# MILLER v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · April 12, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10407111

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 12, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NEAL MILLER and DONNA MILLER, CIVIL ACTION
individually and as Administrators of the
Estate of Ryan Miller, a minor, deceased. NO. 20-6301

v.

POLICE OFFICER JOSEPH WOLK, et
al.

MEMORANDUM RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Baylson, J. April 12, 2024
Plaintiffs Neal and Donna Miller bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant
Police Officer Joseph Wolk. Ryan Miller, Plaintiffs’ fifteen-year-old son, died tragically in a car
crash while fleeing from Wolk, who, while driving on patrol, had noticed Miller driving a motor
scooter without a helmet and without a license plate, after which Wolk attempted to pull Miller
over. Miller refused to stop, and Wolk gave chase. Wolk twice overtook Miller, both times
obstructing his path. The second time, Wolk physically exited his SUV and grabbed Miller.
Yet, Miller broke free again and continued to flee. At that point, Gary Bove, a civilian onlooker,
continued to chase Miller. For the remainder of the chase, Wolk trailed several hundred feet
behind both Bove and Miller. Miller eventually ran a red light and perished in a collision with a
tractor-trailer.
Plaintiffs assert that “Wolk’s actions in pursuing Miller and causing or contributing to his
death constitute an abuse of executive power so clearly unjustified by any legitimate objective of
law enforcement as to be barred by the Fourteenth Amendment.” ECF 65-3 at 6.
Presently before this Court is Wolk’s Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF 64. For the
reasons explained below, Wolk’s motion is GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
While the relevant events here are largely undisputed, the parties vehemently disagree on
several key inflection points. Thus, in summarizing the facts, the Court highlights those points of
dispute, recognizing that it must ultimately “view the evidence presented on the motion in the
light most favorable to the [nonmoving party].” Escalet v. Canada Dry Potomac Corp., 2024

WL 1163539, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2024) (Baylson, J.).
A. Wolk Gives Chase
On May 7, 2019—Wolk, while on patrol in Philadelphia in a marked police SUV—saw
Miller operating a motorized scooter. ECF 64-1 at ¶ 17; ECF 65-1 at ¶ 15. Miller was driving
without a license plate and without a helmet, in violation of Pennsylvania law. ECF 64-1 at ¶¶
17-18; ECF 65-1 at ¶ 15. Thus, Wolk turned on his emergency lights and sirens and began to
follow Miller. ECF 64-1 at ¶¶ 19-22; ECF 64, Ex. H; ECF 65-1 at ¶ 22. Wolk did not, however,
initially notify police radio.1 Wolk has testified that he failed to do so because he was “solo and
it happened so quickly.” ECF 64-1 at ¶ 21; ECF 65-1 at ¶ 21.2

B. Wolk Overtakes Miller
Despite Wolk’s pursuit, Miller did not stop. ECF 64-1 at ¶¶ 22, 25; ECF 65-1 at ¶ 22.
To the contrary, Miller “sped up and entered [oncoming] travel lanes.” ECF 64-1 at ¶ 25; ECF

1 Likewise, a subsequent Internal Affairs investigation revealed that—contrary to Philadelphia
Police Department policy—Wolk did not keep his emergency lights and sirens activated
throughout the entirety of this pursuit. ECF 65-1 at ¶ 22.
2 While Plaintiffs admit that Wolk testified as such, they assert “[t]his was objectively false”
because “Wolk had in excess of 20 seconds while the vehicles were still on Tacony Street to call
in the stop and/or pursuit, as shown by the length of time between the two times the vehicles can
be seen on video on Tacony Street.” ECF 65-1 at ¶ 21. Further, Plaintiffs note that “police
procedure expert Craig Allen has opined that ‘Wolk was not pursuing a dangerous criminal or
felon nor was he forced to make split second decisions in a chaotic environment. . . . Officer
Wolk intentionally chose to engage in the pursuit, which he knew was outside of policy and
knew the dangers his evasive blocking and ramming techniques posed to Mr. Miller.’” Id.
65-1 at ¶ 25.3 According to Wolk, Miller began “approaching a blind turn, in the wrong lane of
traffic.” Id. As a result, Wolk “spe[d] up and passed the scooter” in an attempt to beat Miller to
“the blind curve,” as Wolk “wanted to avoid a collision.” Id. At this point, Wolk claims, he
believed Miller may have been “suicidal or DUI,” and therefore “wanted to alert oncoming
traffic of the scooter approaching.” Id. This forced Miller to U-turn and head back in the

opposite direction. Id.
C. Parking Lot U-Turn
Wolk continued to pursue Miller, and eventually surpassed him again. ECF 64-1 ¶¶ 26-
35; ECF 64, Ex. L; ECF 65-1 at ¶¶ 26-35. This time, Wolk came to a stop, intentionally
blocking Miller’s path forward. Id. Yet, Miller still did not relent. Id. Instead, Miller turned
into a parking lot, drove over a median into a neighboring parking lot, and then cut in front of a
moving sedan to escape in the opposite direction. Id.
D. The Chase Ensues and Gary Bove Enters

Over multiple residential streets and around a few tight corners, Wolk continued to give
chase. ECF 64 at ¶¶ 36-40; ECF 64, Ex. K; ECF 65-1 at ¶¶ 36-40. Throughout, Wolk remained
neck and neck with Miller, with both parties consistently traveling above the applicable speed
limit. Id.
Eventually, Wolk and Miller turned onto James Street, where Gary Bove was already
driving his sedan. Id. Bove—a tow truck driver who was friendly with Wolk and numerous

3 While Plaintiffs deny that “Wolk’s statement is necessarily accurate in any material respect,”
they counter only that this is “only one of four shifting and inconsistent versions of this incident
he has given.” ECF 65-1 at ¶ 25. Yet, Plaintiffs offer no alternative version of events or any
evidence to actually contradict Wolk’s statement.
other police officers—slowed his pace as Wolk and Miller approached.4 Id. At one point, after
all three parties had turned onto Scattergood Street, Wolk and Miller both actively navigated
around Bove, who had come to a full stop. ECF 64, Exs. K, N.
E. Wolk Stops and Grabs Miller

Immediately after Wolk and Miller had maneuvered around Bove, Wolk again managed
to overtake Miller, bringing Miller to a second stop.5 Id. While one eyewitness testified that
“Miller’s vehicle actually did make contact with Wolk’s SUV at this point,” ECF 65-1 at ¶ 37,
all others (along with Plaintiffs’ expert), suggest that no contact occurred, ECF 64-1 at ¶¶ 38-44;
ECF 64-18 at 1. Wolk likewise asserts that “[a]t no point in his pursuit of Miller did [Wolk’s]
vehicle contact Miller.” ECF 71-1 at ¶ 24. Plaintiffs even admit that “[r]econstruction data did
not establish an impact, however, and no impact is apparent on video of this portion of the
pursuit.” ECF 65-3 at 4.
After cutting Miller off, Wolk “then got out of his police vehicle to physically grab and
restrain Miller,” only for Miller to “wrest himself from Wolk’s grasp and pull away on the

scooter.” ECF 64-1 at ¶ 42 (quoting Second Amended Complaint); ECF 65-1 at ¶ 52. In the
process, “Miller’s shirt was ripped,” and Wolk supposedly warned Miller to “stop” because
Miller was “gonna get hurt.” ECF 64-1 at ¶ 46.

