# COYLE v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · May 22, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10405377

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** May 22, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10405377

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that the district court’s reliance on the Middlesex factors was an error in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Sprint that the Middlesex factors are not dispositive
- noting that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania treats the due process provisions in the Pennsylvania Constitution coextensively with those in the United States Constitution

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PETER P, COYLE, :
Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF :
PENNSYLVANIA et al., : No. 23-1618
Defendants :
MEMORANDUM
PRATTER, J. MAY BA. 2023
Peter P. Coyle, a pro se plaintiff, filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Mike Edwards, in his official
capacity as Assistant District Attorney for Lehigh County, Pennsylvania; the Upper Saucon Police
Department, in its official capacity as a subsidiary of Upper Saucon Township, Pennsylvania; and
APS Associates, LLC. Mr, Coyle seeks to enjoin ali of the defendants from executing a judgment
embodied in a Pennsylvania state court order on March 31, 2022, and from enforcing a condition
of Mr, Coyle’s bail in a pending criminal action in Pennsylvania state court. For the following
reasons, the Court denies Mr. Coyle’s motion.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Coyle leased a property owned by APS Associates, LLC in the Fairmount Village
Shopping Center beginning in February 2018 (the “leased property”). Mr. Coyle operated his
business out of the leased property. The lease was most recently amended and extended in April
2019. It names APS Associates, LLC as the landlord and Peter P, Coyle as the tenant.
The manager of the leased property had worked with the Pennsylvania State Constable to
evict Mr. Coyle, and the order evicting Mr. Coyle from the leased property was signed by the
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County (the “Court of Common Pleas”) judge on

March 31, 2022 (the “March 31, 2022 Order”). Just over a month and a half later, on May 16,
2022, Mr. Coyle was officially evicted from the leased property,
On the same day, Mr. Coyle was arrested by the Upper Saucon Police Department for
trespassing on the leased property. Mr, Coyle alleges that he was arrested at the request of APS
Associates. Mr. Coyle was subsequently charged with, and held in custody for, violating 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 3503(a)(1)(ii).!
Mr. Coyle, however, was not individually named as a defendant in civil action No. 2021-
C-2438, the action in which the March 31, 2022 Order was entered. Rather, the complaint filed by
APS Associates named “Peter P. Coyle—Tanning Services Pennsylvania, LLC” as the defendant.
It did not name “Peter P. Coyle” and “Tanning Services Pennsylvania, LLC” as separate patties.
Thus, Mr. Coyle argues that any execution of judgment against him, including the May 16, 2022
eviction from the leased property, is not in accordance with the March 31, 2022 Order. In further
support of this, Mr. Coyle points to a memorandum opinion issued by the Court of Common Pleas
in civil action No, 2021-C-2438 on November 15, 2022, which provides that the judgment set forth
in the Match 31, 2022 Order may only be executed against “Peter P. Coyle—Tanning Services
Pennsylvania, LLC” and not “Peter P. Coyle.”
On June 29, 2022, a bail modification hearing in Mr, Coyle’s pending criminal case in the
Court of Common Pleas was held. The court released Mr, Coyle on bail, contingent upon Mr,
Coyle refraining from (1) entering the leased property from which he was evicted, and (2) entering
anywhere on the Fairmount Village Shopping Center grounds. This bail condition was based in
part on Mr. Coyle’s eviction from the leased property pursuant to the March 31, 2022 Order.

The docket identification number for Mr. Coyle’s state criminal case is CR-23 76-2022.

