# BROWN v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · April 17, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10407139

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 17, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10407139

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “§ 1985(3) defendants must have allegedly conspired against a group that has an identifiable existence independent of the fact that its members are victims of the defendants’ tortious conduct”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RA’ SHEEN J. BROWN, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-CV-1019
:
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al., :
Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

BAYLSON, J. APRIL 17, 2024

Ra’ Sheen J. Brown, an inmate currently confined at SCI Frackville, has filed a pro se
Complaint asserting various civil rights violations in connection with a state court criminal
prosecution. As set forth more fully below, Brown’s claims against the named Defendants in
their individual capacities will be dismissed based on absolute prosecutorial immunity. All
claims based on violations of the Pennsylvania constitution and state tort law also will be
dismissed. The Court will permit Brown to proceed on his Monell claim against the City of
Philadelphia and his official capacity claim against former District Attorney Seth Williams, but
will dismiss the official capacity claims against the Assistant District Attorneys.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1
Brown’s claims arise out of a state court criminal prosecution for which the conviction
and sentence were subsequently vacated.2 He names the following Defendants in their

1 The allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Brown’s Complaint. The Court
adopts the sequential pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.

2 The publicly available state court docket, of which this Court may take judicial notice, see Buck
v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006), reflects that a new trial on the
charges was ordered and is currently scheduled to commence on August 5, 2024. See
Commonwealth v. Brown, CP-51-CR-0002569-2012 (C.P. Phila.).
individual and official capacities: (1) the City of Philadelphia; (2) former Philadelphia District
Attorney Seth Williams; (3) John or Jane Doe #1, a supervisor in the District Attorney’s Office
for the City of Philadelphia; (4), Assistant District Attorney Carolyn Naylor; (5) John or Jane
Doe #2, a supervisor in the Appeals Unit of the District Attorney’s Office for the City of

Philadelphia; and (6) Assistant District Attorney Hugh Burns, Appeals Unit. (Compl. at 7-9.)
Brown was arrested and charged with murder, conspiracy to commit murder, possession
of a firearm by a prohibited person, carrying a firearm on a public street, and possession of an
instrument of crime, in connection with a shooting that occurred on October 17, 2011 in
Philadelphia. (Id. at 9-10; Commonwealth v. Brown, CP-51-CR-0002569-2012 (C.P. Phila.).)
Brown was held for trial based on the statement of a witness, who recanted the statement at the
preliminary hearing, alleging that it was the product of physical and psychological violence by
Detective James Pitts. (Compl. at 10.) Although Brown moved for discovery of the personnel
files of two of the detectives involved in his case to determine whether there had been any
allegations of misconduct, no discovery was turned over by District Attorney Naylor. (Id.) Two

witnesses who were called at trial disavowed their out of court statements that implicated Brown
in the shooting. (Id. at 11.) The first testified that Detective Pitts physically and psychologically
intimidated him into making the statement, and the second testified that she was pressured by
Detective Ronald Dove when giving her statement and she was under the influence of alcohol
when she gave the statement. (Id.) The witness statements were introduced at trial by Assistant
District Attorney Naylor through the detectives. (Id.) A separate witness testified on behalf of
Brown, stating that he observed an individual other than Brown shoot the victim. (Id.)
According to Brown, the “trial was ultimately a credibility contest between the witnesses and
detectives with Ms. Naylor arguing that the detectives were sworn officers of the law with no
reason to lie.” (Id.) Brown was found guilty of all charges and sentenced to life imprisonment
on June 26, 2013. (Id.)
During Brown’s appeal, which was defended against by Assistant District Attorney Hugh
Burns, it was reported in the news that Detective Pitts was found to have fabricated evidence in

three other cases, and Detective Dove was under investigation “in the cover up of three
homicides and a disappearance.” (Id. at 11-12.) Pitts and Dove were each dismissed from
employment with the Philadelphia Police Department and were prosecuted for their actions in
other criminal investigations and trials. (Id. at 12-13.)
Brown was initially unsuccessful in his attempts to overturn his conviction on direct
appeal and through post-conviction proceedings. (Id. at 12.) He later filed a habeas petition and
a successive petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). (Id.) During the course of
his second PCRA proceeding, the Commonwealth sent Brown “over three (300) hundred pages
of disclosure material that was never turned over previously,” which included three sustained
findings of misconduct against Pitts and one sustained finding of misconduct against Dove. (Id.

