# TALBERT v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · March 7, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10405001

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 7, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10405001

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CHARLES TALBERT : CIVIL ACTION
v. : NO. 23-679
COMMONWEALTH OF :
PENNSYLVANIA, PENNSYLVANIA :
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, :
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN :
SERVICES, DEPARTMENT OF :
CORRECTIONS, PHILADELPHIA :
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS :

MEMORANDUM
KEARNEY, J. March 7, 2023
The Commonwealth’s Department of Corrections has detained Charles Talbert in a
restrictive housing unit at a correctional facility in the Middle District of Pennsylvania since early
2020 enforcing a sentence entered by a Philadelphia trial judge. Serial litigant Mr. Talbert now
sues the Commonwealth and a variety of state agencies, as well as the Philadelphia trial court,
alleging they discriminated against him in placing him in a restrictive housing unit (rather than a
psychiatric unit) based on his now-admitted numerous mental and emotional disorders. He does
not allege a fact suggesting the state trial court discriminated against him in the facility because of
his mental or emotional disorders. He instead sues the trial court challenging the sentencing judge’s
decisions in entering and enforcing a final criminal sentence. His pro se challenge to the merits of
his sentencing judge’s decisions cannot state a disability discrimination claim against an immune
judge and the state trial court requiring we dismiss the disability discrimination claims against the
state trial court with prejudice.

We are left with Mr. Talbert’s inadequately pled pro se disabilities claims against several
Pennsylvania state agencies. Mr. Talbert does not plead placement in the restrictive housing unit
is result of his disabilities requiring we dismiss his disabilities claims without prejudice. But he
may be able to plead disabilities claims in the District in which he is presently incarcerated and
where the state actors are engaging in the challenged decisions. We dismiss the disabilities claims
against the Commonwealth and its agencies with leave to timely amend. Mr. Talbert is granted
leave to plead facts in an amended Complaint against the Commonwealth and its agencies in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
I. Alleged pro se facts.
The Philadelphia Department of Prisons transferred pre-sentence detainee Charles
Talbert’s medical and mental health records to SCI Phoenix on December 12, 2019 so it could
treat Mr. Talbert for his admitted diagnoses of antisocial personality disorder, anxiety disorder,
bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder, depression, paranoia, and post-traumatic stress
disorder.! Less than a week later, on December 18, 2019, the Honorable Genece E. Brinkley of the
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas sentenced Mr. Talbert to a term of three to seven and a half
years’ incarceration requesting the Commonwealth and Department of Corrections provide him
adequate treatment and housing for his mental health conditions.” Officers transported Mr. Talbert
back to SCI Phoenix on December 23, 2019.3
Mr. Talbert had a borderline personality disorder episode at SCI Phoenix on January 5,
2020 while placed in the general population “where his associated behavior became erratic and
aggressive.”* A mental health provider at SCI Phoenix moved Mr. Talbert into a psychiatric
observation cell for one day until his behavior stabilized.° Mr. Talbert admits SCI Phoenix’s

method of addressing his “psychotic-related behavior” is “adequate” but claims “this was the last
time in which this method was used.”®
About a week later, the Department of Corrections transferred Mr. Talbert to SCI Camp
Hill in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.’ Correctional officers sent Mr. Talbert to the Restrictive
Housing Unit on January 13, 2020 for fighting another prisoner.® Mr. Talbert remained in the
Restrictive Housing Unit for forty-five days and his mental health began to deteriorate because he
did not receive adequate mental health treatment.® He became “constantly aggravated due to his
inability to adjust to such form of extreme isolation.”!°
Mr. Talbert’s problems arise when later transferred to correctional facilities outside this
District. Mr. Talbert’s “psychotically induced behavior” became rampant while at SCI Camp
The Department did not place Mr. Talbert into a psychiatric observation cell at SCI Camp
Hill.'2 The Commonwealth and Department instead issued more than one hundred written
misconduct reports which caused Mr. Talbert to remain in the Restrictive Housing Unit for three
years.
Pennsylvania sentencing Judge Brinkley held a hearing on May 20, 2021, where Mr.
Talbert told Judge Brinkley he had not been receiving the treatment and housing for his mental
health conditions at SCI Camp Hill.'* He claims Judge Brinkley refused to intervene in the custody
and treatment decisions by the Department at SCI Camp Hill.!°
The Commonwealth and the Department of Corrections, through its correctional staff, have
kept Mr. Talbert in the Restrictive Housing Unit in SCI Camp Hill from 2020 until 2023.'° The
Commonwealth and Department admittedly reviewed Mr. Talbert’s placement in the Restrictive
Housing Unit, but Mr. Talbert claims these reviews are “meaningless[.]’”!”