Despite his contention that the March 31, 2022 Order could not be executed against him, Mr. Coyle
agreed to the bail condition.
After a preliminary hearing in Mr. Coyle’s criminal case, the Lehigh County Sheriff's
Department served Mr. Coyle with a writ of execution related to the pending civil action against
him, The writ directed the Sheriff’s Department to levy property from Mr. Coyle’s former place
of business and to use Mr, Coyle’s banking information for garnishment. Mr. Coyle requested an
exemption from the writ, and on October 3, 2022, a hearing was held to consider the requested
exemption. During this hearing, APS Associates attempted to argue that “Peter P. Coyle” was a
properly named defendant in civil action No. 2021-C-2438 and that the writ of execution against
Mr, Coyle was issued in accordance with the March 31, 2022 Order. According to Mr. Coyle, the
Court of Common Pleas judge concluded that the complaint was filed against “Peter P. Coyle—
Tanning Services Pennsylvania, LLC,” and, thus, any execution of judgment against Mr. Coyle is
not in accordance with the March 31, 2022 Order. However, an order to this effect was not issued.
During another pretrial hearing in Mr. Coyle’s criminal case held on October 18, 2022, Mr.
Coyle requested a modification to his bail conditions to allow him to access his personal property
that remained at the Fairmount Village Shopping Center. Mr. Coyle contends that Assistant
District Attorney Mike Edwards falsely claimed that the March 31, 2022 Order could be executed
against Mr. Coyle and that if this bail condition were modified to allow him to access the shopping
center, Mr. Coyle would interfere with the execution of the judgment in his state civil case. The
Court of Common Pleas denied the bail modification. Therefore, if Mr. Coyle enters either the
leased property or the Fairmount Viilage Shopping Center, he could be arrested for violating this
bail condition.

On November 21, 2022, Mr. Coyle filed a property claim with the Lehigh County Sheriff's
Office which included a property form listing the levied property, proof of ownership documents,
and a request that the Sheriff’s Office cease and desist entering the leased property and levying
any property inside. The Sheriff's Office mailed its determination of Mr. Coyle’s property claim
to all parties involved and granted Mr, Coyle’s cease and desist request. APS Associates lodged
an objection to the determination, which was denied during a hearing in his state civil case on
February 1, 2023.
On April 11, 2023, Mr. Coyle was informed by APS Associates that Mr. Coyle’s personal
property was to be removed from the leased property and would be placed in a garage located at
the Fairmount Village Shopping Center, Mr. Coyle had 30 days to retrieve the property from the
garage before a Petition for Abandonment would be filed. However, Mr. Coyle claims he is not
able to retrieve his property because of the bail condition restricting his access to the shopping
center,
Mr. Coyle filed a complaint here alleging four causes of action: violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section I of the Pennsylvania Constitution
(Counts I, III, and IV); and violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US.
Constitution and Article I, Section I and Section XIII of the Pennsylvania Constitution (Count ID).
Mr, Coyle then filed the present motion, seeking to enjoin the defendants from (1) taking action to
execute the judgment set forth in the March 31, 2022 Order; (2) restricting Mr. Coyle from
accessing the leased property, i.e., enforcing the batl condition imposed in Mr. Coyle’s currently
pending criminal case; and (3) moving Mr. Coyle’s personal property located at the Fairmount
Village Shopping Center without Mr. Coyle’s permission.

LEGAL STANDARD
“A temporary restraining order is a ‘stay put,’ equitable remedy that has its essential
purpose the preservation of the status quo while the merits of the cause are explored through
litigation.” 0. ex rel. C.O. v. Orange Twp. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 2002)
(quoting Foreman vy, Dall. Cnty., 193 F.3d 314, 323 (Sth Cir. 1991)). The standard for determining
whether a movant is entitled to a temporary restraining order is the same as that used for a
preliminary injunction: the movant must demonstrate “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits;
(2) he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) granting relief will not
result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) the public interest favors such relief.”
Bimbo Bakers USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102, 109 (3d Cir, 2010); see also EXL Lab’ies,
LLC y. Egolf, No. 10-cv-6282, 2010 WL 5000835, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2010) (“The standard
for granting a temporary restraining order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 is the same as
that for issuing a preliminary injunction,”). “The failure to establish any of these elements,
however, renders the issuance of an injunction inappropriate.” Bradley v. Amazon.com, Inc., No.
17-cv-1587, 2021 WL 5631754, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2021). “Preliminary injunctive relief is an
extraordinary remedy and should be granted only in limited circumstances.” Kos Pharm., Ine. □□
Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 708 (3d Cir. 2004) Gnternal quotation marks omitted). Movants face
“heavy burden,” Lane v. New Jersey, 753 F. App’x 129, 131 Gd Cir. 2018), and “must establish
entitlement to [injunctive] relief by clear evidence.” Doe ex rel. Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist.,
897 F.3d 518, 526 (3d Cir. 2018).
DISCUSSION
Mr. Coyle seeks to enjoin the defendants from (1) executing the judgment set forth in the
Court of Common Pleas’ March 31, 2022 Order; (2) enforcing the bail condition imposed on Mr,
Coyle by the Court of Common Pleas, which restricts Mr. Coyle from accessing the leased property

