# COOPER v. WETZEL

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · July 11, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10403627

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 11, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10403627

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding defendants not liable for harms caused to plaintiff when they had no control over the issue which caused plaintiff to suffer harm

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BENJAMIN COOPER, :
Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION
:
v. :
:
JOHN WETZEL, et al., : NO. 20-cv-04595-RAL
Defendants, :

RICHARD A. LLORET July 11, 2022
U.S. Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Benjamin Cooper brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against SCI-
Phoenix Unit Manager Jaime Luquis, alleging that Unit Manager Luquis was
deliberately indifferent toward Cooper’s serious medical need, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, by failing to ensure he was properly placed in a bottom bunk. Mr. Cooper
has a seizure disorder and he suffered physical injury when he fell out of a top bunk in
his cell. On April 5, 2022, I presided over a one-day bench trial in this matter. The
parties submitted post-trial briefing proposing findings of fact and conclusions of law.
See Doc. No. 77 (Def.); Doc. No. 79 (Pl.). Unit Manager Luquis also filed a motion for
judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50. Doc. No. 77, 78.
Mr. Cooper responded to the motion. Doc. No. 80.
After considering the evidence presented at trial and the parties’ post-trial
briefing, I find that Unit Manager Luquis was not deliberately indifferent to Mr.
Cooper’s serious seizure disorder, as he appropriately took steps to assign Mr. Cooper to
a bottom bunk, may not have been aware of Mr. Cooper’s seizure disorder, and was not
directly responsible for enforcement of his bunk assignment. Even were I to conclude
that any of Unit Manager Luquis’s conduct was unreasonable, none of his conduct
would rise to more than negligence. I deny Unit Manager Luquis’s motion for judgment
as a matter of law and will make findings of facts and conclusions of law in this matter,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52.
FINDINGS OF FACT

Mr. Cooper, who was diagnosed with a seizure disorder as a young child, entered
the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“Department”) in 2005.
Transcript of Trial Held on April 5, 2022 (“Tr.”), Doc. No. 75, 10:17–19; 11:3–5. In July
2018, Mr. Cooper moved from SCI-Graterford to a newly opened prison, SCI-Phoenix.
Tr. 11:19–25; 12:1–7. Approximately 2,700 prisoners were transferred from SCI-
Graterford to SCI-Phoenix in July 2018. Tr. 110:24–111:1. When he arrived at SCI-
Phoenix in July 2018, Mr. Cooper was assigned to E-Block, in cell 2027 and bed 01,
which meant that he was assigned to a bottom bunk in a cell on the top tier of the block.
Tr. 12:8–22; 29:23–30:6; Ex. D-1.
When SCI-Phoenix opened in July 2018, Unit Manager Luquis was the unit
manager for D-Block, which housed approximately 250 inmates. Tr. 111:8–20. SCI-

Phoenix faced a shortage of unit managers following the July 2018 transfer from SCI-
Graterford, and unit managers were assigned additional responsibilities in conjunction
with the transfer process through at least August 2018. Tr. 111:21–112:17. Sometime in
August 2018, Unit Manager Luquis was assigned to be unit manager of E-Block, in
addition to staying as unit manager of D-Block, which made him responsible for an
additional 250 inmates. Tr. 112:18–113:6; 117:12–14.
“There is a difference between a bunk status and a bunk assignment. A bunk
status is a general designation sometimes made by prison medical staff in consideration
of a prisoner’s medical condition.” Pretrial stipulation; see also Tr. 93:11–21. A bunk
assignment is an inmate’s particular cell number and bed number—that is, top or
bottom bunk—given by unit staff, typically the unit manager, that dictates where that
inmate sleeps. Tr. 93:22–25; 107:23–108:24.
Mr. Cooper was assigned to cell 2027, bed 01 until August 13, 2018. Ex. D-1. On

