# KELLY v. PA DOC

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · March 20, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10404960

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 20, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SHAHEED KELLY, :
Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION
:
v. :
:
UNIT MANAGER : No. 20-4413
CONNOR-COUNCIL, et al. :
Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM
Schiller, J. March 20, 2023
Shaheed Kelly sues three State Correctional Institution (SCI) Chester employees after the
ventilation system on his cell block broke and remained inoperable for several months. He alleges
they violated his Eighth Amendment rights and sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief,
and $10,000 in damages from each defendant.1 Defendants now move for summary judgment
arguing, among other things, they did not violate Kelly’s Eighth Amendment rights. The Court
agrees, and therefore grants their motion for the reasons set forth herein.
I. BACKGROUND
Kelly was an inmate at SCI Chester during the time relevant to his claims. (ECF 60-1,
Kelly Dep., 8:6-7, 13-24.) He resided on the second floor of the prison in cell EB58 (or 2058) on
cell block Echo Bravo. (Id. at 15:9-16:4.) Kelly’s cell had a solid door with a covered cell window.
(Id. at 14:8-15:8.) Hakeem Harris was his cellmate. (Id. at 8:4-12.)2

1 The Court placed his case on the prisoner civil rights panel following Kelly’s request for
counsel. No attorney volunteered to take his case, and Kelly proceeds pro se.

2 Harris and Kelly originally sued together, but the Court severed Harris’s claims from this
case (ECF 26, 27), and the Court ultimately dismissed Harris’s claims without prejudice for failure
In or around September 2019, the ventilation system on Kelly’s cell block broke. (Id. at
10:18-12:18, 16:5-12; see also ECF 60-6 (grievance dated November 18, 2019 indicating
ventilation broke for “over a month and a half”).) There was no air flow to Kelly’s cell (neither
heat nor air) causing his cell to be “too hot.” (Id. at 13:13:16-14:3.) In total, the broken system

affected Kelly and approximately fifty to one hundred other inmates. (Id. at 16:5-21.)
SCI Chester maintenance submitted a purchase order for three motors to “replace burnt out
old motors for the ventilation system ASAP” on September 20, 2019. (ECF 60-5 at 1-2.) The
required motors were backordered, delaying any repair. (ECF60-1, Kelly Dep., 19:3-7.) While the
system was broken, Kelly asked Defendants Unit Manager Connor-Council and Captain Eason to
move his cell because his asthma was negatively affected by the lack of ventilation, but neither did
so. (Id. at 19:8-23:5.) Kelly also informed Defendant Maintenance Manager Selby3 the ventilation
was broken, and Selby informed Kelly fans would be placed on the cell block. (Id. at 23:18-24:8.)
It took “like two months” to get fans. (Id. at 24:9-18.)
The ventilation issue affected Kelly’s asthma.4 (Id. at 46:17-23.) He was diagnosed with

asthma as a child and takes two different inhalers to treat it. (Id. at 28:1-17; see also ECF 69 at

to prosecute. See Harris v. Counsil et al., No. 21-1464, Docket No. 9.

3 Kelly named Maintenance Manager “Shelby” in his Amended Complaint but confirmed he
intended to name Maintenance Manager Selby as the proper defendant. (ECF 60-1, Kelly Dep.,
6:3-7.)

4 The Court acknowledges that Kelly alleges he had a mold issue in his cell in March 2019—
months before the ventilation system stopped working in September 2019. (ECF 20 ¶¶ 28-34.) At
his deposition, though, he maintained the broken ventilation system is what caused the mold to
grow. (ECF 60-1, Kelly Dep., 46:24-49:14.) The Court cannot reconcile these inconsistent
positions. Moreover, Kelly cannot have intended to plead the mold issue occurred in March 2020,
because the system was fixed in or around January 2020, and Kelly left SCI Chester in February

