# JOHNSON v. STILLMAN LAW OFFICE

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · March 28, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10406995

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 28, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10406995

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding the debt collector “communicated with plaintiff’s mother twice about plaintiff’s debt without plaintiff’s authorization” in violation of §§ 1692(b)(2) and 1692c(b)

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GARY JOHNSON, CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff,
NO. 23-2433-KSM
v.

STILLMAN LAW OFFICE,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM
Marston, J. March 28, 2024
Pro se Plaintiff Gary Johnson, Jr. brings claims against Defendant Stillman Law Office
for violating the federal criminal code, the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”), and the Pennsylvania Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act (“FCEUA”). (Doc. No.
10 at 9–12.) Stillman Law moves for summary judgment on all claims. (Doc. No. 20.)1 For the
reasons discussed below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

1 Johnson has filed what he terms, “Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.” (Doc. No. 21.)
That motion includes one sentence: “Plaintiff Gary Johnson respectfully moves the Court to enter
summary judgment in its [sic] favor and against Defendant Stillman Law Office.” (Id. at 1.) He also filed
multiple exhibits. (Doc. Nos. 21-1 to 21-9.) He has not, however, filed a brief or memorandum
explaining the relevance of the exhibits or why summary judgment is appropriate. See E.D. Pa. Local R.
7.1(c) (requiring that every motion be “accompanied by a brief containing a concise statement of the legal
contentions and authorities relied upon in support of the motion” and that the opposing party provide “a
brief in opposition”); Miller v. Cadmus Commc’ns, Civil Action No. 09–cv–02869, 2010 WL 762312, at
*5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2010) (“Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(c), all litigants are required to address substantive
matters in a meaningful manner.”). Accordingly, the Court denies Johnson’s “motion.” In any event,
even considering the exhibits attached to Johnson’s motion and viewing all evidence in the light most
favorable to him, the Court finds that Johnson is not entitled to summary judgment. As the Court
explains in this Memorandum, summary judgment on each claim is either granted in Stillman Law’s favor
or precluded because fact disputes render it inappropriate at this stage.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts2
Johnson attended the University of Maryland, Eastern Shore from 2006 to 2012. (Doc.
No. 23 at ¶ 1.) He did not pay for his education out of pocket, and instead, financed it using
federal student loans from Sallie Mae. (See id. at ¶ 2;3 see also Doc. No. 20-3 at 16–20 (Federal
Student Aid loan summary produced by the University).) On September 11, 2014, an Education

Refinance Loan was submitted to Citizens Bank, N.A. under Johnson’s name. (Doc. No. 23 at
¶ 34; see also Doc. No. 20-4 at 6–15.) Citizens approved the application and informed Johnson
that it had disbursed $86,126.75 to Sallie Mae to resolve Johnson’s federal student loans. (Doc.

2 Where there are disputes of fact, the Court construes those facts in the light most favorable to
Johnson. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (“[At] summary
judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion.” (quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
3 Johnson disputes this fact, stating that he “lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the
truth of this statement” and that he “does not have personal knowledge of the transaction between Sallie
Mae and [the University].” (Doc. No. 23 at ¶ 2.) He then cites to his own deposition where he
responded, “I don’t know,” when asked, “Did Sallie Mae fund your education? Did you obtain the
original loan from Sallie Mae?” (Id.; Johnson Dep. Tr. at 11:6–8 (included in the record as Doc. No. 20-
2).) But “such a response does not create a material dispute of fact.” Carpenters Combined Funds ex rel.
Klein v. Klingman, No. 2:10–cv–63, 2011 WL 92083, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2011); see also, e.g., Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e) (explaining that when a party “asserting that a fact . . . is genuinely disputed” fails to
support that assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in the records” or by “showing that the
materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute,” the court may “consider the fact
undisputed for purposes of the motion”); United States v. Denneny, Civil Action No. 12–4057, 2013 WL
6671495, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2013) (“Because Thomas has produced no evidence suggesting the
assessments are, in fact, incorrect, he has failed to show there is a genuine factual dispute as to this
issue.”); cf. Houghton v. Am. Guar. Life Ins. Co., 692 F.2d 289, 295 (3d Cir.1982) (“A mere demand for
proof does not create a material issue of fact requiring the denial of a motion for summary judgment.”).
4 Johnson disputes having applied for the loan himself (see Johnson Dep. Tr. at 42:23–25 (“Q.
But it’s your position you never applied for that loan? A. Correct.”); id. at 79:17–21 (“[Q.] So whether as
a natural person, as a consumer, as Gary Johnson, as you and I are talking here today, or as Johnson,
colon, Gary, agent, slash, beneficiary, have you ever made an application to Citizens Bank for an
education refinance? A. No.”)), even though he concedes that the application contains “the names, then-
current addresses, employment information, educational information, and other demographic information
about Gary Johnson Jr. and his father, Gary Johnson Sr.” (Doc. No. 23 at ¶ 4). Because the Court must,
for purposes of this motion, construe this disputed fact in Johnson’s favor, see supra n.2, we assume that
Johnson did not himself apply for the loan.
No. 23 at ¶ 5.5) From October 2014 to July 2022, Johnson made regular payments to Citizens
Bank (Johnson Dep. Tr. at 41:19–43:8) because he believed he “was under a financial
obligation” to repay Citizens Bank for the loan (Doc. No. 23 at ¶ 7). In 2022, he stopped making
payments, (id. at ¶ 8), and Citizens Bank hired Stillman Law to recover the remaining balance
(id. at ¶ 96; Doc. No. 20-4 at 1 ¶ 5).

