# RATLIFF v. DETECTIVE MICHAEL GETTLER

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · September 14, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10405934

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** September 14, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10405934

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that, to state a claim for municipal liability, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s policies or customs caused the alleged constitutional violation
- holding that under absolute witness immunity a convicted defendant could not state a claim for damages under § 1983 against a police officer who had allegedly given perjured testimony at the defendant’s criminal trial
- stating that leave to amend is not required “when amendment is inequitable or futile”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EDWARD RATLIFF, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-CV-3373
:
DETECTIVE MICHAEL GETTLER, et al. :
Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

MCHUGH, J. SEPTEMBER 14, 2023

Edward Ratliff, a prisoner housed at SCI Rockview following his conviction in
Montgomery County, Pennsylvania on various firearms charges, filed this civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting constitutional claims against Trenton, New Jersey Police
Detective Michael Gettler and the Trenton Police Department. For the following reasons, on
statutory screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1
Mr. Ratliff alleges that on September 11, 2021, Detective Gettler responded to a service
call at 245 Hamilton Avenue in Trenton for a report of a female arguing with a group of males,
one of whom had a handgun. (Compl. at 12.) When he arrived, Gettler allegedly secured the
weapon. Ratliff states it is unknown after that point whether there were any arrests, what reports
were made, whether the gun was submitted for DNA analysis, or submitted to the New Jersey
gun lab. (Id.) He alleges that each of these steps “is N.J protocol on a firearm.” (Id.)

1 The facts set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Ratliff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1)
and publicly available records, which the Court may consider when conducting a screening under
§ 1915A. Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006). The Court adopts
the pagination assigned to the Complaint by the CM/ECF docketing system.
Ratliff asserts that during his criminal trial in Montgomery County on firearms charges,
Gettler testified on behalf of the Commonwealth. (Id.) He was allegedly asked by the
prosecutor if Ratliff or his family had anything to do with the firearm, and he answered no. (Id.)
He also denied knowing what happened to the firearm. (Id.) Ratliff asserts that “Due Process of

the Law was not followed for the processing of the firearm, nor were the reports generated about
the firearm to the Trial Court which violated my Due Process of the Law.” (Id.) Ratliff also
alleges that Gettler committed perjury when he denied knowing anything about the firearm. (Id.)
As relief on his claims, Ratliff seeks money damages, a declaration that he is innocent, and a
temporary restraining order preventing retaliation against him or his family. (Id. at 5.)
A review of public records indicates that Ratliff was arrested by Montgomery County
Detectives on April 30, 2021 on numerous charges of making materially false statements in the
purchase of a firearms, conspiracy to make materially false statements, sales of firearms to
ineligible transferees, and possession of firearms by a prohibited individual. See Commonwealth
v. Ratliff, CP-46-CR-0004411-2021 (C.P. Montgomery) (listing offense date of January 22,

2021). Following a jury trial, Ratliff was convicted of the charges on November 14, 2022. Id.
An appeal of the conviction remains pending. Id.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mr. Ratliff has paid the filing fee for this case. However, because he is a prisoner 28
U.S.C. § 1915A gives the Court the authority to screen his Complaint prior to service. See Shane
v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing that the district courts have the
authority to screen a prisoner complaint pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1) even if the prisoner is not
proceeding in forma pauperis). Section 1915A requires that the Court “review, before
docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a
civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee
of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In doing so, the Court must dismiss a
complaint or any portion thereof that “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted,” id. § 1915A(b)(1), or that “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief,” id. § 1915A(b)(2).
Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915A(b)(1) is governed by the same
standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See
Neal v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 96-7923, 1997 WL 338838, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 19,
1997); see also Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the
Court must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quotations omitted); Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). ‘“At this early stage
of the litigation,’ ‘[the Court will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro se] complaint as true,’
‘draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor,’ and ‘ask only whether [that]

complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible [] claim.’”
Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d
768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). As plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations
liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F. 4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina,
Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).
III. DISCUSSION
Mr. Ratliff is asserting constitutional claims. The vehicle by which constitutional claims
may be asserted in federal court is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state
law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
A. Claims Against the Trenton Police Department

