# SCHNEIDER v. BUCKS COUNTY CORRECTIONS

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · October 12, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10404271

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** October 12, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10404271

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy and . . . the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells.”
- holding that attaching documents to grievance form is insufficient under Rode to show personal direction or actual knowledge by recipient of underlying facts
- explaining that the district court “appropriately disposed of” prisoner’s conditions of confinement claims against Northampton County Prison on the basis that a prison is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MITCHELL SCHNEIDER, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-CV-2384
:
BCCF, et al., :
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM
KENNEY, J. October 12, 2022
Plaintiff Mitchell Schneider, a prisoner currently incarcerated at Bucks County
Correctional Facility (“BCCF”), brings this pro se civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Currently before the Court are Schneider’s
Complaint (ECF No. 5), Motions for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF Nos. 1, 3), and
Prisoner Trust Fund Account Statement (ECF No. 4). For the following reasons, the Court will
GRANT Schneider leave to proceed in forma pauperis and DISMISS his federal claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) because they are frivolous and fail to state a
claim. Schneider’s state law claims will be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1
Schneider asserts an individual capacity claim against Bucks County Sheriff Andrew
Davis and official capacity claims against the “Warden of Bucks County Corrections” and “Mr.
Gallagher,” alleged to be associated with the Bucks County Prison Oversight Board (ECF No. 5
at 2, 4.) He also lists as Defendants unnamed Investigators and Records Staff. (Id. at 3.)
1 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Schneider’s Complaint.
The Court adopts the pagination supplied to the Complaint by the CM/ECF docketing system.
Schneider alleges that on or about March 3, 2022, Defendant Davis made statements to Davis’s
daughter indicating that Davis “had someone at Bucks County Corrections ac[c]ess” Schneider’s
inmate account. (Id. at 7.) According to Schneider, this unnamed corrections employee
allegedly told Davis the names of all the individuals who made deposits into Schneider’s account

in February of 2022, along with the exact dates and amounts of the deposits. (Id. at 6-7.)
Schneider alleges that he wrote to “the investigators” who subsequently responded on or about
March 12, 2022, informing Schneider that they had spoken to Davis and that Davis “never had
anyone access [his] account” and “fabr[i]cated anything he told his daughter” regarding
Schneider’s account. (Id. at 7.)
Based on these facts, Schneider alleges a “violation of [his] right to privacy and
confidenti[ality,]” claiming that Davis, by virtue of possessing Schneider’s “personal
information[,]” abused his power and defamed Schneider’s character. (Id. at 4-5.) Schneider
alleges that he lost his “family support and no longer felt comfortable or secure in” jail as a result
of this incident which cause him to suffer severe depression and anxiety. (Id. at 8.) As relief,

Schneider wants an “investigation into all part[ies] who pulled [his] account up[,]” along with
$100,000 in damages. (Id.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court will grant Schneider leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that
he is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action.2 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it is frivolous or fails to state a
claim. A complaint is frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) if it “lacks an arguable basis either in

2 Because Schneider is a prisoner, under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, he
must still pay the full filing fee in installments.
law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The use of the term “frivolous”
in § 1915 “embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual
allegation.” Id. A claim is legally baseless if it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory.” Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1085 (3d Cir. 1995). Whether a complaint fails

to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions
to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184
F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether the complaint
contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted).
“At this early stage of the litigation,’ ‘[the Court will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro
se] complaint as true,’ ‘draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor,’ and ‘ask only
whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible []
claim.’” Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Perez v. Fenoglio,
792 F.3d 768, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. As Schneider is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v.
Wetzel, 8 F. 4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,
244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). “This means we remain flexible, especially ‘when dealing with
imprisoned pro se litigants[.]’” Vogt, 8 F.4th at 185 (quoting Mala, 704 F. 3d at 244). The Court
will “apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name
it.” Id. However, ‘“pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support
a claim.’” Vogt, 8 F.4th at 185 (quoting Mala, 704 F. 3d at 245). An unrepresented litigant,
however, ‘“cannot flout procedural rules — they must abide by the same rules that apply to all
other litigants.’” Id. Moreover, “if the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
III. DISCUSSION
Schneider’s Complaint is best understood as raising a constitutional claim based on the