and the Fairmount Village Shopping Center; and (3) moving Mr. Coyle’s personal property, which
is currently at the shopping center, without his permission. The removal of Mr. Coyle’s property
was first ordered in the writ of execution issued to the Lehigh County Sheriff's Office on July 5,
2022. Upon consideration of Mr, Coyle’s claim for exemption and following a hearing, the Court
of Common Pleas granted the claim for exemption in part and excluded a short list of items from
the Sheriffs levy. The other items listed on the writ of execution remain subject to the Sheriff's
levy.
Because the actions Mr. Coyle seeks to enjoin involve pending state criminal and civil
actions, the Court must consider whether abstention is necessary before it can address the merits
of Mr. Coyle’s motion.
“A federal court has an obligation to address a question of subject matter jurisdiction sua
sponte.” Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 217 Gd Cir. 1999), abrogated
on other grounds by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Alapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); Liberty Mut, Ins. Co. v. Ward Trucking Corp.,
48 F.3d 742, 750 Gd Cir. 1995) (“[Flederal courts have an ever-present obligation to satisfy
themselves of their subject matter jurisdiction and to decide the issue sua sponte ....”). Therefore,
it is proper for the Court to consider sua sponte whether the abstention principles announced in
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), apply because they bear on the Court’s obligation to
exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the present action.? See Grode v. Mut. Fire, Marine &
Inland Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 953, 958 (3d Cir, 1993) (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v.

2 As of the date of this memorandum opinion, none of the defendants have entered an appearance
nor have they filed a response to Mr. Coyle’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction.

United States, 424 U.S, 800, 817 (1976)) (“Unless one of the established abstention doctrines
applies, federal courts have a ‘virtually unflagging obligation’ to exercise their properly invoked
jurisdiction.”); Diamond “D” Constr. Corp. y, MeGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 197 (2d Cir, 2002) (citing
Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 816 n.22) (““[W]hen Younger applies, abstention is mandatory and its
application deprives the federal court of jurisdiction in the matter.”).
“Under the Younger abstention doctrine, federal courts must refrain from interfering with
three types of state proceedings: (1) state criminal prosecutions, (2) civil enforcement proceedings,
and (3) civil proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of the state courts
ability to perform their judicial functions.” Altice USA, Inc. vy. Bd. of Pub. Utils., 26 F.4th 571,
576 (3d Cir, 2022) (quoting Sprint Comme’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 73 (2013)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In Sprint, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of Younger abstention, limiting its
application to only these three “exceptional” categories of proceedings. Sprint, 571 U.S. at 73.
Before Sprint, Courts applied the three factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Middlesex County
Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423 (1982): “(1) there are ongoing
state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state
interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims.”
Schall y. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 Gd Cir. 1989) (citing Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432). The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals has “stressed several times since [Sprint narrowed Younger’s domain]
that the three Middlesex conditions are no longer the test for Younger abstention.” Malhan v. Sec’y
U.S. Dep’t of State, 938 F.3d 453, 462 (3d Cir, 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted); see e.g.,
Hamilton v. Bromley, 862 F.3d 329, 337 (3d Cir. 2017) (concluding that the district court’s reliance

