# ROMAN v. COUNTY OF CHESTER

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · November 16, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10406266

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** November 16, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GRAHAM B.C. ROMAN, CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff,
NO. 23-1662-KSM
v.

COUNTY OF CHESTER, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM
Marston, J. November 16, 2023

Plaintiff Graham B.C. Roman is a pretrial detainee at Chester County Prison (“CCP”),
where he has been incarcerated since August 29, 2021. He brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for violations of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights against the County of
Chester, multiple prison officials (collectively, the “County Defendants”), PrimeCare Medical,
Inc. (the prison’s medical services provider), and Aramark Correctional Services, LLC (the
prison’s food services provider). (See Doc. No. 17 at 4–8; Doc. No. 30 at 11.) As relevant here,
Roman alleges that the County Defendants and PrimeCare have unreasonably denied him access
to mental health services and wrongly refused to place him on M-Block despite an unidentified
psychologist’s alleged recommendation that he be moved to a cell on that block. (See Doc. No.
78 at 5–7; see also id. at 12 (describing mental health treatment received to date as “punitive”).)
Currently before the Court is Roman’s fourth motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”)
or preliminary injunction. (Id.; see also Doc. Nos. 11, 24, 49.) It is unclear what precise remedy
Roman seeks, as he vaguely asks the Court to “direct defendants to find a solution and remedy
that is the least intrusive option to the penological needs and interests [ ]or[ ] to admit or file for
a[n] evaluation at Norristown State Hospital to correctly treat and prevent further harm or death
to plaintiff.” (Doc. No. 78 at 12.) Defendants oppose the motion. (Doc. Nos. 82–84.) County
Defendants also ask the Court to bar Roman from submitting any future filings while the case is
stayed. (Doc. No. 82 at 7–9; see also Doc. No. 56 (granting Roman’s motion for appointment of
counsel and staying the case while it is referred to the Prisoner Civil Rights Panel).)

I.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 this court has the power to “grant preliminary
injunctions to enjoin harmful conduct.” ASI Bus. Sols., Inc. v. Otsuka Am. Pharm., Inc., 233 F.
Supp. 3d 432, 437 (E.D. Pa. 2017); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a).1 Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 3626
allows the court to grant a preliminary injunction with respect to prison conditions. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(a)(2). “Preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy and should be granted
only in limited circumstances.” Arrowpoint Cap. Corp. v. Arrowpoint Asset Mgmt., LLC, 793
F.3d 313, 318 (3d Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). And a prisoner’s request for injunctive
relief, in particular, “must ‘be viewed with great caution’ because of the ‘intractable problems of
prison administration.’” Milhouse v. Fasciana, 721 F. App’x 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting

Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995)).
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must present evidence showing: “(1) a
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is
denied; (3) that granting preliminary relief will not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving
party; and (4) that the public interest favors such relief.” Arrowpoint Cap. Corp., 793 F.3d at
318–19 (quotation marks omitted). If a party fails to establish likelihood of success on the merits

1 Likewise, the court may grant a TRO if “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint
clearly show that immediate and irreparable harm . . . will result to the movant before the adverse party
can be heard in opposition . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A); see also Hope v. Warden York Cnty.
Prison, 956 F.3d 156, 159–60 (3d Cir. 2020).
and irreparable harm—what the Third Circuit has referred to as the “gateway factors” of this
test—then the Court need not consider whether all four factors balance in favor of granting
preliminary relief. See Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017); see also
Arthur Treacher’s Franchise Litig., 689 F.2d 1137, 1143 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[A] failure to show a

likelihood of success or failure to demonstrate irreparable injury must necessarily result in the
denial of a preliminary injunction.”).
II.
Roman has failed to show that he is likely to suffer immediate, irreparable injury absent a
preliminary injunction. “In general, to show irreparable harm a plaintiff must demonstrate
potential harm which cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following a trial.”
Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d at 653 (3d Cir. 1994). “The requisite feared injury or
harm must be irreparable—not merely serious or substantial . . . .” ASI Bus. Sols., Inc., 233
F.Supp.3d at 437 (quotation marks omitted); see also Scutella, 2020 WL 571065, at *3 (“[A]
court may not grant preliminary injunctive relief unless ‘the preliminary injunction is the only