alleged intrusion into his personal account information. The vehicle by which federal
constitutional claims may be brought in federal court is Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United
States Code. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988). Moreover, “[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement
in the alleged wrongs” to be liable. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.
1988); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Personal involvement requires
particular ‘allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.’” (quoting
Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207)). See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (explaining that “[b]ecause vicarious

liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”).
A. Claims Against the BCCF
In the caption of his Complaint, Schneider identifies “BCCF” and “Bucks County
Corrections” as Defendants in this action.3 (Compl. at 1.) To the extent Schneider identified
these entities as Defendants in an attempt to bring a § 1983 claim against Bucks County
Correctional Facility, that claim is dismissed as frivolous because a jail is not a “person” under

3 There are no specific factual allegations against either of these entities in the remainder of the
Complaint.
Section 1983. See Edwards v. Northampton Cty., 663 F. App’x 132, 136 (3d Cir. 2016)
(explaining that the district court “appropriately disposed of” prisoner’s conditions of
confinement claims against Northampton County Prison on the basis that a prison is not a
“person” subject to suit under § 1983) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir.

1973)); see also Regan v. Upper Darby Twp., No. 06-1686, 2009 WL 650384, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 11, 2009), aff’d, 363 F. App’x 917 (3d Cir. 2010) (recognizing that county jails are not
considered “persons” that are “subject to suit under federal civil rights laws) (collecting cases);
Edwards v. Bucks Cty. Corr. Facility, No. 19-4923, 2019 WL 5579486, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29,
2019) (“Bucks County Correctional Facility is not an entity susceptible to suit under § 1983.”).
As any attempt to amend would be futile, Schneider’s claims against “BCCF” and “Bucks
County Corrections” will be dismissed with prejudice. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293
F.3d 103, 108, 110 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that leave to amend claims dismissed on screening
should generally be granted “unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.”)
B. Claims Against Gallager & the Prison Oversight Board of Bucks County

Schneider also names as a Defendant an individual identified as Mr. Gallagher, who is
alleged to be associated with the Prison Oversight Board for Bucks County.4 (Compl. at 4.) To
the extent Schneider seeks to brings claims against Gallager in his individual capacity, those
claims are not plausible. In order to state a claim against Gallager, Schneider is required to
allege that he had personal involvement in the alleged wrongs of which Schneider complains.
See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Other than naming Gallager on the designated defendant line on the
form he used to file his Complaint, Schneider does not mention Gallager by name anywhere else

4 Schneider’s Complaint does not explain what role (i.e., member, or employee) Gallager
maintains with respect to the Prison Oversight Board.
in the Complaint. Accordingly, there are no allegations whatsoever that Gallager was personally
involved in either accessing Schneider’s prison account or disclosing his account information.
Schneider alleges that he “wrote [a] detailed letter to the Prison Oversight Board” on or
about March 10, 2022, and that he appealed the denial of his prison grievance “all the way to the

Prison Oversight Board[,]” but did not receive a response. (Id. at 10, 12.) Even liberally
construing these allegations to suggest that Gallager was somehow involved in the grievance
process following the incident involving Schneider’s prison account, these allegations are still
insufficient to state a plausible claim against Gallager. Participation in the grievance process
does not, without more, establish involvement in the underlying constitutional violation. See
Curtis v. Wetzel, 763 F. App’x 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“The District Court
properly determined that Defendants Wenerowicz, Lewis, and Shaylor – who participated only in
the denial of Curtis’ grievances – lacked the requisite personal involvement [in the conduct at
issue].”); Folk v. Prime Care Med., 741 F. App’x 47, 51 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (“Although
some of these defendants were apparently involved in responding to some of Folk’s prison