4 As discussed infra, Plaintiffs assert that Bove’s movements at this point suggest that Bove was
reacting to the chase before he could physically see it, thus indicating coordination between
Bove and Wolk. ECF 65-1 at ¶ 37.
5 Plaintiffs’ expert frames both this and the first temporary stoppage quite differently, attempting
to highlight the dangerousness of Wolk’s actions. In relevant part, Plaintiffs’ expert states that
“Officer Wolk rapidly accelerated past Mr. Miller and then intentionally applied hard braking
and swerving to again, position his vehicle into the direct travel path of Mr. Miller. Had Officer
Wolk applied slightly harder braking and swerving he would have lost control of his vehicle due
to loss of traction on the roadway.” ECF 64-11 at 20.
F. Bove Takes the Lead
The parties dispute exactly what happened next. After Miller fled, Wolk ran back to his
vehicle to continue his pursuit. ECF 64, Ex. N. Before he could do so, however, video evidence
shows Bove’s sedan pulling in front of Wolk’s SUV. Id. According to Plaintiffs, that same
video evidence shows “Wolk briefly stop in front of Bove’s vehicle, where he looks directly at

Bove for a moment before returning to his vehicle.” ECF 65-2 at ¶ 38. Plaintiffs rely on this
moment—along with allegations regarding Bove’s sedan’s earlier movements—to assert that
Wolk coordinated with Bove and “condoned and ratified” Bove’s decision to get involved. ECF
65-3 at 9. Plaintiffs also suggest that Bove and Wolk may have been using “burner” phones to
communicate, based on the fact that “[f]ollowing Wolk’s deposition, subpoenas were issued both
for the telephone number provided by Wolk at his deposition and for Gary Bove’s cell phone
activity. Both service providers’ responses indicated that the records sought were not retained
since both were pre-paid phones.” ECF 65-2 at ¶ 52.
Wolk strongly disputes this point, asserting that the “referenced video shows Officer

Wolk walk straight back to his vehicle after Millers flees, and it is unclear what Plaintiffs are
referring to when they allege Wolk ‘looks directly at Bove for a moment.’” ECF 71-1 at ¶ 38.
Likewise, Wolk further contends that “[t]here is no evidence of coordination between Officer
Wolk and Bove.” ECF 71 at 5. Indeed, when asked by Internal Affairs whether Wolk had
requested assistance from Bove, Wolk unequivocally and repeatedly replied “no.” ECF 65-2 at ¶
48; ECF 71-1 at ¶ 48.
G. Bove Gives Chase
For the remainder of the chase, Bove’s sedan was positioned between Miller’s motor
scooter and Wolk’s SUV. ECF 64-1 at ¶ 54; ECF 65-1 at ¶ 54. More precisely, the record
reflects that Bove pursued Miller from about forty-five feet behind, whereas Wolk trailed Miller
by “at least 150-160 feet.” ECF 64-1 at ¶ 56; ECF 65-1 at ¶ 56. In accordance with those
distances, Wolk has testified that the last time he saw Miller alive was immediately before Bove
began his pursuit. ECF 64-1 at ¶ 53; ECF 65-1 at ¶ 53.6
Robert Mattos, an eyewitness, likewise testified that he “thought the police suv gave up

on the chase and let the silver car take the chase,” and thus “figured that [] maybe the silver car
was chasing the motorcycle because it was and the police car was an suv. The silver car was
aggressive like he was a police officer.” ECF 64-18 at 1; ECF 68-2 at 5. Similarly, Mattos
described a “big gap” between Bove and Wolk for the remainder of the chase. ECF 68-2 at 6.
H. Miller Runs a Red Light and Perishes
With Bove shortly behind Miller and Wolk trailing further behind, the chase continued
for another thirty-one seconds. ECF 64-1 at ¶ 54; ECF 64, Ex. R.; ECF 65-1 at ¶ 54. Ultimately,
Miller sped under a highway overpass and drove through a red light at a busy intersection. ECF
64-1 at ¶ 61; ECF 65-1 at ¶ 61. At this intersection, Miller collided with a tractor-trailer, which

tragically resulted in his untimely death. Id.
I. Immediate Aftermath
Plaintiffs make much of Wolk’s actions immediately following the crash. They assert,
for instance, that when Wolk provided his statement to the Accident Investigation Division
(“AID”) on the evening of the incident, he omitted significant portions of the pursuit. ECF 65-2
at ¶¶ 13, 26, 44. Specifically, Plaintiffs note that Wolk omitted any mention of his close vehicle
interactions with Miller, along with any mention of Bove. Id.

6 Plaintiffs admit that Wolk testified as much, but nonetheless contend it is inaccurate because
Wolk allegedly sped up after returning to his car. ECF 65-1 at ¶ 53.
Plaintiffs also contend that video evidence indicates Wolk considered fleeing the scene.
In relevant part, they state: “With Miller’s dead body lying in the roadway, visible to both of
them, both Bove and Wolk can be seen on video turning their vehicles away []. After a moment,
Wolk apparently reconsiders, and can be seen driving towards the scene of the collision.” ECF
65-2 at ¶ 43.

Wolk heavily disputes this as well, noting that he himself called Bove after the accident
to ask: “Where did you go? You have to come back and make a statement….,” ECF 64-1 at ¶ 76,
which Bove immediately did. Wolk further asserts that “[i]t is unclear what statement Plaintiffs
are alleging was recanted” in between Wolk’s various incident interviews, as “it is undisputed
that [] Wolk’s first recorded statement about the accident, taken the evening of the accident on
May 7, 2019, makes clear that he was in pursuit of Miller and that Miller refused to stop.” ECF
71-1 at ¶ 6. As for Bove, Wolk admits that he “did not discuss Bove in his [initial] statement to
AID,” but counters that “he was not asked any questions about Bove in that interview.” ECF 71-
1 at ¶ 18. Wolk has repeatedly reiterated that he called Bove and instructed him to return to the

scene to give a statement, which contradicts the notion that Wolk was attempting to conceal
Bove’s involvement.
J. Internal Affairs Investigation
An Internal Affairs Investigation (“IA”) ensued. ECF 65-2 at ¶¶ 14-15. Based on the
initial witness statements collected by AID, video evidence, and additional witness statements
taken during this subsequent investigation, IA concluded that Wolk had violated several Police
Department Directives. Id. Specifically, IA found that (1) Wolk did not have his emergency
lights and sirens activated throughout the pursuit, (2) marked Police SUVs, like Wolk’s, should
not initiate vehicle pursuits, (3) Wolk had failed to notify Police Radio that he initiated a
vehicular pursuit, and (4) Wolk failed to complete the necessary paperwork within three days of
the pursuit. ECF 65-2 at ¶¶ 53-59.
At his deposition in this case, Wolk maintained that he “wasn’t departing from policy,”
but instead “stopping [Miller’s] actions to know what was going on, suicidal or DUI, before
something happened to him.” ECF 68-1 at 36. Wolk further stated that he “wishes [he] would

have tackled him so all this would have never happened.” Id.7
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs initiated this matter on December 15, 2020, naming the City of Philadelphia,
the City of Philadelphia Police Department, Joseph Wolk, Gary Bove, and Police Officer John
and Jane Does as Defendants. See ECF 1.
The City of Philadelphia and Wolk answered the original Complaint on January 6, 2021.
ECF 5. They then filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on March 11, 2021, eventually
seeking, among other things, to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Monell claim for failure to state a claim. ECF
14.

Judge Robreno, from whom the undersigned received this case in July 2023, ECF 45,
granted this Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings while also granting Plaintiffs leave to file an
Amended Complaint. ECF 23.
Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint on November 29, 2021. ECF 24. Shortly
thereafter, the City of Philadelphia and Wolk filed a Motion to Dismiss this Amended Complaint
for failure to state a claim. ECF 25. Judge Robreno granted in part and denied in part this
motion, also granting Plaintiffs leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. ECF 33.

