# MILLER v. COUNTY OF CHESTER

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · January 19, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10406630

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** January 19, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

NICHOLAS PAUL MILLER, et al., : CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : NO. 23-3992
:
COUNTY OF CHESTER, et al., :
Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM
MURPHY, J. January 19, 2024
Plaintiffs Nicholas Paul Miller and Matthew Davis (“Plaintiffs”), pretrial detainees
housed at the Chester County Prison (“CCP”), filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, asserting violations of their constitutional rights arising from the conditions of
their confinement at CCP. Currently before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Complaint (“Compl.” (DI
2)), their separate motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (DI 1, 6), and their Prisoner
Trust Fund Account Statements (DI 3, 7). Plaintiffs assert claims against the following
Defendants: Chester County, the Chester County Health Department, the Chester County District
Attorney’s Office,1 CCP, the CCP Maintenance Department, current CCP Warden Holland,
former CCP Warden Phillips, CCP Director Mulrooney,2 CCP Captain Hamb, CCP Q-Block
Serg. Sauer, CCP Q-Block John/Jane Doe Correctional Officers on duty May 19, 2023 through

1 Counsel has filed an entry of appearance on behalf of the Chester County District
Attorney’s Office and a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against that Defendant. (DI 11, 10.)
For the reasons set forth herein, the motion will be denied as moot.

2 There are no factual allegations in the Complaint describing any conduct engaged in by
Mulrooney and for this reason the claims against him will be dismissed, albeit without prejudice.
See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (“A defendant in a civil rights
action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs” to be liable.).
September 20, 2023, and CCP F-Block John/Jane Doe Correctional Officers on duty from May
19, 2023 through September 20, 2023.3 (Compl. at 3, 4, 6-7.) 4 All Defendants are sued in their
“Professional Capacities.”5 (Id. at 6-7.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant Mr.
Miller and Mr. Davis leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss with prejudice their claims

against CCP, its Maintenance Department, the Chester County Health Department, and the
Chester County District Attorneys’ Office. Plaintiffs’ individual capacity asserting violations of
the Americans with Disabilities Act will also be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs’ official

3 Included in Plaintiffs’ Complaint a list of individuals described as, “The List of CCP &
PrimeCare, Inc. Employees.” (Compl. at 17.) Many of the individuals identified are not listed as
Defendants in the caption of the Complaint or on the list that purports to supplement the
Complaint form’s section for identification of Defendants. (See id. at 6-7.) It is not clear
whether Plaintiffs intend to pursue claims against these other parties. Upon amendment,
Plaintiffs will have an opportunity to clarify their intentions in this regard.

4 The Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.

5 Plaintiffs checked boxes on their form Complaint indicating that they were asserting
their claims against CCP, Chester County, Chester County Health Department, and the Chester
County District Attorney’s Office in their official capacities. (Compl. at 2, 8.) On the
handwritten sheets listing the remaining Defendants, Plaintiffs included the phrase “Prof
Capacity,” which the Court understands to mean official capacity, in each entry. (Id. at 6, 7.)
Plaintiffs appear not to have understood the implications of asserting their claims against the
Defendants in their official capacity only. Official capacity claims against municipal employees
such as the named individual Defendants are indistinguishable from claims against the
governmental entity that employs the Defendant, here Chester County. See Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way
of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’”) (quoting Monell v.
N.Y.C. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978)). “[A]n official-capacity suit is, in
all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Id. The Court will
liberally construe the Complaint to assert claims against the individual Defendants in their
individual capacities as well. See Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir.
2020) (“To determine whether a plaintiff sued state officials in their official capacity, we first
look to the complaints and the course of proceedings.” (quotations omitted)); Coward v. City of
Philadelphia, No. 21-1619, 2021 WL 4169422, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2021) (permitting claim
against defendant in his individual capacity to proceed even though “[plaintiff] did not check the
box indicating a desire to sue [that defendant] in his individual capacity” where the allegations
clearly sought relief based on the defendant’s conduct).
capacity civil rights claims against the individual Defendants will be dismissed as duplicative of
the claims against Chester County. Plaintiffs’ remaining claims will be dismissed without
prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Plaintiffs will be
granted leave to file an amended complaint.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS6
The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ claims is that from May 19, 2023 through September 24,
2023, they were exposed to black mold at CCP, informed prison personnel and others orally and
in writing about the problem, and the prison’s efforts to ameliorate the problem was inadequate.
To state their claims, Plaintiffs completed the Court’s prisoner civil rights form Complaint and
supplemented it with handwritten pages. (See Compl.) The first set of handwritten pages
describing the events giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims is presented journal style and is written in
the first person but does not identify which plaintiff wrote the entries. (Id. at 9-18.) The second
set is presented in the form of a signed Affidavit provided by Nicholas Miller. (Id. at 21-24.)
While the first section does not identify the drafter, since it is in a different handwriting than Mr.