Mr. Ratliff has named the Trenton Police Department as a Defendant. Following the
decision in Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), courts concluded that a
police department is a sub-unit of the local government and, as such, is merely a vehicle through
which the municipality fulfills its policing functions. See e.g. Johnson v. City of Erie, Pa., 834
F. Supp. 873, 878-79 (W.D. Pa. 1993). Thus, while a municipality may be liable under § 1983, a
police department, as a mere sub-unit of the municipality, may not. Id.; Martin v. Red Lion
Police Dept., 146 F. App’x. 558, 562 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (stating that police
department is not a proper defendant in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it is a
sub-division of its municipality); Thompson v. State of N.J., No. 05-4420, 2005 WL 2406100, at
*3 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2005) (holding that the Trenton Police Department is not a “person” subject

to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Therefore, the Trenton Police Department is not a proper
defendant in this case under Section 1983 and is dismissed with prejudice.
B. Request for Declaratory Relief
In addition to money damages, Ratliff seeks a declaration that he is innocent of the state
criminal charges associated with Gettler’s testimony.2 “[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging

2 Ratliff also seeks injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining order to
prevent any “retaliation against me or my family.” (Compl. at 5.) Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 65 governs temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. “The standards
for a temporary restraining order are the same as those for a preliminary injunction.” Bieros v.
Nicola, 857 F. Supp. 445, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Preliminary injunctive relief “is not granted as a
matter of right.” Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982). Rather, a
“preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted
the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination
that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole
federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973);
Jaffery v. Atl. Cnty. Prosecutor’s Office, 695 F. App’x 38, 41-42 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam)

(“[T]o the extent Jaffery seeks dismissal of the charges against him as a result of constitutional
violations, such relief is only available through a writ of habeas corpus.”); Duran v. Weeks, 399
F. App’x 756, 759 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“[T]o the extent that Duran is seeking dismissal
of the charges against him as a result of constitutional violations, he is essentially asking for
relief only available through habeas corpus.”) This means that Ratliff cannot pursue his request
for a declaration of innocence of his criminal charges in a civil rights action such as this one and,
rather, must file a habeas petition if he seeks release on the basis that his confinement is
unconstitutional. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Accordingly, Mr. Ratliff’s request for a

unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong,
520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (internal quotations omitted). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary
injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor,
and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008);
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 152 (3d Cir. 2019). “The first two factors are
prerequisites for a movant to prevail.” Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 286 (3d Cir. 2018). “If
these gateway factors are met, a court then considers the remaining two factors and determines in
its sound discretion if all four factors, taken together, balance in favor of granting the requested
preliminary relief.” Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017). “A
plaintiff’s failure to establish any element in its favor renders a preliminary injunction
inappropriate.” Nutrasweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., 176 F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1999).
Additionally, if the request for injunctive relief centers on the ownership of money, any injury
cannot plausibly be deemed to be irreparable. See Tantopia Franchising Co., LLC v. W. Coast
Tans of PA, LLC, 918 F. Supp. 2d 407, 417 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (“Irreparable harm is injury that
cannot adequately be compensated by monetary damages.”).
Given that Ratliff’s claims are subject to dismissal, he cannot meet his burden of
demonstrating success on the merits. Also, because he asserts no facts to allege that he will
suffer retaliation, making his claim entirely speculative, he cannot show he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief. Accordingly, the request for a temporary
restraining order is denied.
declaration that he is innocent will be dismissed with prejudice. See Garrett v. Murphy, 17 F.4th
419, 430 (3d Cir. 2021) (“[W]henever a plaintiff pleads a violation of § 1983 and effectively
seeks habeas relief, the plaintiff fails to state a § 1983 claim. Instead, the prisoner’s only federal
remedy is through a writ of habeas corpus after exhausting state remedies.”).