II. Analysis
Mr. Talbert pro se sues the Commonwealth, the Department of Health, the Department of
Human Services, the Department of Corrections, and the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
County.'® He invokes our limited subject matter jurisdiction by claiming these entities violated
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by placing
him in prolonged isolation at SCI Camp Hill’s Restrictive Housing Unit for more than three
consecutive years without meaningful review.!* He claims he suffered mental anguish, aggravation
of his pretexting mental disorders, stress headaches, high blood pressure, and lower back issues.”°
Mr. Talbert seeks monetary damages, compensatory damages, costs, and legal fees.”!
Congress at 28 U.S.C. § 1915A requires us to screen the incarcerated Mr. Talbert’s
Complaint.”* Congress requires we must “review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as
soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress
from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.””? On review, we
must “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.””4
We apply the same standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) when
considering whether to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim under section 1915A(b)(1).”°
A complaint containing “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face’” meets the Rule 12(b)(6) standard.*© We accept all factual allegations in
Mr. Talbert’s Complaint as true and construe those facts in the light most favorable to him to
determine whether he states a claim to relief plausible on its face.”’
We are directed by our Court of Appeals to be “mindful of our obligation to liberally
construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings particularly where the pro se litigant is imprisoned.”** We

are to “remain flexible” and “apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed
to name it.””° But “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a
claim” and “cannot flout procedural rules—they must abide by the same rules that apply to all
other litigants.”
A. We dismiss Mr. Talbert’s claims against the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County with prejudice.
Mr. Talbert sues the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County for violating the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.*! He claims the state trial court has
“Jurisdiction over people with serious mental conditions being transferred from the Philadelphia
Department of Prisons [ ], to the state and [Department of Corrections’] custody, with inherent
power to supervise the enforcement of the treatment and housing conditions imposed within its
sentencing commitment orders.”?* He claims Judge Brinkley sentenced him to three to seven and
a half years” incarceration conditioned upon the Commonwealth and Department of Corrections
providing him adequate treatment and housing for his mental health conditions.** But on May 20,
2021, he informed Judge Brinkley he had not been receiving the treatment and housing for his
mental health as ordered on December 18, 2019.*4 He claims Judge Brinkley refused to intervene.*
There is no dispute Judge Brinkley afforded him a hearing.
Our Court of Appeals instructs the Court of Common Pleas is an arm of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, and as such, is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity which would
bar a suit against it in federal court.*° But our Supreme Court in United States v. Georgia held
“Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate sovereign immunity for claims brought
under Title II of the [Disabilities Act]” and “insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for
damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II
validly abrogates state sovereign immunity.” 7” The Court established a three-part test to determine

whether sovereign immunity has been abrogated in a particular case, as determined on a “claim-
by-claim” basis: “(1) which aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what
extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such
misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress’s
purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.”
The first prong of the Georgia test requires a party sufficiently plead: “(1) he is a qualified
individual; (2) with a disability; (3) who was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits
of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any
such entity; (4) by reason of his disability.”2 The undisputed plead facts confirm the court did not
deny Mr. Talbert its “services[.]” Judge Brinkley considered Mr. Talbert’s May 20, 2021 motion
and did not intervene.*? Mr. Talbert simply disagrees with Judge Brinkley’s decision. His remedy
is an appeal in the state courts. He cannot allege the trial court denied him a hearing; he instead
alleges he does not like the sentencing judge’s decision.
We also recognize “[a] judicial officer in the performance of [her] duties has absolute
immunity from suit and will not be liable for his judicial acts.”*' A judge’s immunity is overcome
only if the judge: (1) did not act in her judicial capacity; or (2) acted “in the complete absence of
all jurisdiction.’”*? A judge acts in his judicial capacity when he performs “a function normally
performed by a judge.’*? Where generally “a court has some subject matter jurisdiction, there is
sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes.”** A judge will not be deprived of immunity because
she acted in error, maliciously, or in excess of his authority; “rather, [s]he will be subject to liability
only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”*° Our Court of Appeals directs
judges are protected by absolute judicial immunity when they make judicial determination in state
court criminal proceedings.*®

