirmative
policy or custom adopted or promulgated by Defendant City that would give rise to municipal
liability under Section 1983. See McTernan, 564 F.3d at 658. (stating that “[t]o satisfy the
pleading standard, [Plaintiff] must identify a custom or policy and specify what exactly that
custom or policy was”). Furthermore, although Plaintiff alleges generally that Defendant City
failed to adequately train its police officers in the constitutional requirements regarding use of
force and search and seizure, Plaintiff does not provide any facts to support that contention. See
Pahler v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 207 F. Supp. 2d 341, 353 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (granting a motion to
dismiss a failure to train claim where the plaintiff pled no facts to support the contention that his
injuries were caused by a failure to train, failed to identify the specific training the city should
have offered, and failed to establish training was not provided). Finally, Plaintiff fails to allege
any facts from which the Court can infer actual or constructive knowledge by municipal
policymakers of a previous pattern of similar constitutional violations, or of the allegedly
inadequate training as would be required to impose Section 1983 liability. Compare Estate of
Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 799–800 (3d Cir. 2019) (finding the plaintiff had
sufficiently stated a claim for municipal liability based on failure to train where allegations were
supported by identified departmental deficiencies in a consent decree between the city and
United States), cert. denied sub nom., Estate of Roman v. Newark, NJ, No. 18-1366, 2019 WL
4921310 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019), with Goldwire v. City of Phila., 130 F. Supp. 3d 936, 944 (E.D. Pa.

2015) (dismissing a Monell claim against the city where the complaint included no facts
supporting allegations that the city inadequately trained and supervised officers); see also
Kingsmill v. Szewczak, 117 F. Supp. 3d 657, 672 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (dismissing a Monell claim
against the municipal defendant where the plaintiff merely alleged the municipal defendant had
knowledge of an officer’s history of constitutional violations and failed to investigate, supervise,
or discipline the officer absent supporting facts). Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendant’s
motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against Defendant City without prejudice.4

4 District courts must generally extend plaintiffs an opportunity to amend a complaint before
dismissal in civil rights cases. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d
247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007). A court can refuse to permit an amendment on grounds of bad faith,
undue delay, prejudice, or futility. See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). “An
amendment is futile if the amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.” Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 121 (3d Cir.
2000) (citing Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 190 (3d Cir. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 525
U.S. 459 (1999)). In this case, Plaintiff may be able to gather more information related to
municipal policies or a pattern of prior constitutional violations in order to more specifically
plead a Section 1983 failure to train claim against Defendant City. Therefore, the Court finds it
would not be futile to allow amendment.
B. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims for False Arrest (Count II), Invasion of Privacy
(Count III), and Civil Conspiracy (Count IV)

In addition to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim, Plaintiff asserts state law claims for false
arrest (Count II), invasion of privacy (Count III), and civil conspiracy (Count IV) against all
Defendants.5 (Doc. No. 1. ¶¶ 35-38.)
As to Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendant City, the PSTCA grants
municipalities, municipal agencies, and municipal officers acting in an official capacity
immunity from liability for all state law tort claims, unless the suit falls within one of eight
enumerated exceptions. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8541, et seq. (“[N]o local agency shall be liable for
any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local
agency or an employee thereof or any other person.”) Exceptions to the PSTCA are: (1) vehicle
liability; (2) care, custody, control of personal property; (3) real property; (4) trees, traffic
controls and street lighting; (5) utility service facilities; (6) streets; (7) sidewalks; and (8) care,
custody or control of animals. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8542. These exceptions are strictly construed
and narrowly interpreted. See Granchi v. Borough of N. Braddock, 810 A.2d 747, 749 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2002) (citing Jones v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 772 A.2d 435, 440 (Pa.
2001)). It is clear from the allegations in the complaint that none of the enumerated exceptions

5 The Court reads Plaintiff’s complaint as asserting claims for false arrest under both Section
1983 (Count I) and state law (Count II). (Doc. No. 1.) Defendant City’s briefing on the matter
indicates it views both of Plaintiff’s false arrest claims as constitutional claims. (Doc. No. 10 at
4.) However, whether viewed as a constitutional claim or state law tort, Plaintiff’s false arrest
claim against Defendant City must fail. If Plaintiff seeks to assert a claim of false arrest under
Section 1983, it is well established that municipal liability cannot be based on a theory of
respondeat superior. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert a
false arrest claim against Defendant City under state tort law on a theory of respondeat superior,
false arrest is an intentional tort that is not actionable against a municipal defendant under the
Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (“PSTCA”). See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8541, et
seq.
apply in this case. Furthermore, this Court and others have previously dismissed claims of
invasion of privacy, false arrest, civil conspiracy, and other tort claims brought against municipal
defendants as barred by the PSTCA. See Zerby v. Waltz, No. 16-cv-00383, 2017 WL 386616, at
*12 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2017) (dismissing state law claims of malicious prosecution and invasion
of privacy against county defendants in light of the PSTCA); Torres v. Allentown Police Dep't,

