# CURTIS v. WETZEL

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · June 12, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10405476

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 12, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10405476

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding inmate’s claim for injunctive relief was mooted by his transfer from SCI-Huntingdon

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIAM CURTIS, :
Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION
: No. 14-786
v. :
JOHN WETZEL, et al., :
Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM
Schiller, J. June 12, 2023
William Curtis was convicted of murder and is serving a life sentence without possibility
of parole. He is currently housed at SCI Coal Township. His Complaint alleges Defendants,
fourteen Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) employees and officials, retaliated
against him in violation of his constitutional rights and various state laws in 2012 while he was an
inmate at SCI Graterford by placing him in the Restricted Housing Unit for his refusal to sign a
form required to receive sex offender treatment. He seeks monetary damages and equitable relief
in the form of release into the general population and the removal of any references to him as a
sex offender in DOC records.
After remand from the Third Circuit!, Defendants move for summary judgment with
respect to Curtis’ individual capacity claims against former Secretary of Corrections John Wetzel
and former Deputy Secretary Michael Klopotoski. (ECF 194.) Defendants also seek to dismiss
Curtis’ official capacity claims against the Secretary of Corrections and the Deputy Secretary of

This matter was remanded after the retirement of Chief Judge Lawrence F. Stengel, to
whom it was originally assigned. It was reassigned to the Court’s docket in April 2019. (ECF
135.)

the Eastern Region as moot or, in the alternative, seek summary judgment in their favor.” (/d.) In
addition, Defendants Jessica Birmingham, Thomas Bolton, Andrea Brannen, Gerald Kelly, Jay
Lane, Gary Olinger, and Frank Regan move to dismiss as moot all of Curtis’ official capacity
claims against them.’ (/d.) For the following reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ motion.
BACKGROUND
A. Facts
1. Curtis was placed in restricted housing.
Since his murder conviction in 1982, Curtis has been housed at several different
Pennsylvania correctional facilities. (Def.’s Ex. 2B, ECF 99-2 at 6-11; see also Curtis Dep., Defs.’
Ex. 1, ECF 99-1 at 7:19-8:10.) At all times relevant to his claims in this action, Curtis was confined
at SCI Graterford. (Compl., ECF 1, § 18.)
Curtis was placed on the DOC’s Restricted Release List and placed in Administrative
Custody in March or April 2007. (Gerard Kelly Decl., Defs.’ Ex. 4, ECF 99-4 at 3-4.) That year,

2 When Curtis initiated this lawsuit in 2014, John Wetzel was the Secretary of Corrections
and Michael Klopotoski was Deputy Secretary of Corrections for the Eastern Region. Both have
since retired. When Defendants filed their now-pending Motion to Dismiss and for Summary
Judgment (ECF 194), George Little was the Acting Deputy Secretary of Corrections. Dr. Laurel
R. Harry is now the DOC’s Acting Secretary. She is automatically substituted as the relevant
defendant for purposes of Curtis’ official capacity claims against the Secretary of Corrections
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). Current Deputy Secretary of the Eastern Region
Tammy Ferguson is automatically substituted as the relevant defendant for purposes of Curtis’
official capacity claims against the Deputy Secretary pursuant to Rule 25(d).
3 The Court liberally construes Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 210), as
Curtis’ Response to the Commonwealth Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF 194). Curtis filed his “Motion” on September 14, 2022, after the Court directed
him to respond to Defendant’s motion by September 12, 2022. (See ECF 206.) And although
Curtis’ filing is styled as a motion seeking affirmative relief, it opposes Defendants’ arguments,
rather than presenting the Court with new ones. The Court also considers the exhibits attached to
ECF 105, 111, 192, 193, 199, 200, 201, 207, and 211 as exhibits to his response. (See ECF 196,
202, 206.)

