# DAVIS v. CHESTER CROZER HOSPITAL

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · April 6, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10403269

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 6, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10403269

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that prison grievance system provides adequate postdeprivation remedy to satisfy due process

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JERRY DAVIS, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-CV-5035
:
CHESTER CROZER HOSPITAL, et al. :
Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM
RUFE, J. APRIL 6, 2022
Before the Court is the pro se Amended Complaint of Plaintiff Jerry Davis, a pretrial
detainee currently confined at George W. Hill Correctional Facility (“GWHCF”), filed pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 10].) For the following reasons, the Court will
dismiss Davis’s Amended Complaint in part with prejudice and in part without prejudice
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Davis will be granted leave to file a second amended
complaint as set forth more fully below.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1
Davis’s original Complaint alleged violations of his civil rights based on events that
occurred while he received treatment at Crozer-Chester Medical Center and also while housed at
GWHCF.2 (Compl. [Doc. No. 2].) In a December 15, 2021 Memorandum and Order, the Court

1 The allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Davis’s Amended Complaint and the public dockets,
of which the Court may take judicial notice. See Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir.
2006). The Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.

2 It appears from the state court dockets that Davis was in custody in connection with various burglary and theft-
related charges at the time that he was treated at Crozer-Chester Medical Center and that these charges remain
pending. See Commonwealth v. Davis, CP-51-CR-0001687-2020 (C.P. Philadelphia); Commonwealth v. Davis, CP-
51-CR-0001536-2020 (C.P. Philadelphia). The public dockets also reveal that Davis has not been convicted of the
charges stemming from the Crozer-Chester Medical Center incident. See Commonwealth v. Davis, CP-23-CR-
0003351-2020 (C.P. Delaware) (trial scheduled to commence the week of March 21, 2022).
granted Davis leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed his Complaint upon screening
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (See Mem. [Doc. No. 6]; Dec. 15, 2021 Order [Doc. No.
7].) The Court first dismissed with prejudice Davis’s claims against Defendants Crozer-Chester
Medical Center and GWHCF. (Mem. [Doc. No. 6] at 4–5.) The claims against Defendants

Delaware County, the Chester Police Department, Norristown State Hospital, and The GEO
Group, Inc. were dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. (Id. at 6–8.)
Additionally, Davis’s malicious prosecution claims were dismissed without prejudice to Davis
filing a new civil action in the event the charges filed against him terminate in his favor. (Id. at
8–9.) The Court also determined that the claims based on the use of excessive force and the
other conditions of confinement at GWHCF were vague and conclusory and fell short of
providing a sufficient factual basis to state plausible claims. (Id. at 9–11.) Davis was granted
leave to file an amended complaint. (See Mem. [Doc. No. 6]; Dec. 15, 2021 Order [Doc. No. 7].)3
Davis did not file an amended complaint within the thirty-day time frame imposed by the
Court. Instead, Davis filed a letter dated December 20, 2021, in which he stated his desire to

appeal this Court’s decision. (Doc. No. 8.) Consequently, on February 9, 2022, the Court issued
an Order construing Davis’s December 20, 2021 letter as a Notice to Stand on Complaint and
closed the case. (Doc. No. 9.) On February 11, 2022, however, Davis’s Amended Complaint
was entered on the docket. (See Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 10].) By Order dated February 14, 2022,
the Court vacated the dismissal Order and re-opened this matter so that the Amended Complaint
could be screened under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (Feb. 14, 2022 Order [Doc. No.
11].)

3 The Court also denied Davis’s motion to amend the Complaint to add a claim pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971) as there were no allegations that Davis had
been in federal custody. (Dec. 15, 2021 Order [Doc. No. 7].)
The Amended Complaint names as Defendants Delaware County, The GEO Group, Inc.,
and Norristown State Hospital. (Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 10].)4 Davis again alleges that he was
arrested without probable cause at Crozer-Chester Medical Center in February 2020 and brought
to GWHCF,5 where he “underwent months of eating jail food and being a pretrial inmate, subject