August 13, 2018, Mr. Cooper went to a medical appointment, where he asked for and
was given bottom bunk status for the first time. Ex. D-8 (“will request bottom bunk
status”); Ex. D-13 (under “Medical Housing Recommendations,” noting “Lower bunk”
status effective 8/13/2018). On August 14, 2018, Mr. Cooper moved to cell 2024, which
was on the top tier in E-Block. Ex. D-1; Tr. 15:18–21. In cell 2024, Mr. Cooper was
assigned to the bottom bunk. Ex. D-1. Mr. Cooper says that he complained to Sgt. Keith
Whitman that he had been improperly assigned to a cell on the top tier, erroneously
believing that he had been given bottom tier status by medical. Tr. 16:12–23. On August
20, 2018, Mr. Cooper went back to medical “requesting lower tier” status. Ex. D-9. That
same day, Mr. Cooper was given, for the first time, lower tier status. Ex. D-9 (noting
“lower tier ordered”); Ex. D-13 (reflecting “Ground level” status effective 8/20/2018).

On August 23, 2018, Unit Manager Luquis changed Mr. Cooper’s assignment to
cell 1004, which is on the lower tier, and bed 01, which is the bottom bunk. Tr. 16:24–
17:2; 41:2–15; 96:24–97:2; 119:17–120:13; Ex. D-1; Ex. D-14. Inmate Thomas Robinson
had been assigned to and was sleeping on the top bunk in cell 1004 since he moved to
SCI-Phoenix in July 2018, while he had been cellmates with another inmate. Tr. 54:23–
55:4; Ex. D-2. Prior to Mr. Cooper’s arrival and during a brief period when he was alone
in cell 1004, Mr. Robinson moved his belongings from the top bunk to the bottom bunk
because he believed he had an “understanding” that he would be reassigned to a bottom
bunk once his former cellmate moved out. Tr. 61:5–62:6. Mr. Robinson, however, never
spoke with Unit Manager Luquis about making changes to his bed assignment on
August 23, 2018. Tr. 61:5–15. Mr. Robinson’s assignment to the top bunk in cell 1004
never changed during August 2018. Ex. D-2; Tr. 71:12–21. Once Mr. Cooper arrived, Mr.
Robinson told Mr. Cooper that he (Mr. Robinson) had bottom bunk status because of a

back injury. Tr. 17:3–19; 62:25–63:14. Additionally, at the time he moved in,
Corrections Officer James Oslan placed Mr. Cooper’s photograph above Mr. Robinson’s
just outside the cell, which Mr. Cooper took to mean that he was to sleep on the top
bunk. Tr. 41:25–42:20. Unit Manager Luquis was not present for Mr. Cooper’s move
into cell 1004. Tr. 120:19–20.
On or around August 23, 2018, Mr. Cooper and Mr. Robinson approached Sgt.
Whitman, telling him that they both had bottom bunk status. Tr. 17:3–19; 86:23–87:4.
Sgt. Whitman confirmed their bunk statuses, but he never looked up the bunk
assignments in cell 1004 that had been made by Unit Manager Luquis. Tr. 42:21–43:15.
On August 24, 2018, Mr. Cooper complained to Unit Manager Luquis that he “had
bottom bunk bottom tier status,” but had been “placed on the top bunk in [cell] 1004”

because “the person that was in there had bottom bunk status also.” Tr. 20:6–22. Unit
Manager Luquis replied that he “would look into it.” Tr. 20:13–14. Mr. Cooper does not
know what, if anything, Unit Manager Luquis did in response. Tr. 45:1–10. Typically,
when presented with a complaint like this about a cell assignment, Unit Manager Luquis
would have checked the bed assignment and the medical status, made changes if
necessary, and directed unit staff to ensure that the assignment was enforced. Tr. 122:1–
123:9. Mr. Cooper was not able to have any further conversations with Unit Manager
Luquis about his housing situation prior to his seizure. Tr. 21:4–9; 45:11–25. Mr. Cooper
approached Ofr. Oslan and told him that he was staying in a top bunk and wanted to be
reassigned to a bottom bunk, but Ofr. Oslan never had any conversation with Unit
Manager Luquis about that request. Ex. P-12, Deposition of James Oslan, 11:4–12:2;
14:10–16. Ofr. Oslan described it as his job to enforce proper bed assignments to the
greatest extent possible, but explained that cellmates have a responsibility too to ensure