way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.’” (quoting Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F.A. Freight,
Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989))). In addition, it is “insufficient if the harm will occur
only in the indefinite future”; instead, “the moving party must make a clear showing of
immediate irreparable harm.” Campbell, 977 F.2d at 91 (quotation marks omitted).
Roman appears to argue that he will suffer immediate irreparable harm because: (1) the
prison’s security staff refuses to rehouse him in M-Block despite an unidentified mental health
professional ordering his reassignment, and (2) the County and PrimeCare continue to deny and
unnecessarily delay medical care for his mental illnesses. (See Doc. No. 78 at 6–9; see also id. at
9 (“The probability of irreparable harm is imminent ‘if’ medical treatments are ‘not’ followed by
medical personnel.”).) Neither assertion, however, is supported by the record.
Nowhere in Roman’s medical records does a PrimeCare employee recommend that
Roman be placed on M-Block. Instead, his records from October 20, 2023—the day the
unnamed mental health professional allegedly ordered that Roman be moved to M-Block—show

that the professional who saw Roman directed that he be “return[ed] to his block.” (Doc. No. 83-
1 at 7.) And when a psychologist met with Roman three days later, she similarly determined that
Roman could “remain housed in his current cell, where he is comfortable.” (Id. at 6.) Finally,
when Roman’s disability rights lawyer requested that he be moved to M-Block on October 27,
2023, the Director of Behavioral Health at CCP explained the numerous reasons why he was not
recommending that Roman be placed on M-Block:
1. Safety—he is an inmate with significant high-profile
charges. As he would most likely be placed on Modd, this
would place him amongst inmates with documented
impaired judgment and impulsivity. His safety would be
harder to guarantee on that block.
2. Stability of the block—Mr. Roman’s recent behavior has
shown to be argumentative and defiant. In contrast, M block
has achieved relative stability as of late and his modeling of
intentionally defiant behavior may become progressively
destabilizing to the block.
3. Confidentiality—Mr. Roman has a documented history of
desiring confidential and personal space. Given the open bar
format of M block, this would be much harder to provide to
him. Additionally, his medical records (which he insists on
having physical copies of in the facility) are much more
accessible to other inmates while on M block.
4. Spacing—M block is currently running close to capacity.
Traditionally, this block has housed inmates who have
difficulty or outright inability to manage in the general
population (or less restricted housing). It has always been the
goal of mental health to have individuals with serious mental
illness housed in a less restrictive and maximally stimulating
environment based on their mental health needs. Many of
our seriously mentally ill inmates function well on blocks
outside of M block. Mr. Roman has displayed a clear ability
to function on another block.
5. Environment—Mr. Roman is considerably higher
functioning than most individuals on M block, and he would
find appropriate peer-level discourse and activities more
difficult to receive.
6. Summary—Mr. Roman has been clear to mental health that
his issue is not R block. His frustration has been that he is on
restriction. That restriction status is still going to follow him
to other blocks. He has integrated into his community on R
block and his temporary restriction would be a poor rationale
for disrupting this. It has been and will continue to be the
recommendation of mental health that Mr. Roman not be
moved to M block as his placement on that block presents
greater risks to himself and the stability of some of our most
vulnerable inmates.
(Doc. No. 83-2 at 2–3.)
The record likewise does not support Roman’s assertions that he has been or will be
denied necessary medical care in connection with his mental illnesses. To the contrary, Roman’s
medical records show that he is frequently seen by members of PrimeCare’s behavioral health
team, including five evaluations in October 2023 alone. (See generally Doc. No. 83-1.) And as
of his last meeting with a clinician on October 30, 2023, his mental condition was “fair to good
and stable,” he was “at low risk of harm to himself and others,” and he “reported no specific
concerns” related to prison staff. (Id. at 2.) That record also shows that the clinician scheduled a
follow up appointment for Roman on November 30, 2023, which dispels any suggestion that the
County and PrimeCare intend to deny Roman mental health services in the future. See Miller v.
Little, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-cv-01941, 2022 WL 2070282, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 8, 2022)
(“A preliminary injunction cannot be issued based on past harm. The purpose of a preliminary
injunction is to prevent future irreparable harm.” (quotation marks omitted).)
Because Roman has not shown that he will suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary
injunctive relief, his motion is denied. See Wesley, 2002 WL 1286898, at *3 (“Plaintiff also
cannot show that he will suffer irreparable harm by the denial of relief. Even though the Plaintiff
claims that he is not receiving adequate treatment for his Hepatitis C and asthma conditions, the
record indicates that these conditions are being treated and are in fact stable.”).2