grievances, there are no allegations linking them to the underlying incidents and thus no basis for
liability based on those later grievance reviews.”). Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir.
2020) (holding that attaching documents to grievance form is insufficient under Rode to show
personal direction or actual knowledge by recipient of underlying facts)).
Finally, Schneider checked the box on the form complaint indicating that his claims were
being brought against Gallagher in his official capacity. Schneider appears not to have
understood the implication of checking the official capacity box. Claims against governmental
employees named in their official capacity are indistinguishable from claims against the
governmental entity itself. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (“Official-
capacity suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of
which an officer is an agent.’”) (quoting Monell v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
690, n. 55 (1978)). “[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as
a suit against the entity.” Id.

To the extent Schneider naming Gallager in his official capacity could be construed as an
attempt to bring a claim against the Bucks County Prison Oversight Board or Bucks County, any
such claim must also be dismissed as not plausible.5 Municipal entities are subject to liability
under § 1983. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91 (“Congress did intend municipalities and other
local government units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.”). Like the
other municipal defendants, the Bucks County cannot be held responsible for the acts of its
employees on a theory of vicarious liability, or respondeat superior. Id. Rather, to state a claim
against Bucks County, Schneider must allege a municipal policy or custom that caused his
injury. Id.; see also Murray v. Keen, No. 13-258, 2014 WL 940267, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11,
2014) (applying Monell standard to claims against Allegheny County Jail Oversight Board);

Smith v. Indiana Cty. Jail, No. 12-728, 2013 WL 425144, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2013)
(dismissing § 1983 claims against Indiana County Prison Board where the plaintiffs failed to
allege “direct participation, whether by custom or express policy” under Monell). Schneider’s
Complaint is devoid of any allegations that there was a municipal policy or custom that caused

5 A Pennsylvania statute explicitly establishes jail oversight boards for each county in the state.
See 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1723(a) (“There is hereby established in each county a jail oversight
board which shall be named the (Name of County) County Jail Oversight Board.”). Jail
oversight boards are provided certain powers and duties such as the “operation and maintenance
of the prison and all alternative housing facilities” and “the oversight of the health and
safekeeping of inmates.” Id. § 1724(a). Because they are “creatures of statute,” jail oversight
boards are “political subdivision[s] of the government.” Veatch v. Allegheny Cty. Bureau of
Corr., 282 F. App’x 159, 160 (3d Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the official capacity claim against
Gallager is treated as a claim against Bucks County.
an alleged violation of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, Schneider’s claims against
Gallager and the Prison Oversight Board of Bucks County will be dismissed pursuant to §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim. As it appears any attempt to amend would be futile
given the Court’s discussion of Schneider’s privacy claims infra, the dismissal of these claims

will be with prejudice.
C. Claims Against Various BCCF Employees
Schneider’s Complaint lists several BCCF employees as Defendants by reference to their
job titles, including: (1) Bucks County Corrections Warden; (2) Bucks County Corrections
Investigators; and (3) Bucks County Corrections Records Staff. (Compl. at 2-3.) Even assuming
that Schneider’s constitutional rights were violated when his prison account information was
allegedly accessed and disclosed,6 Schneider’s claims against these various Defendants fail. As
noted above, Schneider is required to allege that a defendant had personal involvement in the
alleged wrongs of which he complains. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Schneider makes no factual
allegations that any specific member of the “Records Staff” had any personal involvement in

allegedly accessing his prison account and disclosing his account information to Davis.
Schneider’s sole allegation in this regard is that “Bucks County Corrections . . . [was] giving out
[his] personal information such as names[,] dates[,] and amounts of people who put money on
[his] account for no valid reason.” (Compl. at 6.) This allegation alone is insufficient to allege
personal involvement by any specific individual. Schneider similarly fails to allege a plausible
claim against the Warden based on his holding a supervisory position at BCCF.7 He does not