they were sleeping in their proper bunks. Id. at 20:7–13.
Mr. Robinson testified that he had a conversation with Unit Manager Luquis
about the bed assignments in cell 1004 within a week prior to Mr. Cooper’s seizure. Tr.
64:19–65:21. That conversation never took place—Mr. Robinson directly contradicted
his deposition testimony, where he said that no such conversation occurred prior to Mr.
Cooper’s seizure. Tr. 77:25–79:22. By Mr. Robinson’s account of his conversation, he
told Unit Manager Luquis that that “Mr. Cooper is supposed to be on bottom bunk,
bottom tier,” and Unit Manager Luquis responded that Mr. Cooper had bottom bunk
status, but Mr. Robinson did not. Tr. 64:19–65:10. In a later conversation, Unit
Manager Luquis allegedly confirmed that Mr. Robinson indeed had obtained bottom
bunk status. Tr. 65:11–21.

Unit Manager Luquis never threatened Mr. Cooper or expressed any hostility
toward him. Tr. 46:1–47:20; 121:22–25. Mr. Robinson said that he overheard a
conversation between Unit Manager Luquis, Ofr. Oslan, and Sgt. Whitman where Unit
Manager Luquis said, in response to a conversation about Mr. Cooper, “F-ing I'm not
moving anybody.” Tr. 67:12–23; 81:14–20. Unit Manager Luquis, Ofr. Oslan, and Sgt.
Whitman all deny any such conversation and comment, and Sgt. Whitman expressly
noted that any such comment from Unit Manager Luquis would have been a direct
affront to his own professional expectations and personal faith. Tr. 99:11–100:5, 132:11–
17; Ex. P-12 11:4–12:2, 14:10–16.
On August 28, 2018, Unit Manager Luquis received an email from Sergeant
Roberts Stephany advising him that Mr. Cooper had a lower bunk status but was
sleeping in a top bunk. Ex. P-1. Unit Manager Luquis does not recall receiving that

email. Tr. 132:18–22.
On August 30, 2018, Mr. Cooper was resting on the top bunk in cell 1004 when
he suffered a seizure, fell, and suffered injuries. Tr. 24:25–25:8. Mr. Cooper suffered a
concussion, fractured nose, and lacerated tongue. Tr. 25:11–15.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Deliberate Indifference under Section 1983 and the Eighth
Amendment

“Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any person acting under color of
state law who ‘subjects’ a person or ‘causes [a person] to be subjected ... to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws.’” Vega v. Tekoh, No. 21-499, 2022 WL 2251304, at *4 (U.S. June 23, 2022).
“‘[C]onfinement in a prison ... is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under the
Eighth Amendment standards.’” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345 (1981) (quoting
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978)). “‘After incarceration, only the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain ... constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by
the Eighth Amendment.’” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (quoting
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977)). Accordingly, a prisoner alleging
inadequate attention to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment must
show “deliberate indifference” to “serious” medical needs by a prison official to succeed
on the claim. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). “[D]eliberate indifference describes a state of mind more
blameworthy than negligence,” and “requires ‘more than ordinary lack of due care for
the prisoner's interests or safety.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994)
(quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319). Claims “involving failure to assign a proper bunk to

accommodate an inmate’s medical needs are considered conditions of confinement
claims pursuant to the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment,” and therefore may be actionable under Section 1983. Cameron v. Swartz,
No. 17-cv-816, 2020 WL 7496317, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2020) (citing Glazewski v.
Corzine, 385 F. App'x 83, 89 (3d Cir. 2010)).
“To prevail against prison officials on a claim that an inmate’s conditions of
confinement violated the Eighth Amendment, the inmate must meet two requirements:
(1) the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious,’ and (2) the ‘prison
official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Thomas v. Tice, 948 F.3d 133,
138 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Accordingly, “[t]o be liable on a
deliberate indifference claim, a defendant prison official must both ‘know[ ] of and

disregard[ ] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.’” Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256
F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “[S]ubjective knowledge
on the part of the official can be proved by circumstantial evidence to the effect that the
excessive risk was so obvious that the official must have known of the risk.” Id. “[A]
defendant can rebut a prima facie demonstration of deliberate indifference either by
establishing that he did not have the requisite level of knowledge or awareness of the
risk, or that, although he did know of the risk, he took reasonable steps to prevent the
harm from occurring.” Id. Only those officials who are actually responsible for the
alleged Eighth Amendment violation may be held liable on a claim for deliberate
indifference. See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 339 (3d Cir. 2016).
B. Qualified Immunity
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)). In determining the applicability of qualified immunity, I must examine 1)
whether the facts shown “‘make out a violation of a constitutional right’” and 2)
“‘whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of defendants’ alleged
misconduct.’” Karns v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 520 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). “A right is ‘clearly established’ when its ‘contours ... [are]
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right.’” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)). “The
failure of either prong will result in application of qualified immunity.” Id. (citing James
v. City of Wilkes–Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 2012)).