on the Middlesex factors was an error in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Sprint that the
Middlesex factors are not dispositive).
Younger abstention is also only appropriate where criminal and civil proceedings are
“pending.” See Ankenbrandt y. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992) (“Absent any pending
proceeding in state tribunals... application ... of Younger abstention [i]s clearly erroneous.”’).
“State proceedings are pending only if they are initiated before any proceedings of substance on
the merits have taken place in the federal court.” Mathan, 938 F.3d at 464 (internal quotation marks
omitted). A proceeding that is “merely threatened” is not pending. /d.; see also Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S, 705, 711 (1977) (concluding that Younger did not bar federal jurisdiction where the relief
sought was prospective in an effort to preclude further prosecution under a statute that allegedly
violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights).
J. State Criminal Proceedings
One of the justifications for Younger abstention is “the basic doctrine of equity
jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act to restrain a
criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at state law and will not
suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44 (emphasis added),
Thus, where a plaintiff seeks a federal injunction restraining a pending criminal prosecution in
state court, the federal court should abstain.
Mr. Coyle seeks to enjoin the enforcement of a bail condition imposed by the Court of
Common Pleas upon his release in a currently pending criminal prosecution for trespassing and
criminal mischief. Specifically, Mr. Coyle seeks to enjoin the enforcement of this bail condition
to allow him to enter the Fairmount Village Shopping Center so that he can retrieve his personal
items before a petition for abandonment is filed. But Mr. Coyle cannot enter the shopping center

grounds to retrieve his property because he could be arrested for violating the conditions of his
bail.
Mr. Coyle’s criminal prosecution for trespass is “pending” so Younger abstention is
appropriate. See Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 705. Mr. Coyle was arrested for trespassing on the
leased property from which he was evicted pursuant to the March 31, 2022 Order issued by the
Court of Common Pleas. In releasing Mr. Coyle on bail, the Court of Common Pleas imposed a
bail condition which restricts Mr. Coyle from entering the leased property and the Fairmount
Village Shopping Center grounds. Both the criminal charges and the bail condition were initiated
before Mr. Coyle filed the present federal action. See Malhan, 938 F.3d at 464. Although Mr.
Coyle has not been prosecuted for violating the bail condition, the relief that Mr. Coyle seeks
cannot be considered “wholly prospective” because it is related to a currently pending prosecution
against him, Wooley, 430 U.S. at 711.
In Wooley, the plaintiff-appellees had been prosecuted by New Hampshire three times for
obscuring the state’s motto on his license plates. /d. at 707-08. After his third conviction but before
a fourth prosecution, he and his wife sought and received a federal injunction against future
prosecutions for this same offense. /d. at 709. The Supreme Court concluded that Younger
abstention was not appropriate because the appellees faced “a genuine threat of prosecution” and
because “the suit [wa]s in no way designed to annul the results of a state trial since the relief sought
[wa]s wholly prospective, to preclude further prosecution under a statute alleged to violate
appellees’ constitutional rights.” /d. at 710-11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the relief Mr. Coyle seeks is not strictly speaking, prospective because it is designed
to interfere with the judgment of a state court by modifying the decision of the Court of Common
Pleas with respect to the enforcement of Pennsylvania’s criminal laws. See id. at 711. “[T]he

