# KOVALEV v. NAZARETH HOSPITAL

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · May 22, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10407388

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** May 22, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10407388

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that EMTALA “[l]iability is determined independently of whether any deficiencies in the screening or treatment provided by the hospital may be actionable as negligence or malpractice . . . as the statute was aimed at disparate patient treatment”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
SERGEI KOVALEV, :
Plaintiff, :
V. : CIVIL NO. 22-3551
NAZARETH HOSPITAL; TRINITY :
HEALTH OF THE MID-ATLANTIC :
REGION; MICHAEL MAGRO; :
PRAZAD MATHEW; RONALD :
SHAPIRO; CAROL SNYDER; and :
ADDITIONAL DOES 1-15, :
Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM
Scott, J. May 22, 2024
Pro se Plaintiff Sergei Kovalev brings this action against Defendants Nazareth Hospital,
Trinity Health of the Mid-Atlantic Region, Michael Magro, D.O. — President of Nazareth Hospital,
Prazad Mathew, Ronald Shapiro, Carol Snyder (collectively, “Nazareth Defendants”) and
additional Does 1-15 claiming that he was assaulted, intimidated, and harassed on July 16, 2022
after he refused to put his cell phone in a plastic container to go through the x-ray machine at the
security checkpoint area in the Nazareth Hospital Emergency Department. Presently before the
Court are Nazareth Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 23) and their Supplemental Motion
to Dismiss (ECF No. 40). For the reasons that follow, Nazareth Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss
will be granted in part, and this Court will dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint without
prejudice. An appropriate Order will follow.

I. BACKGROUND!
Plaintiff identifies himself as “a White person of Eastern European ethnicity” who speaks
with an accent. ECF No. 19, Am. Compl. 59. As described below, the allegations in his Amended
Complaint concern his experience at the Nazareth Hospital Emergency Department on July 16,
2022. See generally id. On that day, Plaintiff suffered a “medical emergency” and went to the
Nazareth Hospital Emergency Department in order to receive emergency medical examination and
treatment. Jd. J§ 34-35.
When he arrived at the Emergency Department, Plaintiff approached the security
checkpoint area, which was attended by two security guards, Defendants Prazad Mathew and
Ronald Shapiro, who were both employed by Nazareth Hospital/Trinity Health of the Mid-
Atlantic. Jd. §§ 39-41. At the security checkpoint, Plaintiff placed his small briefcase on the
examining table to be scanned in the x-ray machine. /d. § 42. Plaintiff then got his cell phone out
of his pocket, at which point “both security guards started shouting loudly that Plaintiff must place
his telephone in a plastic container.” /d. J 43. Plaintiff “politely” declined to do so, stating that the
“containers are infected by multiple uses by other patients and by their personal items” and told
the security guards that, instead, he would place his phone into his own briefcase to be x-rayed,
which he then proceeded to do. Jd. J] 45—46.
After hearing Plaintiff's accent when he told the security guards that he would not put his
telephone into a container, the security guards started loudly shouting at Plaintiff to “go away,” to
“find another place for treatment,” shouting that they would “not let [him] in,” and would “throw”
him out and call the police on him. /d. §§ 54-55, 59. Plaintiff did not respond to these “attacks and
assaults” but rather, proceeded to walk through the metal detector and pick up his already x-rayed

The Court draws these factual allegations from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. ECF No. 19.