he was also sanctioned for two misconduct reports: (1) Report No. A514342 for “engaging in
sexual acts with others or sodomy” and presence in an unauthorized area, and (2) Report No.
A514344 for assault and presence in an unauthorized area. (Def.’s Exs. 6B and 6C, ECF 143-5.)
With respect to the first, a hearing examiner determined four confidential informants were
“established as reliable” and “more credible” than Curtis (ECF 143-5 at ECF p. 4), notwithstanding
Curtis’ categorical denial of “any/and all of the horrendous acts stated on th[e] misconduct.” (/d.
at ECF p. 8.) Curtis was sanctioned with 360 days of disciplinary custody for the first report and
to 180 days of disciplinary custody for the second. Ud at ECF p. 5, 12.) A January 2011
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania “Initial Classification Summary” reported Curtis had been placed
on the Restricted Release List due to his history of “exerting a negative influence in facility
activities by repeatedly threatening staff members, refusing orders” and “sexually predatory
behavior.” (Defs.’ Ex. 4, ECF 99-2 at ECF p. 14.) Curtis remained in Administrative Custody on
the Restricted Release List in the Restricted Housing Unit (Level 5) until February 2012. (Defs.’
Ex. 1, ECF 99-1 at 13:14-18; Defs.’ Ex. 4, ECF 99-4, at ¥ 12.)
2. Curtis was removed from restricted housing to receive Sex Offender
Programming.
Efforts began to remove Curtis from the Restricted Release List in December 2011 after
he was assigned to Corrections Counselor Gerard Kelly’s caseload. (Gerard Kelly Decl., Defs.’
Ex. 4, ECF 99-4, at 9] 6, 9.) Kelly reviewed Curtis’ file and saw Curtis “had a conviction for a sex
crime” and had received a misconduct for sexually assaulting inmates. (/d. § 7.) Kelly concluded
Curtis required “treatment for his sexual behavior in prison and his assaultive nature.” (/d.)
Treatment would only have been available to Curtis in the “general population prison at

4 Regrettably, the information Curtis’ file contained about this “conviction” was later
determined to be erroneous.

Graterford,” necessitating his removal from the Restricted Release List and release from the
Restricted Housing Unit. Ud 48.) Kelly received approval for Curtis’ return to the general
population by the end of December. (/d. § 10.) However, Curtis’ general population placement
was conditioned on his participation in Sex Offender Programming and “contingent on [Curtis’]
“acceptance” of Sex Offender Programming. (/d. § 11; Defs.’ Ex. 4A, ECF 99-4 at ECF p. 7.)
When DOC staff voted to approve Curtis’ removal from the Restricted Release List, they did so
based on the recommendation that he “be placed on the Institutional Predator list” and “remain in
closer supervision [sic] in order to adjust appropriately and not present a danger to inmates for the
remainder of his incarceration ... .” (Defs.’ Ex. 4A, ECF 99-4 at ECF p. 7.) In conjunction with
their decision, voting staff noted Curtis would “need[ ] to comply with [sex offender] evaluation
and recommendations,” could “not refuse treatment” and “must be placed on tracking,” and
explained “any violation w[ould] result in return to [Restricted Housing Unit].” Ud. at ECF p. 8.)
3. Curtis was removed from and then returned to restricted housing.
Curtis was removed from the Restricted Release List in February 2012, signed a “tracking
agreement,” and transferred to the general population. (Gerard Kelly Decl., Defs.’ Ex. 4, ECF 99-
4, 912; Curtis Dep., Defs.? Ex. 1, ECF 99-1 at 14:16-15:20.) DOC Psychological Services
Specialist Andrea Brannen then evaluated and interviewed him for Sex Offender Programming
placement. (Andrea Brannen Decl., Defs.’ Ex. 2, ECF 99-2, at 43.) To prepare for his evaluation,
she reviewed his institutional file, which reported his 2007 misconduct for engaging in sexual acts
or sodomy. Ud. § 4-7.) Curtis’ file also included an “Integrated Case Summary—Initial
Classification Summary” which stated that he had been charged with and found guilty of
Aggravated Indecent Assault, which Brannen correctly understood to be a felony sex crime in
Pennsylvania. Ud. Jf 8-10.) See 18 Pa. C.S.§ 3125. Based on Brannen’s file review, she