GO

State’s interest in the enforcement of its criminal laws” is of significant import, and this mterest is
one of the justifications supporting the application of Younger. Juidice, 430 U.S. at 335. As the
Supreme Court stated in Younger,
[the] underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with
criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion
of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that
the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a
continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States
and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate
ways.
401 U.S. at 44,
The imposition of a bail condition in a pending criminal prosecution falls within the ambit
of the State’s interest in enforcing its criminal laws, thus this decision is best left to the State, free
from federal court interference, See id; see also Daves v. Dall. Cnty. Tex., 64 F.4th 616, 620,
626-31 (5th Cir. 2023) (“We hold that a string of consistent Supreme Court authority commencing
with Younger v. Harris requires federal courts to abstain from revising state bail bond procedures
on behalf of those being criminally prosecuted, when state procedures allow the accused adequate
opportunities fo raise their federal claims.”) (internal citations omitted); Cipollini v. Hilburt, No.
22-cv-558, 2022 WL 2313153, at *5—*6 (MLD. Pa. Apr. 19, 2022) (abstaining under Younger from
issuing injunctive relief affecting the bail order in plaintiff's ongoing state criminal trial); Vinci v.
Thurmond, No. 22-cv-P 19-GNS, 2022 WL 901506, at *1, *4 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 28, 2022) (abstaining
from interfering with the state court’s imposition of a bail condition on the plaintiff because the
“[pllaintiff's criminal prosecution was ostensibly pending in [state court] at the time he initiated
th[e] action” and “a proceeding concerning the setting of bail restrictions unquestionably
implicates important state interests”).
For these reasons, the Court will abstain from ruling on Mr. Coyle’s motion to the extent
he seeks to enjoin a pending criminal prosecution.

Ww

II. State Civil Proceedings
A. Abstention
Younger abstention has been extended to “civil proceedings . . . that implicate a State’s
interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts,” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 72-73 (citing
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987)), and “civil proceedings involving certain orders
that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial function.” fd.
at 73 (emphasis added) (citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans,
491 U.S. 350, 367-68 (1989)). Orders regarding bonds pending appeal, civil contempt orders, and
entries of confessed judgments have been found to be uniquely in furtherance of judicial functions
for purposes of Younger abstention. See, e.g, Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 13 (bond pending appeal);
Juidice, 430 US. at 336 & n.12 (civil contempt order); Schall, 885 F.2d at 103 (entry of confessed
judgments), Further, the Supreme Court has held that a state proceeding implicates a state interest
“if the State’s interests in the proceeding are so important that exercise of the federal judicial power
would disregard the comity between the States and the National Government.” Pennzoil, 481 □□□
at 11.
Two of Mr. Coyle’s sought-after injunctions relate to his pending’ civil proceeding: (1)
that the defendants be enjoined from taking action to execute the judgment set forth in the March
31, 2022 Order, and (2) that the defendants not move Mr. Coyle’s personal property pursuant to

3 As a threshold matter, Mr. Coyle’s civil proceeding is “pending” because the proceedings which
Mr. Coyle seeks to enjoin were initiated prior to him filing the present action in federal court. The order
evicting Mr. Coyle from the leased property was entered on March 31, 2022. The writ of execution to
enforce the judgment was entered on July 14, 2022, and the Court of Common pleas granted Mr, Coyle’s
claim for exemption part on November 15, 2022, Mr. Coyle was notified by APS Associates that his
personal property, which was still subject to the writ of execution, was to be relocated on April 11, 2023.
Mr. Coyle did not file his complaint in federal court until April 27, 2023, affer the state civil proceedings
he seeks to enjoin had been initiated, Further, the execution of the judgment set forth in the March 31, 2022
Order is not “merely threatened” because according to Mr. Coyle, his property may have already been
moved. Malhan, 938 F.3d at 464.

