# PERRONG v. BRADFORD

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · May 13, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10407237

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** May 13, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ANDREW R. PERRONG, Case No. 2:23-cv-00510-JDW
Plaintiff

V.
MATTHEW BRADFORD,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM
When it comes to robocalls, you can only call those who, like Blondie, have said,
“Call me. Call me on the line.”' If you call people who haven't opted in, then you face
liability under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Andrew Perrong never agreed to
have calls made to his cellphone, but he received five calls that Pennsylvania Rep. Matthew
Bradford directed, so Mr. Perrong sued. Rep. Matthew Bradford asks me to hold that the
TCPA doesn't apply to state legislators like him. But the law distinguishes between lawsuits
against government officials in their personal and official capacities, and Mr. Perrong
asserts claims against Rep. Bradford in his personal capacity. In that capacity, Rep.
Bradford is not exempt or immune from liability, so he must face the claims in this case.

' Blondie, Ca// Me, on American Gigolo (Polydor 1980).

I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History

Rep. Bradford is a member of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives
Democratic Caucus. When a member of the Democratic Caucus prepares an event for
constituents, he or she may rely on robocalls to get the word out about the event. The

House Communications Office uses the services of Cleo Communications, US, LLC to make
the robocalls to constituents. The Democratic Caucus pays for the calls from a shared
budget. The individual legislator does not pay for them. There is a process that state
representatives must go through before the robocalls are made.

When a member of the Democratic Caucus wants to make a robocall to spread the
word about an event or opportunity, the member uses a calendar system to put in a
request with the House Communications Office. The Communications Office reviews the
request with House Legal and Ethics to make sure that the underlying event has “a clear

legislative purpose and public benefit.” (ECF No. 45-3 at 27:11-13.) For example, the
system is meant to promote events like senior fairs where Pennsylvania seniors can learn
about government programs or services that may be of interest to them. Once the event

is vetted, a staffer in the House Communications Office drafts a script describing the event,
provides it to the legislator’s office, and coordinates with the legislator’s office as to the
specifics of the call. The legislator records the audio for the call and uploads it to a website.
The House Communications Office provides the audio to Cleo to make the actual calls.
Using his prerecorded voice, Rep. Bradford directed five calls to Mr. Perrong. Rep.
Bradford testified that the calls and underlying events were meant to connect his

constituents “to important government services that are available in [the] community.”
(ECF No. 45-2 at 10:6-11.) For example, on September 20, 2019, the call stated:
Bring the family and enjoy the zoo. Free food, fun activities and much more!
Hi, I’m State Representative Matt Bradford and I’m hosting a Family Fair for
residents of the 70th district on Wednesday September 25th from 5:30pm
to 7pm at the Elmwood Park Zoo. Located at 1661 Harding Boulevard in
Norristown. Because space is limited, you must RSVP with your name,
address and number of people attending. You can RSVP by emailing me at
repbradford@pahouse.net or calling my office at 610-222-3490. That’s 610-
222-3490. I’m Matt Bradford and I hope to see on September 25th.

(ECF No. 45-1 at page 2 of 3.) This call was designed to invite constituents to an annual
event where they could learn about services from non-profits and other government
service providers.
On October 10, 2019, the call stated:
I want to help protect your identity and get rid of those old documents
taking up space. Hi, I’m State Representative Matt Bradford and I’m hosting
a free document shredding event on Saturday October 12th from 9am to
1pm or until the truck is full. Come join us in the parking lot of Paul Fly
Elementary School located at 2920 Potshop Road in East Norriton. Only
paper items will be allowed. No electronics or trash. Bring up to three boxes
of your personal documents to be safely and securely shredded onsite. For
more information, please call my office at 610-222-3490. That’s 610-222-
3490. I’m Matt Bradford and I hope to see you on October 12th.