7 Plaintiffs further note that Wolk also testified he would “not put [his] vehicle in front of a
moving scooter” because “it would cause serious bodily injury.” ECF 68-1 at 37.
Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint on July 19, 2022, this time naming only
Wolk and Bove as Defendants. ECF 34.
In this operative Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs asserted a claim against Wolk
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at ¶¶ 133-136. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Wolk had
violated Ryan Miller’s constitutional rights to substantive and procedural due process as

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as Miller’s right to be free from unreasonable
seizure and the use of excessive force as guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id.
Plaintiffs also asserted a negligence claim against Bove for “recklessly engaging in a
police vehicular pursuit, . . . bearing down on the Decedent’s motorbike while utterly and
knowingly disregarding the clear risk of bodily injury or death, and actively placing the
Decedent in mortal fear for his life with the aggressiveness of his inexplicable pursuit.” Id. at ¶
143.
Judge Robreno eventually dismissed Plaintiffs’ claim against Bove due to lack of

prosecution, leaving Wolk as the sole remaining Defendant. ECF 41.
Significant discovery ensued, and on February 1, 2024, Wolk moved for summary
judgment on all remaining counts. ECF 64.
Plaintiffs responded on February 16, 2024. ECF 65. In so doing, however, Plaintiff
conceded that “[a]lthough the Second Amended Complaint raises a claim under the Fourth
Amendment, discovery has confirmed that this case is more appropriately asserted as a
Fourteenth Amendment claim. Since the two claims cannot coexist in any event, Plaintiffs
stipulate to the dismissal of their Fourth Amendment claim.” ECF 65-3 at 22.
Thus, presently before this Court is Wolk’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’
only remaining claim: an alleged violation of Miller’s substantive due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
On April 10, 2024, this Court held oral argument pursuant to written questions the Court
had sent to counsel in advance of argument.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A factual
dispute is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. Id.
A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility for informing
the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a particular
issue at trial, the moving party’s initial burden can be met simply by “pointing out to the district
court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Id. at 325.
After the moving party has met its initial burden, the adverse party’s response must, by “citing to
particular parts of materials in the record,” show that a fact is “genuinely disputed.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c)(1). Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party fails to rebut by making a
factual showing “sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case,
and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Under
Rule 56, the Court must view the evidence presented on the motion in the light most favorable to
the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
IV. PARTY CONTENTIONS
A. Wolk’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Wolk challenges Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim on three grounds. ECF 64.
First, he asserts that Plaintiffs cannot prove that Wolk engaged in this pursuit with an intent to
harm Miller, as Wolk contends is required for prima facie liability here. Id. at 4.
Second, Wolk argues Plaintiffs cannot prove that Wolk was the proximate cause of
Miller’s death. Id. More precisely, Wolk contends that “[w]hen Miller fatally ran the redlight,
Officer Wolk was over a block away from him . . . [a]nd there was a third party present between
Officer Wolk and Miller when Miller suffered his harm.” Id. at 14. The “danger at issue,” Wolk
asserts, was “created [by] Miller by his own actions and choices, not by Officer Wolk.” Id.
Third, Wolk argues he is entitled to qualified immunity here because (1) “Plaintiffs
cannot establish on the record evidence that [Wolk] violated Miller’s Fourteenth Amendment

rights or Fourth Amendment rights,” and (2) there is “no precedential law that clearly establishes
that it is unconstitutional to engage in a pursuit, under any standard of culpability, where the
fleeing plaintiff gets away from the pursuing officer and causes his own harm through reckless
driving.” Id. at 16.
B. Plaintiffs’ Response

Relying on the Third Circuit’s decision in Sauers v. Borough of Nesquehoning, 905 F.3d
711 (3d Cir. 2018), Plaintiffs first counter that Wolk incorrectly invokes the “intent to harm”
standard, as initially set forth in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998). ECF 65-3
at 8. Plaintiffs instead contend that where, as here, an “officer has time to engage in ‘hurried
deliberation’, liability can be found when the officer’s conduct exhibits a ‘conscious disregard of
a great risk of serious.’” Id. at 8 (citing to Sauers, 905 F.3d at 717-18).
According to Plaintiffs, the application of the intent to harm standard in this case would
“subvert the clear intent of the Third Circuit in Sauers,” erroneously creating a bright-line rule
that “in every case where flight occurs, a plaintiff must prove intent to harm.” Id. at 11.

Plaintiffs argue it would be particularly egregious to do so here because “there was no
compelling justification for Wolk’s initiation of pursuit,” or even “a permissible justification
under applicable police department policies.” Id. at 12.
Plaintiffs further contend that—even if this Court were to require Plaintiffs to prove an
“intent to harm”— the record nonetheless enables Plaintiffs to survive summary judgment. Id. at
13. In particular, Plaintiffs note that eyewitness Robert Mattos expressly testified that Wolk
intended to cause a collision. Id. Likewise, Plaintiffs’ “accident reconstructionist” expert opined
that “Wolk intentionally blocked Mr. Miller’s path of travel, creating an immediate hazard that
Mr. Miller only avoided by performing above average levels of braking and swerving.” Id.

Similarly, Plaintiffs’ police procedure expert opined that “the manner in which Officer Wolk
aggressively engaged Mr. Miller on his motor scooter, in close proximity in an apparent attempt
to cause a collision, indicates Officer Wolk intended to cause injury unrelated to any legitimate
police objective.” ECF 69-3 at 14. These pieces of evidence and opinions, Plaintiffs assert,
provide “a sufficient basis from which intent to harm could be inferred.” ECF 65-3 at 14.
Plaintiffs also argue, somewhat tangentially, that “[t]here is also a non-trivial chance that
Wolk and Bove were acting in a clandestine vigilante manner in an attempt to punish - or at a
minimum scare - Miller for [a] knifepoint sexual assault’ he was falsely accused of, and which
Wolk continues to believe he committed.” Id. at 17.
Further, in contesting Wolk’s proximate cause argument, Plaintiffs assert that “it was
anything but unforeseeable that a collision with another vehicle could result from Wolk’s
decision to pursue a person on a motor scooter.” Id. at 20.
Lastly, Plaintiffs contend that Wolk is not entitled to qualified immunity in this case
because “[f]ollowing Sauers, police officers within the Third Circuit were on notice that if they

initiated a high speed pursuit without compelling justification, liability could arise for conduct
demonstrating a conscious disregard of the risk of serious harm, analogous to the tort concept of
recklessness.” Id. at 24. And here, Plaintiffs assert, Wolk knew “full well that a traffic violation
was not an authorized basis for a pursuit under Directive 9.4,” yet nonetheless “engaged in a
prohibited pursuit anyway.” Id. As Plaintiffs construe the record, Wolk’s conduct here clearly
evidences a shocking degree of disregard for the serious risk of harm associate with a potential
crash. In relevant part, Plaintiffs frame this record as Wolk having
deactivated his emergency equipment. He exceeded the speed limit on every
straightaway. He engaged in the pursuit in a vehicle not authorized to participate
in pursuits. He failed to call in the pursuit and maintain radio contact as required
to do by Directive 9.4. He took turns so aggressively that they pushed the
performance and operational capabilities of his SUV to their absolute limit,
risking loss of control and serious potential harm that could ensue. He crossed
over into opposing lanes without emergency equipment to overtake Miller’s
vehicle. He twice attempted to use his vehicle to cause a collision between it and
Miller’s person in order to effectuate a stop, with the subjective knowledge that he
could cause serious injury or death doing so. He allowed and condoned a
civilian’s participation in the pursuit, and significant evidence points to him
actively coordinating with that civilian. When he first saw Miller’s body, he
actually turned away, indicating that he considered abandoning the scene entirely
to conceal what had transpired.