to the unusual and cruel punishment” of GWHCF. (See Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 10] at 4.)
According to Davis, because he refused to accept a plea agreement, the state court judge ordered
an involuntary psychiatric evaluation and he was transferred to Norristown State Hospital in
February 2021. (Id.) He contends that staff at Norristown State Hospital assaulted him and
forced him to take medication. (Id.) Davis alleges that he had a “gash” on his forehead from
“some alleged employee and was made to stay in the room until [his] blood dried up and [his]
body proceeded to try to heal itself.” (Id.) He avers that he was returned to GWHCF on May 4,
2021. (Id.)
Davis further claims that it is “GEO policy that ASA or PSA are not allowed to use the
phone or get recreation” in violation of his constitutional rights. (Id. at 5.) He also contends that

it is “GEO policy that all meals are to be eaten outside of the cell which was never followed in
[his] case” and that his rights to a speedy trial have been violated. (Id.) According to Davis,
“Delaware County was aware of this because they enforce the laws but did not follow protocol”
and instead have subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment. (Id.) He further claims that

4 The Court notes that an amended complaint, once submitted to the Court, serves as the governing pleading in the
case because an amended complaint supersedes the prior pleading. See Shahid v. Borough of Darby, 666 F. App’x
221, 223 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam); see also Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019), cert.
denied, 140 S. Ct. 1611 (2020) (“In general, an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading and renders the
original pleading a nullity. Thus, the most recently filed amended complaint becomes the operative pleading.”)
(internal citations omitted); Argentina v. Gillette, 778 F. App’x 173, 175 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (holding
that “liberal construction of a pro se amended complaint does not mean accumulating allegations from superseded
pleadings”).

5 It appears from the publicly available docket that Davis’s confinement at GWHCF began on March 2, 2020. See
Commonwealth v. Davis, CP-23-CR-0003351-2020 (C.P. Delaware).
Delaware County and the GEO Group, Inc., were “aware of the provisions made at GWHCF I’m
at least relatively certain and did nothing to change its policy, discipline its employees nor
repress or curb these abuses inflicted” during his time at GWHCF. (Id.) He further alleges
Delaware County and the GEO Group, Inc., “were aware of the illegal actions and oppressive

issues going on … and are still taking place.” (Id.) He acknowledges that he does not know the
names of the individuals who are alleged to have violated his rights. (Id.)
While housed at GWHCF, Davis claims that he is “under 24 hour lockdown in a cell
approximately since the end of August until present January.” (Id. at 6.) He alleges that he is
“not being permitted showers recreation or telephone calls for five months straight [and]
counting” and that “the jail is trashing” his mail. (Id.) Davis also claims that on November 16,
2021, “a CO opens my slot and I try to tell him I haven’t had a shower in since I can’t remember
can I have one he and his partner now this is round the second meal of the day grab and twist my
arm out of socket trying to get me to put my arm back inside.” (Id.) He further claims that on
December 23, 2021, “a CO slides a tray under my door where poop and urine has been . . . and I

slide it back out those are like complete no-nos and they don’t appear to be aware of that.” (Id.)
Additionally, Davis contends that other inmates have thrown excrement on him in the presence
of Corrections Officers. (Id. at 4.) Davis asserts that he has suffered psychological and physical
trauma and seeks monetary damages. (Id. at 6.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Since the Court granted Davis leave to proceed in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) applies, which requires the Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint if it
fails to state a claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which
requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted); Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir.

2021) (“At this early stage of the litigation, [the Court will] accept the facts alleged in [the pro
se] complaint as true, draw[] all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor, and ask only
whether [that] complaint, liberally construed, . . . contains facts sufficient to state a plausible []
claim.” (internal quotations omitted)). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. Section 1915 also requires the dismissal of claims for monetary relief brought against a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii); Rauso v.
Giambrone, 782 F. App’x 99, 101 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (holding that § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii)
“explicitly states that a court shall dismiss a case ‘at any time’ where the action seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief”).
As Davis is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v.
Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,