In that capacity, Stillman Law sent Johnson a letter on January 25, 2023, which stated
that “Stillman Law Office is a debt collector . . . trying to collect a debt that [Johnson] owed
Citizens.” (Doc. No. 20-6; see also Doc. No. 23 at ¶ 10.) The letter also explained that as of that
date, Johnson owed $73,825, and the letter told Johnson what steps he could take to dispute the
debt. (Doc. No. 20-6.) In response, Johnson sent a letter dated January 30, 2023, which told the
law firm to “CEASE AND DESIST further communication through all mediums regarding such
alleged debt.” (Doc. No. 23 at ¶ 12; see also Doc. No. 20-7 at 5.) Johnson also attached an
“Invoice,” which directed Stillman Law to pay Johnson $11,000 for violations of the FDCPA
caused by its initial letter. (Doc. No. 20-7 at 7.)

When Johnson did not hear back from Stillman Law, he sent a second letter on April 26,

5 Again, Johnson disputes this fact, claiming he “lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to
the truth of this statement.” (Doc. No. 23 at ¶ 5.) That argument fails. See supra n.3. It is also
inconsistent with his own testimony that he paid Citizens Bank money for approximately six years
because he “thought [he] was paying off . . . a loan that was given on my behalf . . . to Sallie Mae . . .who
[Citizens Bank] paid money to.” (Johnson Dep. Tr. at 42:14–22.) Johnson also disputes this fact under
Federal Rule of Evidence 602, arguing that Stillman Law lacks “personal knowledge of [the] transaction”
between Citizens Bank and Sallie Mae. (Doc. No. 23 at ¶ 5.) This argument fails because Stillman Law
does not need personal knowledge that the transaction occurred; other admissible evidence establishes as
much. (See Doc. No. 20-4 at 12 (Private Education Loan Final Disclosure from Citizens Bank to
Johnson, which states $86,126.75 was “paid to others on [Johnson’s] behalf”).)
6 Johnson disputes this fact, claiming he “lacks sufficient information to form a belief as to the
truth of this statement.” (Doc. No. 23 at ¶ 9.) That argument fails. See supra n.3. And contrary to
Johnson’s assertion that Stillman Law “does not have personal knowledge of the transaction and
accounting records,” the law firm submitted the Declaration of Dawn M. Blair, in which Ms. Blair avers,
based on her personal knowledge as Partner and Legal Manager for Stillman Law, that Citizens Bank
hired the law firm in 2022 (Doc. No. 20-4 at 2 ¶¶ 2, 5).
2023. (Doc. No. 20-8 at 2.) In that letter, he claimed the law firm was “now in DEFAULT for
failure to pay the invoice attached to [his] cease and desist” letter. (Id.) Johnson reiterated his
belief that Stillman Law’s initial collection letter was “unlawful” and “deemed to be an unfair,
deceptive practice in commerce” in violation of the FDCPA and the FCEUA. (Id.) Last,

Johnson exclaimed, “THERE WAS NEVER NO [sic] MUTUAL AGREEMENT OR
CONSIDERATION EXCHANGED SUFFICIENT ENOUGH [to] SUPPORT A SIMPLE
CONTRACT BETWEEN YOU AND I. You never had no [sic] prior consent granted by me or
any express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction to ever communicate with me in the
collection of any alleged debt!” (Id.; see also Doc. No. 23 at ¶ 15.) Attached to this letter was
an identity theft report that Johnson submitted to the Federal Trade Commission on April 18,
2023, attesting that he was “a victim of identity theft due to Stillman Law Office [sic] actions by
committing aggravated identity theft by obtaining [his] nonpersonal public information from a
3rd party source without [his] consent.” (Doc. No. 20-8 at 4.) Johnson’s second letter also
included another copy of the “Invoice,” this time with a label, “PAST DUE.” (Id. at 6.) Last, he