at 13.) Brown asserted Brady violations on September 21, 2022, based on information
discovered in another case involving Detective Pitts. (Id.) According to Brown, as part of an
investigation into the other case, “the Conviction Integrity Unit discovered that the District
Attorney’s Office had a general policy of not obtaining or disclosing such records” and advised
counsel to subpoena the records to find the Brady material, thereby “putting the onus on the
defense counsel to find Brady material.” (Id.)3 Brown contends that the investigation into at
least two of the misconducts occurred and concluded prior to his own trial. (See id. at 18.)

3 Brown alleges that the misconducts were initially detailed in a Joint Stipulation of Fact filed by
the Commonwealth and the defendant in an unrelated case, Commonwealth v. Onyiah, No. CP-
51-CR-00001632-2011 (C.P. Phila.).
Brown further asserts that the Commonwealth acknowledged that it “had suppressed exculpatory
and impeachment evidence regarding Pitts and Dove, critical witnesses for the Commonwealth at
[Brown’s] trial on the merits, the Commonwealth conceded to vacate [his] conviction on March
29, 2023” and the sentencing judge vacated the judgment of sentence on May 5, 2023. (Id.)

Brown asserts various constitutional claims, as well as state law claims based on
Defendants’ actions.4 (Id. at 19.) He seeks declaratory relief and monetary damages. (Id. at
20.)5

4 Brown lists various constitutional amendments and legal theories as the basis for his claims.
However, passing references to various legal precepts, without further development, are not
sufficient to raise claims under such principles. See Campbell v. LVNV Finding, LLC and
Resurgent Capital Servs., No. 21-5388, 2022 WL 6172286, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2022) (A
“‘passing reference’ to jurisprudential precepts without more does not bring that issue before the
Court in that it provides no basis for a ruling one way or the other.”) (citing Laborers’ Int’l
Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994));
Alexis v. Sessions, No. 18-2099, 2018 WL 5077899, at *2 n.1 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2018). Thus, the
Court construes the Complaint as raising only the claims discussed in detail below. In any event,
to the extent Brown invokes other legal provisions, for instance, § 1985 and § 1986, he has not
stated a plausible basis for a claim under those provisions. “[T]o state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3), a plaintiff must allege (1) a conspiracy; (2) motivated by a racial or class based
discriminatory animus designed to deprive, directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons
to the equal protection of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an injury
to person or property or the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States.” Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1997); Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d
131, 136 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining that Ҥ 1985(3) defendants must have allegedly conspired
against a group that has an identifiable existence independent of the fact that its members are
victims of the defendants’ tortious conduct”). “[T]o properly plead an unconstitutional
conspiracy, a plaintiff must assert facts from which a conspiratorial agreement can be inferred.”
Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir. 2010). “[A]
bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556
(2007). “[Section] 1986 constitutes an additional safeguard for those rights protected under 42
U.S.C. § 1985, and ‘transgressions of § 1986 by definition depend on a preexisting violation of §
1985.” Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1295 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Rogin v. Bensalem Twp.,
616 F.2d 680, 696 (3d Cir. 1980)). Thus, “to maintain a cause of action under § 1986, the
plaintiffs must show the existence of a § 1985 conspiracy.” Id. at 1295 n.5.