244–45 (3d Cir. 2013)). “This means we remain flexible, especially ‘when dealing with
imprisoned pro se litigants[.]’” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 244). The Court will “apply the
relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Id. However, ‘“pro se
litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.’” Id. (quoting
Mala, 704 F.3d at 245).
III. DISCUSSION
To state a claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
It is difficult to determine the claims in Davis’s Amended Complaint because he once again
articulates his claims in a generalized, conclusory manner. (See generally Am. Compl. [Doc.
No. 10].) That is, Davis does not specify what happened, when it happened, and who was

involved in a given set of events.
Although Davis alleges violations of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth,
Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Amendment rights, (see id. at 3),
liberally construing Davis’s Amended Complaint as this Court must do, the Court understands
the Amended Complaint as attempting to present claims for malicious prosecution, excessive
force, interference with mail, and regarding the conditions of his confinement.6 Despite that
liberal construction, Davis again has not alleged a plausible basis for a claim against any
Defendant.
A. Claims Against Delaware County and The GEO Group, Inc.
The claims Davis seeks to pursue against Delaware County and The GEO Group, Inc.,

must be dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). To plead a basis for municipal liability under
§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the municipality’s policy or custom caused the violation of his
constitutional rights. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). “To
satisfy the pleading standard, [the plaintiff] must . . . specify what exactly that custom or policy
was.” McTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). “‘Policy is made when a
decisionmaker possess[ing] final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the
action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.’” Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914
F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir.

6 The other constitutional provisions to which Davis refers do not give rise to any plausible basis for liability here.
1990)). “‘Custom, on the other hand, can be proven by showing that a given course of conduct,
although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as
virtually to constitute law.’” Id. (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir.
1990)). For a custom to be the proximate cause of an injury, a plaintiff must establish that the

defendant “had knowledge of similar unlawful conduct in the past, failed to take precautions
against future violations, and that its failure, at least in part, led to [plaintiff’s] injury.” Id.
(internal quotations and alterations omitted). A plaintiff may also state a basis for municipal
liability by “alleging failure-to-supervise, train, or discipline . . . [and alleging facts showing]
that said failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of those affected.”
Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 106 (3d Cir. 2019).
As a private corporation under contract to provide services at GWHCF, The GEO Group
is a state actor and is subject to § 1983 liability. See Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318
F.3d 575, 583–84 (3d Cir. 2003) (acknowledging that entity contracted to perform medical
services for county jail is state actor for purposes of § 1983); French v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 18-

4312, 2018 WL 4929859, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2018) (“The GEO Group acts under the color
of state law by providing services for the George W. Hill Correctional Facility.”); Regan v.
Upper Darby Twp., 2009 WL 650384, at *3 n.5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2009) (“For purposes of
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, Defendant GEO Group, a private company, was acting under the color
of state law since it provided daily functional services for the Delaware County Prison.”). Thus,
The GEO Group, Inc. may be liable under § 1983 if its policies or customs caused the alleged
constitutional violation. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; McTernan, 564 F.3d at 658. It may also
be liable for failure to supervise, train, or discipline its employees. See Forrest, 930 F.3d at 106.
Davis seeks to present claims against Delaware County and The GEO Group, Inc., but he
sets forth only vague and conclusory allegations against these Defendants. (See Am. Compl.
[Doc. No. 10] at 5.) Davis alleges that it is “GEO policy that ASA or PSA are not allowed to use
the phone or get recreation which is a violation of federal law any my constitutional rights.”

(Id.) He also claims that it is “GEO policy that all meals are to be eaten outside of the cell which
was never followed in my case.” (Id.) Additionally, Davis asserts that he has been subjected to
a “long oppressive incarceration” and that Delaware County “was aware of this because they
enforce the laws but did not follow protocol” such that he has been subjected to “cruel and
unusual punishments.” (Id.) Davis also contends that he is “relatively certain” that Delaware
County and The GEO Group, Inc. were aware of the conditions under which he is held at
GWHCF, but that they “did nothing to change its policy, discipline its employees nor repress or
curb these abuses inflicted during my incarceration.” (Id.)
Nothing in the Amended Complaint plausibly suggests that the claimed constitutional
violations stemmed from a policy or custom of either Delaware County or The GEO Group, Inc.