briefcase, which contained his cell phone. /d. § 60. Plaintiff then walked to the registration window
located near the security checkpoint “in silence,” despite the fact that Defendant Shapiro continued
to assault and harass Plaintiff by following him. /d. J" 61-62.
When he arrived at the registration window, Plaintiff provided his identification to
Defendant Carol Snyder, who was working as the Emergency Department Registrar. /d. § 63-64.
He also told Defendant Snyder that “he would like to file a complaint against both security guards,
because he was attacked without any reason and was subject to an assault by Nazareth Hospital’s
two security guards.” Id. §§ 63-64. At that point, Defendant Shapiro “approached Plaintiff again,
in front of the registration window and started shouting loudly to . . . [Defendant Snyder] not to
tell Plaintiff anything.” /d. § 65. Defendant Shapiro then shouted that he would “throw” Plaintiff
out of the Emergency Department and would “be calling the police to throw Plaintiff out.” Jd.
Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant Shapiro’s shouting, but rather, told Defendant
Snyder that “she is a witness of the fact that security guards are attacking, harassing, and assaulting
Plaintiff’ and asked her to provide the names of the security guards. Jd. J{ 66, 68. In response,
Defendant Snyder “stated that she will not be a witness of anything” and refused to provide the
names of both security guards. /d. 67-68. Defendant Snyder also refused to provide her own
name when requested by Plaintiff. /d@. § 69. Plaintiff then asked Defendant Snyder to call any
supervisor or anyone in charge of the Emergency Department, to which Defendant Snyder falsely
responded, “that they do not have a supervisor” and “they do not have anybody in charge.” Jd.
70-73, 79.
“Without communicating with any security guard, Plaintiff received his registration plastic
bracelet and sat down in the waiting area.” /d. J 82. While silently sitting in the waiting area,
Defendants Mathew and Shapiro “were continuing with their intimidation and harassment by

walking back and forth next to Plaintiff... about 10-15 times each[.]” /d. 7 83. Plaintiff was then
“invited into the examination/treatment area,” and while he was sitting silently in the hallway of
this area with 2-3 other patients, multiple Nazareth Hospital security guards (not Defendants
Mathew and Shapiro) intentionally walked next to Plaintiff approximately 10 or more times. /d. □
85.
As aresult of the foregoing events, Plaintiff alleges that he “has been severely traumatized,
suffered and continues to suffer from personal physical sickness and mental anguish therefrom,
severe emotional distress, psychological trauma, humiliation, apprehension, alienation, grief, fear
of public places, loss of enjoyment of life, reduced quality of life, injury to his dignity, injury to
his health, financial losses, and many other harms and damages[.]” /d. 4 96. Plaintiff requests, inter
alia, “punitive damages in the amount of at least Ten Million Dollars,” and injunctive relief. /d. 4
114-28 & pp. 105-06.
Based on these facts, on August 2, 2022, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit by filing a
Complaint in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. See ECF No. 1 § 3. Nazareth
Defendants then removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441, and 1446 on
September 6, 2022. See generally ECF No. 1. After removing the case, Nazareth Defendants filed
a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 4), which was denied as moot when the Court
granted Plaintiff's Motion to File an Amended Complaint. ECF No. 18.
Accordingly, on November 15, 2022, Plaintiff filed the operative Amended Complaint.
ECF No. 19. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brings the following twenty-two (22) claims:
e Count I: Assault — Civil Claims for Intimidation and Threats of Physical Attack;
e Count II: Assault — Civil Claims for Intentional Denial of Medically Necessary
Services;
e Count III: Assault by Harassment or Independent Claim for Harassment;
e Count IV: Assault by Ethnic Intimidation or Independent Claim for Ethnic
Intimidation;

e Count V: Civil Conspiracy — Conspiracy to Deny Medical Services, to Injure and
to Defraud;
e Count VI: Pennsylvania Civil Rights Violations — Violation of 42 Pa. C.S. § 8309;
e Count VII: Violation of Plaintiff's Civil Rights Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
e Count VIII: Violations of Rights Secured by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
e Count IX: Violations of Rights Secured by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution — Plaintiff's Right to Safety and
Bodily Integrity Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
e Count X: Failure to Train, Discipline, and Supervise Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
e Count XI: Discrimination in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) et seq.;
e Count XII: Discrimination in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981;
e Count XIII: Conspiracy in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985;
e Count XIV: Violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act
(EMTALA), also known as 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (Examination and Treatment for
Emergency Medical Conditions);
e Count XV: Ordinary Negligence;
e Count XVI: Negligence Per Se;
e Count XVII: Gross Negligence;
e Count XVIII: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress;
e Count XIX: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress;
e Count XX: Reckless Endangerment;
e Count XXI: Defamation, Defamation Per Se, and Defamation by Implication; and
e Count XXII: Violation of Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law (UTPCPL), 73 P.S. § 201-1, et seg.
On November 28, 2022, Nazareth Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 23), to which Plaintiff filed an Opposition (ECF No. 28). Thereafter, on
February 22, 2023, this case was reassigned from the Honorable Wendy Beetlestone to this jurist.
ECF No. 29. Then, on April 10, 2023, Nazareth Defendants filed a Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 40), to which Plaintiff filed an Opposition (ECF No. 41). Accordingly, the
Motions are ripe for resolution.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell] Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Plausibility