C. Claims Against Defendant Gettler
Ratliff asserts claims for money damages based on his allegation that his due process
rights were violated when New Jersey protocols for the processing of a firearm were not
followed, and because Gettler committed perjury at Ratliff’s trial when he allegedly denied
knowing anything about the firearm. The Court understands Ratliff to be asserting a due process
claim regarding the firearms evidence admitted in his trial, and a fabricated evidence claim
regarding Gettler’s allegedly perjured testimony.3

3 In drafting his Complaint, Mr. Ratliff checked the boxes on the form he used indicating
that he sought to name Gettler in his individual and official capacities. Ratliff appears not to
have understood the implication of checking the official capacity box. Claims against municipal
employees such as Gettler named in their official capacity are indistinguishable from claims
against the governmental entity that employs the Defendant, here the City of Trenton, New
Jersey. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits . . .
‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer
is an agent.’”) (quoting Monell v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978)).
“[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the
entity.” Id. Because Ratliff does not attempt to allege an official capacity claim, see Monell,
436 U.S. at 694 (holding that, to state a claim for municipal liability, a plaintiff must allege that
the defendant’s policies or customs caused the alleged constitutional violation), the Court will
liberally construe the Complaint to assert a claim against the Gettler in his individual capacity
only. See Downey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2020) (“To determine
whether a plaintiff sued state officials in their official capacity, we first look to the complaints
and the course of proceedings.” (quotations omitted)); Coward v. City of Philadelphia, No. 21-
1619, 2021 WL 4169422, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2021) (permitting claim against defendant in
his individual capacity to proceed event though “[plaintiff] did not check the box indicating a
desire to sue [that defendant] in his individual capacity” where the allegations clearly sought
relief based on the defendant’s conduct).
1. Claim Based on Perjured Testimony
Mr. Ratliff’s civil rights claim against Gettler based on his allegedly perjured testimony
at Ratliff’s criminal trial fails to state a plausible claim under § 1983. Witnesses are entitled to
absolute immunity from civil rights claims based on their testimony in court. See Williams v.

Hepting, 844 F.2d 138, 141 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating that witness immunity is “firmly bottomed in
public policy”) citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 329-30 (1983) (holding that under
absolute witness immunity a convicted defendant could not state a claim for damages under §
1983 against a police officer who had allegedly given perjured testimony at the defendant’s
criminal trial). Because Gettler is absolutely immune from the claim that he offered perjured
testimony as a witness, the claim is dismissed with prejudice.
2. Claim Based on Failure to Follow Firearms Protocols
Ratliff also asserts a civil rights claim against Gettler based on his involvement in
securing a firearm recovered at 245 Hamilton Avenue, New Jersey. He bases his claim on his
assertion that it is unknown whether or not New Jersey protocols on firearms were followed.

This claim suffers several defects.
First, other than securing the firearm at the scene, Ratliff alleges no facts to suggest that
Gettler was personally involved in following or not following the alleged post-confiscation
protocols, such as conducting DNA and ballistics testing. “A defendant in a civil rights action
must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs” to be liable. See Rode v. Dellarciprete,
845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020)
(“Personal involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal direction or of actual
knowledge and acquiescence.’” (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207)). See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676
(explaining that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must
plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution”). Second, the claim is speculative. Rather than assert facts about how
Gettler may have violated his rights, Ratliff alleges only that it is unknown whether New Jersey
gun protocols were followed. And most importantly, even if those state law protocols were not

followed, a violation of a state law does not equate to a violation of a person’s constitutional
rights. See Wyatt v. Dep’t of Prob. & Parole, No. 19-5460, 2020 WL 2307351, at *7 (E.D. Pa.
May 8, 2020) (“[E]ven if this Court were to assume that the statute at issue was violated, a
violation of state law generally does not equate to a federal constitutional violation.”). For these
reasons, the claim against Gettler based on the alleged failure to follow New Jersey firearms
protocols for DNA and ballistics testing is dismissed with prejudice since any attempt at
amendment would be futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 112-113 (3d Cir.
2002) (stating that leave to amend is not required “when amendment is inequitable or futile”).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Ratliff’s Complaint with prejudice. An

appropriate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gerald Austin McHugh
__________________________________
GERALD A. MCHUGH, J.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10405934. Public record. Not legal advice.