Rather, Davis’s Amended Complaint consists entirely of conclusory allegations that his
constitutional rights were violated. He also fails to allege that Delaware County or The GEO
Group, Inc. had actual knowledge of prior similar conduct or failed to prevent the repetition of
such conduct, and that this failure led to his injury. Allegations that simply paraphrase the
standard for municipal liability are too vague and generalized to support a claim against the
Delaware County or The GEO Group, Inc. See Szerensci v. Shimshock, No. 20-1296, 2021 WL
4480172, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2021) (“Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation, which generally
paraphrases the relevant standard, is insufficient to state a claim for § 1983 liability under
Monell.”) (citing cases). Thus, Davis’s claims against Delaware County and The GEO Group,
Inc., will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. However, since the Court cannot say at this
time that Davis can never assert a plausible claim against Delaware County or The GEO Group,
Inc., the dismissal will be without prejudice and Davis will be afforded one more opportunity to
file a second amended complaint if he is capable of curing the defects the Court has identified.

B. Claims Against Norristown State Hospital
Davis includes Norristown State Hospital as a Defendant in the caption of his Amended
Complaint and in the list of named Defendants. (Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 10] at 1, 3.) Davis
appears to allege that he was confined at Norristown State Hospital in February 2021, when “the
Judge sees I won’t take the deal he then signs me up for an involuntary psyche eval. at
Norristown State Hospital.” (Id. at 4.) Davis contends that “the staff at Norristown assaulted
me, forced me to take medication I was jumped by multiple staffs I had a gash in my forehead
from some alleged employee and was made to stay in the room until my blood dried up and my
body proceeded to try to heal itself.” (Id.)
Nonetheless, the claims for money damages Davis seeks to assert against Norristown

State Hospital may not proceed. Absent consent by the Commonwealth, the Eleventh
Amendment bars suits against a state and its agencies in federal court that seek monetary
damages. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99–100 (1984); A.W. v.
Jersey City Public Schs., 341 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2003). As the Commonwealth has not
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity for lawsuits filed in federal court, state entities and
officials sued in their official capacities are immune from suits filed in federal court. See
Matthews v. Norristown State Hosp., 528 F. App’x 115, 118 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); 42 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 8521–22. “Because [Norristown State Hospital] is a state institution within the
Department of [Human Services], [Norristown State Hospital] and its employees are an arm of
the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in so far as they are sued in their official
capacities.” Matthews, 528 F. App’x at 118–19; see Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621
F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Individual state employees sued in their official capacity are also
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 23 (1991)

(holding that Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against state officials sued in their
individual capacities under § 1983). Thus, Davis’s claims against Norristown State Hospital
under § 1983 will be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
C. Claims for Malicious Prosecution
Davis again alleges that he has been falsely charged with a crime and maliciously
prosecuted. (See Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 10] at 4–6.)
To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must show
that: (1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended
in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the
defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice;
and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure
as a consequence of a legal proceeding.

McKenna v. City of Phila., 582 F.3d 447, 461 (3d Cir. 2009).
According to the state court docket, the charges against Davis were dismissed with
prejudice on March 22, 2022. See Commonwealth v. Davis, CP-23-CR-0003351-2020 (C.P.
Delaware). However, Plaintiff has asserted only conclusory facts as to the circumstances of his
arrest and prosecution, and the Court will dismiss this claim without prejudice and with leave to
amend.7

7 Similarly, to the extent Davis raises a false arrest claim and, assuming arguendo that there is a basis for such a
claim, he has not adequately tied that allegation to any named Defendant or articulated facts that would support a
plausible inference that probable cause was lacking for his arrest. See Godfrey v. Pennsylvania, 525 F. App’x 78, 80
(3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (explaining that, to the extent plaintiff was asserting claims for false arrest “[plaintiff]
needed to point to facts suggesting that Defendant Thompson lacked probable cause to believe he had committed the
offense for which he was arrested”).
D. Additional Claims Based on Conditions at GWHCF and Norristown State
Hospital

Davis’s Amended Complaint contains additional allegations that at times appear
attributable to individuals who are not named as Defendants in this case. Although Davis did not
name any individual defendants, it is worth noting that “[a] defendant in a civil rights action
must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs” to be liable. See Rode v. Dellarciprete,
845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (the personal involvement of each defendant in the alleged
constitutional violation is a required element and a plaintiff must allege how each defendant was
involved in the events and occurrences giving rise to the claims). Indeed, “[b]ecause vicarious
liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official
defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 676. The personal involvement of a defendant in a § 1983 action may be shown
“through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode, 825
F.2d at 1207. Many of Davis’s allegations with regard to these potential claims are vague and
conclusory. The Court addresses his primary allegations below.
1. Claims Based on the Use of Excessive Force
Because Davis was a pretrial detainee during the relevant events, the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment governs his excessive force claims. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576