means ‘more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.’” Tatis v. Allied
Interstate, LLC, 882 F.3d 422, 426 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting /gbal, 556 U.S. at 678). A claim is
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” /gbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” /d. In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and interpreted in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all inferences are drawn in the plaintiff's favor. See
McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Schrob v. Catterson, 948
F.2d 1402, 1408 (3d Cir. 1991)). As Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must construe the
allegations in the Amended Complaint liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021)
(citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).
Il. DISCUSSION
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following eight federal claims: (Count VII)
Violation of Plaintiff's Civil Rights Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (Count VIII) Violations of
Rights Secured by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (Count [X) Violations of Rights Secured by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution — Plaintiff's Right to
Safety and Bodily Integrity Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (Count X) Failure to Train, Discipline,
and Supervise Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (Count XI) Discrimination in Violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a(a) et seg.; (Count XII) Discrimination in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (Count XIII)
Conspiracy in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985; (Count XIV) Violation of the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) also known as 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (Examination and
Treatment for Emergency Medical Conditions). As detailed below, the Court finds that Plaintiff

has failed to state any federal claim and, because the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over any state law claim, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint will be dismissed.
A. Counts VII-X: Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
In Counts VII through X, Plaintiff alleges four separate § 1983 claims. Am. Compl.
233-80. “To pursue a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff ‘must establish that
[he] was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.” Dophin v. Bank
of Am. Mortg. Co., 641 F. App’x 131, 133 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626,
646 (3d Cir. 2009)). “Although there is no ‘simple line’ between state and private actors . . .[the
Third Circuit has] explained that [t]he principal question at stake is whether there is such a close
nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly
treated as that of the State itself.” Kach, 589 F.3d at 646 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). To make such a determination, the Third Circuit has “outlined three broad tests . . . to
determine whether state action exists: (1) whether the private entity has exercised powers that are
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state; (2) whether the private party has acted with the
help of or in concert with state officials; and (3) whether the [s]tate has so far insinuated itself into
a position of interdependence with the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint participant
in the challenged activity.” /d. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants Nazareth Hospital and Trinity Health of
the Mid-Atlantic Region are private entities. See generally Am. Compl. Moreover, Plaintiff does
not dispute that the individually-named-employee Defendants were not employed by the
government, but rather by the private entities. Jd. Instead, “Plaintiff contends that [Nazareth
Defendants] . . . should be construed as being an arm of the state, at least for purposes of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because of state and federal tax exemptions

that both Defendants receive, because of receipt by the Hospital Defendants of state and federal
funds pursuant to an all-encompassing state plan for the care and treatment of all state citizens,
because of exhaustive state regulation which governs in great detail the day-to-day operation of
the Hospital Defendants, and because the Hospital Defendants are expressed through the public
interest.” Am. Compl. { 236.
Plaintiffs contention is wrong. “Private hospitals are not transformed into state actors
merely because they received federal and state funding and are subject to accompanying
regulations.” White v. Willingboro Twp., No. 18-cv-10964, 2020 WL 3604091, at *7 (D.N.J. July
2, 2020) (citation omitted). In fact, Plaintiff's “argument has been considered and repeatedly
rejected by the Supreme Court in similar cases.” Schneller v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 387 F.
App’x 289, 293 (3d Cir. 2010) (collecting cases). Accordingly, as Plaintiff has failed to establish
the necessary “close nexus” between the State and Nazareth Defendants’ actions so that the actions
of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself, all of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims fail.
Thus, the Court will dismiss Count VII through Count X.
B. Count XI: Discrimination in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) et seq.
In Count XI, Plaintiff asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) ef seq. alleging that
“Defendants denied Plaintiff the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations for receiving medically necessary services because
of his ethnicity or other characteristics, such as race, and/or gender when Defendants’ employees
intentionally interfered with Plaintiff's enjoyment of his civil rights, but the same employees never
subjected to the same abuses and mistreatments all other patients.” Am. Compl. [§ 281-92.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, a plaintiff must plead “that he or she (1) is a
member of a protected class; (2) attempted to exercise the right to full benefits and enjoyment of