2
29.) Heat and exercise trigger Kelly’s asthma. (ECF 60-1, Kelly Dep., 38:911-16; see also ECF 69
at 28.) He needed to use one of his inhalers more than the usual twice per day during the ventilation
issue. (ECF 60-1, Kelly Dep., 29:6-8.) While Kelly’s asthma caused hospitalizations in the past,
he did not need to be hospitalized during the ventilation outage. (Id. at 30:4-19.) He did, however,

seek treatment from SCI Chester Medical during the ventilation outage for shortness of breath that
he attributed to having dry air in his cell and an inability to breathe out of his nose. (Id. at 31:9-
39:22; ECF 60-9, 60-10.) Nurse Brittany Greene treated Kelly on November 17, 2019,
documenting: “Inmate reported to medical to retrieve his inhalers. NAD.5 Inmate stated that he
wasn’t having a hard time breathing but that in his cell the air is dry and he started to have
[shortness of breath] . . . lung sounds were clear.” (ECF 60-9.) Physician Assistant John Nicholson
treated Kelly on November 18, 2019 after Kelly complained of an “inability to breathe out of his
nose.” (ECF 60-10.) Nicholson noted Kelly had “allergic rhinitis” and prescribed him a nasal spray
to help him breathe out of his nose. (ECF 60-10; see also ECF 60-1, Kelly Dep., 36:1-21.) Kelly
still uses the nasal spray “to this day.” ECF 60-1, Kelly Dep., 36:14-21.)

Around the same time as his medical visits, Kelly filed a grievance regarding the ventilation
issue. (ECF 60-6) (grievance dated November 18, 2019). He complained the ventilation had been
broken “for over a month and a half” and that he “suffer[s] from asthma, and that inadequate
ventilation, or exposure to excessive heat, could and would cause [him] to suffer from asthmatic
episodes.” (Id.) He detailed three instances in November where he sought treatment for his asthma

2020. The Court cannot find the ventilation issue caused any mold on the existing record.

5 NAD is a medical abbreviation for “no appreciable disease; nothing abnormal detected.”
N.A.D., 586970, Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (Westlaw, last updated Nov. 2014).

3
and explained he had “been suffering from shortness of breath, sleepless night’s [sic], heat cramps,
heat exhaustion” and “forced to deal with the cold with no ventilation.” (Id. at 2; see also ECF 60-
9, 60-10 (medical records confirming he sought treatment only two times in November 2019 for
shortness of breath and inability to breathe out of nose, not three); ECF 60-8 (grievance appeal

response listing medical visits).) He indicated he complained about the ventilation issue to
Sergeant Book, C.O. Morgan, Sergeant Montanez, Superintendent Lamas, Deputy Eason, Major
Davy, Sergeant Foster along with others. (ECF 60-6 at 2.) Selby responded to Kelly’s grievance
indicating the motor on the HVAC system needed to be replaced, but was on backorder, and would
be installed once SCI Chester received it. (ECF 60 ¶ 4; ECF 60-7.) He also indicated the unit
managers were advised they could request fans by submitting a work order. (ECF 60-6.) Kelly
appealed Selby’s decision to the Facility Manager who denied his requested relief and dismissed
his appeal in January 2020. (ECF 60-8.) Kelly then appealed to the Chief Grievance Officer who
again denied the appeal in June 2020. (ECF 60-11.)
SCI Chester eventually fixed the ventilation system “no more than one month” before

February 2020, or approximately four to five months after it broke. (Id. at 12:29-13:4, 18:11-19:7.)
Kelly was transferred to SCI Somerset in February 2020 after the ventilation system was fixed and
is now housed at SCI Phoenix. (Id. at 8:13-24; ECF 67.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “Material facts are those ‘that could affect the outcome’ of the proceeding, and ‘a
dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury

4
to return a verdict for the non-moving party.’” Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534
(3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 2011)). “Summary
judgment is appropriate only if, after drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
party, there exists ‘no genuine dispute as to any material fact’ and the movant ‘is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.’” Moyer v. Patenaude & Felix, A.P.C., 991 F.3d 466, 469 (3d Cir.
2021) (quoting Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760, 770 (3d Cir. 2018)).
“The party seeking summary judgment ‘has the burden of demonstrating that the
evidentiary record presents no genuine issue of material fact.’” Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313,
323 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 643
(3d Cir. 2015)). “Although the initial burden is on the summary judgment movant to show the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden on the moving party may be discharged by
showing—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support
the nonmoving party’s case when the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of proof.” UPMC
Health Sys. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 391 F.3d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Singletary v.

Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 266 F.3d 186, 192 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) then Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) (internal quotations omitted)). If the movant carries its burden,
“the nonmoving party must identify facts in the record that would enable them to make a sufficient
showing on essential elements of their case for which they have the burden of proof.” Willis, 808
F.3d at 643 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “If, after adequate time for
discovery, the nonmoving party has not met its burden, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56, the court must enter summary judgment against the nonmoving party.” Id. (citing Celotex
Corp., 477 U.S. at 322–23).

5
III. ANALYSIS
Defendants now move for summary judgment arguing: (1) they did not violate Kelly’s
Eighth Amendment rights; (2) Defendants Connor-Council and Eason had no personal
involvement in the purported violation; (3) Kelly failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as

to Defendant Connor-Council because he did not name her in his grievance; and (4) in the
alternative, all defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (ECF 61). Kelly filed a “Motion for
Summary Judgment” arguing “there is a genuine dispute of material fact” in this case, and he is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (ECF 69 at 2.) Although styled as a motion seeking
affirmative relief, the accompanying brief is titled “Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition
to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment,” and it opposes Defendants’ arguments, rather
than presenting the Court with new ones. (ECF 69 at 3-11.) The Court therefore construes Kelly’s
filing as a response in opposition to Defendants’ motion. The Court agrees, based on the on the
record before it, Defendants did not violate Kelly’s Eighth Amendment rights. The Court grants
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.6

Section 1983 provides private citizens with a means to redress violations of federal law
committed by state actors. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff
“must establish that [he] was deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.”
Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009).

6 As a threshold matter, Kelly’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot because
the ventilation system was fixed, he is no longer housed as SCI Chester, and there is no evidence
he is likely to be subjected to the same condition again. See Griffin v. Beard, 401 F. App’x 715,
716 (3d Cir. 2010).

6
The Eighth Amendment “prohibits any punishment which violates civilized standards and
concepts of humanity and decency.” Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1992). To show
his conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment, Kelly bears the burden of proving
two requirements: “(1) the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious,’”

resulting in the “denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and “(2) the ‘prison
official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133, 138 (3d
Cir. 2020) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) then Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 299, 302-303 (1991) (cleaned up)); McClure v. Haste, 820 F. App’x 125, 128 (3d Cir. 2020).
Only “extreme deprivations” are sufficient to present a claim for unconstitutional conditions of
confinement. Fantone v. Herbik, 528 F. App’x. 123, 127 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1992)).
To satisfy the first requirement, Kelly “must show that he [was] incarcerated under
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” but he need not show actual injury. Porter v.
Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 974 F.3d 431, 441 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

934 F.3d 368, 373 (3d Cir. 2019) (internal quotations omitted)). “The proof necessary to show that
there was a substantial risk of harm is less demanding than the proof needed to show that there
was a probable risk of harm.” Id. (quoting Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 227
(3d Cir. 2015)). “This is a totality-of-the circumstances analysis” and should consider the duration
and severity of the unconstitutional conditions. McClure, 820 F. App’x at 128; see also Erskine v.
Mears, 2022 WL 16921844, at *4 (D. Del. Nov. 14, 2022) (“The Eighth Amendment is concerned
with both the ‘severity’ and the ‘duration’ of a prisoner’s exposure to inadequate cooling and
ventilation.”)