When defining the right at issue, “[t]he dispositive question is ‘whether the
violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S.
7, 12 (2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)) (emphasis in
original). “It is not enough that the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent. The
precedent must be clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to
establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577,
590 (2018). “Because deliberate indifference under Farmer requires actual knowledge
or awareness on the part of the defendant, a defendant cannot have qualified immunity
if [he] was deliberately indifferent.” Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 142 n.15.
C. Rule 50 Judgment as a Matter of Law
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 provides that a court may enter judgment as a
matter of law if it “finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient

evidentiary basis to find for the [non-moving] party on that issue.” See Fed. R. Civ. P.
50(a)(1). In ruling on Unit Manager Luquis’s motion, I must draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of Mr. Cooper and can neither make credibility determinations nor
weigh the evidence. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150
(2000). Entry of judgment as a matter of law is appropriate “‘only if, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant [Mr. Cooper] and giving [him]
the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from
which a jury could reasonably find liability.” Warren v. Reading Sch. Dist., 278 F.3d
163, 168 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Fultz v. Dunn, 165 F.3d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1998)). Put
another way, “[t]he question is not whether there is literally no evidence supporting the
party against whom the motion is directed but whether there is evidence upon which the

jury could properly find a verdict for that party.” Walter v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 985 F.2d
1232, 1238 (3d Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Unit Manager Luquis did not disregard a substantial risk to Mr. Cooper. There is
no dispute that Mr. Cooper’s seizure disorder is a serious medical condition and his
placement on a top bunk would violate his rights under the Eighth Amendment. See
Cameron, 2020 WL 7496317, at *5. There is also no dispute that Unit Manager Luquis
was aware that Mr. Cooper was sleeping in a top bunk. Mr. Cooper told Unit Manager
Luquis on August 24, 2022 that he had been assigned a top bunk in his cell, even though
he had bottom-bunk status, and Unit Manager Luquis responded that he “would look
into it.” Tr. 20:13–14. Nevertheless, I find that Unit Manager Luquis took reasonable
steps to prevent the harm from occurring, given that he indeed assigned Mr. Cooper to a
bottom bunk, was not directly responsible for enforcement of bunk assignments, and

may not have even known about Mr. Cooper’s seizure disorder. In any event, any
unreasonable action by Unit Manager Luquis does not rise beyond mere negligence.1
A. Unit Manager Luquis reasonably responded to Mr. Cooper’s
complaint and medical concerns.

Unit Manager Luquis did not disregard an excessive risk to inmate health and
safety, but rather took reasonable steps to prevent harm to Mr. Cooper, given his role
and circumstances. See Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 133. First and foremost, there is no
dispute that Unit Manager Luquis, who was tasked with overseeing cell assignments in
E-block, assigned Mr. Cooper to a bottom bunk in a bottom-tier cell on August 23, 2018,
in compliance with Mr. Cooper’s medical status. Tr. 16:24–17:2; 41:2–15; 96:24–97:2;
119:17–120:13; Ex. D-1; D-13; D-14. Additionally, Unit Manager Luquis did not book two
prisoners to the same bunk in cell 1004. Rather he assigned Mr. Robinson, who also had
bottom-bunk status, to the top bunk. Ex. D-2; P-16. I find that Unit Manager Luquis
properly ensured that Mr. Cooper’s cell and bed assignment were in compliance with his
medical status.
Unit Manager Luquis testified that he does not remember receiving a complaint
from Mr. Cooper about an allegedly improper bunk assignment, and relatedly did not