a place of public accommodation; (3) was denied those benefits and enjoyment; and (4) was treated
less favorably than similarly situated persons who are not members of the protected class.”
Shumate v. Twin Tier Hosp., LLC, 655 F. Supp. 2d 521, 537 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (citation omitted).
“Section 2000a sets forth a comprehensive list of establishments that qualify as a place of public
accommodation and in so doing excludes from its coverage those categories of establishments not
listed.” Castillo v. Receptionist for Cathy Polcinik, No. 5:15-CV-02296, 2016 WL 4124057, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2016) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Included within the list of
qualifying establishments “are places that provide lodging to travelers, restaurants and other
facilities that sell food for consumption on the premises, and places of exhibition and
entertainment.” /d. Not included in this list are medical facilities such as hospitals. Jd. Accordingly,
numerous courts across the country have held that a hospital does not qualify as a place of public
accommodation. See Ramirez v. Adventist Med. Ctr., No. 3:17-CV-831, 2017 WL 4798996, at *5—
6 (D. Or. Oct. 24, 2017) (collecting cases). As Plaintiff has not included any allegations in his
Amended Complaint that would bring Nazareth Hospital within the definition of a “public
accommodation,” this claim fails.
Moreover, even if this Court were to find Defendant Nazareth Hospital to be a place of
public accommodation, Plaintiff has not put forth any allegations that suggest he was discriminated
against on the basis of his race or ethnicity. Plaintiff simply jumps to the conclusion that
“({m]ultiple Nazareth Hospital employees agreed and conspired to subject Plaintiff to their abuses,
harassment, illegal and discriminative activities, because of Plaintiffs ethnicity reflected in being
a White person of the Eastern European ethnicity who is speaking with an accent.” Am. Compl. §
88. But Plaintiff fails to allege any facts “plausibly suggesting any discriminatory animus (e.g.,
suggestive statements directed toward him, better treatment of similarly situated customers outside

of protected class).” Scott v. Police & Fire Fed. Credit Union, No. 1:22-CV-00988, 2022 WL
17547279, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2022). Although Plaintiff is entitled to a relaxed pleading standard
because he is proceeding pro se, the Court is not required to “credit a pro se plaintiff's bald
assertions or legal conclusions.” /d. (citations omitted). Also dooming this claim is the fact that
Plaintiff has failed to allege that Nazareth Defendants actually denied him any public
accommodation, as there are no averments that the care and treatment provided to Plaintiff were
inadequate.
Therefore, Count XI fails to state a claim and will be dismissed.
Cc. Count XII: Discrimination in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981
In Count XII, Plaintiff asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging that Nazareth
Defendants interfered with his ability to contract for emergency medical services because of his
“ethnicity (or race and gender).” Am. Compl. 79 293-315. Section 1981 provides that:
[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens ....
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). “In order to state a claim under § 1981, a plaintiff must allege facts in support
of the following elements: (1) [that plaintiff] is a member of a racial minority; (2) intent to
discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant; and (3) discrimination concerning one or more
of the activities enumerated in the statute[,] which includes the right to make and enforce
contracts[.]” Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotations
and citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff has not put forth any factual allegations to support a finding of intent to
discriminate on the basis of race by any of the Defendants. While Plaintiff repeatedly asserts his