Id. at 25. In so arguing, Plaintiffs also note that Wolk was previously a defendant in McKenna v.
Wolk, et al., No. 18-cv-3746. Id. at 26. That case involved “Wolk pursuing dirt bike riders, and
ultimately maneuvering his vehicle in such a way as to place it directly in the path of one of the
riders, causing an unavoidable collision that killed a rider.” Id. Plaintiffs suggest the McKenna
Court’s denial of summary judgment is “highly relevant baggage,” as it should have put Wolk on
notice of the dangers of pursuing Miller here. Id. at 26-27.
C. Wolk’s Reply

Wolk counters that Sauers should not “determine the standard of culpability applied here”
because that case “addressed a situation where the suspect was not fleeing.” ECF 71 at 2
(emphasis added). By contrast, Wolk contends, Lewis makes clear that “[w]hen a police officer
is pursuing an actively fleeing suspect, a police officer can only be constitutionally liable under
the Fourteenth Amendment for any harm suffered by the suspect (or a third-party) if the officer’s
actions in pursuing the suspect exhibited an ‘intent to harm.’” Id. (citing to Lewis, 523 U.S. at
844). And here, Wolk argues, the record—at most—shows that “Wolk created an ‘immediate
hazard’ that Miller was forced to respond to or risk injury,” which is insufficient to demonstrate
an intent to harm. Id. at 2-3. According to Wolk, without more, there is simply “no evidence
that [his actions] were for anything but apprehending Miller.” Id. at 3.
Wolk also argues that McKenna is distinguishable, given that in this case (1) “Plaintiffs’

own expert admits that Officer Wolk never made contact with Miller in his attempts to
apprehend him,” and (2) “when Miller finally did stop, the surveillance video shows Officer
Wolk elected to leave his vehicle to grab Miller with his hands, evidencing that Officer Wolk’s
intent was to apprehend Miller and do his job as a law enforcement officer.” Id. Likewise, Wolk
notes that the McKenna Court expressly credited the fact that, unlike here, “McKenna was not
even fleeing at the time of the alleged seizure.” ECF 65-3 at 22.
Wolk further counters that he “cannot be responsible for the actions of Bove” because
there “is no evidence in the record to allow a reasonable jury to find that [he] coordinated with
Bove to bring about any of the events at issue in this case.” Id. at 5.
Finally, Wolk reiterates that proximate cause independently undermines Plaintiffs’ claim
here, as “Miller’s decision to flee was his own, and this breaks the necessary causality Plaintiffs
need to prove a state-created danger claim.” Id. at 6.
V. DISCUSSION
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Here, Miller was struck and killed by a third party. Thus, the Court construes Plaintiffs’
substantive due process claim as asserted under the state-created danger doctrine. Indeed, the
“case law is clear that this . . . framework for analysis applies to police-pursuit cases” such as
this one. Sauers, 905 F.3d at 717 (citing to Brown v. Pa. Dep’t of Health & Emergency Med.
Servs. Training Inst., 318 F.3d 473, 480 (3d Cir. 2003); cf. Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424,
432, 448 (3d Cir. 2017)).
The state-created danger doctrine embodies the principle that the government has an
obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “to protect individuals
against dangers that the government itself creates.” Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 176 (3d
Cir. 2018). To succeed on such a claim, Plaintiffs must prove the following four elements:
1) [t]he harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct;

2) a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience;

3) a relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff was
a foreseeable victim of the defendant’s acts, or a member of a discrete class of
persons subjected to the potential harm brought about by the state’s actions, as
opposed to a member of the public in general; and
4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her authority in a way that created a danger
to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger than had the
state not acted at all.

Sauers, 905 F.3d at 717 (citing to Haberle, 885 F.3d at 176-77).
A. The Intent to Harm Standard Applies Here

Here, a threshold dispute exists as to the nature of the relevant secured right, and thus
whether Wolk’s conduct might “shock the conscience” in potentially violating that right. This
dispute turns almost entirely on each party’s reading of Sauers, and so the Court begins there.
In Sauers, the Third Circuit went to great lengths to precisely define the constitutional
right at issue. 905 F.3d 716-17. Specifically, the Sauers Court explained that citizens have a
constitutional right “not to be injured or killed as a result of a police officer’s reckless pursuit of
an individual suspected of a summary traffic offense when there is no pending emergency and
when the suspect is not actively fleeing the police.” Id. at 717.
In so doing, however, the Court clarified that “[t]he level of culpability required ‘to shock
the contemporary conscience’”—i.e., the second element of a prima facie state-created danger
claim—“falls along a spectrum dictated by the circumstances of each case.” Id. at 17 (citations
omitted). More precisely, the Court explained that there “three distinct categories of culpability
depending on how much time a police officer has to make a decision.” Id. First, “actions taken
in a ‘hyperpressurized environment’ . . . will not be held to shock the conscience unless the
officer has ‘an intent to cause harm.’” Id. Second, “actions taken within a time frame that
allows an officer to engage in ‘hurried deliberation’” need only “reveal a conscious disregard of
a great risk of serious harm.” Id. Third, “actions undertaken with ‘unhurried judgments,’ with
time for ‘careful deliberation,’” will only shock the conscience if they are “done with deliberate
indifference.’” Id. (citation omitted).
Specifically at issue in Sauers was the conduct of a defendant police officer who
witnessed a Dodge Neon committing a “summary traffic offense.” Id. at 715. The officer
radioed ahead to a neighboring jurisdiction to pull over the Dodge when it crossed into its
territory. Id. Rather than wait, however, the officer-defendant decided to catch up to the Dodge.
Id. To do so, the officer drove recklessly and at speeds of over one hundred miles-per-hour,

eventually crashing and killing the plaintiff, an innocent driver of a different vehicle. Id.
Ultimately, the Sauers Court concluded that because the defendant officer “had at least
some time to deliberate” on whether and how to pursue the traffic offender, the Court would
analyze the “fact-pattern [under] the second category of culpability.” Id. at 718. This decision,
the Sauers Court further explained, was supported by (1) the allegation the officer “had time to
call the neighboring police department as he was contemplating his actions,” and (2) the
“obvious inference from the nature of the Dodge driver’s mild provocation: there was no
emergency arising from a simple traffic violation.” Id.
Critical here, however, the Sauers Court made clear its decision turned on the “[t]he

particular factual allegations,” given that Sauers involved only “a police pursuit of a non-fleeing
summary traffic offender.” Id. at 719 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Court actively contrasted
its facts from a situation in which an officer “pursue[s] an actively fleeing suspect who is
endangering the public welfare,” as the Court expressly indicated that such a scenario “may [] be
a reasonable justification” for pursuit that triggers the “intent to harm” standard. Id. at 718.
More recently, in Donahue v. Borough of Collingdale, this Court had occasion to analyze
just such a fact pattern. 2024 WL 387455, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2024). There, a plaintiff-
bystander was struck and killed by a vehicle fleeing from the police. Id. In analyzing the
plaintiff-bystander’s suit against the pursuing police officers, this Court explained that “[u]nder
binding precedent, high-speed police chases are hyper-pressurized environments requiring a snap
judgment.” Id. at *3 (quoting Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 975 F.3d 394, 401 (3d Cir. 2020)
(citations omitted)). As both the Supreme Court and Third Circuit have made clear, “a balancing
of the need to stop a suspect’s flight from the law against the threat a high-speed chase poses to
others demand an officer’s instant judgment.” Id. (citing to Davis v. Twp. of Hillside, 190 F.3d,