included what he titled an “Affidavit of Fact,” which claimed Stillman Law violated numerous
provisions of the federal criminal code, the FDCPA, and the FCEUA. (Id. at 8–11.) Among
other things, Johnson stated that Stillman Law Office had falsely represented “the character,
amount, or legal status” of the debt. (Id. at 10 ¶ 25.)
Construing Johnson’s second letter as disputing the existence of the underlying debt,
Stillman Law mailed a response on May 15, 2023, which included verification of the purported
loan between Citizens Bank and Johnson. (Doc. No. 20-9; see also Doc. No. 20-4 at 4 ¶ 13.)
The body of Stillman Law’s response letter was one sentence: “In response to your request,
enclosed please find verification of the debt.” (Doc. No. 20-9 at 2.) As an end note, Stillman
Law also again disclosed that it was a “debt collector.” (Id.)
B. Procedural History
On May 23, 2023, Johnson filed suit against Stillman Law in the Philadelphia County
Court of Common Pleas. His Complaint, submitted as a “Statement of Fact,” for the most part,
mirrored the “Affidavit of Fact” that Johnson sent to Stillman Law with his second April 26,

2023 letter. (Compare Doc. No. 10 at 3–12, with Doc. No. 20-8 at 8–11.) Stillman Law
removed the action to this Court on June 26, 2023. (See Doc. No. 1.) In the Complaint, Johnson
maintains that Stillman Law violated multiple provisions of the federal criminal code, the
FDCPA and the FCEUA. (Doc. No. 10 at 3–12.) Stillman Law moves for summary judgment
on all claims. (Doc. No. 20.) Johnson opposes that motion. (Doc. Nos. 23, 25.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the

parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the
requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). A dispute is genuine if the “evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” and a fact is material if it “might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. at 248.
“[A]party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing
the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 325 (“[T]he
burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’ — that is, pointing out to the
district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”).
After the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party is required to “designate specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 323 (quotation marks omitted); see
also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.., 475 U.S. at 586 (“When the moving party has carried its
burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” (footnote omitted)). “[U]nsupported assertions,
conclusory allegations or mere suspicions” are insufficient to overcome a motion for summary
judgment. Schaar v. Lehigh Valley Health Servs., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 490, 493 (E.D. Pa.
2010).
III. DISCUSSION
Stillman Law moves for summary judgment, arguing that Johnson has no private cause of
action for violations of federal criminal law and that he has failed to put forth evidence to
support his claims for violations of the FDCPA and the FCEUA. (Doc. No. 20-10.) The Court

addresses each category of violations in turn.
A. Violations of the Criminal Code
In his Complaint, Johnson argues that Stillman Law willfully violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 894
and 1341. (Doc. No. 10 at 11 ¶¶ 32, 33.) Johnson also cites, without discussion, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1028(a) and 1028A(a). (Id. ¶¶ 30, 31.) All four provisions are housed in Title 18 of the
United States Code, which covers federal crimes and criminal procedure. See 18 U.S.C. § 894
(collection of extensions of credit by extortionate means); id. § 1028(a) (fraud and related
activity in connection with identification documents, authentication features, and information);
id. § 1028A(a) (aggravated identity theft); id. § 1341 (frauds and swindles). Stillman Law argues
that it is entitled to summary judgment on these claims because “[t]here is no private right of
action” under the United States Criminal Code. (Doc. No. 20-10 at 7–8.) The Court agrees.
See, e.g., Conquest v. WMC Mortg. Corp., 247 F. Supp. 3d 618, 647 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“[A]
criminal statute of general applicability does not create a private right of action.”); Graf v. Iora,

CIVIL NO: 3:23-CV-01375, 2023 WL 7031544, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2023) (“Graf cannot
bring a private action under any of the criminal statutes he cites because no such private action
exists.”). Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in Stillman Law’s favor as to these
claims.7
B. Violations of the FDCPA
Next, Johnson’s claims that Stillman Law violated nine provisions of the FDCPA. (Doc.
No. 10 at 10–11 (claiming Stillman violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b(1), 1692b(2), 1692b(5),
1692c(a), 1692c(c),1692d(2), 1692e(2), 1692e(10), and 1692j(a)).8)