recommended that Curtis participate in High Intensity Sex Offender Programming. (Defs.’ Ex. 2,
ECF 99-2, at § 11.) Curtis, however, denied he had ever been convicted of a sex crime and asserted
he had been wrongly accused of sexual misconduct in 2007. (Defs.’ Ex. 2, ECF 99-2, at ¥ 12;
Defs.’ Ex. 1, ECF 99-1, at 16:3-17:22.)
To participate in the cognitive behavior-based Sex Offender Programming, inmates are
required to accept responsibility for their sexual misbehavior. (Defs.’ Ex. 3, ECF 99-3 at ECF p.
11, 4] 25-28; Defs.’ Ex. 5, ECF 143-1, 4 10.) Curtis was asked to sign a “Limits of Confidentiality”
Agreement acknowledging he was participating in treatment “to reduce the risk that [he] might re-
offend” and permitting his treatment team to “report to the proper authorities any occurrence or
potential occurrence of behaviors or intentions that constitute a risk to myself or others.” (Defs.’
Ex. 9, ECF 143-8.) On March 22, 2012, Curtis signed the form, but did so under a handwritten
note stating that “[T]his is coercion. I was told I’d be locked down if I did not agree to participate.”
Curtis testified it was his belief that by signing the paper, he “would have made a false
material statement that [he] had been convicted of a sexual criminal act, because [he] never pled
guilty to or never was found guilty of a sexual act.” (Defs.’ Ex. 1 at 21:25-22:6.) After that, Curtis
refused to sign the “Limits of Confidentiality” Agreement again on more than one occasion. (/d.
at 23:21-24:18.) Kelly explained that Curtis would not participate in Sex Offender Programming
even though he was told that if he did not attend the programming, he would be returned to the
Restricted Release List and the Restricted Housing Unit. (Defs.’ Ex. 4, ECF 99-4, at § 18.) Kelly
issued Curtis a misconduct for his refusal to participate in Sex Offender Programming. (Defs.’ Ex.
1 at 29:8-13.) Thereafter, Curtis was returned to the Restricted Housing Unit and remained in
Administrative Custody at Graterford. (Ud. at 30:9-25.) Kelly explained this was because Curtis
was “a danger to others in the institution.” (Defs.’ Ex. 4, ECF 99-4, at 19; see also Defs.’ Ex.

5C, ECF 143-2 at ECF p. 3.)
4, Curtis had a Renchenski hearing after SCI Graterford learned he had
not been convicted of aggravated indecent assault.
After Curtis filed this lawsuit, Brannen learned the information in Curtis’ “Integrated Case
Summary” relating to his criminal conviction was inaccurate. (Defs.’ Ex. 2, ECF 99-2 at § 27.) In
fact, Curtis did not have a conviction for aggravated indecent assault and his file regrettably
included erroneous information. (/d.) Thereafter, in an effort to remedy the impact of the DOC’s
flawed records, then-Secretary of Corrections John Wetzel appointed an independent hearing
officer to evaluate whether, without the erroneous conviction, there was just cause to classify
Curtis as a sex offender in accordance with the procedure required in Renchenski v. Williams, 622
F.3d 315, 335 (3d Cir. 2010).° (Defs.’ Ex. 3, ECF 99-3 at ECF p. 4 and ECF p. 4 n.1.) Curtis
received advance written notice of a hearing in August 2015 and provided written submissions to
the hearing officer but declined to appear. (Defs.’ Ex. 3, ECF 99-3 at ECF p. 4-5.)
The hearing examiner found the DOC presented “credible” evidence of just cause,
explaining Curtis “did not avail himself of the opportunity to present evidence of record that might
contradict any of the [DOC’s] evidence” at the Renchenski hearing. Ud. at ECF p. 18.) She
ultimately concluded that even though Curtis “was not criminally convicted of a sexual offense,”
his “history of inappropriate sexual behavior, including his sexual assault on another inmate,
warrant[ed] classifying him as a sex offender and requiring him to participate in sex offender
treatment programming.” (Jd. at ECF p. 17-19.) In support of her decision, she noted the DOC’s
“duty ... to recommend sex offender treatment programming for those who are in need of