U.S. 389, 397 (2015) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of
excessive force that amounts to punishment.”) (internal quotation and citation omitted); Hubbard
v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166 (3d Cir. 2005). To state a due process violation based on excessive
force, a detainee must allege facts to plausibly suggest that “that the force purposely or
knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 396–97.
“[O]bjective reasonableness turns on the ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case.’” Id.
at 397 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). A non-exhaustive list of factors
relevant to a determination of excessive force, include:
the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the
extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the
amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably
perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.
Id.
Davis alleges that he was “assaulted” by staff at Norristown State Hospital, among other
things, but this is a legal conclusion that he does not develop. Davis also claims that on
November 16, 2021, “a CO opens my slot and I try to tell him I haven’t had a shower in since I
can’t remember can I have one he and his partner now this is round the second meal of the day
grab and twist my arm out of socket trying to get me to put my arm back inside.” (Am. Compl.
[Doc. No. 10] at 6.) However, he has failed to tie this allegation to any of the named Defendants
as a basis for their liability. Additionally, to plausibly allege a claim against an individual, Davis
must identify the individual or individuals alleged to have asserted force, and allege facts
describing the force used, the circumstances under which it was used, and the injuries he suffered
as a result. The allegations are insufficient to survive screening and Davis’s excessive force
claims will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
2. Claims Based on Conditions of Confinement
With respect to Davis’s conditions of confinement claims, the Amended Complaint still
does not allege a plausible claim for relief. Davis alleges, inter alia, that “since the end of
August until present January” he was locked in his cell for twenty-four hours a day and was
refused showers, telephone calls, and recreation. (See Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 10] at 4, 6.)
Pretrial detainees in federal custody are protected from “punishment” by the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); see also Camps v. Giorla,
843 F. App’x 450, 452 (3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“[A] court must determine whether the
conditions complained of were imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is merely
incidental to a legitimate governmental objective.”). “Unconstitutional punishment typically

includes both objective and subjective components.” Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d
Cir. 2007). The objective component requires an inquiry into whether “the deprivation [was]
sufficiently serious” and the subjective component asks whether “the officials act[ed] with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind[.]” Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991);
Bell, 441 U.S. at 538–39, 539 n.20). In general, a detainee must assert that prison officials acted
with deliberate indifference, meaning that they consciously disregarded a serious risk to the
detainee’s health or safety. See Seiter, 501 U.S. at 298–99; see also Wilson v. Burks, 423 F.
App’x 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“‘[T]he official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial harm exists, and he must also draw that
inference.’”) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)); cf. Edwards v.

Northampton Cnty., 663 F. App’x 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (“[W]e agree with the
District Court and find no reason to apply a different standard here as we have applied the
‘deliberate indifference’ standard both in cases involving prisoners and pretrial detainees.”
(internal citations omitted)).
Although these facts may provide the basis for a constitutional claim, Davis has not
adequately tied his allegations about the conditions at GWHCF to any of the named Defendants,
nor has he named as Defendants individuals who were personally responsible for the alleged
harm he suffered as a result of the conditions he describes. Thus, Davis’s Amended Complaint
also fails to state a claim with respect to the conditions of his confinement. Accordingly, Davis’s
claims based on the conditions of his confinement will be dismissed without prejudice.8
3. Claim Based on Interference with Mail
Davis alleges that he has “put mail out and have not received correspondence. I think the

jail is trashing my mail.” (Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 10] at 6.) Prisoners have protected First
Amendment interests in both sending and receiving mail. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S.
401 (1989); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). However, “these rights must be
exercised with due regard for the ‘inordinately difficult undertaking’ that is modern prison
administration.” Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 407 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 85).
Regarding legal mail, a “pattern and practice of opening properly marked incoming
[legal] mail outside an inmate’s presence infringes communication protected by the right to free
speech.” Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1452 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated in part by Oliver v.
Fauver, 118 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2006)
(“A state pattern and practice . . . of opening legal mail outside the presence of the addressee

inmate . . . impinges upon the inmate’s right to freedom of speech.”). A prisoner may allege that
actions were taken pursuant to a pattern or practice without the existence of a “blanket policy.”
See, e.g., Jones, 461 F.3d at 359 (distinguishing between “a pattern and practice” and an
“explicit policy”). “[P]risoners need not allege or prove any ‘actual injury’ beyond direct injury
to their First Amendment right to use the mails.” Taylor v. Oney, 196 F. App’x 126, 128 (3d Cir.