5 Declaratory judgments are unavailable to litigants who seek a proclamation that their rights
were violated in the past, as Brown requests here. See Corliss v. O’Brien, 200 F. App’x 80, 84
(3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“Declaratory judgment is inappropriate solely to adjudicate past
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although Brown has paid the filing fee in full, (see ECF No. 4), the Court has the
authority to screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d
113, 116 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing that the district courts have the authority to screen a

prisoner complaint pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1) even if the prisoner is not proceeding in forma
pauperis). Section 1915A requires that the Court “review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner
seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In doing so, the Court must dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof that
“is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” id. §
1915A(b)(1), or that “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief,”
id. § 1915A(b)(2).
Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915A(b)(1) is governed by the same
standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See

Harris v. Wetzel, 822 F. App’x 128, 130 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam); see also Tourscher v.
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the Court must determine whether
the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). ‘“At
this early stage of the litigation,’ ‘[the Court will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro se]
complaint as true,’ ‘draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor,’ and ‘ask only

conduct” and is also not “meant simply to proclaim that one party is liable to another.”); see also
Andela v. Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, 569 F. App’x 80, 83 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam)
(“Declaratory judgments are meant to define the legal rights and obligations of the parties in the
anticipation of some future conduct.”). Accordingly, declaratory relief is not available here. The
Court addresses Brown’s remaining claims for damages below.
whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible []
claim.’” Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio,
792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678.

As Brown is proceeding pro se, the Court construes the allegations in the Complaint
liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina,
Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). “This means we remain flexible, especially ‘when
dealing with imprisoned pro se litigants[.]’” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 245). The Court will
“apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Id. However,
‘“pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.’” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Section 1983 Claims
Brown raises claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the vehicle by which federal constitutional
claims may be brought in federal court. Section 1983 “does not, by its own terms, create

substantive rights; it provides only remedies for deprivations of rights established elsewhere in
the Constitution or federal laws.” Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996); Pappas
v. City of Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (“Section 1983 is not a source of
substantive rights,” but is merely a means through which “to vindicate violations of federal law
committed by state actors.”) (citing Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002)). “To
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
1. Individual Capacity Claims
Brown’s claims against the Defendants in their individual capacities are based on their
actions taken during the prosecution of Brown’s state criminal case. Specifically, he claims that
Seth Williams acted as final policymaker and supervisor for the District Attorney’s Office,

including the decision of what material was to be provided to criminal defendants. (Compl. at
19.) He further alleges that the actions of John or Jane Doe #1 were taken in his or her role as
supervisor for the District Attorney’s Office and he or she was legally responsible for the actions
of his or her subordinates during his or her shift. (Id.) Additionally, Brown contends that
Carolyn Naylor acted in her role as Assistant District Attorney and she prosecuted cases in
accordance with the policy of the District Attorney’s Office. (Id. at 20.) He further claims that
the actions of John or Jane Doe #2 were taken in his or her role as supervisor for the Appeals
Unit in the District Attorney’s Office and he or she was legally responsible for the actions of his
or her subordinates during his or her shift. (Id.) Brown also alleges that the actions of Hugh
Burns were undertaken in his role as Assistant District Attorney in the Appeals Unit for the

District Attorney’s Office and he prosecuted cases on appeal in accordance with policy of the
District Attorney’s Office. (Id.)
It is well settled that prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for
damages under § 1983 for acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process” such as “initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the State’s case.” Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976). “[W]hether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute
immunity depends on whether she establishes that she was functioning as the state’s ‘advocate’
while engaging in the alleged conduct that gives rise to the constitutional violation.” Yarris v.
Cty. of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 2006). Absolute immunity extends to the decision
to initiate a prosecution, including “soliciting false testimony from witnesses in grand jury
proceedings and probable cause hearings,” presenting a state’s case at trial, and appearing before
a judge to present evidence. Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal citations
omitted). “[P]rosecutors [also] are entitled to absolute immunity from claims for damages