167, 170 (3d Cir. 1999); Lewis, 523 U.S. at 834). That is why “[i]n the circumstances of a high-
speed chase aimed at apprehending a suspected offender . . . only a purpose to cause harm
unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest will” shock the conscience. Id. at *3 (quoting Lewis,
523 U.S. at 851) (emphasis added).
Of particular note, this Court’s opinion in Donahue expressly undercut Plaintiffs’ primary
argument in this case. Indeed, this Court explained that Sauers—which did not involve a fleeing
suspect—did “not change [the] rule” that an “intent to harm,” rather than a “disregard of great
risk,” applies to high-speed chases where a suspect flees. Id. at *6; see also Lewis, 523 U.S. at
853–54; Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1306–07 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc). Instead,

this Court explained the “Sauers test is conjunctive” because it applies to a “reckless pursuit of
an individual suspected of a summary traffic offense [1] when there is no pending emergency
and [2] when the suspect is not actively fleeing police.” Donahue, 2024 WL 387455, at *6
(quoting Sauers, 905 F.3d at 717) (bold and emphasis added); see also Sauers, 905 at 722 n.8
(reiterating that Sauers more narrowly addressed “the proper standard by which to judge whether
an officer’s conduct shocks the conscience in police pursuits that involve neither an emergency
nor a fleeing suspect”) (emphasis added). It is therefore inapplicable when “only one prong” is
met. Donahue, 2024 WL 387455, at *6. Otherwise stated, if an officer engages in a high-speed
pursuit where [1] there is a pending emergency or [2] a suspect does actively flee, this Court
must instead revert to Lewis’s intent to harm standard. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 834.
And this case more closely resembles Donahue than it does Sauers. Simply put, unlike
Sauers, Miller actively fled from Wolk. Indeed, nothing in the record contradicts Wolk’s
contemporaneous witness statement and his subsequent deposition testimony that “Miller failed

to stop when [Wolk] turned on his lights and sirens,” and that Miller “instead maneuvered into
opposing lanes of travel.” ECF 65-2 at ¶ 9 (citing ECF 66-3 at 27) (emphasis added); cf Johnson
v. Baltimore Police Dep’t, 452 F. Supp. 3d 283, 301-02 (D. Md. 2020) (noting that officer
defendants pursued fleeing suspect “without ever activating their vehicles’ emergency
equipment”) (emphasis added).8 Likewise, video evidence unequivocally demonstrates that
Miller (1) impermissibly hopped over a parking lot median, (2) cut off at least one other
pedestrian car while attempting to evade Wolk, and (3) “exceeded the speed limit along every
straight segment” during the chase. See, e.g., ECF 64, Exs. K, L, N; ECF 64-11 at 17.
As such, the Court must conclude there is no genuine dispute that Miller was “actively

fleeing the police in a dangerous manner.” Sauers, 905 F.3d at 711; Lewis, 523 U.S. at 836; cf
Clark v. Merrell, 2021 WL 288791, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2021) (noting that there was “no

8 As noted above, Plaintiffs counter only that Wolk has offered inconsistent statements on this
latter point, but do not actually challenge its veracity. Further, the Court is not persuaded that
Wolk’s statements on this point are actually inconsistent. At best, Plaintiffs might say Wolk’s
later statements were more fulsome than those given immediately after the crash. Regardless, in
view of the further video evidence showing Miller actively speeding and cutting off other
vehicles, even if Plaintiffs had offered evidence contradicting Wolk’s statements regarding the
beginning of the chase, the record indisputably contains evidence of Miller maneuvering out of
the proper lane at multiple points throughout.
urgency to pursue” and that officer defendant was “specifically ordered not to pursue”). This, in
turn, triggers Lewis’s “intent to harm” standard.9
B. Plaintiffs Fail to Raise a Genuine Dispute that Wolk Intended to Harm Miller

Which brings us to Wolk. The dispositive question thus becomes—at least for the
“shocks the conscience” element of Plaintiffs’ state-created danger claim at summary
judgment—whether a “reasonable jury could return a verdict” that Wolk intended to harm
Miller. Debiec v. Cabot Corp., 352 F.3d 117, 128 n.3 (3d Cir. 2003).
As described above, Plaintiffs essentially rely on three pieces of evidence to demonstrate
the requisite intent. First, Plaintiffs note that Robert Mattos, an eyewitness, testified that Wolk
appeared to have intended to cause a collision. ECF 68-2 at 12-13.
Second, Plaintiffs’ accident reconstructionist expert opined—with regard to both of
Wolk’s attempts to stop Miller’s progress—that “Wolk intentionally blocked Mr. Miller’s path
of travel, creating an immediate hazard that Mr. Miller only avoided by performing above
average levels of braking and swerving.” ECF 68-6 at 19. Likewise, Craig Allen, a retired

policer officer and Plaintiffs’ “police procedure” expert, opined that “the manner in which
Officer Wolk aggressively engaged Mr. Miller on his motor scooter, in close proximity in an
apparent attempt to cause a collision, indicates Officer Wolk intended to cause injury unrelated
to any legitimate police objective.” ECF 69-3 at 17 (emphasis added).10

9 In so holding, this Court does not preclude the possibility that there may be other instances in
which a suspect who flees does not do so in a “dangerous manner.” Sauers, 905 F.3d at 711. In
such a scenario, it may be appropriate to analyze an officer’s pursuit under the “conscious
disregard” standard. But that is simply not this case.
10 As noted above, Allen further opined that “Wolk was not pursuing a dangerous criminal or
felon nor was he forced to make split-second decisions in a chaotic environment….. Officer
Wolk intentionally chose to engage in the pursuit, which he knew was outside of policy and
knew the dangers his evasive blocking and ramming techniques posed to Mr. Miller. This was all
done with no radio communication, no emergency equipment activated, and allowing a citizen
Third, Plaintiffs argue that Wolk’s “two attempts represent the same basic modus
operandi Wolk employed to lethal effect in the McKenna case,” an earlier incident where “Wolk
brought his SUV directly into the path of a motorcycle in such a manner as to cause an
unavoidable collision, which resulted in the motorcycle rider sustaining injuries resulting in
death after months on life support.” ECF 65-3 at 14.

Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, the Court is simply not persuaded this evidence creates a
genuine question as to whether Wolk intended to harm Miller. Indeed, the Third Circuit
expressly addressed this very issue in Davis. There, a “chase ended when the pursuing police car
bumped into the rear of [fleeing suspect’s] car, causing him to lose control of the car, which led
to the collision in which plaintiff was injured.” Davis, 190 F.3d at 171. Like here, the Davis
“plaintiff argue[d] that the deliberate ramming of [a fleeing suspect’s] car by the police vehicle
amounted to use of a deadly weapon, which permits the drawing of an inference that the police
acted with the intent to cause physical injury.” Id.
Yet, the Davis Court flatly rejected this argument, explaining that “Lewis does not permit

an inference of intent to harm simply because a chase eventuates in deliberate physical contact
causing injury. Rather, it is conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any
government interest [that] is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-
shocking level.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted).
The Davis Court further explained it is “foreseeable” that “physical contact of some sort
between the pursued and pursuing vehicles might occur in the course of a high-speed chase,
particularly at its conclusion,” and so “it would undermine Lewis’ premise to limit liability to

acquaintance to join the pursuit. The egregious and excessive pursuit tactics undertaken by
Officer Wolk are totally contrary to police practice, policy, and law and had direct influence in
causing the death of Mr. Miller.” ECF 65-1 at ¶ 29. But for the reasoned already explained, the
Court cannot agree.
conscience-shocking conduct if courts were to segment a high-speed chase and examine
elements in isolation from each other.” Id.
Here, the entirety of the record—with the lone exception of one equivocating statement
from a single witness—indicates that Wolk’s SUV did not bump Miller. Particularly in view of
the video evidence in this case, Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007), the Court

concludes that no such contact occurred. Thus, at best, Plaintiffs might argue that Wolk’s two
attempts to cut off Miller somehow evinced an intent to harm.11 But Wolk “testified that he was
only ever trying to stop Miller because he believed that was necessary to Miller’s safety,” and
the Court agrees the record contains “no evidence to the contrary.” ECF 64 at 11. Indeed, the
Court is highly persuaded by the video evidence itself, ECF 64, Ex. N, along with the fact that
Wolk actually exited his own vehicle and physically grabbed Miller. Both strongly suggest to
the Court that Wolk intended only to apprehend him. Id.12
Moreover, even if the Court accepts as true Plaintiffs’ assertion that “Wolk twice
attempted to cause a collision between his vehicle and Miller’s”—which the Court does not—

Davis makes clear that such “physical contact of some sort between the pursued and pursuing
vehicles,” without more, is simply not enough.13 Davis, 190 F.3d at 171.