1 Because I conclude that the facts shown do not make out a violation of a constitutional right, as Mr.
Cooper does not show deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment, I need not address the
parties’ arguments concerning qualified immunity. See Karns, 879 F.3d at 520.
remember whether he took any actions in response to Mr. Cooper’s complaint.
Individual officials under Unit Manager Luquis also did not recall receiving a specific
order to ensure that Mr. Cooper slept in the bottom bunk in his cell. Unit Manager
Luquis credibly testified, however, that his standard practice when presented with a
complaint of an erroneous bunk assignment would be to check the prisoner’s housing

assignment, make any necessary changes to the housing assignment, and give a direct
and enforceable order to unit staff to carry out the assignment. Tr. 122:1–123:9. Unit
Manager Luquis also credibly testified that he did not recall having any reason to think
that staff were not carrying out housing assignments. Tr. 126:25–127:2. In a chaotic
prison cell-block in the aftermath of a population transfer, it is unsurprising that prison
officials do not recall particular one-off exchanges with individual prisoners. I find no
evidence that Unit Manager Luquis acted contrary to his standard practices, and I
conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that he followed these procedures.
Mr. Cooper argues that Unit Manager Luquis’s preoccupation with the transfer
from SCI-Graterford to SCI-Phoenix does not excuse his failure to address his serious
medical needs, citing Parkell, 833 F.3d at 339, for the proposition that “[l]ogistical

constraints unrelated to medical judgment typically do not excuse failure to provide
adequate medical care.” Doc. No. 79, at 11. However, the Third Circuit also states in
Parkell that “there is a difference between actors who are actually responsible for those
logistical constraints (or capable of remedying them) and actors who are not.” 833 F.3d
at 339 (finding defendants not liable for harms caused to plaintiff when they had no
control over the issue which caused plaintiff to suffer harm). When running two units
housing a combined 500 prisoners supported by a team of agents who are instructed to
carry out the orders of the unit supervisor, it is not unreasonable for a unit supervisor to
look up the prisoner’s bunk status and to direct his staff to execute the status. Unit
managers are not the individuals who typically roam the hallways to make sure that
their bed assignments are enforced. Unit Manager Luquis made the proper assignment
and had the power to issue orders to staff. He reasonably responded to Mr. Cooper’s
medical concerns.

Unit Manager Luquis also credibly testified that he does not recall whether he
was aware of the danger presented by Mr. Cooper’s seizure disorder when Mr. Cooper
made his complaint. Tr. 127:3–6. Mr. Cooper presents no evidence that he informed
Unit Manager Luquis of his seizure disorder. Based on Unit Manager Luquis’s standard
practice in response to improper bed assignment complaints, it is unclear whether or
not he would become aware of the seizure disorder through a search of prison records.
See Ex. D-1 (Mr. Cooper’s cell history); but see Ex. D-13 (Mr. Cooper’s medical status
summary, noting that he was granted bottom-bunk status because of a seizure disorder).
No additional evidence demonstrates that Unit Manager Luquis knew of Mr. Cooper’s
seizure disorder. As Unit Manager Luquis persuasively argues, Mr. Cooper’s serious
medical risk would not become immediate apparent by virtue of his bunk assignment

either, as bunk assignments can be granted for issues as relatively benign as back
injuries. Doc. No. 77, at 9. Even if Unit Manager Luquis knew of Mr. Cooper’s seizure
disorder, he acted reasonably in assigning Mr. Cooper to the bottom-bunk and he would
have reasonably responded to the complaint in the ordinary course of events by ordering
his staff to enforce Mr. Cooper’s bottom-bunk status.
Unit Manager Luquis demonstrated through a preponderance of the evidence
that he properly assigned Mr. Cooper to a bottom-bunk in a bottom-tier cell and acted in
compliance with his standard practices and procedures in addressing Mr. Cooper’s
complaint. A preponderance of the evidence also demonstrates that Unit Manager
Luquis was not immediately aware at the time of the complaint that Mr. Cooper faced
serious risk by sleeping in a top bunk. In conclusion, I find that Unit Manager Luquis
did not demonstrate deliberate indifference to Mr. Cooper’s serious medical need.
B. Any unreasonable conduct by Unit Manager Luquis in response to Mr.
Cooper’s complaint do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.