related to their roles in choosing when and whether to dismiss charges or withdrawal [sic] an
arrest warrant lodged against a defendant.” Garcia v. Philadelphia Dist. Attorney’s Off., No. 23-
1224, 2023 WL 3750604, at *2 (3d Cir. June 1, 2023), cert. denied, No. 23-6327, 2024 WL
675086 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2024), (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (extending
absolute immunity to protect those functions in which the prosecutor acts as an “advocate for the
State,” even if they “involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions
apart from the courtroom”)). After a conviction is obtained, a prosecutor’s conduct is entitled to
absolute immunity where the conduct is “part of the prosecutor’s continuing personal
involvement as the state’s advocate in adversarial post-conviction proceedings.” Yarris, 465 F.
3d at 137. “[P]rosecutors are [also] entitled to absolute immunity from claims based on their

failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, so long as they did so while functioning in their
prosecutorial capacity.” Id.; see also Munchinski v. Solomon, 747 F. App’x 52, 58 (3d Cir. 2018)
(“[T]he prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity from suit - even when he intentionally
withholds evidence that is exculpatory under Brady” because “‘accurately determining guilt or
innocence requires that both the prosecution and the defense have wide discretion in the conduct
of the trial and the presentation of evidence’” (citing Imbler, 242 U.S. at 426)). Moreover,
District Attorneys and other supervisory prosecutors are likewise entitled to absolute immunity
from claims based on their role in pursuing a prosecution on behalf of the Commonwealth. See
Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 348-49 (2009).
Because Brown’s claims against each of the named individual Defendants are clearly
based upon their actions as prosecutors representing the Commonwealth in the judicial phase of
his state criminal proceedings, each is entitled to absolute immunity. The claims against
Defendants Williams, Naylor, Burns, as well as the John and Jane Does, in their individual

capacities will be dismissed with prejudice.
2. Official Capacity Claims and Claims Against the City of Philadelphia
Brown alleges that prior to trial, he moved for discovery of, inter alia, the personnel files
of Detectives Pitts and Dove to ascertain whether there were any allegations of misconduct
against them, but no discovery with respect to Pitts and Dove was turned over by ADA Naylor.
(Compl. at 10.) During the pendency of Brown’s appeal, it was reported in the media that Pitts
had been found to have fabricated evidence in three cases and that Dove was under investigation;
Brown then requested a hearing based on after-discovered evidence on January 6, 2015. (Id. at
11-12.) Brown raised a Brady violation in his successive PCRA petition in September 2019, and
during an evidentiary hearing on June 17, 2022 on the successive PCRA petition. (Id. at 12-13.)

On August 21, 2022, Brown received 300 pages of discovery material that had not been
previously disclosed to him, including three sustained misconduct findings with respect to Pitts,
and one sustained misconduct finding with respect to Dove. (Id. at 13.) These misconducts were
detailed in the Joint Stipulation in the Onyiah case. (Id.) Two of the misconduct investigations
were completed prior to Brown’s trial, while a third investigation was concluded during the
pendency of Brown’s appeal. (Id. at 18.) Brown alleges that the Commonwealth acknowledged
that it “had suppressed exculpatory and impeachment evidence regarding Pitts and Dove, critical
witnesses for the Commonwealth” at his trial and vacated his conviction on March 29, 2023.
(Id.) The judgment of sentence was vacated on May 5, 2023. (Id.)
Brown claims that Defendants’ conduct deprived him of his constitutional rights during
his prosecution, including, e.g., inter alia, the right to a fair trial, due process, cross examination,
and compulsory process. (Id. at 19.) He asserts that the actions of the individual Defendants
were taken pursuant to the practices and policies of the City of Philadelphia “to prosecute

individuals without due process and to deny a fair trial as evidence[d] by the policy of the
District Attorney’s Office.” (Id.) He further avers that the actions of the individual Defendants
were caused by the failure of the City, “with deliberate indifference, to properly train, control or
supervise the individual defendants with respect to their powers under the Constitution and laws
of the United States.” (Id.)
From his allegations, it appears that Brown seeks to pursue claims for municipal liability
pursuant to Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Local
governments and municipalities are considered persons under § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
However, municipal liability cannot be predicated on a respondeat superior basis, meaning that
municipalities may not be held liable simply because their employees committed a constitutional