Mr. Talbert appears to be suing the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County for
violating the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act for decisions Judge Brinkley
made when sentencing Mr. Talbert and then not ordering the Department to alter its treatment after
a hearing in May 2021. But Mr. Talbert fails to meet the first prong of the Georgia test. And Judge
Brinkley has absolute immunity for sentencing Mr. Talbert. We dismiss the disabilities claims
against the Court of Common Pleas with prejudice. He cannot state a disabilities claim against the
state trial court after it sentenced him and afforded him a hearing on his alleged request for better
treatment in his custody.
B. We dismiss Mr. Talbert’s remaining Americans with Disabilities Act and
Rehabilitation Act claims without prejudice.
Mr. Talbert sues the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Department of
Health, the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services, and the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections for violating Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. We analyze Mr. Talbert’s Title II and Rehabilitation Act claims together
because “the substantive standards for determining liability are the same.” *”
“Title II of the [Americans with Disabilities Act] prohibits discrimination against the
disabled in public services, programs, and activities.”4* To state a claim under Title II of the Act,
Mr. Talbert must plead facts allowing us to plausibly infer: “(1) he is a qualified individual; (2)
with a disability; (3) who was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any such entity; (4)
by reason of his disability.”*? Pennsylvania’s correctional facilities are “public entities” as defined
by Title II of the Act.*°
Where, as here, Mr. Talbert seeks compensatory damages, Mr. Talbert must also allege
“intentional discrimination under a deliberate indifference standard.”>! To show deliberate

indifference, Mr. Talbert must allege the entities he sued: (1) had “knowledge that a federally
protected right is substantially likely to be violated,” and (2) failed “to act despite that
knowledge.”>?
Mr. Talbert alleges the Commonwealth, the Department of Corrections, “by and through
its correctional staff,” the Pennsylvania Department of Health, and the Pennsylvania Department
of Human Services discriminated against him when they placed him in the Restrictive Housing
Unit at SCI Camp Hill after a fight upon arrival at the facility.** He claims these entities were
deliberately indifferent to his serious mental conditions because they knew Mr. Talbert suffered
from antisocial personality disorder, anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder, borderline personality
disorder, depression, paranoia, and post-traumatic stress disorder, but failed to house him in an
appropriate setting to treat his needs.** His deliberate indifference claims sound in an Eighth
Amendment challenge to his conditions of custody. Mr. Talbert does not plead a disabilities
discrimination claim.
Mr. Talbert sufficiently plead two of the four elements of a disabilities discrimination
claim. He admits to being an individual with a disability.°> Having met the first two elements for
a disabilities discrimination claim, we focus on the third and fourth elements — whether these
Pennsylvania entities excluded Mr. Talbert “from participation in or denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity” because of his disability.*° Mr. Talbert pleads
was sent to the [Restrictive Housing Unit] for fighting another prisoner.’*” He then alleges
the Department of Corrections knew of, yet failed to accommodate his deteriorating mental health
while in the Restrictive Housing Unit.*® He presumably challenges the Department’s decision to
not place him in the general population even though he admits his emotional and mental disorders.