5 In Renchenski, the Third Circuit held that “only after a prisoner has been afforded due
process may sex offender conditions be imposed on an inmate who has not been convicted of a
sexual offense.” 622 F.3d at 326.

rehabilitation and... to protect other inmates and Department staff from sexually predatory
individuals ....” Ud. at ECF p. 18.)
5. Curtis eventually was transferred to a general population unit.
Following the hearing officer’s decision, Curtis remained on the Restricted Release List in
Administrative Custody, first at SCI-Graterford and then at its successor SCI-Phoenix, until May
2019, when then-Secretary Wetzel or the DOC’s then-regional deputy secretary, Deputy Michael
Wenerowicz, reviewed Curtis’ Restricted-Release-List status and determined Curtis should
participate in the DOC’s PORTAL program at SCI-Pine Grove. (Defs.’ Ex. 5, ECF 143-1 at □□□□
PORTAL “provides a gateway for inmates to re-integrate into general population, while providing
therapeutic programming, education, and socialization opportunities for inmates confined to a
Level 5 setting for extended periods.” (/d. § 3.) Inmates in the PORTAL program are assigned to
individual cells in Administrative Custody but are not in “solitary confinement.” Ud. § 4.) They
meet with counselors, may interact with staff and inmates, and have out-of-cell activity
opportunities. (/d.) Inmates who progress to PORTAL Phase III “are allowed out of their cells at
least 20 hours per week with yard and day room recreation time together with another Phase III
inmate.” (/d.) In June 2019, the Program Review Committee promoted Curtis to Phase III of the
PORTAL program. Ud. § 12.) By December 2019, Curtis was transferred to Phase II of the
PORTAL program, although he remained uninterested in Sex Offender Programming. (Defs.’ Ex.
12, ECF 194-1 at ECF p. 173.) By June 2020, Curtis had completed the PORTAL Program’s
violence prevention component, but continued to refuse Sex Offender Programming based on his
belief that he had been placed on the Restricted Release List because of four “make believe”
confidential informants “giving untrue stories about him.” (Defs.’ Ex. 13, ECF 194-1 at ECF p.
178.) DOC staff voted to retain Curtis on the Restricted Release List because of his Sex Offender

Programming refusal and his “history of sexual predatory behaviors.” Ud. at ECF p. 178-79.)
When the DOC Program Review Committee reviewed Curtis’ status in November 2020, it
recommended maintaining his status on the Restricted Release List in Administrative Custody.
(Defs.’ Ex. 14, ECF 194-1 at ECF p. 176.) By October 2021, Curtis had been relocated to SCI-
Greene and was transferred to SCI-Coal Township. (Wheary Decl., Defs.’ Ex. 16, § 3, ECF 194-1
at ECF p. 178.) In November 2021, Curtis moved to SCI-Coal Township’s J-Block: “a general
population unit with all standard general population privileges.” Ud. {J 4-5.)
B. Procedural history
After Curtis filed his Complaint, Defendants Wetzel, Klopotozki, Wenerowicz, Lewis and
Shaylor moved to dismiss Curtis’s claims against them. Ruling on their motions in 2015, Judge
Stengel held the Eleventh Amendment barred Curtis’s official capacity claims against them. Curtis
v. Wetzel, No. 14-786, 2015 WL 5115439, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2015). He held Curtis failed to
allege sufficient facts to show their personal involvement in the alleged conduct, barring his First
and Fourteenth Amendment claims against the five defendants in their individual capacities. /d. at
*5-7. He also dismissed Curtis’ Fifth Amendment claim, holding the consequences Curtis faced
for his refusal to participate in Sex Offender Programming did “not rise to the level of compulsion
which would compel a prisoner to expose himself to criminal liability.” Jd. at *7.
After discovery, Curtis and the remaining Defendants filed cross-motions for Summary
Judgment. Judge Stengel granted summary judgment in the remaining Defendants favor with
respect to Curtis’ First Amendment retaliation claim because he “did not engage in protected
activity when he refused to sign the sex offender program form.” Curtis v. Wetzel, No. 14-786,
2017 WL 1163888, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017). He held qualified immunity shielded the
remaining Defendants from Curtis’ First and Fourteenth Amendment claims because they “could