violation. Id. at 691. Rather, “under § 1983, local governments are responsible only for ‘their
own illegal acts.”’ Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quoting Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (emphasis in original)). There are two ways for a § 1983
claim against a municipality to proceed: “[a] plaintiff may put forth that an unconstitutional
policy or custom of the municipality led to his or her injuries, or that they were caused by a
failure or inadequacy by the municipality that reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.” Forrest
v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “‘Policy is
made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with
respect to the action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.’” Estate of Roman v. City
of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d
1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)). “‘Custom, on the other hand, can be proven by showing that a given
course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and
permanent as virtually to constitute law.’” Id. (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850

(3d Cir. 1990)). For a custom to be the proximate cause of an injury, a plaintiff must establish
that the defendant “had knowledge of similar unlawful conduct in the past, failed to take
precautions against future violations, and that its failure, at least in part, led to [plaintiff’s]
injury.” Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted). “A plaintiff must also allege that the
policy or custom was the ‘proximate cause’ of his injuries.” Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798
(citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996)). This can be done “by
demonstrating an ‘affirmative link’ between the policy or custom and the particular
constitutional violation” alleged. Id.
If the alleged policy or custom at issue is a failure to train or supervise, the plaintiff must
show that this failure “amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the .

. . employees will come into contact.” Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 403 (3d
Cir. 2020) (citations and internal quotation omitted). “The failure to train an employee must be a
choice on the part of the supervisor or supervising entity knowing that the training that is (or is
not) being provided is not sufficient for the employees and the choices they encounter on the
job.” Curran v. Venango Cnty., No. 23-0019, 2023 WL 8439274, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2023)
(citing City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-90 (1989)), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 23-19, 2023 WL 8061513 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2023). “A plaintiff
claiming a failure to train must allege a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained
employees that puts . . . decisionmakers on notice that a new program is necessary.” Johnson,
975 F.3d at 403 (citations and quotations omitted). “Otherwise, the plaintiff needs to show that
failure to provide the identified training would likely result in the violation of constitutional
rights - i.e., to show that the need for more or different training was so obvious.” Id. (quotations
and citations omitted).

A claim against a government employee named in his official capacity is
indistinguishable from a claim against the governmental entity that employs the defendant. See
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally
represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an
agent.’”) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55). “[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects
other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Id. Thus, to state a § 1983 claim
against a public entity’s employees acting in an official capacity, a complaint must allege that a
constitutional deprivation was caused by an official policy or informally adopted custom.
Garcia, 2023 WL 3750604, at *2 (internal citations omitted).
Here, Brown brings claims against the City, as well as claims against Defendant Williams

and the individual ADAs in their official capacities. Brown’s claims against the Assistant
District Attorneys in their official capacities will be dismissed because they do not have
policymaking authority. See DeSousa v. City of Philadelphia, No. 11-3237, 2012 WL 6021319,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2012) (dismissing official capacity claims against Assistant District
Attorney because “under Pennsylvania law, assistant district attorneys do not possess
policymaking authority for the District Attorney’s Office”) (citing Patterson v. City of Phila.,
No. 08-2140, 2009 WL 1259968, at *10 (E.D. Pa. May 1, 2009); Payson v. Ryan, No. 90-1873,
1992 WL 111341, at *11 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 1992), aff’d, 983 F.2d 1051 (3d Cir. 1992)); see also
Bey v. Sierra Streets, No. 21-0685, 2021 WL 735724, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2021) (official
capacity claim against Assistant District Attorney is essentially a claim against the Philadelphia
District Attorney’s Office for which the plaintiff must identify a custom or policy, and specify
what exactly that custom or policy was to satisfy the pleading standard).
This leaves Brown’s Monell claim against the City, and official capacity claim against