11 Indeed, given that the key inquiry here is on Wolk’s intent, whether any such slight contact
actually occurred is largely irrelevant. There is little dispute about the maneuvers Wolk actually
employed in cutting off Miller.
12 In reaching this result, the Court assigns minimal weight to the portion of Plaintiffs’ experts’
reports opining that “Officer Wolk intended to cause injury unrelated to any legitimate police
objective,” ECF 69-3 at 14. As the Third Circuit made clear in M.S. by & through Hall v.
Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., “an expert cannot testify to the legal conclusion of whether
appropriate people had” the requisite mens rea. 969 F.3d 120, 129 (3d Cir. 2020); see also Advo,
Inc. v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1201 (3d Cir. 1995) (opting to ignore “the
bald assertions of its expert, that are without factual significance”).
13 Likewise, while Plaintiffs highlight that Wolk’s chase occurred in violation of several
Philadelphia Police Department directives, Wolk is correct that “intent to harm cannot be
inferred an officer’s violation of police directives.” As the Third Circuit explained in Davis,
If anything, this set of facts presents a weaker inference of “intent to harm” than Davis,
Lewis, or Mckenna. In Davis, for instance, the police utilized a “bump procedure” to
intentionally hit the rear of the driver's vehicle with a police cruiser. Davis, 190 F.3d at 169; cf
Wilson v. Doe, 2020 WL 1701709, at *5-6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2020). In Lewis, “[t]he motorcycle
and patrol car reached speeds up to 100 miles an hour, with [the officer] following at a distance

as short as 100 feet; at that speed, his car would have required 650 feet to stop.” Lewis, 523 U.S.
at 837. In McKenna, while many of the facts are analogous, Judge Goldberg expressly noted
that “McKenna was not even fleeing at the time of the alleged seizure.” ECF at 10-11.
By contrast, the video evidence here shows that Wolk swerved in front of a fleeing
Miller. In other words, unlike a purposeful bump or leaving insufficient space to avoid a
collision, Wolk’s method for apprehending Miller did not automatically involve car-to-motor
scooter contact. Wolk attempted to and did stop Miller’s progress without actually hitting him, a
physical impossibility in both Davis or Lewis. Had Wolk side-swiped or attempted to side-swipe
Miller from behind, it is entirely possible that a reasonable jury could have drawn a different set

of inferences. But that is not this case.
As such, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that a reasonable jury might find Wolk intended to
harm Miller. For this reason alone, Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim fails.
C. Plaintiffs also Fail to Demonstrate a Genuine Dispute on Proximate Cause

Moreover, even if this Court were to instead assume that Wolk’s conduct here shocked
the conscience—which it does not—Plaintiffs still cannot establish that Wolk proximately
caused Miller’s death. To be sure, “the presence of the requisite causation is normally a question

“Lewis [] squarely refutes [the] contention that the officers' violation of police department
regulations, which might be probative of recklessness or conscious disregard of plaintiff's safety,
suffices to meet the shocks-the-conscience test under the due process clause.” Davis, 190 F.3d at
170.
of fact for the jury.” Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 194 (3d Cir. 2004). And Plaintiffs
are undoubtedly correct that it is foreseeable that a high-speed chase may result in bodily harm.
65-3 at 20 (citing to Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F. 3d 1296 (3d Cir. 1994); Davis, 190 F. 3d at
171; Jones v. Chieffo, 833 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Davenport v. Borough of Homestead,
870 F. 3d 273 (3d Cir. 2017)).

Yet, “if the relevant facts are not in dispute and the remoteness of the causal connection
between the defendant’s [misconduct] and the plaintiff's injury clearly appears, the question
becomes one of law.” Jewell v. Ridley Twp., 2011 WL 5524260, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10,
2011), aff'd, 497 F. App'x 182 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
Indeed, “[t]he Supreme Court has held on multiple occasions that the decision to engage
in flight and to ignore police warnings to stop causing risk to innocent bystanders results, not
from the pursuit by law enforcement, but from the fleeing suspect intentionally placing himself
and others in danger by unlawfully engaging in reckless flight.” Koreny v. Smith, 2018 WL
1141513, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2018) (citing to Lewis, 523 U.S. at 855; Scott, 550 U.S. at 384;

Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014)) (emphasis in original). In Lewis itself, for
example, the Supreme Court concluded that liability is improper where an officer has “done
nothing to cause [a fleeing suspect’s] high-speed driving in the first place, nothing to excuse his
flouting of the commonly understood law enforcement authority to control traffic, and nothing
(beyond a refusal to call off the chase) to encourage him to race through traffic at breakneck
speed forcing other drivers out of their travel lanes.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 855 (emphasis added).
Again, this Court’s recent decision in Donahue is instructive. Midway through that
chase, the fleeing suspect pulled into a McDonald’s parking lot. Donahue, 2024 WL 387455, at
*4. Unbeknownst to both the instigating officer and the suspect himself, a second officer had
driven into the McDonald’s drive-through exit to physically prevent the suspect from exiting the
parking lot. Id. The fleeing suspect bumped this second car while exiting the lot, after which
other officers continued to give chase. Id. Critically though, this second officer’s “participation
was limited to the McDonalds parking.” Id. at *7 n.17. As such, this Court granted that officer’s
motion for summary judgment, concluding that “[h]is action, plausibly stated as blocking the exit

and remaining in the parking lot, is too tenuously related to the terminal crash over a mile away
to satisfy causation.” Id.
Here too, “a superseding cause [broke] the chain of proximate causation.’” Lamont v.
New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 186 (3d Cir. 2011). Indeed, the record unequivocally shows that after
Miller escaped Wolk’s physical grasp, Wolk’s role in the chase effectively ended. Instead, Bove
quite literally “superseded” Wolk and began to pursue Miller. True, Wolk continued to follow
Miller from a distance, potentially distinguishing Wolk from the parking lot-bound officer in
Donahue.14 But given the uncontradicted testimony and Plaintiffs’ own expert’s evidence that
Wolk (1) remained at least one hundred and fifty feet away from Miller, and (2) was out of sight

for at least thirty seconds before Miller’s accident, Wolk’s later actions cannot save Plaintiffs’
claim. To the contrary, the Court notes that Robert Mattos—an eyewitness to this portion of the
chase—expressly testified that he “thought the police suv gave up on the chase and let the silver
car take the chase.” ECF 64-18 at 1; ECF 68-2 at 5.

14 Indeed, certain evidence suggests that Wolk “[re-]accelerated to 45 mph” during this portion
of the chase. ECF 65-1 at ¶ 53; ECF 64, Ex. K.
Thus—absent a material dispute over whether Wolk somehow enabled Bove (discussed
below)—it is difficult to see how Wolk’s initial pursuit proximately caused Miller’s eventual
death.15
D. Facts Concerning Bove’s Involvement Do Not Preclude Summary Judgment

That brings us to the final, extraordinary wrinkle in this case. As explained above,
following Wolk’s second stoppage of Miller, Gary Bove somewhat inexplicably began to pursue
Miller. If Bove did so unilaterally, this would not alter the Court’s above conclusions. By
contrast, if a reasonable jury could find that Wolk “coordinated,” “condoned[,] and ratified”
Bove’s actions, as Plaintiffs assert, ECF 65-3 at 19, this Court would be required to further
consider how, if at all, such coordination affects the “shocks the conscience” inquiry.
For the following reasons however, the Court concludes that (1) the record does not
reasonably support a jury finding that Wolk “condoned and ratified” Bove’s behavior, and (2)
even if it did, such ratification would still not evince an “intent to harm” in this hyper-
pressurized situation.