7 Stillman Law also moves for summary judgment on Johnson’s “claims that Stillman violated the
Graham-Leach-Bliley Act (‘GLBA’), 15 U.S.C. § 6801, et seq.,” arguing that there is likewise no private
right of action under the GLBA. (Doc. No. 20-10 at 7–8.) Although Johnson does not cite the GLBA in
his Complaint, he does allege that he “never granted any lawful consent to Stillman Law Office” or “to
Citizens Bank, N.A.” to obtain and share his non-public, personal information. (Doc. No. 10 at 9 ¶¶ 3–4.)
The GLBA states it “is the policy of the Congress that each financial institution has an affirmative and
continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect the security and confidentiality
of those customers’ nonpublic personal information.” 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a). To the extent Johnson meant
to assert a cause of action for violations of the GLBA, there is no such private right of action, and
Stillman Law is also entitled to summary judgment on this claim. See id. § 6805(a) (“This subchapter and
the regulations prescribed thereunder shall be enforced by the Federal functional regulators, the State
insurance authorities, and the Federal Trade Commission . . . .”); see also, e.g., Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 893 F. Supp. 2d 75, 83 (D.D.C. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds by
787 F.3d 524 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing § 6805(a) and concluding that “the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act does
not provide for a private right of action” (cleaned up)); Newcomb v. Cambridge Home Loans, Inc., 861 F.
Supp. 2d 1153, 1163 (D. Haw. 2012) (“[T]here is no private right of action under GLBA.”).
8 In Johnson’s brief in opposition to Stillman Law’s motion for summary judgment, he also
references § 1692e(3). (See Doc. No. 23-1 at 9.) But a “plaintiff may not amend his complaint through
arguments in his brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.” Bell v. City of Philadelphia,
275 F. App’x 157, 160 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). Because Johnson did not allege a
violation of § 1692e(3) in his Complaint (see Doc. No. 10 at 9–12), the Court does not consider this claim
further.
“The FDCPA is a remedial statute and the Court construes its language broadly, so as to
effect its purpose.” Strouse v. Enhanced Recovery Co., 956 F. Supp. 2d 627, 632 (E.D. Pa.
2013) (quotation marks omitted). “In its findings Congress observed that ‘existing laws and
procedures’ enacted to remedy the injuries occasioned by abusive debt collectors ‘are inadequate

to protect consumers.’” Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 1692(b)). Accordingly, it passed the FDCPA to “provide[ ] consumers with a private
cause of action against debt collectors who fail to comply with” the Act’s provisions. Strouse,
956 F. Supp. 2d at 632 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692k).
“To prevail on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must prove that (1) she is a consumer, (2) the
defendant is a debt collector, (3) the defendant’s challenged practice involves an attempt to
collect a ‘debt’ as the Act defines it, and (4) the defendant has violated a provision of the
FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.” Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299,
303 (3d Cir. 2014). Only the fourth prong is at issue here. As stated above, Johnson claims
Stillman Law violated nine provisions of the FDCPA: §§ 1692b(1), 1692b(2), 1692b(5),

1692c(a), 1692c(c), 1692d(2), 1692e(2), 1692e(10), and 1692j(a). Stillman Law argues that
Johnson has failed to put forth any evidence to support a violation under eight of those
provisions. (Doc. No. 20-10 at 9–10 (failing to mention Johnson’s claims under § 1692c(c)).)
The Court addresses each provision in turn. In doing so, we are mindful that “to give effect to
the Act’s intent to protect the gullible as well as the shrewd,” the court must “analyze[ ] the
statutory requirements from the perspective of the least sophisticated debtor.” Id. (quoting
Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 550 F.3d 294, 298 (3d Cir. 2008)).
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(1), (2), and (5)
First, Johnson claims Stillman Law violated § 1692b(1), (2), and (5). (Doc. No. 10 at
10.)
The FDCPA includes a general prohibition that “[e]xcept as provided in section 1692b of
this title” a debt collector may not, “without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to
the debt collector[,] . . . . communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any
person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise

permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.”
15 U.S.C § 1692c(b) (emphasis added). Section 1692b, in turn, allows limited communications
when necessary to determine the consumer’s location. Specifically, it states that when a “debt
collector communicat[es] with any person other than the consumer for the purpose of acquiring
location information about the consumer,” certain restrictions apply. 15 U.S.C. § 1692b
(emphasis added). For example, § 1692b(1) mandates that the representative of the debt
collector must “identify himself, state that he is confirming or correcting location information
concerning the consumer, and, only if expressly requested, identify his employer.” Section
1692b(2), in turn, prohibits the debt collector from telling the other person that the “consumer
owes any debt,” and § 1692b(5) similarly prohibits the debt collector from using “any language