reasonably believe they were not violating clearly established law when they required Mr. Curtis
to participate in the sex offender program or return to the restricted housing unit” when “his records
indicated that Mr. Curtis was convicted of a sex crime.” Jd. at *4. He also granted summary
judgment in the remaining Defendants’ favor with respect to Curtis’ state law claims, finding they
were “barred by sovereign immunity.” /d. at *5. Curtis appealed in April 2017 after Judge Stengel
denied his timely motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). (ECF 124; see also ECF
123.)
The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims against Defendants Wenerowicz,
Lewis and Shaylor based on their lack of personal involvement but found Curtis sufficiently
alleged Wetzel’s and Klopotowski’s personal involvement and reversed their dismissal. Curtis v.
Wetzel, 763 F. App’x 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2019). It affirmed Judge Stengel’s determination that
qualified immunity barred Curtis’ First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for monetary
damages but held qualified immunity does not bar his First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief (1.e., his request to be released into the general
population and the removal of any references to him as a sex offender in DOC records). Jd. at 264.
So, the Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s “determination that the defendants’ threats of
solitary confinement did not rise to the level of compulsion for Fifth Amendment purposes,” and
its “judgment insofar as it rejected Curtis’ First Amendment claim on the basis that his speech was
personal, rather than a matter of public concern... .” /d. at 266. It directed the Court to consider
on remand “whether labeling Curtis a sex offender and requiring that he attend Sex Offender
Programming violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights” and whether Defendants’
“threats to place Curtis in solitary confinement indefinitely rose to the level of compulsion” if
Curtis’ “requests for declaratory and injunctive relief are not moot... .” Jd. at 264.

In June 2019, following remand, Curtis moved for the appointment of counsel. (ECF 142.)
His case was referred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s Prisoner Civil Rights Panel (ECF
144), and a member of the prisoner panel was appointed to represent Curtis in August 2020. (ECF
171.) That attorney subsequently informed the Court that he was unable to proceed on Curtis’
behalf, so the Court renewed the search for counsel from the Prisoner Civil Rights Panel. (ECF
175.) Curtis confirmed his desire to wait for counsel from the Prisoner Civil Rights Panel in March
2021. (ECF 177.) When no attorney had volunteered to accept appointment by January 2022, the
Court informed Curtis that he would be required to represent himself on a going forward basis.
(ECF 184.) Defendants filed the motion which is the subject of this Opinion in April 2022 (ECF
194). Curtis subsequently asked for two extensions of time to respond (ECF 195, 205), which the
Court granted. (ECF 196, 206.) Consistent with footnote 3 above, the Court has considered Curtis’s
numerous responsive filings in reaching its decision today.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Motion to dismiss
To withstand dismissal, Curtis’ Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible when the facts pled “allow[ | the court to draw the reasonable
inference that [a] defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,
the complaint has alleged——but it has not ‘show|n]’——‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Jd. at
679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
When a complaint includes well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court “should assume