Miller’s portion, construing the Complaint liberally, the Court will presume for purposes of
statutory screening that the first set of handwritten pages is a narrative written by Matthew
Davis.
A. Mr. Davis’s Allegations
On June 27, 2023, Mr. Davis smelled mold on Q-Block. (Id. at 9.) Over the next week,
Mr. Davis thoroughly cleaned the cell with bleach and other chemicals, but the smell remained.
(Id.) On July 6, Mr. Davis alleges that he exchanged his used sheets for clean ones and noticed a

6 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Plaintiffs’
Complaint (DI 2).
two-by-two-foot patch of black spots on the underside of his mattress. (Id.) Mr. Davis informed
Block Officer Kennedy that he had been sleeping on a mattress with black mold on it and that he
had asthma. Block Officer Kennedy replied that there was nothing he could do, but Mr. Davis
should submit a request to the Block Supervisor. (Id.) Mr. Davis did so. (Id.)

Mr. Davis alleges that the next day, he informed the (unnamed) Q-Block Officer that he
had black mold on his mattress and that he had asthma. (Id.) The Officer replied that he had
heard that the Maintenance Department was ordering new mattresses for the entire jail. (Id.)
The same day, Mr. Davis sent a written request to Captain Maznack asking to switch cells or
exchange his mattress for a clean one in light of his asthma and heart problems. He also asked
that the vents in his cell be cleaned. (Id. at 10.) Mr. Davis received no response to the request.
On July 10, Mr. Davis alleges that he unsuccessfully requested that the Block Officer call
the Medical Department so that he could receive a breathing treatment. (Id.) He further alleges
that he had experienced chest pains, headaches, and dizziness for ten days by that point. (Id.)
On July 12, Defendant Ham (sometimes spelled “Hamb”) and Sauer (sometimes spelled “Secar”)

inspected Mr. Davis’s mattress, whereupon Defendant Ham remarked that the mold problem was
bad and that he would speak to Maintenance about replacing the mattress immediately. (Id.) He
also instructed Defendant Sauer to call Maintenance. (Id.) Later that day, Defendant Sauer
returned to Mr. Davis’s cell and informed Mr. Davis that Maintenance had been contacted but
that he would need to be patient as replacing the mattress would take at least a month. (Id. at
11.)
On July 13, Correctional Officer Stuart asked Mr. Davis if he had black mold on his
mattress, asked to see it, then wrote down Mr. Davis’s name. (Id.) Later that day, Mr. Davis
followed up on a request for a grievance form to which he had received no response and was told
that there was a “Grievance Box” on the quad where forms were available. (Id.) Mr. Davis
alleges that the available forms are styled “Complaint” not “Grievance” and that to the extent
there is a new grievance procedure it was not explained to him. (Id. at 12.)
On July 14, a non-defendant named Sergeant Diori called Mr. Davis to the “bubble” on

Q-Block and aggressively asked Mr. Davis about his grievance. (Id. at 12-13.) He then told Mr.
Davis, “This is not a f***ing grievable issue, what’s your problem,” tore up Mr. Davis’s
grievance and threw it in the trash. (Id. at 13.) Sergeant Diori then told Mr. Davis to complete a
grievance form while Sergeant Diori waited. Mr. Davis did so and upon handing the completed
grievance to Sergeant Diori, Sergeant Diori repeated that the issue (black mold on Mr. Davis’s
mattress and in his cell) was not grievable, tore up the grievance form, and threw it in the trash.
(Id.)
On July 15, Mr. Davis submitted a grievance describing the black mold on his mattress
and was told by an unidentified person that if he refused to continue sleeping on the mattress in
his cell, he would be sent to the “hole.” (Id. at 13-14.) Mr. Davis alleges that later that day he

was refused a breathing treatment by an unnamed Medical Assistant, who told him that his blood
oxygen level was 97% and that she heard no wheezing. (Id. at 14.) Mr. Davis responded that his
lungs hurt and that he had been exposed to black mold, but the Medical Assistant responded only
that his claim sounded like a dangerous situation but that she had no control over it. (Id.)
Mr. Davis alleges that over the next several days, he continued to smell mold in his cell
and experienced sore lungs, itchy throat, dizziness and disorientation, and returned to the
Medical Department for chest pains and a breathing treatment. (Id. at 14.) On July 18, Mr.
Davis was brought to the Medical Department, where he saw Captain Maznack and told him that
he had received no response to his complaints and requests regarding the black mold in his cell
and on his mattress. (Id. at 14-15.) Captain Maznack responded that it was unacceptable that
Mr. Davis had been waiting for a response for nearly a month and that he would handle the
problem immediately. (Id. at 15.) He also remarked, “Man, that s**t’s dangerous.” (Id.) Mr.
Davis alleges that during the July 18 visit to the Medical Department, a physician’s assistant

repeated that black mold is dangerous and could affect Mr. Davis’s asthma and cause lung
infections. (Id.)
Mr. Davis alleges that the next evening, he was taken to Chester County Hospital because
of chest pains. (Id.) He received blood work and an EKG, but hospital personnel were not able
to determine the cause of the problem. (Id. at 15-16.) Mr. Davis was returned to CCP where he
remained on the medical block for observation for two days, after which he was returned to his
original cell. (Id. at 15-16.)
Mr. Davis alleges that on July 21, he submitted another grievance about the black mold.
(Id. at 16.) He alleges that on July 22, he experienced itchy throat and eyes, chest pains,
difficulty breathing, dizziness, insomnia, anxiety, and disorientation. (Id.) Later that day, an