or symbol on any envelope or in the contents of any [mail] communication . . . that indicates that
the debt collector is in the debt collection business or that the communication relates to the
collection of a debt.”
Here, Johnson has not put forth any evidence to suggest Stillman Law violated any
subsection of § 1692b. To the extent that Johnson is arguing Stillman Law violated § 1692b(1),
(2), or (5) because it communicated with Citizens Bank about his debt and personal information,
that argument is unavailing because such communications are authorized by the FDCPA. See 15
U.S.C § 1692c(b) (stating a debt collector may not “without the prior consent of the consumer
given directly to the debt collector . . . . communicate, in connection with the collection of any
debt, with any person other than . . . the creditor. . . .” (emphasis added)). To the extent he
claims his own conversations with Stillman Law violated § 1692b(1), (2), or (5), the claims fail
because such communications are authorized under § 1692c(b), see id., and § 1692b restricts
only those communications that a debt collector has about the consumer’s location “with any

person other than the consumer,” id. § 1692b. Johnson has put forth no evidence that Stillman
Law communicated with anyone but Citizens Bank and himself about the debt, let alone that
those alleged conversations failed to comply with any subsection of § 1692b. See, e.g., Voltz v.
Weiler, No. 1:22cv656, 2023 WL 4060298, at *3 (M.D. N.C. Mar. 22, 2023) (dismissing
§ 1692b(5) claim based on use of company’s logo in debt letter because “Defendants addressed
the debt letter to Plaintiff, and therefore did not use a symbol identifying Defendants as in the
debt collection business when ‘communicating with any person other than the consumer’”
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(2))); Olley v. SunTrust Bank, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-cv-00047-
TCB-RGV, 2021 WL 9624559, at *3 (N.D. Ga. May 14, 2021) (same). Contra. Clayson v.
Rubin & Rothman, 751 F. Supp. 2d 491, 496 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding the debt collector

“communicated with plaintiff’s mother twice about plaintiff’s debt without plaintiff’s
authorization” in violation of §§ 1692(b)(2) and 1692c(b)).9

9 During his deposition, Johnson suggested that Stillman Law violated § 1692b(5)—which
prohibits a debt collector from using “any language or symbol on any envelope . . . that indicates that the
debt collector is in the debt collection business”—because Stillman Law included its name on the
envelopes that it sent to Johnson, and someone who saw that envelope could research the firm’s name and
learn it is in the debt collection business. (See Johnson Dep. Tr. at 60:6–62:18.) But the law firm’s name,
which does not use the word “debt” or “collections,” is not a “symbol . . . that indicates that [Stillman
Law] is in the debt collection business.” Indeed, Johnson’s own testimony concedes that further
investigation is required before anyone would know that the letter involves the collection of a debt. Cf.
15 U.S.C. § 1692f(8) (“A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt
to collect any debt . . . . [T]he following conduct is a violation of this section: Using any language or
symbol, other than the debt collector’s address, on any envelope when communicating with a consumer
by use of the mails or by telegram, except that a debt collector may use his business name if such name
does not indicate that he is in the debt collection business.”); Olley, 2021 WL 9624559, at *3 (“Olley has
not explained how the mere use of the SunTrust logo on the envelope containing its communication
Accordingly, Stillman Law is granted summary judgment on Johnson’s FDCPA claims
premised on violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(1), (2), and (5).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)
Next, Johnson claims Stillman Law violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a) because it did not have
his express consent to contact him about the loan when it sent its initial collections letter on

January 25, 2023. (Doc. No. 10 at 11 ¶ 24.) But § 1692c(a) does not say that debt collectors
must have express written consent from a consumer before reaching out. Instead, that section
states:
(a) Communication with the Consumer Generally. Without
the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector
or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, a debt
collector may not communicate with a consumer in connection with
the collection of any debt—
(1) at an unusual time or place or a time or place known or
which should be known to be inconvenient to the consumer.
In the absence of knowledge of circumstances to the
contrary, a debt collector shall assume that the convenient
time for communicating with a consumer is after 8 o’clock
antemeridian and before 9 o’clock postmeridian, local time
at the consumer’s location;
(2) if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented
by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge
of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney’s name and
address, unless the attorney fails to respond within a
reasonable period of time to a communication from the debt
collector or unless the attorney consents to direct
communication with the consumer; or
(3) at the consumer’s place of employment if the debt
collector knows or has reason to know that the consumer’s
employer prohibits the consumer from receiving such
communication.
15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a) (emphases added). Johnson has not alleged, let alone put forth evidence to

indicated that it was in the debt collection business. . . .” (cleaned up)).
show, that Stillman Law communicated with him about the debt at an unusual time or place, that
he was ever represented by an attorney in connection with the debt, or that Stillman Law sent its
communications to Johnson’s place of employment. As such, Stillman Law is entitled to
summary judgment on his FDCPA claim premised on a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a).

3. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(2)
Third, Johnson claims that Stillman law violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(2), which prohibits a
debt collector from using “obscene or profane language the natural consequence of which is to
abuse the hearer or reader.” (Doc. No. 10 at 11 ¶ 25.) Johnson does not identify which language
in Stillman Law’s communications he considers “obscene or profane.” (See generally id. But cf.
Johnson’s Dep. Tr. at 84:10–85:20 (testifying that “a debt collector reaching out to me. That’s—
that’s—to me, the way I took it, that’s obscene and profane”).) And the Court’s independent
review of the letters reveals that the language used was neither abusive nor harassing. To the
contrary, the language used “is typical, benign informational language that often appears in a
collection letter.” Murray v. Capio Partners, Civil No. 23-842, 2023 WL 4956443, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 3, 2023) (dismissing claim brought under § 1692d(2)); see also Jeter v. Credit Bureau,

Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1178 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[I]t is clear that, when read in context, subsection
(2) was meant to deter offensive language which . . . might encompass name-calling, racial or
ethnic slurs, and other derogatory remarks which are similar in their offensiveness to obscene or
profane remarks. . . . The language of Credit Bureau’s letters is not remotely offensive. The
letters contained no personal comments directed towards Jeter. Thus, subsection (2) does not
encompass Jeter’s claim.”). Accordingly, summary judgment is also entered in Stillman Law’s
favor on Johnson’s FDCPA claim to the extent it is premised on a violation of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692d(2).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2) and (10)
Next, Johnson claims Stillman Law willfully violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, which prohibits
a debt collector from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in
connection with the collection of any debt.” (Doc. No. 10 at 11 ¶¶ 26–27.) Johnson specifically
references subparagraphs (2)(A) and (10) of that section (see id.), which respectively prohibit the

“false representation of . . . the character, amount or legal status of any debt” and the “use of any
false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or obtain
information concerning a consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A), (10); see also McLaughlin v.
Phelan Hallinan & Schmieg, LLP, 756 F.3d 240, 246 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Each of these provisions
deals with debt collectors’ representations to debtors.”). Johnson disputes that he owes any debt
to Citizens Bank and argues that because Stillman Law’s letters identify this debt and assert that
it is owed by him, their communications were necessarily “false” and “deceptive.” (Doc. No.
23-1 at 9.)
Stillman Law argues that these claims fail because Johnson “has produced no evidence”
to support the proposition that he “is not responsible for the loan.” (Doc. No. 20-10 at 10.) But

that is not entirely true. Although Johnson’s deposition reads like he is trying to teach a Master
Class in semantics and word play, he does clearly deny ever having applied for the Citizens Bank
loan. (See Johnson Dep. Tr. at 42:23–25 (“Q. But it’s your position you never applied for that
loan? A. Correct.”); id. at 79:17–21 (“[Q.] So whether as a natural person, as a consumer, as
Gary Johnson, as you and I are talking here today, or as Johnson, colon, Gary, agent, slash,
beneficiary, have you ever made an application to Citizens Bank for an education refinance?
A. No.”).) As dubious as this testimony may be,10 the Court cannot make credibility

10 As noted previously, Johnson concedes that the loan application contains his full name, social
security number, and date of birth. (Johnson Dep. Tr. at 15:4–12.) The application also contains
determinations at summary judgment and must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
Johnson. See supra n.2. So , the Court has no choice but to find an issue of fact as to whether
Stillman Law’s communications included “false statements” about the “legal status” of the
debt—i.e., Stillman Law stated Johnson owed $73,825 to Citizens Bank when he did not.11 See

Stuart v. AR Resources, Inc., Civil Action No. 10–3520, 2011 WL 904167, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
16, 2011) (“Courts within the Third Circuit have consistently held that an attempt to collect a
debt from a non-debtor constitutes a ‘false representation’ as to the character or status of the debt
in violation of 1692e.”); Velazquez v. NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., Civil Action No. 2:11–CV–00263,
2011 WL 2135633, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 31, 2011) (“[W]e find that demanding payment from the
wrong individual, even where the collector mistakenly sends one letter may give rise to a claim
under the FDCPA as a matter of law.”); see also Dutton v. Wolhar, 809 F. Supp. 1130, 1137 (D.
Del. 1992) (“An issue of fact exists as to whether an unsophisticated consumer, upon receiving
defendants’ letter to plaintiff Dutton, would believe himself legally obligated to pay the debt
incurred by his father. Dutton’s motion for partial summary judgment on defendants’ alleged §

1692e(2)(A) violation will be denied.”). Accordingly, Stillman Law’s motion for summary