10

their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”
Connelly y. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
However, this “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for which there is sufficient
factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v. President of the U.S., 839
F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted). This plausibility
determination is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Jd. (quoting Connelly, 809 F.3d at 786-87).
B. Summary judgment
Summary judgment is proper if the movant proves that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
see also Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 2018). A fact is “material” if
it may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A “genuine dispute” exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Jd. A mere scintilla of evidence supporting
the nonmoving party, however, will not suffice. Jd. at 252. Rather, the nonmovant must “set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Jd. at 256.
At summary judgment, a court may consider any material in the record that may be
admissible at trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Pamintuan v. Nanticoke Mem’l Hosp., 192 F.3d 378,
387-88 & n.13 (3d Cir. 1999). In doing so, a court “must view the facts in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party's favor.” Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms,
579 F.3d 285, 286 (3d Cir. 2009). But it need not credit “[u]nsupported assertions, conclusory
allegations, or mere suspicions.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir.
2010). Nor may a court make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. See Parkell v.

1]

Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 323 (3d Cir. 2016).
Il. DISCUSSION
A. Curtis’ claims for equitable relief are moot.
Curtis’ claims may only proceed if they are not moot. The Court “has neither the power to
render advisory opinions nor to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case
before” it. Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (citations and quotations omitted).
1. Curtis’ official capacity claims for equitable relief against Defendants
Lane, Olinger, Bolton, Regan, Birmingham, Brannen, and Kelly are
moot.
Curtis seeks equitable relief in the form of removal from the Restricted Release List and
release to the general population. Defendants argue Curtis’ official-capacity claims for equitable
relief cannot proceed against Defendants Lane, Olinger, Bolton, Regan, Birmingham, Brannen,
and Kelly because they were officials at SCI-Graterford and its successor institution SCI-Phoenix.
Since the events alleged in Curtis’ Complaint, he has been transferred to SCI-Coal Township. (See
ECF 137.) SCI-Graterford’s closure bars his future assignment there and Curtis has set forth no
evidence to show “that he will ever be assigned again to SCI-Phoenix as his ‘home’ institution,”
instead, the Court “can only speculate” that this could happen. (Defs.’ Mot., ECF 194 at 10.)
Moreover, the Court can only speculate that any of these Defendants might endeavor to remove
Curtis from the general population based on his failure to participate in Sex Offender
Programming. Speculation is not enough. Curtis’ transfer moots his requests for equitable relief as
to these officials from SCI-Graterford/SCI-Phoenix. See Griffin v. Beard, 401 F. App’x 715, 716-
17 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding inmate’s claim for injunctive relief was mooted by his transfer from
SCI-Huntingdon); Fantauzzi v. Wetzel, No. 18-5166, 2019 WL 4543095, at *12 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
18, 2019) (holding the plaintiffs claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were “moot—even if

12

they were potentially valid while incarcerated at SCI-Graterford—as he was no longer enduring
the alleged conditions at SCI-Graterford” after his transfer). The Court dismisses these claims.
2. Curtis’ official capacity claims for equitable relief against the Acting
Secretary and Deputy Secretary of the DOC are moot.
Even though Curtis’ transfer to SCI-Coal Township alone did not moot his official-capacity
claims for equitable relief against the Acting Secretary and Deputy Secretary of the DOC, these
claims likewise are moot. There is an exception to the mootness doctrine in “exceptional
situations” for controversies that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Kingdomware
Techs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 162, 170 (2016) (citation and internal quotation omitted).
In theory, Curtis could be threatened with solitary confinement for not participating in Sex
Offender Programming again. However, the mootness exception applies only when (1) the
challenged action is too brief “to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration,” and (2) it can
be reasonably expected “that the same complaining party [will] be subject to the same action
again.” /d. Even if Curtis could show that the time during which he was placed on the Restricted
Release List was too short to be fully litigated, there must still be some reasonable expectation that
he would again be subject to placement on the Restricted Release List based on his refusal to
participate in Sex Offender Programming. Nothing in the record suggests there is a reasonable
expectation that he will be threatened again with indefinite solitary confinement within the
Pennsylvania DOC for refusing to admit to engaging in sexual misconduct. Curtis was removed
from the Restricted Release List in November 202 1after his transfer to the PORTAL program and
released into the general population “with all standard general population privileges.” (Wheary
Decl., Defs.’ Ex. 16, ECF 194-1 at ECF p. 178.) The mootness exception does not apply to permit
Curtis’ official-capacity claims for equitable relief against the Acting Secretary and Deputy
Secretary of the DOC to proceed. The Court dismisses these claims as well.