+4

the writ of execution. Here, the Court will not abstain from ruling on Mr. Coyle’s motion to the
extent he seeks to enjoin the defendants from taking actions to enforce the March 31, 2022
judgment. In Parr v. Colantonio, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that abstention
under Younger was not proper because “the parallel state proceeding—an ordinary eviction action
in the Court of Common Pleas—does not fit into any of the three categories identified in Sprint,”
including the third category--a “civil proceeding[] involving certain orders uniquely in
furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform [its] judicial functions.” 844 F. App’x 476, 479
& 479 n.3 (3d. Cir. 2021) (quoting Sprint, 571 U.S. at 78); see also Shawe v. Bouchard, No. 20-
ev-1770, 2021 WL 1380598, at *16 (D. Del. Apr. 12, 2021) (‘Our Court of Appeals noted a
possession order arising from a commonplace eviction action does not fit within the final Sprint
category.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Mr. Coyle seeks to enjoin the execution of an eviction order issued by the Court of
Common Pleas, This is factually similar to Parr, in which the plaintiff was the owner of storage
trailers located on property owned by his landlady. Parr v. Colantonio, No. 19-cv-1930, 2019 WL
2589453, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2019). The landlady brought an action against the tenant, seeking
back rent and the eviction of his company from the property. Jd. The state magisterial district judge
granted judgment for the landiady and issued an Order for Possession. fd. The tenant then filed a
complaint in federal court arguing that the constable of the state district court “improperly
effectuated the state court Order of Possession.” Jd, at *3. The federal district court concluded that
Younger was applicable to this claim. fd. On appeal, the Third Circuit concluded that abstention
was not proper because (1) the district court relied on the Middlesex factors and failed to first
consider the “three exceptional categories” set forth in Sprint; and (2) the Court of Common Pleas
eviction action did not fit within any of the three Sprint categories. Parr, 844 F. App’x at 479,

14

Therefore, in accordance with the decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Parr,
this Court will not abstain under Younger and will consider the merits of Mr. Coyle’s motion for
a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to the extent they relate to Mr. Coyle’s
state civil proceedings.
B. Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
To succeed on his claim for a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, Mr.
Coyle must prove that (1) it is likely that he will succeed on the merits; (2) he will suffer irreparable
harm without the injunction; (3) the nonmoving party will not suffer greater harm with the
imposition of equitable relief; and (4) the public interest favors relief. Bimbo, 613 F.3d at 109.
The Court will first consider the likelihood of success on the merits. “At the preliminary
injunction stage, plaintiffs need only show a reasonable probability that their... claims will
succeed on the merits.” Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2010). Here, Mr. Coyle
alleges two causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relating to his pending civil case: violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section I of the Pennsylvania
Constitution against APS Associates arising out of its attempted execution of the March 31, 2022
Order (Count 1); and violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article
I, Section I of the Pennsylvania Constitution against APS Associates arising out of its disposition
of Mr. Coyle’s property (Count IV).’ To demonstrate the likelihood of his success on these claims,
Mr. Coyle points to the memorandum opinion issued by the Court of Common Pleas on November
15, 2022, which provided that the judgment set forth in the March 31, 2022 Order may only be
executed against “Peter P. Coyle—Tanning Services Pennsylvania, LLC” and not “Peter P.
Coyle.” Ex. F to Compl. Mr. Coyle argues that in light of this opinion, he has established a

4 Mr, Coyle’s two other causes of action relate to his pending criminal case and as set forth above,
the Court will abstain from ruling on Mr. Coyle’s motion to the extent it relates to his criminal case.

12

likelihood of success on both of his claims because the March 31, 2022 Order cannot be executed
against him. Although APS Associates has yet to enter an appearance or file a responsive pleading,
it is likely, given the arguments raised in the Court of Common Pleas, that APS Associates will
argue that the March 31, 2022 Order can be enforced against Mr. Coyle. Thus, they will likely □□
argue that Mr. Coyle cannot succeed on either of his claims because APS Associates was acting in
accordance with the March 31, 2022 Order.
Although Mr. Coyle presents a reasonable basis for finding that the order is not enforceable
against him, this alone is insufficient to establish a likelihood of success on the merits because Mr.
Coyle must also establish that the defendants were acting “under color of state law” to succeed on
his § 1983 claim. Melo v, Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 638 (3d Cir, 1990); see also 42 U.S.C, § 1983, This
inquiry turns not on “whether the state was involved in some way in the relevant events, but
whether the action taken can be fairly attributed to the state itself.” Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan,
47 F.3d 628, 638 (Gd Cir. 1995). For private parties, such as APS Associates, to qualify as state
actors under § 1983, “the state must significantly contribute to the constitutional deprivation... .”
Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1266 (3d Cir. 1994). Courts have
concluded that private parties may be liable under § 1983 where they invoke state procedures to
seize property. See id, at 1267 (“We agree and hold that a judgment creditor who uses
Pennsylvania’s procedure for executing on a confessed judgment acts under color of law and
becomes a state actor... .”); Shipp v. Donaher, No. 09-cv-2475, 2010 WL 1257972, at *5 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 25, 2010) (‘[U|nder Jordan, otherwise-private parties who merely seek and receive
confessed judgments are not state actors, while those who execute on confessed judgments are
state actors.”),