But Mr. Talbert does not contend the Department, or any of the entities he sues, placed him
in the Restrictive Housing Unit because of his alleged mental disabilities or denied him a particular
program or service because of his alleged mental disabilities.°? And we are mindful “[{i]mproper
medical treatment claims may not be brought under the [Americans with Disabilities Act] or
[Rehabilitation Act].”©
We dismiss Mr. Talbert’s claims against the Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania Department
of Corrections, the Pennsylvania Department of Health, and the Pennsylvania Department of
Human Services for violating the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act without
prejudice to possibly plead facts supporting his disabilities or possible Eighth Amendment claims.
C. We transfer Mr. Talbert’s remaining claims to the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Talbert is presently incarcerated at SCI Coal Township located in the Middle District
of Pennsylvania.®! Mr. Talbert’s claims against the Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania Department
of Health, the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services, and Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections arise from conduct which occurred at SCI Camp Hill located in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. Mr. Talbert’s claims do not arise from conduct in Philadelphia facilities or at SCI
Phoenix; to the contrary, he swears SCI Phoenix offers a fair comparator: Mr. Talbert swears he
had a borderline personality disorder episode at SCI Phoenix on January 5, 2020, and a mental
health provider placed Mr. Talbert into a psychiatric observation cell for one day until his behavior
stabilized, which Mr. Talbert described as an “adequate” treatment but claims “this was the last
time in which this method was used.”® A few days later, correctional officers transferred Mr.
Talbert to SCI Camp Hill where officers placed him in the Restrictive Housing Unit.”
Mr. Talbert offers no present connection to this venue. A possible disabilities or Eighth
Amendment claim (if suitably amended) brought by an incarcerated person at SCI Coal Township

against state actors at SCI Camp Hill in the Middle District of Pennsylvania is proper in the Middle
District of Pennsylvania. We transfer the case to the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania.
Venue is proper in the judicial district where “any defendant resides, if all defendants are
residents of the State in which the district is located;” or where “‘a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of
the action is situated[.]’ “[I]f there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought . .

. any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with
respect to such action.”® Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 1404 requires we consider the “convenience of
parties and witnesses” and “the interests of justice” before transferring a civil action to another
district “where it might have been brought.”®* Congress through section 1404(a) gives us “broad
discretion to determine, on an individualized, case-by-case basis, whether convenience and
fairness considerations weigh in favor of transfer.”°’ We find the factors described by our Court
of Appeals in Jumara v. State Farm Insurance Company favor transfer to the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
There is no nexus between Mr. Talbert’s conditions of confinement claim to this District.
We transfer this matter to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
— after dismissing the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County with prejudice — for claims
arising entirely at SCI Camp Hill located in the Middle District of Pennsylvania brought by an
incarcerated individual residing in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
II. Conclusion
We dismiss Mr. Talbert’s claims against the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
County with prejudice as an amendment to sue the court is futile. We dismiss Mr. Talbert’s claims

10

against the Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania Department of Health, the Pennsylvania Department
of Human Services, and Pennsylvania Department of Corrections without prejudice as Mr. Talbert
fails to allege these entities violated the Americans with Disabilities Act or the Rehabilitation Act.
But we grant him leave to file an amended Complaint if he can cure the defects. We transfer this
matter to United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

' ECF Doc. No. 1 § 24.
2 Id. 425.
3 Id. 4 26.
4 Id. § 28.
> Id. 429.
6 Id. ¥ 30.
□□□
8 Td.
Id. 32.
10 Td.
7d. 33.
2 Td. 30.
13 33.
14 1.4 34.
'S 436. We are not aware if Mr. Talbert appealed Judge Brinkley’s decision on the Department’s
placement decisions.
16 Td. 4 42.
17 Td. 4 44.
18 Td. 4 2-6.

11

19 Td. 9 46-67.
20 14.945.
21 Td. 99 55, 67.
22 Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2000).
3 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
2428 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
5 Turner v. District Att’y Phila. Cnty., No. 22-491, 2022 WL 1568395, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 18,
2022) (citing Neal v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 96-7923, 1997 WL 338838, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
June 19, 1997); Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).
26 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)).
27 Elansari v. Univ. of Pennsylvania, 779 F. App’x 1006, 1008 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)) (quoting Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116,
120 (3d Cir. 2012)).
8 Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333,
339 (3d Cir. 2011) and citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir.
2013)) (internal quotations omitted).
? Yogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 244).
3° Td. (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 245) (italics added).
31 ECF Doc. No. 1 49 46-67.
2 Id. 4 20.
33 425.
34 434.
5 Id. 4 36
36 See Dutton v. Ct. of Common Pleas of Philadelphia Domestic Rels. Div., 215 F. App’x 161, 162
(3d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e have held that the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania, which includes the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as a state
entity with respect to a federal claim under [Title I of the] Americans with Disabilities Act.”); Benn
v. First Judicial Dist. of Pennsylvania, 426 F.3d 233, 240 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005); Malarik v. Court of
Common Pleas of Beaver Cty, Pennsylvania, 145 F.App’x. 756, 757 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Taylor
v. Pennsylvania, No. 17-3369, 2018 WL 11243146, at *1 n. 1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 12, 2018).
12