(ECF No. 45-1 at page 2 of 3.) This call was meant to connect with constituents by inviting
them to shred confidential documents to avoid identity theft.
On December 30, 2020, the call stated:
I want to help you connect to the health care coverage plan that best fits
you and your family. Hello, this is State Representative [Matthew Bradford].
Join me on Tuesday, January 5, for a virtual information session on Pennie,
the new way to connect Pennsylvanians to health care coverage. This event
will focus on often underserved and overlooked communities, so please
spread the word. Featuring representatives from Pennie and the NAACP of
Greater Norristown, the virtual event will start at 6:30 PM Tuesday, January
5. You can reserve your spot and find out more by visiting my website at
repbradford.com. You can also call my office from more information by
dialing 610-222-3490. That’s 610-222-3490. This is State Representative
Matt Bradford. Let’s get connected on January 5.

(ECF No. 45-1 at page 2 of 3.) Rep. Bradford hosted this event with the local chapter of
the NAACP in an effort to make his constituents aware that health insurance was available
for purchase on the state-level marketplace.
On January 31, 2020, the call stated:
This is a great opportunity to support our community. You can apply to
become a part of the 2020 census team and earn 27 dollars an hour. Hi, this
is State Representative Matt Bradford. I’m collaborating with the Norristown
Area Census Office and the Norristown Complete Count Committee to host
a census recruitment event tomorrow, Saturday February 1st from 10 am to
1pm at Norristown Borough Hall 235 East Airy Street in Norristown. You can
apply to become a part of the 2020 census team and earn 27 dollars an hour
working to help make sure that everyone in our community is counted. In
addition to great pay, the hours are flexible, and you’re paid for training. For
more information, please call my office at 610-222-3490. I’m Matt Bradford
and hope you can make it tomorrow to Norristown Borough Hall from 10am
to 1pm.

(ECF No. 45-1 at page 3 of 3.) Rep. Bradford made this call to alert constituents about an
employment opportunity with the federal government during the 2020 census.
On April 17, 2020, the call stated:
My staff and I are here to serve as Pennsylvanians do their duty to slow the
spread of COVID-19. Hi, this is State Representative Matt Bradford.
Pennsylvania remains under a stay-at-home order and though my physical
office is closed, my staff and I continue to work remotely to serve you. We
can assist with questions on unemployment compensation, resources for
small businesses and help you access government services during a time
when many physical offices have closed to the public. For the latest on
COVID-19, visit the Health Department website at Health.pa.gov. As always,
call my office at 610-222- 3490 or email repbradford@pahouse.net with any
questions. We will get back to you as soon as possible. That number again
is 610-222-3490. This is State Representative Matt Bradford. Please - stay
home. Stay safe and stop the spread.
(ECF No. 45-1 at page 3 of 3.) Rep. Bradford made this call to remind his constituents that
constituent services would still be available to them even though his physical office was
closed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Rep. Bradford did not make any of these calls for

emergency purposes, and Mr. Perrong maintains that he did not give his prior consent to
receiving them.
B. Procedural History
On February 8, 2023, Mr. Perrong sued Rep. Bradford, alleging violations of the
TCPA and the Pennsylvania Telemarketer Registration Act (“TRA”). I dismissed Mr.
Perrong’s claims under the TRA with prejudice. I also ruled that to the extent he intended

to, Mr. Perrong could not maintain a claim against Rep. Bradford in his official capacity

2 Though Mr. Perrong did not cite any actual evidence demonstrating this fact (only
the allegations in his Amended Complaint), he would be able to present admissible
evidence at trial via his own testimony. And, in any event, Rep. Bradford did not move for
summary judgment on this issue.