13

B. Wetzel and Klopotoski are entitled to qualified immunity on
Curtis’s remaining claims.
The Third Circuit affirmed that qualified immunity bars Curtis’ First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment damages claims against the Defendants other than Wetzel and Klopotoski. Curtis,
763 F. App’x at 264. Because Curtis’ damages claims against Wetzel and Klopotoski were
dismissed prior to summary judgment before his appeal, the Court has yet to determine whether
the doctrine also shields Wetzel and Klopotoski from those claims. Since the Third Circuit vacated
their dismissal, the Court considers that question now and finds that it does.
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that “shields officials from harassment,
distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Qualified immunity is generally a question of law that should be
considered at the earliest possible stage of the proceedings, although a genuine dispute of material
fact may preclude summary judgment on the defense. See Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 325-26
(3d Cir. 2009). “Whenever a district court denies a public official qualified immunity at summary
judgment, the court must analyze separately, and state findings with respect to, the specific conduct
of each defendant.” Dean v. Borough of Glassboro, No. 21-2468, 2023 WL 2597586, at *3 (3d
Cir. Mar. 22, 2023) (citation and internal quotation omitted). To assess whether qualified immunity
exists, courts consider: (1) whether the facts “show the violation of a constitutional right, and
(2) whether the law was clearly established at the time of the violation.” Kelly v. Borough of
Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
“{Qjualified immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
the law.’” Williams v. City of York, 967 F.3d 252, 259 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
The Third Circuit has already explained that the other Defendants “reasonably relied on

14

the DOC’s records” when they required Curtis to participate in Sex Offender Programming and
that Curtis “had not presented any evidence that the prison records were inaccurate.” Curtis, 763 F.
App’x at 264. Moreover, Curtis failed to “identif[y] any clearly established law that would have
required prison officials to investigate his claims before requiring that he participate in [Sex
Offender Programming].” /d.; see also id. at 265 (“As with his First and Fourteenth Amendment
Claims, Curtis’ Fifth Amendment claim fails on qualified immunity grounds to the extent that he
sought damages.”’).
“Usually, the law of the case doctrine dictates that when a court decides upon a rule of law,
that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.
Mack v. Yost, 63 F.4th 211, 231 Gd Cir. 2023) (citation and internal quotation omitted). Curtis has
not shown any reason why the same qualified immunity analysis that barred his damages claims
against the other Defendants should not apply to bar his damages claims against either former
Secretary Wetzel or former Deputy Secretary Klopotoski. “A government official’s conduct
violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, every reasonable
official would understand that what he is doing violates the right alleged.” Curtis, 763 F. App’x at
263-64 (citation omitted). There is no record evidence sufficient to show any material question of
fact exists as to whether either Wetzel or Klopotoski had any reason to understand they had an
obligation to investigate beyond the information included in his Integrated Case Summary—lnitial
Classification Summary and to consider Curtis’ original court records when Curtis was placed on
the Restricted Release List for refusing to agree to participate in Sex Offender Programming.
Wetzel and Klopotoski, like the other Defendants, are entitled to summary judgment in their favor
on Curtis’ claims for damages under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments because the
doctrine of qualified immunity bars the claims.

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IV. CONCLUSION
While the circumstance giving rise to Curtis’ claims in this case—the DOC’s inaccurate
recordkeeping—is regrettable, it does not provide a basis for any relief. The Court grants
Defendants’ motion because Curtis’ remaining claims for equitable relief are moot and his
remaining claims for damages are barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity.
An Order consistent with this Memorandum will be docketed separately.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10405476. Public record. Not legal advice.