6 The Court addresses the constitutional claims infra.

7 There are “two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for
unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d
307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), reversed on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015).
First, a supervisor may be liable if he or she “‘with deliberate indifference to the consequences,
allege any facts sufficient to demonstrate that the Warden had personal involvement in the
alleged violation either by accessing Schneider’s prison account or disclosing his account
information. See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Furthermore, Schneider does not allege that the
Warden acted with deliberate indifference to a policy, practice or custom at BCCF which

resulted in the alleged incident regarding Schneider’s account information being accessed and
disclosed. Accordingly, Schneider’s claims against the Records Staff and the Warden will be
dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.
With respect to the unidentified Defendants Schneider refers to as the “Bucks County
Corrections Investigators,” it is clear from the allegations of the Complaint that their
involvement was limited to investigating Schneider’s claims that his account information was
accessed and disclosed only after the alleged incident occurred. By definition, these individuals
could not have had any personal involvement in the incident of which Schneider complains.
Moreover, “an allegation of a failure to investigate, without another recognizable constitutional
right, is not sufficient to sustain a section 1983 claim.” Graw v. Fantasky, 68 F. App’x 378, 383

(3d Cir. 2003) (quotations omitted); see also Boseski v. N. Arlington Municipality, 621 F. App’x
131, 135 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Boseski has no cognizable claim against a government
entity for its failure to investigate or bring criminal charges against another individual.”).
Accordingly, Schneider’s claims against the Bucks County Corrections Investigators must be
dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Schneider’s claims against

established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional
harm.” Id. (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d
Cir. 2004) (alteration in original)). “Second, a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983
if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as
the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate’s unconstitutional
conduct.” Id.
the Investigators, as well as the Records Staff and the Warden, will be dismissed with prejudice
as the Court concludes that amendment with respect to these Defendants would be futile.
D. Claims Against Bucks County Sheriff Andrew Davis
Schneider alleges that Davis “had someone at Bucks County Corrections ac[c]ess” his

inmate account, and Davis thereby learned the names of all the individuals who made deposits
into Schneider’s account in February of 2022, along with the exact dates and amounts of the
deposits.8 (Id. at 6-7.) Schneider clearly seeks to bring a § 1983 claim against Davis asserting
that the accessing and disclosing of his inmate account information violated Schneider’s right to
privacy. The Constitution does not explicitly mention a right to privacy, but the Supreme Court
has found certain “zones of privacy” incorporated into constitutional amendments. See C.N. v.
Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 178 (3d Cir. 2005). While Schneider does not point to
any specific constitutional amendments in support of his claims, liberally construing the
Complaint, the Court will analyze his Davis’s alleged actions to determine if Schneider’s rights
under either the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment were violated.

Generally, the Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV. “The Fourth Amendment is violated when the state conducts an unreasonable
search or seizure that infringes on a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Talley v. Mazzocca, 796
F. App’x 61, 63 (3d Cir. 2019). However, neither the United States Court of Appeals for the

8 Schneider also alleges that, following an investigation into the incident, he was informed by the
investigators that Davis “never had anyone access [Schneider’s] account” and that any
statements Davis made about having such access were “fabricated[.]” (Id. at 7.) In analyzing
any alleged violation of Schneider’s constitutional rights related to this incident, the Court
accepts as true Schneider’s allegation that his account was accessed and his information was
disclosed, and the Court will draw all reasonable inferences therefrom.
Third Circuit, nor this Court are aware “of any precedent suggesting that the use of financial
information maintained by the government for a prisoner constitutes a ‘search’ for Fourth
Amendment purposes.” Id.; see also Talley v. Mazzocca, No. 19-0161, 2019 WL 2025175, at *5
(W.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2019), (noting a complete absence of legal authority for plaintiff’s argument