because such a claim would amount to a claim against the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, which is entitled to sovereign immunity.
Mr. Perrong filed an Amended Complaint and added Cleo as a defendant. He
asserted claims against Rep. Bradford and Cleo for violating the TCPA by (1) making calls
using a prerecorded message (Count One); and (2) making calls with an automatic
telephone dialing system (“ATDS") (Count Two). Mr. Perrong also alleged that Rep.
Bradford and Cleo violated the TCPA’s implementing regulations by (1) making five
telemarketing calls to Mr. Perrong’s phone number, which is on the Do-Not-Call registry;
(2) failing to have a written Do-Not-Call policy; and (3) failing to maintain Mr. Perrong on

a Do-Not-Call list (Count Three).
Cleo moved to dismiss Mr. Perrong’s claims against it. 1 granted Cleo’s motion in

part, explaining that Mr. Perrong could not maintain his claims based on the use of an
ATDS or his claims under the TCPA’s regulations.? Thereafter, Mr. Perrong settled his
remaining claim against Cleo.
On December 15, 2023, Rep. Bradford moved for summary judgment as to Mr.
Perrong’s claims arising under Section 227(b)(1)(A) of the TCPA, and I permitted the

; Though I dismissed those claims as against Cleo only, my reasoning applies to the
same claims asserted against Rep. Bradford as well. However, Rep. Bradford did not seek
dismissal of those claims after I ruled on Cleo’s motion, and he has not moved for
summary judgment on them either. Therefore, as a technical matter, they remain live in
the case. However, I will provide Mr. Perrong an opportunity to explain why I should not
dismiss those claims from this matter, to the extent he is still pursuing them.

Republican and Democratic Caucuses of the Senate of Pennsylvania and the Republican
Caucus of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives to file a brief in support of Rep.

Bradford’s motion as . The motion is ripe for disposition.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) permits a party to seek, and a court to enter,

summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). In ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must “view the facts and draw
reasonable inferences ‘in the light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary

judgment] motion.’” , 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (quotation omitted).
However, “[t]he non-moving party may not merely deny the allegations in the
moving party’s pleadings; instead, he must show where in the record there exists a
genuine dispute over a material fact.” , 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d

Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B). If he fails to make this
showing, then the court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion”
and/or “grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials — including the

facts considered undisputed — show that the movant is entitled to it[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e)(2), (3).
III. DISCUSSION
A. TCPA Liability

The TCPA makes it “unlawful for any within the United States … to make
any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express
consent of the called party) using … an artificial or prerecorded voice … to any telephone

number assigned to a … cellular telephone service … or any service for which the called
party is charged for the call[.]” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). For purposes
of the Communications Act, which includes the TCPA, a “person” “includes an individual,
partnership, association, joint-stock company, trust, or corporation” “unless the context

otherwise requires.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(39). A person who causes someone else to make a call
on his behalf can face liability under the TCPA under common law principles of agency.
, 577 U.S. 153, 168 (2016);
, 28 FCC Rcd. 6574 (2013).

The parties don’t dispute that someone made five calls to Mr. Perrong’s cellphone
using Rep. Bradford’s prerecorded voice. There doesn’t seem to be a dispute, at least for
purposes of this motion, that Rep. Bradford caused the House Communications Office to

make the calls at issue in this case. What’s left is to ensure that Rep. Bradford is a person
under the statute. He is.
“Personal-capacity suits … seek to impose individual liability upon a government
officer for actions taken under color of state law.” , 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991).
“Official-capacity suits, in contrast, generally represent only another way of pleading an
action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” , 473 U.S. 159, 165

(1985) (quotation omitted). Courts treat official capacity suits as a “suit against the entity,”
rather than the person who occupies the office. at 166. Thus, defendants in official
capacity claims can assert sovereign immunity as a defense. at 167. “But sovereign

immunity ‘does not erect a barrier against suits to impose individual and personal
liability.’” , 581 U.S. 155, 163 (2017) (quoting , 502 U.S. at 30-31).
Mr. Perrong has sued Rep. Bradford in his personal capacity. Rep. Bradford seems
to contend otherwise based on the fact that his conduct was connected to his professional

position. And his make much of the fact that he made the challenged phone calls
in accordance with internal House procedures and ethical guidelines, as part of fulfilling
constituent services as a Pennsylvania legislator. But “[i]t does not follow that every time
a public official acts under color of state law, the suit must of necessity be one against the