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Eastern European origins and that he speaks with an accent, he fails to plausibly allege that
anything other than his failure to place his cell phone in a bin at the security checkpoint area led
to the Defendants’ employees “harass[ing], threaten[ing] and attempt[ing] to remove him” from
the Emergency Department. Am. Compl. § 302. Notably absent from the Amended Complaint is
even one instance of a defendant indicating “[Plaintiff] was singled out on account of his race or
ethnicity such that this Court could plausibly infer racial animus.” Kovalev v. Home Depot U.S.A.,
Inc., No. CV 22-465, 2023 WL 2588549, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2023), aff'd, No. 23-1759, 2023
WL 7179467 (3d Cir. Aug. 23, 2023). Accordingly, Count XII fails to state a claim and will be
dismissed.
D. Count XIII: Conspiracy in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985
In Count XIII, Plaintiff asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, alleging that Defendants
“conspired to deprive Plaintiff of the equal protection of the law and/or the equal privileges and
immunities provided under the law.” Am. Compl. §§ 316—28. Section 1985 provides:
[i]f two or more persons . . . conspire . . . for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons
of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws . . . the party so injured or deprived may
have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such
injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). “To establish a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must show (1) a conspiracy;
(2) motivated by a racial or class-based discriminatory animus designed to deprive, directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons to the equal protection of the laws; (3) an act in
furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury to person or property, or the deprivation of any
right.” Whitehead v. Wetzel, 720 F. App’x 657, 662 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotations and citation
omitted).

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Here, as discussed above in this Court’s analysis of Plaintiffs § 1981 claim, Plaintiff has
not alleged any facts that would support a finding that Nazareth Defendants were motivated by a
racial or class-based discriminatory animus designed to deprive Plaintiff of equal protection of the
laws. Plaintiffs conclusory allegations of the elements of this claim are entirely unsupported by
the facts. Accordingly, Count XIII fails to state a claim and will be dismissed.
E. Count XIV: Violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act
(EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd
In Count XIV, Plaintiff alleges that Nazareth Defendants, by attempting to prevent
Plaintiff's entrance into the Emergency Department and threatening him with infliction of physical
injuries, violated EMTALA. Am. Compl. 9] 329-52.
“Congress enacted EMTALA in the mid—1980s based on concerns that, due to economic
constraints, hospitals either were refusing to treat certain emergency room patients or transferring
them to other institutions’”—a practice known as “patient dumping.” Torretti vy. Main Line Hosps.,
Inc., 580 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). “EMTALA requires hospitals to provide
medical screening and stabilizing treatment to individuals seeking emergency care in a
nondiscriminatory manner.” Jd. “EMTALA does not create a federal cause of action for
malpractice, but it does allow private plaintiffs to sue when hospitals fail to provide an appropriate
screening and when hospitals fail to stabilize an emergency medical condition.” Foster v. Klasko,
No. 20-cv-1905, 2020 WL 6255372, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2020) (citation omitted); see also
Torretti, 580 F.3d at 174 (explaining that EMTALA “[l]iability is determined independently of
whether any deficiencies in the screening or treatment provided by the hospital may be actionable
as negligence or malpractice . . . as the statute was aimed at disparate patient treatment”).
Under EMTALA, a hospital has multiple obligations: “(a) appropriate medical screening,
(b) stabilization of known emergency medical conditions and labor, and (c) restrictions on transfer