7
Kelly’s claim against Connor-Council, Eason, and Selby is based on his conditions of
confinement while the ventilation system was inoperable for approximately four to five months in
late 2019 and early 2020. His claim centers around his cell being too hot, too cold, and without
adequate airflow. Kelly fails to produce evidence to establish he was incarcerated under conditions

posing a substantial risk of serious harm during the ventilation outage, which he bears the burden
of proving at trial, and summary judgment is warranted in Defendants’ favor.
The record before the Court is scant, and the evidence supporting Kelly’s conditions of
confinement claim includes his own deposition testimony, medical records, and grievances.7 At
his deposition, Kelly testified “there was no working air flow at all. So, there was a problem with
the heating, there was a problem with the air because there was nothing coming out of the vent. So
my cell was too hot.” (ECF 60-1, Kelly Dep., 13:13:16-14:3.) Although Kelly also testified the
heat did not work, he never testified his cell was too cold during the outage, only too hot.8 He also
testified there was “no air circulation[,] [] no ventilation” or no “air flow” in his cell. Kelly visited
medical twice during the ventilation outage and attributed his shortness of breath and his “inability

to breathe out of his nose” to the dry air in his cell. While it is “well settled that exposing prisoners
to extreme temperatures without adequate ventilation may violate the Eighth Amendment,”
(Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 126 (2d Cir. 2013), the Eighth Amendment “does not mandate

7 ECF 60-1 (Kelly Dep.); 60-9 (medical records); 60-10 (medical records); ECF 69 at 15,
21-23 (Defendants’ statement of material facts citing to Kelly’s deposition testimony and medical
records highlighted by Plaintiff); 25-30 (medical records which Plaintiff highlighted).

8 Even assuming he did testify his cell was too cold due to the ventilation issue, he did not
testify, and there is no evidence, the prison failed to ameliorate the cold in some other way.

8
comfortable prisons.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981); see also Thomas, 948 F.3d
at 139 (“[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons . . . which house
persons convicted of serious crimes, cannot be free of discomfort.” (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at
349)). The record does not contain any evidence of the temperatures from September 2019 to

January 2020 nor does it have general evidence of the “severity” of the heat or cold during this
time from Kelly (or his cellmate or other inmates on his cell block). The Court also lacks testimony
from Kelly (or any other evidence) that the air quality in the cells was negatively impacted or
inadequate due to the broken ventilation system. All the Court has to consider are Kelly’s
conclusions his cell was “too hot,” lacked “air flow,” and had “dry” air. This evidence is not
sufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment claim because it fails to establish he was subjected to
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm; rather, the record only establishes Kelly
experienced uncomfortable prison conditions.9 Defendants are entitled to summary judgment
because Kelly fails to prove the objective element of his claim.10 Jones v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr.,

9 Plaintiffs may rely on their own sworn deposition testimony setting forth “specific facts”
(even if when self-serving) to establish genuine issues of material fact sufficient to withstand
summary judgment. (See Paladino v. Newsome, 885 F.3d 203, 209 (3d Cir. 2018); see also Pinson
v. United States, 826 F. App’x 237, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2020); Aruanno v. Maurice, 790 F. App’x 431,
434 (3d Cir. 2019)). But here, Kelly’s general, conclusory testimony about the conditions he
experienced during the ventilation outage, even taken as true and construed in his favor, does not
establish an Eighth Amendment violation.

10 As to the second requirement, Kelly must show “that prison officials acted with deliberate
indifference to the inmate's health or safety or conditions of confinement that violated the inmate's
constitutional rights.” Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 299, 302-03). The second element is
subjective, and the “prison official must both know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate
health and safety.” Mammana, 934 F.3d at 373. “In other words, ‘the official must both be aware
of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). Because Kelly fails at
requirement one, the Court need not analyze the second requirement.

9
589 F. App’x 591, 593 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Jones’s ‘complete failure of proof’ on the objective
element of his claim entitled the defendants to summary judgment.”).
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

An Order consistent with this Memorandum will be docketed separately.

10

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10404960. Public record. Not legal advice.