unnamed Correctional Officer came to Mr. Davis’s cell and asked if he had black mold on his
mattress. (Id.) Mr. Davis replied yes and was told to take a different mattress from an empty
cell on the block. (Id.) Mr. Davis alleges that one of the mattresses in the cell also had black
mold on it, and that the unnamed Correctional Officer instructed Mr. Davis to take that mattress
and the moldy mattress from his cell to the Sally-Port. (Id. at 16-17.) Mr. Davis did so but
secured a large piece of his moldy mattress for his “records.” (Id. at 17.)
Mr. Davis alleges that on September 11, he was transferred to F-Block and upon arriving
at the new cell discovered that the mattress had black mold on it. (Id. at 18.) Mr. Davis
informed the Correctional Officer on the Block and was provided with a clean mattress
immediately. (Id. at 18.) Mr. Davis alleges that, as of September 25, he has not received a
response to his grievance and is unaware of the outcome. (Id.)
B. Mr. Miller’s Allegations
Mr. Miller sets forth his allegations in a signed Affidavit.7 (Id. at 21-24.) Mr. Miller

asserts that the culture at CCP improved during the period from May 19, 2023 through October
7, 2023, which he attributes to Defendant Holland’s assumption of the position as Warden. (Id.
at 21.) Mr. Miller nonetheless alleges that during the time he has been detained at CCP, he
experienced first-hand the administration’s “failed, understaffed, poorly enforced safety and
health Policy.” (Id.) Mr. Miller alleges that black mold has been allowed to develop throughout
CCP, notwithstanding the danger associated with it. (Id. at 21-22.) He alleges that he and Mr.
Davis individually both spoke with and wrote to prison personnel and outside agencies
persistently about the situation. (Id. at 22.) He alleges, however, that he has spent six months
living in what he describes as toxic conditions that endanger both inmates and staff. (Id.)
Mr. Miller admits that he does not know whether black mold spores will have an adverse

effect on his health in the future. (Id.) He references the recent COVID protocols and questions
why there is currently an issue with air-borne pathogens at CCP and why the vent and moisture
removal systems are in their current (undescribed) conditions. (Id.) He asserts that the “old
guard[’s] personnel and maintenance policy” has shown deliberate indifference to the condition
of these systems and describes CCP as “an unsupervised basement where no governing body
performs any double checks, outside of reports, facts, and findings.” (Id. at 22-23.)

7 The Court notes that the document is signed by both Mr. Miller and Mr. Davis, and the
Court will, therefore, attribute the allegations therein to both Plaintiffs. (Id. at 24.)
Mr. Miller alleges that the prison administration has been able to maintain ignorance of
the black mold conditions because of the “filtered” grievance process and policy in place during
the relevant time. (Id. at 23.) He asserts that the administration has engaged in deliberate
indifference to the long-term health benefits of both inmates and staff. (Id.) Mr. Miller alleges

that the new administration has acknowledged the black mold problem and have begun efforts to
clear it. (Id. at 23-24.) These efforts, however, have been unsuccessful and have merely spread
more mold into the air, because of the prison personnel’s inexperience with addressing mold
infestations and a lack of processes and policies governing the treatment of mold. (Id. at 23-24.)
Mr. Miller asserts that the failed policies of the previous administration reflect historical
indifference to maintenance of the facility and safety of the staff and inmates. (Id. at 24.)
Mr. Miller requests that the Court find CCP and Chester County liable for failed policies
that continue to put lives at risk. (Id. at 23.) He asks that the Court award damages to him and to
Mr. Davis for services rendered and hardships endured. (Id.) He also requests that CCP’s in-
house processes and procedures be evaluated and that the facility be brought into compliance

with its (undescribed) documentation. (Id.) He also requests that OSHA (presumably the
Occupational Health and Safety Administration) assess CCP’s conditions, policies and practices
and report its findings to the Court. (Id.)
Jointly, Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Miller sent written notice of the mold issue to the
Chester County Health Department, the Chester County District Attorney’s Office, and Chester
County. (Id. at 20.) They further allege that their claims arise from CCP’s grievance system, the
failure of the CCP Maintenance Department and staff to know about or have a mold removal
process, and the deliberate indifference of CCP to the potential for harm because of exposure to
black mold. (Id.)
Plaintiffs assert claims for deliberate indifference, for violations of their Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, and for violations of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (Id. at
8.) The “Injuries” section of the form Complaint lists auditory hallucinations, depression, weight
gain and breathing issues, and hospitalization, presumably as a result of exposure to black mold.

(Id. at 25.) This section does not identify which Plaintiff experienced these injuries. Plaintiffs
request injunctive relief and money damages. (Id.)
Included with Plaintiffs’ Complaint is a handwritten document titled “Affidavit” that
appears to have been signed by a non-party named Jacob Fulton. The document states that Mr.
Fulton was provided with a mattress with black mold on it when he arrived at intake on N-Block
on February 22, 2023. (Id. at 19.) The document further states that when Mr. Fulton requested a
new mattress, he was told, “[n]ot gonna happen.” (Id.) When Mr. Fulton was placed in the
general population, he was again provided with a mattress with black mold on it but was allowed
to switch it for a clean one. (Id.) When Mr. Fulton was later placed in Restricted Housing for a
month beginning in June 2023, he noted that all cells had mats with black mold on them. (Id.)