official in his or her official capacity.” , 912 F.2d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1990), ,
502 U.S. 21 (1991). Instead, I must determine who is the real party in interest: the sovereign
(i.e. the Commonwealth); or the individual (i.e. Rep. Bradford). “In making this assessment,

courts may not simply rely on the characterization of the parties in the complaint, but
rather must determine in the first instance whether the remedy sought is truly against the
sovereign.” , 581 U.S. at 162. That is because “[t]he critical inquiry is who may be
legally bound by the court's adverse judgment[.]" /@ at 165. In this case, I have little
trouble concluding that Rep. Bradford is the real party in interest.
While Mr. Perrong’s Amended Complaint is silent on the issue, he listed Rep.
Bradford's personal address rather than his office address and seeks damages and
injunctive relief against him personally. Mr. Perrong did not name Rep. Bradford as a
defendant due to his official position; he did so because of Rep. Bradford's personal
actions in directing the challenged phone calls. The fact that Rep. Bradford may have been
acting within the scope of his role as a state legislator when he made the calls does not
make this an official capacity suit. See eg. Melo, 912 F.2d at 636; Pennachietti v.
Mansfield. No. 17-cv-2582, 2017 WL 6311646, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2017); A/ v
McClinton, No. 16-cv-6373, 2017 WL 2588425, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 14, 2017).
At the same time, there is no indication that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
or the Pennsylvania House of Representatives is the real party in interest. Rep. Bradford
does not suggest that a state law or regulation required him to make the challenged calls

or that he made these calls on behalf of the Commonwealth. On the contrary, the evidence
demonstrates that state representatives must apply for permission to make such calls and
that they do so on an individual basis, with some seeking to do so more often than others.

4 Rep. Bradford points me to an unpublished decision from the Ninth Circuit that
holds that sovereign immunity applies to personal capacity claims against legislators
under the TCPA. See Cheng v. Speier, No. 22-16170, 2023 WL 4490352 (9th Cir. July 12,
2023). I have reviewed that case, and I respectfully disagree with it. Instead, I find Judge
Bress's dissenting opinion to be more persuasive.
10

Finally, as for the critical inquiry, any adverse judgment against Rep. Bradford would not
bind the Commonwealth. The fact that individual state representatives might read this

decision and stop using prerecorded calls to reach their constituents is not the same as
the Commonwealth to change its own operations or procedures. And, of
course, state legislators can still make robocalls to their constituents, as long as they

ensure that the calls only go to those who have opted to receive them.
In his individual capacity, there’s little question that Rep. Bradford is a “person”
under the TCPA because he’s an individual. He argues otherwise, but his arguments all
focus on the idea that the definition of “person” does not extend to a sovereign. He’s

right, but the argument misses the point. Mr. Perrong couldn’t pursue an official capacity
claim against Rep. Bradford. (I held that when I ruled on Rep. Bradford’s motion to dismiss.
(ECF No. 11 at ¶ 3.)) But none of his arguments accounts for the distinction between an
official capacity suit and a personal capacity suit. And a “government official in the role of

personal-capacity defendant [like Rep. Bradford] … fits comfortably within the statutory
term ‘person.’” , 502 U.S. at 27 (interpreting definition of “person” in context of 42
U.S.C. § 1983).

The same distinction means that Rep. Bradford’s reliance on the FCC’s decision in
is misplaced. That decision determined that a “state
government caller making calls in the conduct of official government business is not a
‘person’ subject to” the TCPA. 35 FCC Rcd. 15052 ¶¶ 13, 22-28 (2020). The FCC based its
decision on the longstanding understanding that the word “person” in a statute excludes
“the sovereign unless articulated otherwise.” at ¶ 53 (citing

, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) and , 552 U.S. 653, 667 (1979)). That
principle means that the TCPA does not reach official-capacity claims against state officials
because those are claims against the sovereign. And it also means that has

nothing to say about personal capacity claims because those are not claims against the
sovereign.
B. Qualified Immunity
Because Mr. Perrong has sued Rep. Bradford in his individual capacity, Rep.