former District Attorney Williams. Brown identifies a specific policy of the City and District
Attorney’s Office — to refrain from obtaining and disclosing Internal Affairs investigation
reports concerning police misconduct, and instead to notify defense counsel that they should
subpoena the records themselves. Brown asserted a Brady violation on the basis that exculpatory
evidence was withheld from him as a result of this policy, and his conviction and sentence were
vacated. Thus, Brown has pled an affirmative link between the alleged policy and the alleged
constitutional violation. At this stage, the Court will allow Brown’s Monell claims against the
City and former District Attorney Williams in his official capacity to proceed past statutory
screening. See Poteat v. Lydon, No. 22-2114, 2023 WL 6620368, at *3 (3d Cir. Oct. 11, 2023),
cert. denied, No. 23-6683, 2024 WL 1348921 (U.S. Apr. 1, 2024) (noting that the Lehigh County

District Attorney’s Office might have been subject to liability for § 1983 claims if its official
policy or custom caused Poteat’s deprivation of rights) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694-95; City
of Canton, 489 U.S. at 385).
B. State Law Claims
Brown seeks to assert claims based on the Pennsylvania constitution and state tort law
against the individual Defendants. (See Compl. at 19-20.) This he may not do. First, Brown
may not proceed on any claims for damages based on the Pennsylvania constitution.
“Pennsylvania does not have a statutory equivalent to § 1983 and does not recognize a private
right of action for damages stemming from alleged violation of the state constitution.” Miles v.
Zech, 788 F. App’x 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam); see also Plouffe v. Cevallos, 777 F.
App’x 594, 601 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[N]or is there a private right of action for damages under the
Pennsylvania Constitution”); Pocono Mountain Charter Sch. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 442
F. App’x 681, 687 (3d Cir. 2011) (“No Pennsylvania statute establishes, and no Pennsylvania

court has recognized, a private cause of action for damages under the Pennsylvania
Constitution.”).
Second, to the extent Brown seeks to assert claims against the individual Defendants
under state tort law, such claims will be dismissed. In Pennsylvania, common law tort immunity
protects “high public officials,” including district attorneys and assistant district attorneys, from
suit when acting in the scope of their official duties and authority, as the individual Defendants
were in pursuing Brown’s prosecution. See Poteat, 2023 WL 6620368, at *3 (citing Heller v.
Fulare, 454 F.3d 174, 177 (3d Cir. 2006); Durham v. McElynn, 772 A.2d 68, 69-70 (Pa. 2001));
see also Johnson v. City of Reading, No. 21-4860, 2023 WL 1783775, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6,
2023) (“The standard used to determine who qualifies as a ‘high public official’ under

Pennsylvania common law (1) depends on the nature of their duties, (2) the importance of their
office, and (3) whether the role has policy-making functions. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has held that District Attorneys and Assistant District Attorneys qualify as a high official for
purposes of immunity.”) (internal citations omitted); Wilson v. City of Philadelphia, No. 21-
2057, 2023 WL 5186258, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2023) (because Court had determined that
ADA, and by extension, DA, were participating in “prosecutorial” activity that was absolutely
protected, this necessarily meant that they were operating within the scope of their official duties
and powers, and were immune from plaintiff’s claims for civil damages based on state law tort
claims of malicious prosecution and reckless or intentional infliction of emotional distress). As
discussed above, the facts alleged show that the individual Defendants acted within their
prosecutorial roles. Accordingly, any claims based on violations of the Pennsylvania
constitution and state tort law will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Brown’s claims against the Defendants in their individual
capacities will be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to
state a claim based on absolute prosecutorial immunity. Moreover, any claims based on
violations of the Pennsylvania constitution and state tort law will be dismissed with prejudice
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim. Brown’s Monell claims against
the City and former District Attorney Williams in his official capacity will be allowed to
proceed; however, the Court will dismiss the official capacity claims against the Assistant
District Attorneys.
An appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:

s/ Michael M. Baylson
_________________________________________
MICHAEL M. BAYLSON, J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10407139. Public record. Not legal advice.