No. 13-cv-3066, 2014 WL 4081477, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2014) (dismissing state law claims
of negligence, assault and battery, and civil conspiracy against county defendants in light of the
PSTCA); Gallashaw v. City of Phila., 774 F. Supp. 2d 713, 719 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (dismissing state
law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress
against city defendant in light of the PSTCA). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s
state law tort claims against Defendant City with prejudice.6
C. Plaintiff’s Federal Conspiracy Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Count V)
1. Applicable Legal Standard
It is clearly established that in order to survive a motion to dismiss a claim under 42

U.S.C. § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege:
(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and
(3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is
injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or
privilege of a citizen of the United States.

6 The briefing in this matter also debates whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pled these claims at
all. (Doc. Nos. 10-12.) However, the Court need not decide the matter as Defendant City is
immune from liability under the PSTCA as a matter of law. The Court further finds that
amendment of these claims would be futile as Defendant City’s immunity would not permit
amended claims to survive a subsequent motion to dismiss. See Alvin, 227 F.3d at 121 (citing
Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 190 (3d Cir. 1998), rev’d on other grounds, 525 U.S. 459 (1999)
(“An amendment is futile if the amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted”)).
See Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing United Bhd. Of
Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828-829 (1983)). “In most cases, a bare conclusory
allegation of ‘conspiracy’ or ‘concerted action’ will not suffice.” Flanagan v. Shively, 783 F.
Supp. 922, 928 (M.D. Pa. 1992), aff’d, 980 F.2d 722 (3d Cir. 1992). Rather, a plaintiff must
plead facts from which the existence of an agreement between defendants can be inferred. See

Parrott v. Abramsen, 200 F. App’x 163, 165 (3d Cir. 2006). Further, a plaintiff must allege
“‘some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
conspirators’ action’ in order to state a claim.” See Farber, 440 F.3d at 135 (citing Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)).
2. Parties’ Arguments
Defendant City asserts that Plaintiff has not pled a conspiracy claim. (Doc. No. 8 ¶ 18.)
According to Defendant City, Plaintiff’s complaint “does not sufficiently allege any facts to
establish that the unidentified officer defendants took the actions alleged due to an agreement to
deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights or because of some discriminatory animus.” (Doc.

No. 12 at 5-6.) In response, Plaintiff argues that he has sufficiently pled that Defendants acted
together by alleging that “Defendants unreasonably seized [Plaintiff] by use of the threat of
deadly force and searched his person and his vehicle absent reasonable suspicion or probable
cause.” (Doc. No. 11 at 15.)
3. Whether Plaintiff’s Complaint Has Stated a Claim for Conspiracy
Under Section 1985

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for conspiracy under Section
1985. As noted above, under Twombly and Iqbal, a plaintiff must plead facts in support of a
claim rather than legal conclusions. Here, the only allegation in Plaintiff’s complaint specific to
a Section 1985 conspiracy claim is:
Individual Defendants and York City acted together, in concert, to
deprive [Plaintiff] of the equal protection of the laws and/or equal
privileges and immunities under the laws. Accordingly,
Defendants have conspired to violate [Plaintiff]’s civil rights.

(Doc. No. 1 ¶ 42.) While Plaintiff alleges in a conclusory fashion that Defendant City acted in
concert with Individual Defendants to deprive Plaintiff of his civil rights, the complaint alleges
no facts that would plausibly support the finding of an agreement between Defendants.
Furthermore, although Plaintiff notes in briefing on this matter that “Plaintiff is a member of a
protected class on the basis of his race, color[,] and ethnicity” (Doc. No. 11 at 15), Plaintiff’s
complaint does not allege that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class, nor does it allege that
the incident forming the basis of this action was motivated by discriminatory animus. (Doc. No.
1.) Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
without prejudice.7
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant City’s motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 8) will be
granted. An Order consistent with this Memorandum follows.

7 Consistent with the Court’s earlier discussion of the propriety of amendment as it pertains to
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim, the Court also finds that amendment of Plaintiff’s Section 1985
claim would not necessarily be futile. Therefore, the Court’s dismissal of this claim is without
prejudice.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10408017. Public record. Not legal advice.