Bradford cannot rely on sovereign immunity to escape liability. , 581 U.S. at 163
(quotation omitted). However, he “may be able to assert immunity defenses[.]”
(original emphasis) (citation omitted). For example, legislators like Rep. Bradford may
rely on legislative and/or qualified immunity, where appropriate.

, 991 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). Rep. Bradford
contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
1. Qualified immunity and the TCPA

Neither party has addressed the threshold issue of whether qualified immunity is
available as a defense under the TCPA, and the Third Circuit has not confronted this issue.
However, I conclude that governmental officials may assert qualified immunity when
defending against TCPA claims.
“‘[Q]ualified immunity’ shields governmental officials from suit and from liability if
their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.’” , 63 F.4th 211, 221 (3d Cir.
2023) (quotation omitted). This defense is designed to balance two competing interests—
"the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and

the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform
their duties reasonably.” (same).
In , the Third Circuit determined that this defense is available to claims under
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”). at 226-27. That decision

provides useful guidance. Like RFRA, the TCPA makes no mention of qualified immunity.
Instead, liability under Section 227(b)(1)(A) appears mandatory unless the defendant
made the challenged call for emergency purposes or with the called party’s consent. In
addition, the fact that the TCPA provides for statutory damages suggests that qualified

immunity is an available defense for government officials. Indeed, “Congress is presumed
to enact legislation with knowledge of the law and a newly-enacted statute is presumed
to be harmonious with existing law and judicial concepts.” , 63 F.4th at 222

(quotation omitted). Like RFRA, by the time Congress enacted the TCPA in 1991, the
Supreme Court “understood the common law [since] 1871 to provide most officials a
qualified immunity from liability for their actions.” at 223. In other words, “Congress
enacted [the TCPA] against a ‘legal backdrop,’ in which state and federal officials sued for
violating the Constitution, and state officials sued for violating federal law, could invoke
qualified immunity as a defense. Qualified immunity ‘represent[ed] the norm’ when it

came to suits against public officials.” Ja. (quotations omitted). Thus, I can “presume that
Congress drafted [the TCPA] mindful of and consistent with that status quo.” Jad
This decision is in line with the current legal landscape, as well. Because the
considerations underlying the doctrine of qualified immunity “are present regardless of
the cause of action against the official, qualified immunity ‘represents the norm’ in suits
against public officials.” A/aj v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 25 F.Ath 805, 814 (10th Cir. 2022)
(quotation omitted). As a result, “many circuits have applied qualified immunity to
individual-capacity suits under a variety of statutes,” including statutes like the TCPA that
prohibit acts by government officials and non-government officials alike.? Mack, 63 F.Ath
at 224 (quotation omitted). Given all this, 1 am convinced that qualified immunity is an
available defense under the TCPA.

> See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)); Bryant v. Texas
Dep't of Aging & Disability Servs., 781 F.3d 764, 770 (5th Cir. 2015) (Family and Medical
Leave Act); Gonzalez v. Lee Cnty. Hous. Auth. 161 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 1998) (Fair Housing
Act); Cullinan v. Abramson, 128 F.3d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1997) (Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act); 7orcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1343 (4th Cir. 1995)
(Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act); Mat/ Black Police Ass'n, Inc. v.
Velde, 712 F.2d 569, 572 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Crime Control Act of 1973).
14

2. Rep. Bradford violated Mr. Perrong’s clearly established rights
Though Rep. Bradford can rely on the doctrine of qualified immunity, it does not

shield him from liability in this case. Determining whether a government official is entitled
to qualified immunity involves a two-prong inquiry. The first prong requires me to
consider whether—in the light most favorable to Mr. Perrong—the facts show that Rep.