14

Mr. Coyle’s § 1983 claim against APS Associates relates to its attempted execution of the
judgment set forth in the March 31, 2022 Order by notifying Mr, Coyle that it was removing his
personal items from the leased property. Because the cause of action against APS Associates
relates to its execution of the state court judgment, it is at least plausible that APS Associates was
acting under the color of state law such that it may be liable under § 1983.
Because it is conceivable that APS Associates was acting under the color of state law, Mr.
Coyle must next establish that he was deprived of his constitutional rights “without due process of
law” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.? U.S. Const. amend. XIV. “The fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.” Mathews v. Fidridge, 424 U.S, 319, 333 (1976) Gnternal quotation marks omitted). Mr,
challenges APS Associates’ attempted execution of the March 31, 2022 Order and the
removal of his personal items from the leased property as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, it is not clear from Mr. Coyle’s compiaint or the instant motion whether
he is intending to assert a substantive due process claim or a procedural due process claim.
To the extent Mr. Coyle is raising a substantive due process claim, he must allege that he
was deprived of a fundamental right, and that the government conduct at issue was “so egregious,

5 Article I, Section J of the Pennsylvania State Constitution provides that “[a]ll men are born equally
free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those... of
acquiring, possessing and protecting property ....” Pa. Const. Art. I, § 1. “Due process protections . .
emanate from [this provision of] the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Germantown Cab Co. v. Phila. Parking
206 A.3d 1030, 1042 (Pa. 2019); Khan v. State Bd. of Auctioneer Exam rs, 842 A.2d 936, 945 (Pa.
2004) (“The guarantee of due process of law, in Pennsylvania jurisprudence, emanates from a number of
provisions of the Declaration of Rights, particularly Article I, Sections 1, 9, and 11 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.”), Because “Pennsylvania’s ... due process provisions are coextensive with the corresponding
provisions of the United States Constitution,” the Court will proceed with its due process analysis only
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Republican Party of Pa. v. Cortes, 218 F. Supp. 3d 396, 417 (E.D. Pa.
2016); see also Hosp. & Healthsystem Ass'n of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 77 A.3d 587, 600 n.15 (“The state
and federal due process provisions are substantially equivalent in their protective scope.”) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted); Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp. v. Taylor, 841 A.2d 108, 114 n.6
(Pa. 2004) (noting that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania treats the due process provisions in the
Pennsylvania Constitution coextensively with those in the United States Constitution),

1«

so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.” Katcher v. Cnty.
of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 425 (3d Cir. 2006). Based on the pleadings and the arguments raised in
Mr. Coyle’s motion, the Court cannot conclude that Mr. Coyle has established a likelihood of
success on a substantive due process claim because he has not alleged that APS Associates’
conduct was “shocking to the conscience.” Rather, it is arguable, based on the pleadings, that APS
Associates thought its conduct was proper because no order was ever issued by the Court of
Common Pleas preventing the execution of the March 31, 2022 judgment despite the Court’s
acknowledgement of the naming deficiencies. Thus, at this stage, Mr. Coyle has not shown a
reasonable probability that this claim will succeed,
To the extent Mr. Coyle is asserting a procedural due process claim, he “must prove that a
person acting under color of state law deprived [him] of a protected property interest, and that the
state procedure for challenging the deprivation does not satisfy the requirements of procedural due
process.” Prosperi y. Twp. of Scott, No. 06-cv-501, 2006 WL 2583754, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 7,
2006) (citing Parratt vy. Taylor, 451 U.S. 537, 536-37 (1981), overruled on other grounds by
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986)). Mr. Coyle also has failed to show a reasonable
probability of success on this claim because: (1) he has not established that he has a protected
property interest in the property APS Associates plans to, or has already, moved because this
property is subject to the Sheriff's levy under the writ of execution and as ordered by the Court of
Common Pleas; and (2) Mr. Coyle has not asserted any claims which go to the state procedure for
challenging this alleged deprivation.