While I find Unit Manager Luquis’s conduct to be reasonable, even if his conduct
were unreasonable, it would not rise beyond mere negligence. When it comes to medical
care, the Third Circuit has found that deliberately indifferent conduct can be found
when
(1) reasonable requests for medical treatment are denied, exposing the
inmate to undue suffering or the threat of further injury; (2) necessary
medical treatment is delayed for non-medical reasons; (3) arbitrary or
burdensome procedures are erected to create treatment delays to suffering
prisoners; and (4) inmates are presented from receiving access and
treatment from capable medical professionals.

Peet v. Beard, No. 3:10-CV-482, 2015 WL 2250233, at *8 (M.D. Pa. May 12, 2015)
(citing Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346–47
(3d Cir. 1987)). Furthermore, “persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of
permanent injury” may be sufficient to show deliberate indifference. White v. Napoleon,
897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990). On the contrary, the Supreme Court has described “an
inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care” as not constituting “an
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).
Even if I found Unit Manager Luquis’s response to Mr. Cooper’s claim to be
unreasonable, it would be merely inadvertent conduct, as at worst he neglected to
follow-up to ensure enforcement of his proper bed assignment following a single
complaint.
The Middle District of Pennsylvania, in a similar matter, found that a prisoner
plaintiff could not hold prison officials liable for an Eighth Amendment violation when
he was assigned bottom-bunk status, claimed to have been placed in a top bunk, and fell
the next day after suffering a sleeping seizure, as this conduct was at most negligent.
Murray v. Wetzel, No. 17-cv-491, 2019 WL 1303217, at *8–9 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2019),

report and recommendation adopted, No. 17-cv-491, 2019 WL 1298826 (M.D. Pa. Mar.
21, 2019). If officials could not be found deliberately indifferent in that matter, I find it
difficult to reach a contrary conclusion here.
The Third Circuit, in another deliberate indifference case, held that a Youth
Development Center unit official’s failure to notify the executive director of allegations
of sexual assault “is evidence of negligence in the performance of his job, but it does
nothing to support the claim that he knew or must have known of the excessive risk to
the plaintiffs.” Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d at 141. Even if Unit Manager Luquis indeed
failed to notify his unit staff about Mr. Cooper’s situation, Mr. Cooper presents no
evidence that such failure to notify staff was anything more than inadvertent. While I
conclude that Unit Manager Luquis reasonably responded to Mr. Cooper’s complaint

and properly accommodated his serious medical condition, any contrary finding on
these facts would not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.
C. I will deny Unit Manager Luquis’s Rule 50 motion for judgment as a
matter of law.

While I will enter judgment in favor of Unit Manager Luquis, I will do so on the
basis of my findings of fact and conclusions of law rather than his Rule 50 motion for
judgment as a matter of law. As a practical matter, it is difficult to justify performing the
analysis necessary to determine a Rule 50 motion in the context of a bench trial. Rule 50
requires me to view “‘the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and
giv[e] it the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference,’” and determine if “‘there
is [ ]sufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find liability.’” CGB
Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs. Inc., 357 F.3d 375, 383 (3d Cir. 2004)
(quoting W.V. Realty Inc. v. N. Ins. Co. of New York, 334 F.3d 306, 311 (3d Cir. 2003)).

The quanta of factual and legal analysis necessary to make a Rule 50 decision seem
about the same as that necessary to reach a verdict, although a different standard
applies. If I were to decide the Rule 50 motion against Unit Manager Luquis, I would
still have to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in my role as the finder of fact
at trial. If I were to grant a Rule 50 motion, it would risk the appeal of a remedy that is
meant to be granted “sparingly,” and hence is more likely to be overturned on appeal.
See id. This seems injudicious.
Rather than engage in this inefficiency, I will not perform a Rule 50 analysis, but
will instead enter a verdict in favor of Unit Manager Luquis based on my findings of fact
and conclusions of law. I will deny the Rule 50 motion as moot.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, I find that Unit Manager Luquis did not exhibit
deliberate indifference toward Mr. Cooper’s serious medical need by not personally
ensuring that his bottom-bunk assignment was being enforced. Accordingly, I will enter
a verdict in favor of Unit Manager Luquis.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Richard A. Lloret
RICHARD A. LLORET
U.S. Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10403627. Public record. Not legal advice.