Johnson’s father’s correct full name, social security number, and date of birth. (See Gary Johnson, Sr.
Dep. Tr. at 28:18–29:10.) Johnson also made payments to Citizens Bank in connection with the loan
from 2015 to 2021. (See Doc. No. 23 at 2–3 ¶ 6.)
11 Stillman Law’s Amended Answer asserts an affirmative defense based on § 1692k(c). (See
Doc. No. 14 at 4.) That section states, “A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought
under this subchapter if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was
not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures
reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). Stillman Law did not, however,
argue this defense at summary judgment (see generally Doc. Nos. 20, 24), so the Court does not consider
it further, see, e.g., Evankavitch v. Green Tree Serv’g, LLC, 793 F.3d 355, 363 (3d Cir. 2015) (explaining
that § 1692k(c) “explicitly places the burden on the debt collector to prove that it acted unintentionally
and had procedures in place to avoid such an error”); Johnson v. Riddle, 443 F.3d 723, 727–28 (10th Cir.
2006) (“[A]n FDCPA defendant seeking the protection of the bona fide error defense carries the burden of
proving that the violation was 1) unintentional, 2) a bona fide error, and 3) made despite the maintenance
of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid the error.”).
judgment is denied as to Johnson’s FDCPA claim premised on a violation of § 1692e(2)(A).
The Court does, however, grant summary judgment in Stillman Law’s favor on Johnson’s
FDCPA claim premised on a violation of § 1692e(10) because it is duplicative of Johnson’s
claim under § 1692e(2)(A). See Beattie, 754 F. Supp. at 394 (“Plaintiffs have alleged no false or

deceptive conduct beyond the fact that defendants demanded payment from persons who were
not responsible for the debt and the alleged threat of a lawsuit. The court has already found that
defendants’ statements that the debt was owed by plaintiffs may best be characterized as a
representation concerning the status or character of the debt. Consequently, the conduct
complained of has been specifically addressed by subsection 1692e(2)(A).”); cf. Dutton, 809 F.
Supp. at 1140–41 (“Because O’Dell has failed to assert any action by defendant not already
specifically addressed by other provisions of the FDCPA, her motion for partial summary
judgment under § 1692e(10) will be denied.”).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1692j(a)
Last, Johnson argues that Stillman Law willfully violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692j(a). (Doc.
No. 10 at 11 ¶ 28.) That provision makes it “unlawful to design, compile, and furnish any form

knowing that such form would be used to create the false belief in a consumer that a person other
than the creditor . . . is participating in the collection or in an attempt to collect a debt” that the
consumer owes to the creditor, “when in fact such person is not so participating.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692j(a). Section 1692j(a) “imposes liability on parties who provide creditors with dunning
letters12 that create a false impression that someone other than the creditor is trying to collect the
debt.” Anthes v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 162, 167 (D. Del. 1991). The legislative

12 A “dunning letter” is an “insistent or repeated demand[ ] for payment.” Campuzano-Burgos v.
Midland Credit Mgmt., 550 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2008).
history of the FDCPA explains that this provision targets a practice known as “flat-rating,”
where a person sends “creditors a set of dunning letters bearing the letter-head of the flat-rater’s
collection agency” and insisting “the debtor pay the creditor at once.” Id. (quoting S. Rep. No.
382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5). The creditor then sends these letters to the debtor, “giving the

impression that a third party debt collector is collecting the debt,” when in fact, the “flat-rater is
not in the business of debt collection,” and merely sells dunning letters. Id. at 167–68 (quoting
S. Rep. No. 382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5); see also id. (describing the practice as “inherently
deceptive” (quoting S. Rep. No. 382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5)).
Johnson has not put forth any evidence to suggest Stillman Law violated § 1692j(a).
“First, § 1692j(a) only applies to situations w[h]ere a third party provides a creditor with dunning
letters,” but “there is no evidence, or even an allegation, that anyone provided the creditor” in
this case, Citizens Bank, “with dunning letters.” Id. at 168; see also Clark v. Ratchford Law
Grp., PC, No. 5:21-cv-03358, 2022 WL 837241, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2022) (“[Section]
1692j(a) governs the conduct of form sellers, and Clark has not alleged that Galaxy is a form

seller covered by § 1692j. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed.”). Second, Stillman Law’s
letters did not create a “false” impression that someone other than Citizens Bank was trying to
collect Johnson’s outstanding debt. To the contrary, the letters created the true impression that
Stillman Law was involved in collecting the debt. See Anthes, 765 F. Supp. at 168; see also
Alfaro v. Client Servs., Inc., Civil Action No. 11-05462 (CCC), 2012 WL 1150845, at *3 (D.N.J.
Apr. 5, 2012) (“Plaintiff . . . does not allege that Defendant had not actually been retained by [the
creditor] or that Defendant was otherwise not involved in the effort to collect the debt. As such,
the Complaint fails to allege facts that could plausibly state a claim under § 1692j(a)”). Third,
both parties agree that Stillman Law is a “debt collector,” not a “flat rater,” and “§ 1692j only
applies to ‘flat raters.’” Anthes, 765 F. Supp. at 168 (explaining that a defendant “can be either a
‘debt collector’ or a ‘flat rater,’ but not both”).
Accordingly, Stillman Law is entitled to summary judgment on Johnson’s FDCPA claim
premised on a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692j(a).