Bradford violated a statutory right. , 994 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir.
2021). The second requires me to consider “whether the right was clearly established, such
that ‘it would [have been] clear to a reasonable [official] that his conduct was unlawful in
the situation he confronted.’” (quotation omitted). As the party asserting this

affirmative defense, Rep. Bradford “bears the burden of persuasion on both prongs at
summary judgment.” , 63 F.4th at 227 (citation omitted).
Taken in the light most favorable to Mr. Perrong, there’s no question that he
received calls that violated the TCPA. Each of the calls came to his cellphone without his

consent and played a message using Rep. Bradford’s prerecorded voice.
As to the clearly-established prong, Rep. Bradford is entitled to summary judgment
only if he satisfies the burden of demonstrating “that reasonable [officials] could not have

known that their actions violated clearly established law.” , 63 F.4th at 228 (citation
omitted). This, too, is a two-step inquiry. First, I must “‘define the right allegedly violated
at the appropriate level of specificity’ and then ‘ask whether that right was clearly
established at the time of its alleged violation.’” (quotation omitted). To address “the
crucial question whether the official acted reasonably in the particular circumstances that
he or she faced[,]” the Supreme Court has “repeatedly stressed” that courts must define

the right with “a high ‘degree of specificity.’” , 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018). Mr.
Perrong’s framing of the right to be free from “annoying” calls is untethered to the
statutory text. (ECF No. 51 at 21.) Instead, the relevant right is the right that 47 U.S.C. §

227(b)(1)(A)(iii) creates: the right not to receive calls from persons (as the statute defines
that term) that use an automatic dialing system or a prerecorded voice. I can rely on the
statute to define the right because it’s a specific pronouncement from Congress, rather
than a broad Constitutional principle, and because the right is in a specific subparagraph

of a statutory section. At that level of granularity, the right does not need more definition.
The right that Section 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) creates is clearly established. The statutory
text is not ambiguous. And the Third Circuit has focused on the language of the statutory
text to emphasize the provision’s reach. , 727 F.3d

265, 273 (3d Cir. 2013); , 861 F.3d 382, 390 (3d Cir. 2017). Rep.
Bradford argues that the law is not clearly established because there is no factually
analogous Supreme Court precedent, binding opinions from the Third Circuit, or a “robust

consensus of cases of persuasive authority in the Courts of Appeals.” , 994
F.3d at 165 (quotation omitted). But a “right may be ‘clearly established’ even without a
‘precise factual correspondence between the case at issue and a previous case.” at 166
(quotation omitted). A “public official does not get the benefit of ‘one liability-free
violation’ simply because the circumstance of his case is not identical to that of a prior
case.” (quotation omitted). In cases involving constitutional violations, the

constitutional principles at play are often broad, which makes finding analogous factual
cases particularly important because “we cannot expect [government] officials to
anticipate the evolution of constitutional law[.]”

, 747 F.2d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1984).
But we can—and do—expect government officials to adhere to clear statutory
prohibitions, and they don’t have to wait for a case to come along to know that a statute
prohibits certain conduct.

Rep. Bradford argues that a state legislator would not have known that the TCPA
applied to him. But there’s no reason why that’s so. The TCPA applies to “individuals,” of
which Rep. Bradford is obviously one. Although the FCC has concluded that the TCPA
does not apply to a state government, an individual legislator is not the government, nor

does he act for the government when he exercises his discretion and makes individual
decisions to publicize events to his constituents. And the distinction between an official
capacity suit, which allows a legislator to claim sovereign immunity, and an individual

capacity suit, which does not, has been clearly established for decades. , ,
473 U.S. at 165 (decided in 1985). Rep. Bradford might have made a mistake about the
TCPA’s application to him, but it was not because of a lack of legal clarity about the
possibility that he could be liable.
IV. CONCLUSION
“Only the written word is the law[.]” , 590 U.S. 644,

653 (2020). In this case, that written word is the TCPA, and it could not be clearer that it
applies to all calls that any individual makes using a prerecorded voice, including an
individual serving as a state legislator. And it would have been clear to a reasonable state

legislator that the TCPA applied, so Rep. Bradford has not shown that he is entitled to
qualified immunity. I will therefore deny his motion for summary judgment. An
appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:

JOSHUA D. WOLSON, J.
May 13, 2024

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10407237. Public record. Not legal advice.