8 Davis again complains generally about the unsanitary conditions at GWHCF. The Court recognizes that unsanitary
conditions can support a cognizable § 1983 conditions of confinement claim. See, e.g., Conway v. Cnty. of Camden,
No. 16-9550, 2017 WL 3783263, at *2–3 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2017) (finding plaintiff sufficiently pled a plausible basis
for a claim that he experienced unconstitutionally punitive conditions as a detainee where he alleged, inter alia, that
he was housed in a two-person cell with three other people and required to sleep on the floor next to the toilet with
only a thin mattress, facility had only one set of fingernail clippers for all inmates on the unit and plaintiff sustained
a skin infection, mold caused plaintiff to sustain respiratory problems, there was a lack of hot water in the cells,
plaintiff sustained insect bites, and was housed with inmates infected with MRSA). Here, however, Davis’s
conclusory statements regarding the lack of cleanliness at GWHCF do not sufficiently state a plausible claim.
2006). However, courts have found that mere isolated incidents of interference without evidence
of an improper motive, are insufficient to establish a First Amendment violation. See, e.g.,
Nixon v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 501 F. App’x 176, 178 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (“[T]he
District Court correctly determined that Nixon’s claim alleging a single, isolated interference

with his personal mail was insufficient to constitute a First Amendment violation.”).
It is unclear from the Amended Complaint whether Davis is referring to his legal mail, or
other personal correspondence. To the extent Davis alleges interference with his legal mail, his
Amended Complaint fails to set forth specific factual averments describing how any named
Defendant was personally involved in the interference. He also makes no allegation that the
interference was part of a pattern and practice. Indeed, this allegation appears to be based on
speculation. Without at least a modicum of factual specificity on these points, the Court must
conclude that Davis has failed to state a plausible claim of interference with legal mail under the
First Amendment.
To the extent Davis seeks to pursue a claim for deprivation of his property without due

process of law, such claim is not plausible. A prisoner in Pennsylvania cannot state a
constitutional claim based on the loss of his property. See Spencer v. Bush, 543 F. App’x 209,
213 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“‘[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a
state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is
available.’”) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)); Shakur v. Coelho, 421 F.
App’x 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (explaining that the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act
provides an adequate remedy for a willful deprivation of property); Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty.
Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that prison grievance system provides
adequate postdeprivation remedy to satisfy due process); see also Shareef v. Moore, 844 F.
App’x 487, 488 (3d Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (no due process violation where inmate had access
to adequate post-deprivation remedy to address confiscation and destruction of property and
legal papers), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 146 (2021). Accordingly, any claims based on Davis’s

mail will be dismissed without prejudice as not plausible.
IV. CONCLUSION
As set forth more fully above, Davis’s § 1983 claims against Norristown State Hospital
are dismissed with prejudice because he cannot cure the defects in these claims and amendment
would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108, 110 (3d Cir. 2002)
(holding that district courts should dismiss complaints under the PLRA with leave to amend
“unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.”). Davis’s claims against Delaware County
and The GEO Group, Inc., are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim, as is
Davis’s malicious prosecution claim based on the criminal charges related to the incident at
Crozer-Chester Medical Center.

Because Davis may be able to state a plausible claim, he will be granted a further
opportunity to amend his claims. Cognizant of Davis’s pro se status, the Court will grant Davis
an opportunity to “flesh out [his] allegations by . . . explaining in the amended complaint the
‘who, what, where, when and why’ of [his] claim.” See Gambrell v. S. Brunswick Bd. of Educ.,
No. 18-16359, 2019 WL 5212964, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2019). Any second amended complaint
should clearly describe the factual basis for Davis’s claims against the relevant defendant and
how the defendant was involved in the alleged denial of his Constitutional rights. If Davis fails
to file a second amended complaint within the time specified in the Court’s Order, this matter
will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). An order will be entered.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10403269. Public record. Not legal advice.