15 One might alternatively rely on the fact that—at some point during this chase—the record
indicates that Wolk turned off his sirens and emergency lights, even if Wolk has testified that he
continued to blow his airhorn throughout the chase. Given that Bove, in his civilian vehicle,
similarly lacked headlights or a siren, one might reasonably find this may have confused Miller
and led him to believe Bove was also law enforcement. This, in turn, might have prompted
Miller to continue his flight rather than slow his pace. And perhaps, from that perspective, one
might contend that Wolk’s allegedly erroneously decision to turn off his siren and emergency
lights caused Miller to continue fleeing. Nonetheless, the very speculative nature of such a chain
reinforces that Wolk’s conduct was ultimately not a “substantial factor causing” Miller’s death.
Jewell, 2011 WL 5524260, at *11.
i. The Record Does Not Reasonable Show Coordination or Ratification
The threshold question here, as just noted, is whether the record reasonably supports a
jury finding that Wolk coordinated with Bove or otherwise sanctioned his conduct. To recap,
Plaintiffs direct the Court to the following portions of the record to establish such coordination:
e The reconstruction animation of the pursuit, which shows “that as soon as
Miller’s motor scooter turned onto Kennedy Street, Bove’s vehicle on James
Street began to slow down significantly. Notably, Bove would not have been able
to_see Miller at this time, as rowhomes would obscure his view. Therefore, he
appears to be reacting to something other than a visual cue. Since Bove began to
slow down at a time when he could only know Miller’s location on Kennedy
Street through Wolk, and slowed to a crawl until he was able to ensure that Miller
could not turn off James Street before reaching Scattergood, there is strong
circumstantial evidence of real-time communication and coordination between
Wolk and Bove during the pursuit.” ECF 65-1 at § 37 (emphasis added).
e “[Bove’s] actions immediately prior to pulling over on Scattergood Street,” which
Plaintiffs assert shows that “Bove was lying in wait for the pursuit to catch up to
him.” ECF 65-1 at 38.
e The moment after Miller frees himself from Wolk’s grasp, as Plaintiffs contend
“[t]here appears to be a moment when Wolk stops directly in front of Bove’s
vehicle,” during which Wolk allegedly “looks directly at Bove for a moment
before returning to his vehicle.” ECF 65-1 at § 49 (emphasis added).
e Wolk’s allegedly inconsistent statements regarding the nature and extent of his
association with Bove, as Plaintiffs highlight that “Wolk did not mention Bove in
either his initial report where he claimed he had merely found Miller’s body or in
his later statement to AID investigators, where he completely omitted the portion
of the pursuit Bove participated in. . . . . Eventually, after video of Bove
participating in the pursuit surfaced, he told IAD investigators that he recognized
Gary as a tow truck operator who operates in the Northeast. At his deposition,
however, Wolk disclosed what appears to be a more than incidental association,
testifying that he knew Bove for several years, had his telephone number in his
phone, and had telephone conversations with him in the past, generally with Bove
calling him about personal issues. Wolk also testified that after Miller’s fatal
collision with the truck, Wolk called Bove to tell him to return to the scene to give
a statement to investigators.” ECF 65-1 at ¥ 51.
e Bove’s statement to police after the chase, which was allegedly “patently false,
stating that he (Bove) was ‘not involved’ in the pursuit of Miller, and that Wolk
‘pulled up behind [him] and told [him] to move.’” Id. (citing to ECF 66-3 at 19-
21).
27

e Following Wolk’s deposition, subpoenas were issued both for the telephone
number provided by Wolk at his deposition and for Gary Bove’s cell phone
activity. Both service providers’ responses indicated that the records sought were
not retained since both were pre-paid phones. ECF 65-2 at § 52.
Distilled, Plaintiffs assert that (1) Bove’s supposed awareness of the chase before it
entered his sightline, (2) an alleged look of approval from Wolk, (3) the possible use of burner
phones, and (4) Wolk’s and Bove’s after-the-fact supposedly inconsistent statements, are
sufficient to establish coordination between Wolk and Bove for the purposes of summary
judgment. The Court cannot agree.
First, Plaintiffs’ claim that Bove “‘appears to be reacting to something other than a visual
cue” simply ignores that Plaintiffs’ expert’s own recreation shows that (1) Bove was approaching
a turn onto Scattergood Street when he began to slow, and (2) in the midst of Bove’s slowing
down, Miller and Wolk turned on James Street, thus becoming visible to Bove. ECF 64, Ex. K.
Moreover, Plaintiff ignore Wolk’s entirely uncontradicted testimony that he had no
communication with Bove until after the accident. See, e.g., ECF 68-1 at 25.'°
While this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, it need
not draw “unreasonable inferences,” InterVest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 163 (3d
Cir. 2003) or accept “bald assertions” as true, Advo, Inc. v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 51
F.3d 1191, 1201 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d
1, 8 (Ist Cir. 2007) (“That does not mean, however, that we ought to
draw unreasonable inferences or credit bald assertions, empty conclusions, rank conjecture, or

'6 Tn relevant part, Wolk testified that “I don't know what he was doing. He just happened to be
on the block and seen me out of the vehicle, I guess. I didn't notice he was that close to me in
that Ford until I seen the video and I seen the blur of his face going by.” Id. Similarly, Wolk
testified that he did not “have any communication or contact with him at any time in the months
leading up to this incident.” Id. at 24.
28

vitriolic invective”). And it strains credulity to suggest that Bove’s slightly ambiguous car
movements permit the inference that Bove and Wolk were coordinating.17 Indeed, such a
finding would have no limiting principle. If this Court were to so hold, that could potentially
open the floodgates for all bystanders who slow down for an approaching police chase. That
result is untenable.

The same is true of Plaintiffs’ “bald assertions” that Wolk and Bove communicated via
burner phones. Indeed, Wolk persuasively counters that
Plaintiffs’ description of the records not being retained because the phone at issue
was a pre-paid “burner” phone is inaccurate. The hearsay letter from a T-Mobile
representative Plaintiffs refer to states:

I located this under Tracking ID 4510947

It was an objection letter we sent to yall due to no docket
number on the subpoena as well as it being a prepaid line that
is outside our normal range of retention.

It is unclear what subpoena or phone number this letter refers to. However, the
letter is clear that the subpoena was rejected for not having a docket number and
for being a “prepaid line” that is “outside of our normal range of retention”. As
the official objection letter states, which is believed to relate the subpoena of
Bove’s call records, calls on both “prepaid” and “wholesale account” are stored
for “approximately 24 months following usage.” And so, no matter what type of
phone plan was being used, the records at issue were no longer being stored. In
addition, that objection letter, states the number at issue is “… associated with a
CA, PA or DE postpaid account. SUBPOENA WITH CONSENT OR COURT
ORDER REQUIRED FOR RELEASE OF RECORDS.” A postpaid account
would appear to be the opposite of a pre-paid account. See
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Postpaid_mobile_phone . In summation, there is no
admissible evidence in the record to support these allegations, and in fact they
appear to contradict the information Plaintiffs’ rely on.