37 Geness y. Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts, 974 F.3d 263, 270 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing
United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 154 (2006)); Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159. In Georgia, a
paraplegic inmate in the state prison system filed a complaint in federal court challenging the
conditions of his confinement under Title II. Georgia, 546 U.S. at 151.
38 Geness, 974 F.3d at 270.
39 Id. at 271.
40 ECF Doc. No. 1 § 34.
Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Azubuko
v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006)).
* Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,
11-12 (1991)); see also Clark v. All the Judges of the Crim. Just. Ctr., No. 21-5690, 2022 WL
1567321, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 2022).
Clark, 2022 WL 1567321, at *2 (quoting Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d
Cir. 2000)).
“4 Clark v. Warden & All Prison Guards, No. 21-5498, 2022 WL 1443427, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 5,
2022) (quoting Figueroa, 208 F.3d at 443-44),
4S Kinnard v. George, 652 F. App’x 96, 98 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted).
46 Td. (holding lower court properly dismissed § 1983 action by a pro se plaintiff against two state
court judges where plaintiff complained of “judicial actions [the] Judges . . . took in the course of
an official criminal proceeding” because the judges were “protected by absolute judicial
immunity”).
Furgess y. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 288 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing McDonald v. Com. of
Pa., Dep’t of Pub. Welfare Polk Ctr., 62 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1995)).
The Rehabilitation Act prohibits qualified individuals with a disability being “excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . .” “solely by reason of his or her disability.” 29
§ 794.
‘8 Disability Rights New Jersey, Inc. v. Comm’, N.J. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 796 F.3d 293, 301 (3d
Cir. 2015) (citing Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004)).
Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d 344, 361 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170,
(3d Cir. 2018)).
°° Brown v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections, 290 F. App’x 463, 467 (3d Cir.2008).

13

>! Furgess, 933 F.3d at 289 (citing S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248,
263 (3d Cir. 2013)); Geness, 974 F.3d at 263, 274 n.11.
Geness, 974 F.3d at 274 n.11 (quoting Durrell, 729 F.3d at 265).
°3 ECF Doc. No. 1 §§ 33, 35, 42.
4 Id. OF 24, 38-39.
Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210-11 (1998) (holding a state prisoner is a
“qualified individual” under the Americans with Disabilities Act); 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)
(defining “disability” to include “a... mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities”).
Geness, 902 F.3d at 361 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Haberle, 885 F.3d at 178-79).
°7 ECF Doc. No. 1 431.
8 Id. § 32.
°° See Goins v. Beard, No. 09-1223, 2011 WL 4345874, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 15, 2011).
69 4.H. v. St. Louis Cty., 891 F.3d 721, 729-30 (8th Cir. 2018).
6! ECF Doc. No. 1.
8 Id. TJ 29-30.
63
64 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
65 Id.
6 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
67 Jumara v. State Farm Insurance Company, 55 F.3d 873, 883 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Stewart Org.,
Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 30-31 (1988)).
68 Our Court of Appeals in Jumara requires we consider private factors such as: (1) Mr. Talbert’s
choice of venue; (2) defendants’ preference; (3) where the claim arose; (4) the relative physical
and financial conditions of the parties; (5) convenience of the witnesses — but only to the extent
the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial; and (6) location of books and records (similarly
limited to the extent the files could not be produced in the alternative forum). Jd. at 879-80. The
public factors we consider include: (1) enforceability of the judgment; (2) practical considerations
to make trial easy, expeditious, or inexpensive; (3) court congestion; (4) local interest in deciding
controversies at home; (5) public policies of the fora; and (6) familiarity of the trial judge with the
applicable state law in diversity cases. Jd. Although Mr. Talbert’s forum preference is the United
14

States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, he does not reside here (allowing us
to offer less consideration) and all the other factors strongly favor transfer or are neutral. The
claims arise in the Middle District of Pennsylvania brought by an incarcerated person in the Middle
District of Pennsylvania against state actors in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The witnesses
to his claims are in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.Transporting Mr. Talbert to the Middle
District courthouse is less expensive. This controversy arises in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania.

15

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10405001. Public record. Not legal advice.