The purpose of this document is unclear.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court will grant Mr. Miller and Mr. Davis leave to proceed in forma pauperis
because it appears that they are incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action.8
Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails
to state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed

8 However, as Plaintiffs are prisoners, they will each be obligated to pay the full filing
fee in installments in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b). See Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 155 (3d Cir. 2009).
by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the
Court to determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(quotations omitted). “At this early stage of the litigation,’ ‘[the Court will] accept the facts
alleged in [the pro se] complaint as true,’ ‘draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s]
favor,’ and ‘ask only whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to
state a plausible [] claim.’” Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting
Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)). Conclusory allegations do not
suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). As Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, the
Court construes their allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021)
(citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).
Moreover, a complaint may be dismissed for failing to comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8. Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 91 (3d Cir. 2019). To conform to Rule 8,

a pleading must contain a short and plain statement showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.
See Travaline v. U.S. Supreme Court, 424 F. App’x 78, 79 (3d Cir. 2011). The Third Circuit
recently explained that in determining whether a pleading meets Rule 8’s “plain” statement
requirement, the Court should “ask whether, liberally construed, a pleading ‘identifies discrete
defendants and the actions taken by these defendants’ in regard to the plaintiff’s claims.”
Garrett, 938 F.3d at 93 (citation omitted). A pleading may still satisfy the “plain” statement
requirement “even if it is vague, repetitious, or contains extraneous information” and “even if it
does not include every name, date, and location of the incidents at issue.” Id. at 93-94. The
important consideration for the Court is whether, “a pro se complaint’s language . . . presents
cognizable legal claims to which a defendant can respond on the merits.” Id. at 94.
However, “a pleading that is so ‘vague or ambiguous’ that a defendant cannot reasonably
be expected to respond to it will not satisfy Rule 8.” Id. at 93; see also Fabian v. St. Mary’s

Med. Ctr., No. 16-4741, 2017 WL 3494219, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2017) (“Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8 requires that pleadings provide enough information to put a defendant on
sufficient notice to prepare their defense and also ensure that the Court is sufficiently informed to
determine the issue.”) (quotations omitted). Dismissals under Rule 8 are “‘reserved for those
cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that
its true substance, if any, is well disguised.’” Garrett, 938 F.3d at 94 (quoting Salahuddin v.
Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988)). In this case, the Defendants cannot meaningfully
respond to Mr. Miller’s conditions of confinement claims because he does not provide sufficient
factual allegations to permit the Defendants to understand the nature and basis of the claims
against them. See Afzal v. N.J. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, No. 22-1609, 2022 WL 4533826, at *3 (3d

Cir. Sept. 28, 2022) (affirming dismissal of complaint pursuant to Rule 8 because plaintiff failed
to plead adequate factual content to support a reasonable inference that defendants were liable
and failed to present cognizable legal claims to which defendants could respond on the merits).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs assert constitutional claims based on violations of their constitutional rights
arising from the longstanding presence of black mold at CCP and ineffective efforts to remove it.
The vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal court is 42 U.S.C. §
1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs” to
be liable. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207; Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020)
(“Personal involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal direction or of actual

knowledge and acquiescence.’” (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207)). See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676
(explaining that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must
plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution”).
A. Claims Against Chester County Prison and its Maintenance Department
The § 1983 claim against Chester County Prison is not plausible because a prison is not a
“person” under Section 1983. Cephas v. George W. Hill Corr. Facility, No. 09-6014, 2010 WL
2854149, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2010); Miller v. Curran-Fromhold Corr. Facility, No. 13-7680,
2014 WL 4055846, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2014) (citing Mitchell v. Chester Cty. Farms Prison,
426 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1976). Similarly, the prison’s Maintenance Department appears to be

a department of CCP and therefore not a “person” subject to suit under 1983. See Hall-Wadley
v. Maint. Dep’t, No. 19-193, ECF No. 5 (dismissing as frivolous claims against CCP’s
Maintenance Department and citing Collins v. S. Central Reg’l Jail, No. 16-08015, 2018 WL
3550112 (S.D. W. Va. June 25, 2018) (noting that a regional jail’s maintenance department was
not a person under § 1983), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 3543080 (S.D. W.
Va. Jul. 23, 2018)). The claims against these Defendants will be dismissed with prejudice.
B. Claims Against Chester County District Attorney’s Office
The claims against the Chester County District Attorney’s Office must be dismissed with
prejudice because the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that district
attorney’s offices in Pennsylvania are not entities subject to suit under § 1983. See Reitz v.
County. of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 148 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that “the Bucks County District
Attorney’s Office is not an entity for purposes of § 1983 liability”); see also Briggs v. Moore,
251 F. App’x 77, 79 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“[T]he Monmouth County Prosecutor’s Office

is not a separate entity that can be sued under § 1983.”). Even if the Chester County District
Attorney’s Office was an entity liable under § 1983, the Plaintiffs have failed to allege that entity
was involved in the mold problem at CCP. The claims against this Defendant will be dismissed
with prejudice.
C. Civil Rights Claims Against Chester County
1. Claims Against the Chester County Health Department
Claims against a county agency like the Chester County Health Department are treated as
claims against the county itself. Kane v. Chester Cty. Dep’t of Child., Youth & Fams., 10 F.
Supp. 3d 671, 686 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (concluding that the Chester County Department of Children,
Youth and Families is not a legal entity separate from the County of Chester and evaluating