that the financial information in his prison account was “private”), report and recommendation
adopted, 2019 WL 2024829 (W.D. Pa. May 8, 2019), aff’d, 796 F. App’x 61. Schneider’s
Complaint does not allege plausibly that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the prison
account information maintained by the Bucks County Corrections Facility, nor does he allege
plausibly that a corrections employee allegedly accessing this information constitutes a search
under the Fourth Amendment.
With respect to any Fourteenth Amendment claim Schneider seeks to bring, the Supreme
Court in Paul v. Davis, recognized that the limited category of Fourteenth Amendment privacy
rights extends to “matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
and child rearing and education[.]” 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976). The Supreme Court found that

there was no constitutional protection against the disclosure of a record of an official act
maintained by the government. Id. at 712-13 (rejecting plaintiff’s § 1983 claim that law
enforcement officers violated his right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment, among
others, by disclosing and publicizing the fact that he was arrested on a shoplifting charge and
declining to “enlarge” the privacy rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment in the
manner sought by plaintiff). The Fourteenth Amendment’s protections against the disclosure of
personal information are “limited by an ‘individual’s reasonable expectations of
confidentiality.’” Talley, 795 F. App’x at 64 (citing Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 564 (3d
Cir. 2011)). In the present case, the Court has not found any precedent to support a claim that
Schneider had a reasonable expectation of privacy and confidentiality in the prison account
information recorded and maintained by the Bucks County Correctional Facility during his
incarceration there. To the contrary, there is no right to privacy in the context of incarceration.
Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 316 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The Supreme Court has concluded that the

Fourth Amendment right to privacy, to be free from unreasonable searches, is fundamentally
inconsistent with incarceration.”); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984) (stating that
“prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy and . . . the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells.”).
Accordingly, any claim Schneider seeks to assert arising from the alleged accessing of his
prison account and the disclosure of his account information under either the Fourth or the
Fourteenth Amendment will be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure
to state a claim. Schneider will not be granted leave to amend on this issue as amendment would
be futile.
E. State Law Claims

Construing Schneider’s claims liberally, he may be attempting to assert state law invasion
of privacy and defamation claim against the named Defendants. Because the Court has
dismissed Schneider’s federal claims, the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) over any state law claims. Accordingly, the only independent basis for
jurisdiction over any such claims is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which grants a district court jurisdiction
over a case in which “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive
of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.”
Section 1332(a) requires “‘complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants,’
even though only minimal diversity is constitutionally required. This means that, unless there is
some other basis for jurisdiction, ‘no plaintiff [may] be a citizen of the same state as any
defendant.’” Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting
Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) and Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood,
592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal footnotes omitted)). An individual is a citizen of the

state where he is domiciled, meaning the state where he is physically present and intends to
remain. See Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011). “[T]he domicile of
a prisoner before his imprisonment presumptively remains his domicile during his
imprisonment.” Pierro v. Kugel, 386 F. App’x 308, 309 (3d Cir. 2010). It is the
plaintiff’'s burden to establish diversity of citizenship, see Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72
(1939); Quaker State Dyeing & Finishing Co., Inc. v. ITT Terryphone Corp., 461 F.2d 1140,
1143 (3d Cir. 1972) (stating that, in diversity cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate complete
diversity between the parties and that the amount in controversy requirement has been
met); Jackson v. Rosen, C.A. No. 20-2842, 2020 WL 3498131, at *8 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2020).
Schneider does not allege the citizenship of the parties. Rather, he provides only

Pennsylvania addresses for himself and the Defendants, which suggests that he and some of the
Defendants may be Pennsylvania citizens. Accordingly, Schneider has not sufficiently alleged
that the parties are diverse for purposes of establishing the Court’s jurisdiction over any state law
claims he intends to pursue and these claims will be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The dismissal is without prejudice to Schneider pursuing these claims in an
appropriate forum.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Schneider leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and dismiss his federal claims pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) as
frivolous and for failure to state a claim. His state law claims will be dismissed without
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Chad F. Kenney
_________________________
CHAD F. KENNEY, JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10404271. Public record. Not legal advice.