* * *
In sum, Stillman Law’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to Johnson’s FDCPA
claims premised on violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b(1), 1692b(2), 1692b(5), 1692c(a),
1692d(2), 1692e(10), and 1692j(a). The motion is denied as to Johnson’s FDCPA claims
premised on violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(c)13 and 1692e(2)(A).
C. Violations of the FCEUA
That leaves Johnson’s claims Stillman Law violated the FCEUA. That statute provides,
“It shall constitute an unfair or deceptive debt collection act or practice under this act if a debt
collector violates any of the provisions of the [FDCPA].” 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2270.4(a).
Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”) “provides the
private cause of action for FCEUA claims,”14 and to survive summary judgment on a UTPCPL

claim, the plaintiff must put forth evidence that they “‘suffered an ascertainable loss as a result
of a defendant’s prohibited action.’” Jarzyna v. Home Props., L.P., 185 F. Supp. 3d 612, 626

13 As noted above, Stillman Law sought summary judgment as to all of Johnson’s claims but did
not discuss this provision in its motion. (Doc. No. 20-10 at 9–10 (failing to mention Johnson’s claims
under § 1692c(c)).)
14 Recognizing this principle, Stillman Law argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on
Johnson’s claim premised on a violation of the FCEUA because he “does not plead a cause of action
under the UTPCPL in his Complaint and has thus offered the Court no basis upon which to grant him
relief under the FCEUA.” (Doc. No. 20-10 at 11.) But Johnson does reference the UTPCPL in his
Complaint, noting that a violation of the FCEUA is a violation of the UTPCPL. (See Doc. No. 10 at 10
¶ 16.) Because Johnson is proceeding pro se, the Court broadly construes his Complaint as bringing a
claim under the UTPCPL. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021). Nevertheless, for the reasons
discussed in this section, Stillman Law is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
(E.D. Pa. 2016) (quoting Kern v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 180 A.2d 1281, 1290 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2015)); see also Gress v. Freedom Mortg. Corp., 386 F. Supp. 3d 455, 470–71 (M.D. Pa. 2019)
(“[T]he FCEUA ‘does not provide its own private cause of action; rather, it is enforced through
the remedial provision of the UTPCPL.’” (quoting Kaymark v. Bank of Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 168,

182 (3d Cir. 2015))); Hall v. Equifax Info. Servs. LLC, 204 F. Supp. 3d 807, 812 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
Here, Johnson has not put forth any evidence that he suffered an ascertainable loss as a
result of Stillman Law’s conduct. Although Johnson claims he has had to pay for legal filing
fees and for transportation to and from the courthouse (Doc. No. 23 at 5 ¶ 17), neither constitutes
an “ascertainable loss” under the UTPCPL. See Hall, 204 F. Supp. 3d at 812 (rejecting the
plaintiff’s argument that “legal fees” constitute an ascertainable loss under the UTPCPL); cf.
Grimes v. Enterprise Leasing Co. of Phila., LLC, 105 A.3d 1188, 1193 (Pa. 2014) (holding that
“the mere acquisition of counsel would not suffice to satisfy the ‘ascertainable loss’
requirement” and rejecting the appellee’s contrary reading of the statute because that “reading
would allow a plaintiff to manufacture the ‘ascertainable loss’ required to bring a private

UTPCPL claim simply by obtaining counsel to bring a private UTPCPL claim; we presume that
such an unreasonable result was not intended by the General Assembly”).
Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in Stillman Law’s favor on Johnson’s
UTPCPL claim premised on violations of the FCEUA.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, Johnson’s motion for summary judgment is denied. Stillman Law’s motion for
summary judgment is denied in part and granted in part. The motion is denied as to Johnson’s
FDCPA claims premised on violations of § 1692c(c) and § 1692e(2)(A). The motion is granted,
and judgment is entered in Stillman Law’s favor on Johnson’s remaining claims. Because this
case qualifies for the Court’s mandatory arbitration program, it will be scheduled for
arbitration.15 An appropriate order follows.

15 This case was initially scheduled to go to arbitration on January 17, 2024, but the Court
cancelled that arbitration with the understanding that it would be rescheduled if necessary following the
adjudication of dispositive motions. (See Doc. No. 19.)

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10406995. Public record. Not legal advice.