claims as if brought against the County itself). See https://www.chesco.org/8/Departments
(Chester County official website listing Health Department as county office) (last accessed
January 16, 2024). “Pennsylvania county offices . . . are treated as municipalities for purposes of
Monell [v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978).]” Hatfield v. Berube,
714 F. App’x. 99, 102 n.1 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Mulholland v. Gov’t Cty. of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d
227, 237 (3d Cir. 2013)). The claims against the Chester County Health Department will be
dismissed with prejudice as duplicative of the claims against Chester County.
2. Official Capacity Claims Against Employees of Chester County
As noted, Plaintiffs indicated in their Complaint that they were asserting claims against
the individual Defendants in their official capacities. (See Compl. at 6, 7.) These official
capacity claims are indistinguishable from claims against the municipality at issue, here, Chester
County. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66 (“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only

another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’”) (quoting
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, n. 55). “[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to
be treated as a suit against the entity.” Id. To the extent the named Defendants are sued in their
official capacities, any such claims are dismissed as duplicative of the claims against Chester
County. See Stanek v. St. Charles Cty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 303, 783 F.3d 634, 644 (7th Cir.
2015) (“The district court correctly dismissed these defendants in their official capacity because
the Staneks also sued the District.”); Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 783 (4th Cir. 2004)
(“The district court correctly held that the § 1983 claim against Martin in his official capacity as
Superintendent is essentially a claim against the Board and thus should be dismissed as
duplicative.”); see also Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (“As long as the government entity receives

notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name,
to be treated as a suit against the entity.”).
3. Claims Against Chester County
Plaintiffs assert claims against Chester County. Local governments can be liable as
“persons” under § 1983, however, this liability extends only to “their own illegal acts.” Connick
v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (emphasis in original) (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475
U.S. 469, 479 (1986)); see Monell, 436 U.S. at 665-83. This limitation is based on the well-
established principle that municipalities “are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for their
employees’ actions.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 60; Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (“[A] municipality
cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor — or, in other words, a municipality
cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”).
Rather, to plead a basis for liability against a municipal entity such as Chester County
under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the municipality’s policy or custom caused the violation

of his constitutional rights. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 69. “To satisfy the pleading standard, [the
plaintiff] must . . . specify what exactly that custom or policy was.” McTernan v. City of York,
Pa., 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). “‘Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation,
policy, or edict.’” Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)). “‘Custom, on the other
hand, can be proven by showing that a given course of conduct, although not specifically
endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.’”
Id. (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990)). For a custom to be the
proximate cause of an injury, a plaintiff must establish that the Defendant “had knowledge of

similar unlawful conduct in the past, failed to take precautions against future violations, and that
its failure, at least in part, led to [plaintiff’s] injury.” Id. (internal quotations and alterations
omitted). It is not enough, however, to allege the existence of a policy or custom. “A plaintiff
must also allege that the policy or custom was the ‘proximate cause’ of his injuries.” Estate of
Roman, 914 F.3d at 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir.
1996)). This can be done “by demonstrating an ‘affirmative link’ between the policy or custom
and the particular constitutional violation” alleged. Id. Allegations that simply paraphrase the
standard for municipal liability, are too vague and generalized to support a plausible claim. See,
e.g., Szerensci v. Shimshock, No. 20-1296, 2021 WL 4480172, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2021)
(“Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation, which generally paraphrases the relevant standard, is
insufficient to state a claim for § 1983 liability under Monell.”) (citing cases).
Plaintiffs attribute the development of black mold at CCP to “the old administration’s”
alleged custom of understaffing and poor enforcement of its safety and health policy. (Compl. at

21.) They assert that the “old guard” had personnel and maintenance policies constituting
deliberate indifference due to the state of the HVAC system and the potential for resulting harm
to inmates and staff. (Id. at 22.) They also refer to a “filtered” grievance process allowing the
prison administration to purposefully avoid knowledge of the black mold problem at CCP. (Id.
at 23.) They allege that, when attempting to clear the mold from the facility, unknown prison
officials “did what was quick and easy not what was proper or reasonable for the situation.” (Id.
at 24.) They assert that “[t]he long running failed policys [sic] of the previous administration
show a pattern of historical indifference to general maintenance of the facility and safety of staff
and inmates in favor of non-adequate, penny-pinching, cost-cutting remedies.” (Id.) They fault
the CCP Maintenance Department and staff for the facility’s lack of an effective mold removal

process. (Id. at 20.)
In short, Plaintiffs assert in turn that the black mold problem at CCP is the result of lack
of enforcement of safety and health policies, and also the result of an absence of policies
addressing mold removal. However, they do not specify what these policies say or should say.
Other than referencing an “old guard,” they do not identify any specific official who has put
these policies in place or failed to do so. They do not allege that any of the conduct engaged in
by the named Defendants happened because of the policies to which they refer. Thus, their
allegations fall short of stating a plausible municipal liability claim based on policy.
Plaintiffs also point to historic understaffing as a contributing cause to the black mold
problem at CCP. To the extent the seek to allege a municipal liability claim based on a “custom”
of understaffing, they have not done so, because they do not describe how understaffing resulted
in the growth of black mold at CCP.