17 If anything, had Wolk and Bove been coordinating at this point, one would think that Bove
would have remained on James Street so as to obstruct Miller’s path.
ECF 71-1 at § 51; ECF 68-4 at 1.!° The Court is inclined to agree, particularly since—apart from
Plaintiffs’ unsubstantiated assertions—nothing in the record establishes (1) that Wolk or Bove
actually used these phones during the chase, and (2) even if they did, what they communicated to
each other. Plaintiffs’ bare assertion, without more, is again insufficient to permit a reasonable
inference that Wolk and Bove were communicating via burner phones.
Likewise, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiffs’ key contention—‘‘Wolk look[ed]
directly at Bove” immediately before Bove gave chase—is accurate, or that it somehow indicates
that Wolk condoned Bove’s subsequent chase. Simply put, the video evidence capturing this
moment is ambiguous, at best. As cropped from Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint:
: □ ade
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'8 Moreover, Wolk testified at his deposition: “I think I had Simple Mobile at the time.” ECF
68-1 at 23. That further undermines the relevance of T-Mobile’s letter.
30

ECF 64, Ex. N. In the Court’s view, this video reveals nothing more than Wolk walking back to
his police vehicle. Scott, 550 U.S. at 380-81. Accordingly, the Court is again hesitant to credit
Plaintiffs’ version of events—even for the purposes of summary judgment—when nothing in the
record actually supports that version, other than Plaintiffs’ own narrative.
To be sure, the Court cannot look at each individual piece of evidence in a vacuum. And,

by far, Plaintiffs’ most favorable piece of evidence is that Bove did in fact begin to pursue Miller
after this moment. Indeed, it is somewhat remarkable to think that a private citizen would
undertake a high-speed chase without some sort of explicit or implicit direction from police.
Yet, the Court struggles to identify any such evidence here.
To the contrary, Wolk expressly testified that he did not (1) request any help from, or (2)
communicate at all with Bove during the pursuit. ECF 71-1 at 11. As Wolk tells it, after the
fact, Bove informed Wolk that Bove had “seen [Wolk] trying to stop the male on the motorcycle
and struggle with the male,” and thus began pursuing Miller because “he was trying to keep an
eye on him.” Id. (emphasis added). Bove’s contemporaneous statements match, as Bove

likewise told the police that he “saw a P/O grabbing a white male on a bike pulling. The male on
the bike pulled away and took of the bike,” which is why Bove “made both turns behind” Miller
after he fled from Wolk. ECF 66-3 at 20 (emphasis and bold added).19 Those are both far more
reasonable explanations than Plaintiffs’ coordination theory, even if Bove’s actual decision to
pursue may have been unreasonable.
While such testimony is undoubtedly self-serving, it nonetheless remains uncontradicted.
And “[t]he fact is that in considering a motion for summary judgment the court should

19 The Court further notes that this portion of Bove’s statement also undermines Plaintiffs’
contention that Bove somehow hid his involvement in the chase when providing a statement to
the police.
believe uncontradicted testimony unless it is inherently implausible even if the testimony is that
of an interested witness.” Lauren W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 272 (3d Cir.2007).
True, eyewitness Mattos said he “thought the police suv gave up on the chase and let the
silver car take the chase.” ECF 64-18 at 1; ECF 68-2 at 5 (emphasis added). But that lone
statement, in the Court’s view, is not enough for a rational juror here to find the degree of

coordination that Plaintiffs have alleged.
ii. Even with Coordination, There Remains No Intent to Harm

Further, even if a reasonable jury could find that Wolk somehow deputized Bove—which
a jury could not—Wolk nonetheless would have done so within a “hyperpressurized
environment.” Sauers, 905 F.3d at 718. Thus, Plaintiffs would still be required to demonstrate
that Wolk’s “snap judgment” evinced an intent to harm.
Again, the record is barren. Bove’s pursuit essentially served as a continuation of
Wolk’s. Indeed, Bove’ self-stated purpose was “keeping an eye on” Miller, given that Wolk
himself lagged behind. ECF 71-1 at ¶ 48. That simply does not evince an intent harm. If
anything, that further undermines the notion that Wolk imputed some type of “malicious motive”
onto Bove. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 855. Unlike Wolk—who twice engaged in a risky maneuver to
bring Miller to a stop—Bove did no such thing. Bove simply tailed Miller, albeit doing so above
the applicable speed limits.
As Miller’s terrible tragedy occurred only after running a redlight and colliding with a
third-party vehicle, the Court cannot reasonably ascribe that eventual crash to Bove’s (or
Wolk’s) intent.20

20 The Court also concludes that Plaintiffs’ alternative theory that Wolk and Bove were somehow
connected to or motivated by Miller’s unrelated alleged sexual assault of a young girl is entirely
unsubstantiated. Plaintiffs merely assert, but do not explain, that there was “a non-trivial chance
To be sure, there will undoubtedly be instances where “officers utilizing a civilian to
assist” in the apprehending of a suspect will “demonstrate a conscious disregard of a great risk of
harm.” Kohuth v. Borough of W. Chester, 2013 WL 1809431, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2013).
For instance, in Kohuth, Judge Goldberg denied summary judgment against a police officer who
“directed a group of inebriated college students to engage in a ‘sting operation’ late at night,

where obvious criminal activity was unfolding,” and where that officer “did not provide them
with proper instruction.” Id.
But again, the level of deference a Court must afford police officers turns on “how much
time” that “officer has to make a decision.” Sauers, 905 at 717. Indeed, Judge Goldberg
expressly concluded that Kohuth was not a hyper-pressurized situation, explaining that “[w]hile
[police officer defendant] was informed of on-going criminal conduct, and likely felt pressured
to act quickly, he also had several minutes to deliberate the best course of action.” Id. at *5
(emphasis added); see also Walter v. Pike County, Pa., 544 F.3d 182, 193 (3d Cir.2008)
(requiring only “deliberate indifference” for the extended planning and effecting of a suspect’s

arrest); Matican v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 151, 159 (2d Cir 2008) (similar).

that Wolk and Bove were acting in a clandestine vigilante manner in an attempt to punish - or at
a minimum scare - Miller for the ‘knifepoint sexual assault’ he was falsely accused of, and which
Wolk continues to believe he committed.” ECF 65-3 at 17. Again, the Court need not credit
such “bald assertions.” Advo, Inc., 51 F.3d at 1201. Plaintiffs’ only argument is that Wolk’s
testimony as to his understanding of the allegations against Miller in this separate sexual assault
case makes it “likely that Wolk heard of the allegations against Miller before he engaged in the
pursuit on May 7, 2019 despite his testimony to the contrary.” ECF 65-1 at ¶ 37. But this does
nothing to change the Court’s conclusion. Even if Plaintiffs’ circumspect theory could
reasonably permit the inference that Wolk knew of Miller’s allegations ex ante—which it does
not—this theory certainly does not permit the further inferential leap that Wolk (1) pursued
Miller because of those allegations and (2) spoken with Bove about them.
Wolk had no such opportunity for reflection here, and so even his actions and decisions
with respect to Bove must be analyzed under intent to harm standard. Yet, as just explained, the
record does not allow Plaintiffs to succeed under that framework.
To be clear, this Court does not intend to suggest that police officers are regularly free to
deputize civilians to engage in high-speed chases. To the contrary, in essentially any other

conceivable scenario, the Court believes that enlisting the help of civilians would amount to an
“action taken within a time frame that allows an officer to engage in ‘hurried deliberation,’” thus
subjecting that officer to the “conscious disregard” standard. Sauers, 905 at 717. But the
“particularized facts of [this] case” make clear that—to the extent Wolk implicitly or
ambiguously indicated to Bove that he should pursue Miller (which, again, the Court concludes
is beyond the range of permissible inferences here)—this happenstance snap judgment occurred
in the midst of an ongoing chase. Id. at 719. This sequence of events—where a civilian
onlooker who happens to be familiar with a pursuing officer has a passing ambiguous interaction
with the officer, mid-chase—is highly particularized and likely a very rare occurrence. As such,

the Court’s ruling here is limited only to these facts.
VI. CONCLUSION
This is a deeply unfortunate case. Ryan Miller’s untimely death was nothing short of a
tragedy. But the Supreme Court and Third Circuit have made clear that police officers are
entitled to considerable protections when they pursue a fleeing suspect that poses a danger to

themselves or others. This Court is bound by that precedent. And here, because this Court
simply cannot say that a reasonable jury might find that (1) Wolk’s actions shocked the
conscience or (2) served as the proximate cause of Miller’s death, the Court will GRANT
Wolk’s motion for summary judgment.21

O:\CIVIL 20\20-6301 Miller v Wolk\20cv6301 - MSJ Memo.docx

21 Moreover, because the Court concludes that no prima facie constitutional violation occurred, it
need not further consider whether Wolk would be entitled to qualified immunity here.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10407111. Public record. Not legal advice.