At this preliminary stage in the litigation, and given the deficiencies in Mr. Coyle’s
pleading as it relates to his Fourteenth Amendment claims,° the Court concludes that Mr. Coyle
has failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his
claims. See Miller, 598 F.3d at 147. Thus, Mr. Coyle failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to the
“extraordinary remedy” of injunctive relief. Kos, 369 F.3d at 708. Although Mr. Coyle’s failure to
establish this element renders the issuance of an injunction inappropriate, Bradley, 2021 WL
5631754, at *2, in anticipation of future issues perhaps, the Court will also address irreparable
harm.
“[T]o show irreparable harm a plaintiff must demonstrate potential harm which cannot be
redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following a trial.” Acierno v. New Castle Cnty., 40
F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994) Gnternal quotation marks omitted). “The risk of irreparable harm
must not be speculative.” Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 488 (Gd Cir. 2000). “[Aln
assertion of irreparable harm must be based on concrete evidence and cannot be sustained on the
basis of bald and conclusory statements.” Bradley, 2021 WL 5631754, at *3 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Campbell Soup Co. vy. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 Gd Cir, 1992)
(“[T]he moving party must make a ‘clear showing of immediate irreparable harm.’”). Mr. Coyle
argues that he has already established irreparable harm by alleging that APS Associates has, or
shortly will, remove Mr. Coyle’s personal property from the leased property and place it in a garage
in the Fairmount Village Shopping Center. He alleges that without the injunction, APS Associates
will remove the property, if it has not already done so, and if done, this will likely damage the
property in the process.

6 The Court notes that its finding that Mr, Coyle has not established a likelihood of success on the
merits is in part based on the insufficiency of his pleadings. This conclusion, however, does not foreclose
the possibility that Mr. Coyle could, at a later stage in this litigation, succeed on these claims.

479

Mr. Coyle has failed to make a “showing of immediate irreparable harm.” Campbell Soup,
977 F.2d at 91. Mr. Coyle argues that he was notified by APS Associates that it has or will move
his personal items from the leased property. Mr. Coyle has presented no “concrete evidence” that
his personal items have been moved, or even that APS Associates has definitive or imminent plans
to move the property. Bradley, 2021 WL 5631754, at *3. Thus, because Mr, Coyle has failed to
prove with the requisite evidence that he has suffered harm, the harm he claims as irreparable is
merely speculative. See Adams, 204 F.3d at 488. Given that, the Court need not consider the
remaining elements of the test. See Ferring Pharms., Inc, v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765 F.3d 205,
219 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Absent a showing of irreparable harm, a plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive
relief, even if the other three elements are found.”); Bennington Foods LLC vy. St. Croix
Renaissance Grp., LLP, 528 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir, 2008) (‘As ... there is no possibility of
irreparable harm on the record before us, there is no need to analyze the other prongs of the test.”),
Because Mr. Coyle has failed to establish several necessary elements required for
injunctive relief, the Court will deny Mr. Coyle’s motion for a temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court will abstain in part from resolving Mr. Coyle’s motion for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and will deny in part Mr. Coyle’s motion.
An appropriate order follows.
BY THE COURT:
Chak ealte
GENTE.K, PRATTER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10405377. Public record. Not legal advice.