Plaintiffs have not stated a plausible municipal liability claim and the claim will be
dismissed. Because Plaintiffs may be able to assert a plausible claim, they will be granted leave
to amend this claim.
D. Individual Capacity Civil Rights Claims
1. Conditions of Confinement Claims
The Court understands Plaintiffs to be asserting claims based on the conditions of their
confinement at CCP and the failure of the individual Defendants to successfully remove the
black mold at CCP. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs claims
brought by pretrial detainees. Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166 (3d Cir. 2005). To
establish a basis for a Fourteenth Amendment violation, a prisoner must allege that their

conditions of confinement amount to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979).
“Unconstitutional punishment typically includes both objective and subjective components.”
Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007). “[T]he objective component requires an
inquiry into whether the deprivation was sufficiently serious and the subjective component asks
whether the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. (internal quotations
and alterations omitted).
In that regard, “a ‘particular measure amounts to punishment when there is a showing of
express intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, when the restriction or
condition is not rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive government purpose, or when the
restriction is excessive in light of that purpose.’” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 373 (3d Cir.
2012) (quoting Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 68); Steele v. Cicchi, 855 F.3d 494, 504 (3d Cir. 2017).
Courts should consider the totality of the circumstances in evaluating such a claim. Bistrian, 696
F.3d at 373 (“In evaluating a pretrial detainee’s claim of unconstitutional punishment, courts

must examine the totality of the circumstances within the institution.”). Furthermore, “[i]n
determining whether restrictions or conditions are reasonably related to the Government’s
interest in maintaining security and order and operating the institution in a manageable fashion,”
courts are obligated to keep in mind that “such considerations are peculiarly within the province
and professional expertise of corrections officials.” Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 68 n.3.
The degree of protection afforded pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment is
greater than that afforded convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment. See Hubbard, 399
F.3d at 167 n.23. Thus, cases analyzing prisoner conditions of confinement claims are
instructive, but only to establish a minimum level of protection available to a pretrial detainee.
See Hall-Wadley v. Maint. Dep’t, 386 F.Supp.3d 512, 517 E.D. Pa. 2019) (dismissing claim

based on black mold in shower where pretrial detainee did not allege “actual physical harm from
mold.”) “The presence of toxic mold in a prison may elicit a violation of the Eighth
Amendment, but only if it has posed a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 518. Thus, the
presence of mold without any allegation that it has resulted in harm, does not constitute a
violation. Id. Additionally, a pretrial detainee cannot state a plausible conditions of
confinement claim against a defendant unless that defendant “had actual knowledge [of] or were
otherwise aware of the[ ] conditions and acquiesced in their existence/continuation.” Brown v.
Berks Cty. Jail, No. 23-0780, 2023 WL 3324676, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 0, 2023) (dismissing
pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment claim based on presence of black mold where plaintiff
did not allege that specific defendants were aware of the condition and acquiesced in its
existence or continuation)
a. Mr. Davis’s Claim
Mr. Davis alleges that he was exposed to black mold on his mattress and in the vents in

his cell, that he advised various CCP personnel of the problem, and that he suffered negative
health consequences because of his exposure to mold. (See Compl. at 9-18.) Mr. Miller also
describes the responses he received from various CCP personnel. He alleges that Defendants
Hamb and Sauer observed the mold in his cell and followed up on his complaints by contacting
the Maintenance Department about a new mattress. Defendant Sauer advised Mr. Davis that it
would take at least a month to replace the mattress because so many had to be ordered. (Id. at
11.) Mr. Davis alleges that various other non-Defendant CCP personnel noted the presence of
mold in his cell, commented that the situation was unacceptable, and allowed him to take a clean
mattress from a different cell. While Mr. Davis has plausibly alleged that the named Defendants
were aware of the condition of which he complains, he has not alleged that they acquiesced in its

continuation. To the contrary, he alleges that they responded to his complaint by seeking to
ameliorate the situation. In these circumstances, Mr. Davis has not plausibly alleged a claim
against the only individually named Defendants against whom he asserts his claims and these
claims will be dismissed. Because Mr. Davis may be able to identify other Defendants against
whom he can state a plausible claim, he will be granted leave to amend this claim.
b. Mr. Miller’s Claim
In his Affidavit, Mr. Miller focuses on the effects the failure to enforce policies or
develop policies has had on the black mold problem at CCP. He does not, however, include
factual allegations describing his personal experience with exposure to black mold. For
example, he does not allege when or how he was exposed to mold, whether or to whom he
reported a problem and, if so, whether he received a response. With respect to the consequences
of exposure to black mold, Mr. Miller alleges both that “black mold is toxic to everybody,” and
that, “[w]e have no idea how this airborn[e] spore or toxin will affect us tomorrow or ten years

from now.” (Id. at 21, 22.) He does not allege that he has suffered any ill effects from exposure
to black mold.
In short, Mr. Miller fails to state a plausible Fourteenth Amendment claim arising from
exposure to black mold because his Affidavit does not adequately describe the relevant “who,
what, where, when, and how” regarding his exposure to black mold, his efforts (if any) to
communicate that a problem existed, or the results of any such communications. His Affidavit
does not “provide enough information to put a defendant on sufficient notice to prepare their
defense and also ensure that the Court is sufficiently informed to determine the issue.” Fabian,
2017 WL 3494219, at *3. Recently, in Wright v. United States, the United State Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal with prejudice of a pro se