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of unstabilized individuals to outside hospital facilities.” Torretti, 580 F.3d at 172—73 (citations
omitted). In order “to state an EMTALA failure-to-screen claim, the plaintiff must allege that: (1)
the patient had an emergency medical condition; and (2) the hospital did not screen the patient in
the same way it screens other patients presenting with similar symptoms.” McClure v. Parvis, 294
F. Supp. 3d 318, 324 (E.D. Pa. 2018). On the other hand, in order to state an EMTALA failure-to-
stabilize claim, a plaintiff must allege that he “(1) had an emergency medical condition; (2) the
hospital actually knew of that condition; and (3) the [plaintiff] was not stabilized before being
transferred.” Foster, 2020 WL 6255372, at *2 (citation omitted). Under EMTALA, an “emergency
medical condition” is defined as:
(A)a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of
sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of
immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result
in—
(1) placing the health of the individual . . . in serious jeopardy,
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part... .
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1).
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to plausibly state an EMTALA claim. First, Plaintiff
has not put forth facts demonstrating that he meets the definition of having an “emergency medical
condition.” Plaintiff's Amended Complaint puts forth conclusory allegations, alleging, for
example, that he was “gravely ill” Am. Compl. 4 1, 56, that he “suffered a medical emergency
and needed to receive emergency medical examination and treatment,” Am. Compl. § 34, and that
he came into the hospital “in severe physical distress accompanied with excruciating pains.” Am.
Compl. § 39. However, Plaintiff fails to explain exactly what “emergency medical condition” he
was experiencing when he went to Nazareth Hospital. As Plaintiff does not put forth factual

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allegations concerning his reason for being in the emergency room, Plaintiff has not sufficiently
alleged that he meets the definition of having an “emergency medical condition.”
Even putting aside the conclusory assertions of his “emergency medical condition,”
Plaintiff has failed to allege that the Hospital did not screen or stabilize him. Although Plaintiff
alleges that Defendants “were trying to prohibit Plaintiffs entrance into the Emergency
Department,” Am. Compl. § 337, Plaintiff does not claim he was not screened or stabilized. From
what the Court can deduce, despite the alleged issues at security, Plaintiff was able to check into
the emergency room and receive treatment. There are zero allegations that patients presenting with
similar symptoms as Plaintiff were screened in a different way nor are there any allegations that
Plaintiff's condition was not stabilized. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to plead the necessary
elements to state a claim under EMTALA and, thus, Count XIV will be dismissed.
F. State Law Claims
Plaintiff's remaining claims are the following state law claims: (Count I) Assault — Civil
Claims for Intimidation and Threats of Physical Attack; (Count II) Assault — Civil Claims for
Intentional Denial of Medically Necessary Services; (Count III) Assault by Harassment or
Independent Claim for Harassment; (Count IV) Assault by Ethnic Intimidation or Independent
Claim for Ethnic Intimidation; (Count V) Civil Conspiracy — Conspiracy to Deny Medical
Services, to Injure and to Defraud; (Count VI) Pennsylvania Civil Rights Violation — Violation of
42 Pa. C.S. § 8309; (Count XV) Ordinary Negligence; (Count XVI) Negligence Per Se; (Count
XVII) Gross Negligence; (Count XVIII) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; (Count XIX)
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (Count XX) Reckless Endangerment; (Count X □□□
Defamation, Defamation Per Se, and Defamation by Implication; and (Count XXII) Violation of
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL), 73 P.S. § 201-1,

14

et seq. Because the Court has dismissed Plaintiff's federal claims, the Court will not exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. Accordingly, the only independent basis for
jurisdiction over any such claims is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which grants a district court jurisdiction
over a case in which “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and is between... citizens of different States.”
Section 1332(a) requires “complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants, even
though only minimal diversity is constitutionally required. This means that, unless there is some
other basis for jurisdiction, no plaintiff [may] be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.”
Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, an individual is deemed to be a citizen of
the state where he is domiciled. Swiger v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 540 F.3d 179, 182 (3d Cir. 2008)
(citation omitted). Here, the Plaintiff is a citizen of Pennsylvania and Plaintiff alleges that “[alll
Defendants were conducting their business and employment in the State of Pennsylvania, and are
located in the same State.” Am. Compl. § 30. Thus, it appears to the Court that complete diversity
of citizenship is lacking, and therefore this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over
any state law claims Plaintiff may be raising. Accordingly, Plaintiff's state law claims will be
dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. This
dismissal is without prejudice to Plaintiff's right to file a second amended complaint within thirty
(30) days in the event that he can cure the defects noted above. See Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). An appropriate Order follows.

15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10407388. Public record. Not legal advice.