III.
That leaves the County Defendants’ request that the Court prohibit Roman from making
future filings while the case is stayed. (Doc. No. 82 at 7–9.)
“[T]he All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, gives the district court the power to issue an
injunction to restrict the filing of meritless pleadings . . . .” Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d
329, 332 (3d Cir. 1990). A pre-filing injunction is most often used to enjoin pro se litigants from
filing future lawsuits after a district court “concludes that a litigant has abused the judicial
process by filing frivolous lawsuits and will continue to file such lawsuits unless restrained.”
Gonzalez v. Feiner, 131 F. App’x 373, 378 (3d Cir. 2005). Nevertheless, the principles
governing this remedy seem to apply equally to a motion to enjoin a litigant from filing

additional frivolous motions in a single case. See Hiles v. Mortgage, Case No. 1:12-cv-392,
2016 WL 454895, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2016) (“Federal courts have both the inherent power
and constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability
to carry out Article III functions. To achieve these ends, the Sixth Circuit has approved

2 Because Roman is consistently receiving medical care for his mental health, he also has not
shown that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims against the County and PrimeCare for
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Wesley v. Vaughn, Nos. CIV.A.99–1228, CIV.A.99-
1229, 2002 WL 1286898, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 2002) (“Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with his medical care
at Graterford does not prove that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference. A disagreement
between the physician and the prisoner regarding the medical diagnosis and treatment does not constitute
deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment.”); see also Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.3d 468,
471 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Medical malpractice may give rise to a tort claim in a state court but not necessarily
to a constitutional claim.”).
enjoining vexatious and harassing litigants by requiring them to obtain leave of court before
submitting additional filings.” (citations omitted)).
The Court declines at this time to bar Roman from making additional filings. Although
Roman has filed four motions seeking a preliminary injunction, it is only this most recent one

that appears to be truly frivolous. (See Doc. No. 25 at 7 n.5 (warning prison officials that “if
Roman’s account is true, a longer delay may qualify as unreasonable or suggest that the delay
may be occurring for non-medical reasons”); Doc. No. 58 at 4 (“The Court does, however,
reiterate its previous warning to County Defendants that multiple missed appointments or a
lengthy delay may be enough to warrant the Court’s intervention.”).) Moreover, this most recent
motion is the only one that Roman filed after the Court stayed the case.
Instead of enjoining Roman, the Court reminds him that: (1) a preliminary injunction is
an extreme form of relief and should be requested only when there is an imminent risk of
irreparable injury; and (2) this case is stayed, which means absent extreme circumstances, he
should not be making any filings in this action until the stay is lifted. Roman is also cautioned

that although the Court declines at this time to bar him from making additional filings in this
case, the Court is likely to grant the relief requested by County Defendants if Roman continues
to file frivolous motions while the case is stayed.
IV.
For the reasons discussed above, Roman’s motion for a preliminary injunction and TRO
is denied. The County Defendants’ request that the Court bar Roman from making further filings
while the case is stayed is also denied. However, County Defendants may renew their request if
Roman continues to file frivolous motions. An appropriate order follows.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10406266. Public record. Not legal advice.