amended complaint where the amended complaint failed to assert adequate factual allegations to
put the named defendants on notice of the claims against them. Id., No. 22-1164 (3d Cir., July
14, 2023) (per curiam). The Court of Appeals stated, “[a]s the District Court noted, the second
amended complaint lacked factual allegations with respect to many named defendants. [ ] The
balance of defendants has been left to guess the specific factual nature and the legal basis of [the
plaintiff’s] claims against them, such that they are unable to properly answer or prepare for trial.”
Id., slip op. at 6 (citing Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988)).
Mr. Miller’s claim, to the extent he seeks recovery based on exposure to black mold and
the individual Defendants’ deliberate indifference to the potential negative health effects of such
exposure, suffers from a similar problem. He does not allege when he was exposed to black
mold, whether he advised CCP personnel of the presence of the black mold, whether he received
a response to any complaint lodged, or whether he suffered health consequences as a result of the
exposure. This leaves the Defendants to guess at the nature and basis of Mr. Miller’s claims.

Additionally, Mr. Miller’s failure to allege harm resulting from exposure to black mold renders
his conditions of confinement claim not plausible as pled. See Hall-Wadley, 386 F. Supp. 3d at
519 (allegations of actual physical harm are required to state Fourteenth Amendment conditions
of confinement claim).
Mr. Miller’s conditions of confinement claims will be dismissed for failure to state a
plausible claim and because they do not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.
Because Mr. Miller may be able to state a plausible claim, he will be permitted to amend his
allegations to “flesh out [their] allegations by . . . explaining in the amended complaint the ‘who,
what, where, when and why’ of [their] claim.” See Davis v. IRS, No. 21-4728, 2022 WL
407639, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2022) (citing Gambrell v. S. Brunswick Bd. of Educ., No. 18-

16359, 2019 WL 5212964, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2019)).
2. Supervisory Liability Claims
Plaintiffs assert claims against current and former CCP Wardens Holland and Phillips,
respectively. However, there are no allegations in the Complaint describing any conduct
engaged in by these individual or suggesting that these individuals were personally responsible
for the conditions giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims. As such, Plaintiffs cannot state plausible
claims against them. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. “Although a court can infer that a defendant
had contemporaneous knowledge of wrongful conduct from the circumstances surrounding a
case, the knowledge must be actual, not constructive.” Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806
F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1194 (3d Cir. 1995);
Rode, 845 F.2d at 1201 n.6).
To the extent Plaintiffs assert their claims against CCP Wardens Holland and Phillips in
their capacity as supervisors, they have not stated plausible claims against these Defendants.

Liability under § 1983 cannot be predicated on a respondeat superior basis. Chavarriaga, 806
F.3d at 227; Robinson v. Delbalso, No. 22-2378, slip op. at 3-4 (3d. Cir. Nov. 28, 2022) (per
curiam). Instead, there are “two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for
unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d
307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), reversed on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015).
First, a supervisor may be liable if they “‘with deliberate indifference to the consequences,
established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional
harm.” Id. (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir.
2004) (alteration in original)). To set forth a claim for supervisory liability under the policy-and-
practice strand of supervisory liability, a plaintiff must:

(1) identify the specific supervisory practice or procedure that the supervisor
failed to employ, and show that (2) the existing custom and practice without
the identified, absent custom or procedure created an unreasonable risk of the
ultimate injury, (3) the supervisor was aware that this unreasonable risk
existed, (4) the supervisor was indifferent to the risk; and (5) the underling’s
violation resulted from the supervisor’s failure to employ that supervisory
practice or procedure.

Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 227 (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir.
2001)). “Put another way, the inmate must identify the supervisor’s specific acts or omissions
demonstrating the supervisor’s deliberate indifference to the inmate’s risk of injury and must
establish a link between the supervisor, the act, and the injury.” Id.
As discussed above, although Plaintiffs refer to various policies giving rise to the
development of black mold at CCP, they do not specify what those policies were, who put them
into place, or who implemented them. Using a term like “old guard” is insufficient to ascribe
personal conduct to a specific defendant. In particular, they do not identify former Warden

Phillips or current Warden Holland as individuals who established or maintained a policy,
practice or custom that resulted in Plaintiffs’ exposure to black mold. They also do not attribute
to either CCP Wardens Phillips or Holland a failure to implement a particular policy or
procedure that would have effectively ameliorated the unreasonable risk associated with
exposure to black mold. They have, therefore, not stated a plausible supervisory liability claim
against with CCP Wardens Phillips or Holland on a policy or practice theory.
A supervisor may also “be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in
violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had
knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.” Id. However,
generalized allegations that a supervisory defendant is “in charge of” or “responsible for” an

office or facility are insufficient to allege personal involvement in an underlying constitutional
violation. See Saisi v. Murray, 822 F. App’x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (“Saisi asserted
that some defendants were ‘in charge of agencies that allowed this to happen,’ and that liability
stemmed merely from defendants’ ‘belief’ that their conduct would be ‘tolerated.’ However, a
director cannot be held liable ‘simply because of his position as the head of the [agency].’”
(quoting Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir. 2005)).9

9 Of note, a supervisory prison official’s involvement in the grievance process, alone, is
not actionable under § 1983. See Folk v. Prime Care Med., 741 F. App’x 47, 51 (3d Cir. 2018)
(per curiam) (“Although some of these defendants were apparently involved in responding to
some of Folk’s prison grievances, there are no allegations linking them to the underlying
incidents and thus no basis for liability based on those later grievance reviews.”); Curtis v.
Plaintiffs do not allege that CCP Wardens Holland or Phillips participated in violating
their rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the persons in charge, had knowledge of and
acquiesced in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct. Indeed, as noted, there are no factual
allegations in the Complaint describing any conduct engaged in by these Defendants. The claims

against CCP Wardens Holland and Phillips are not plausible and will be dismissed without
prejudice. Plaintiffs will be granted leave to amend these claims.
E. Claims Pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act
Plaintiffs assert a claim under the ADA. (Compl. at 8.) To allege a plausible violation of
Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must assert that (1) they are a “qualified individual with a
disability;” (2) they are being excluded from participation in or being denied the benefits of some
“services, programs, or activities,” by reason of their disability; and (3) the entity which provides
the service, program or activity is a public entity. See, e.g., Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469, 472
(8th Cir.1998); Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 475 (D.N.J. 1998); Adelman v. Dunmire,
No. 95-4039, 1997 WL 164240 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 1997). The United States Supreme Court has

held that Title II of the ADA applies to state prisons and inmates. Penn. Dep’t of Corr. v.
Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210-12 (1998) (noting the phrase “services, programs, or activities”

Wetzel, 763 F. App’x 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“The District Court properly
determined that Defendants [Superintendent] Wenerowicz, Lewis, and Shaylor – who
participated only in the denial of Curtis’ grievances – lacked the requisite personal involvement
[in the conduct at issue].”). See also Robinson v. Delbalso, No. 22-2378, slip op. at 4 (3d Cir.
Nov. 28, 2022) (per curiam) (“Contrary to Robinson’s assertions, awareness of a grievance or
complaint after the allegedly unconstitutional conduct has occurred, without more, is insufficient
to establish personal involvement.”). Plaintiffs’ Complaint, and Mr. Davis’s allegations in
particular, reference filing grievances and the related conduct of some of the named Defendants.
There are, however, no allegations describing the participation, if any, of CCP Wardens Holland
or Phillips in the grievance process. It is not clear from the Complaint whether Plaintiffs seek to
pursue claims based on the grievance process. They will be afforded an opportunity to clarify
their intent on amendment.
includes recreational, medical, educational, and vocational prison programs). The proper
defendant under a Title II claim is the public entity (such as Chester County) or an official acting
in his official capacity.10 See Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2002).
Therefore, as an initial matter, individual-capacity ADA claims against the individual

Defendants must be dismissed because they are not “public entities” within the meaning of the
ADA.
To be considered a “qualified individual with a disability” under the statute, a plaintiff
must allege that he has a “disability” which is defined as “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. §
12102(1)(A). “[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending,
speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.”
Id. at § 12102(2)(A). The Supreme Court has construed the term “substantial” to preclude
“impairments that interfere in only a minor way” with a major life activity and the term “major

life activities” to refer “to those activities that are of central importance to daily life.” Toyota
Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196-97 (2002); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.108. Therefore,
“merely having an impairment does not make one disabled for purposes of the ADA.” Id. at 195.
Monetary damages, such as those sought by Plaintiffs, are not available under the ADA
absent a showing of intentional discrimination. Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 181 (3d Cir.
2018)). “To prove intentional discrimination, an ADA claimant must prove at least deliberate

10 To the extent Plaintiffs are suing the named Defendants in their official capacities, the
Supreme Court has held that Title II of the ADA “validly abrogates state sovereign immunity”
for “conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment.” United States v. Georgia, 546
U.S. 151, 159 (2006).
indifference, and to plead deliberate indifference, a claimant must allege (1) knowledge that a
federally protected right is substantially likely to be violated and (2) failure to act despite that
knowledge.” Id. (internal citation and ellipses deleted). A plaintiff can plead deliberate
indifference in two ways: “first, by alleging facts suggesting that the existing policies caused a

failure to adequately respond to a pattern of past occurrences of injuries like the plaintiffs,’ or,
second, by alleging facts indicating that [plaintiff] could prove that the risk of cognizable harm
was so great and so obvious that the risk and the failure to respond will alone support finding
deliberate indifference.” Id. (internal quotation marks and ellipses deleted).
The Complaint includes no allegation that either of the Plaintiffs is disabled within the
meaning of the ADA, and the Complaint does not include allegations suggesting that the
Plaintiffs have been excluded from participation in or been denied the benefits of “services,
programs, or activities,” by reason of a disability. Even construed liberally, the Complaint does
not provide factual allegations sufficient to support an ADA claim, and these claims will be
dismissed. Because Plaintiffs may be able to state plausible ADA claims, the claims will be

dismissed without prejudice and Plaintiffs will be granted leave to amend.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Mr. Miller and Mr. Davis leave to proceed
in forma pauperis and dismiss with prejudice their claims against CCP, its Maintenance
Department, the Chester County Health Department, and the Chester County District Attorneys’
Office. Plaintiffs’ individual capacity claims arising from their ADA claims will also be
dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs’ official capacity civil rights claims against the individual
Defendants will be dismissed as duplicative of the claims against Chester County. Plaintiffs’
remaining claims will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Plaintiffs will be granted leave to file an amended complaint. The
Chester County District Attorney’s Office’s motion to dismiss will be denied as moot.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10406630. Public record. Not legal advice.