# SESAY v. CYS/DELCO

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · April 12, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10403154

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 12, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN RE: NENNEH SESAY, : CIVIL ACTION NOS.
Plaintiff. : 22-CV-0082
: 22-CV-0083
: 22-CV-0119
: 22-CV-0934
: 22-CV-0936
: 22-CV-0938
: 22-CV-0939
: 22-CV-1026
: 22-CV-1061
: 22-CV-1062
: 22-CV-1067
: 22-CV-1068
: 22-CV-1069
: 22-CV-1158
: 22-CV-1254
:

MEMORANDUM
PAPPERT, J. April 12, 2022
Since 2022, pro se Plaintiff Nenneh Sesay1 filed fifteen cases in this Court, ten
between March 7 and March 14 alone. The Court grants Sesay leave to proceed in
forma pauperis in these cases and dismisses them pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B): Sesay v. Kamara, Civ. A. No. 22-0082, Sesay v. Sescey, Civ. A. No. 22-
0083, Sesay v. Sescey, Civ. A. No. 22-0119, Sesay v. Kamara, Civ. A. No. 22-1158, Sesay
v. United States Military/Army, Civ. A. No. 22-0934, Sesay v. Xfinity/Comcast, Civ. A.

1 Since July 2021, Nenneh Sesay filed twenty lawsuits here. She spells her name
inconsistently in her filings, but recently told the Clerk of Court in person that her name’s proper
spelling is Nenneh Sesay. Nevertheless, some of her subsequent filings identify her as Nenneh
Sesay Moet. For ease of reference and consistency, the Court refers to her simply as Sesay, including
in the captions of her various cited civil actions. Sesay spelled her last name as “Sescey” in many
filings and sued defendants with the same last name, spelled the same way, suggesting she may may
share an unspecified familial relationship with these parties. The last names of those defendants
will remain spelled as alleged in the original filings.
No. 22-0936, Sesay v. Roc Nation/Music, Civ. A. No. 22-0938, Sesay v. Mercy Fitzgerald
Hospital, Civ. A. No. 22-0939, Sesay v. CYS/Delco, Civ. A. No. 22-1026, Sesay v. SEPTA
Transportation, Civ. A. No. 22-1061, Sesay v. United States Military, Civ. A. No. 22-
1062, Sesay v. United States Military, Civ. A. No. 22-1067, Sesay v. Sierra Leone

Parliament, Civ. A. No. 22-1068, Sesay v. Roc Nation/Kamara Turney Family, Civ. A.
No. 22-1069, and Sesay v. Biden Administration, Civ. A. No. 22-1254.
Sesay is hereby informed that the Court may consider future similar filings to
constitute an abuse of the privilege to proceed in forma pauperis. If she continues to
file repeated, groundless complaints, she may be required to show cause why she should
not be enjoined from filing non-habeas civil cases in forma pauperis.
I
From July through September 2021, Sesay filed five lawsuits in this Court:
(1) Sesay v. YouTube, Civ. A. No. 21-3311; (2) Sesay v. Kamara, Civ. A. No. 21-3315;
(3) Sesay v. Walmart/Onn Unit, Civ. A. No. 21-3355; (4) Sesay v. Boost Mobile, Civ. A.

No. 21-3638; and (5) Sesay v. Onwulsbull, Civ. A. No. 21-4379. Although each of the
2021 cases have been dismissed, they illustrate Sesay’s emerging pattern of litigation.
In the 2021 cases, Sesay named a wide range of defendants including a social
media company, a wireless communications carrier, a discount retailer and several
individuals with whom she had had family or personal connections. While the cases’
specific allegations varied somewhat, they centered on Sesay’s contentions that: (1) she
was the subject of illegal surveillance and monitoring made possible by illegal wiretaps,
data breaches and the compromise of her cellphone, television and social media
accounts; (2) she and her children were being tracked, stalked, and harassed as a
result; and (3) her privacy rights were being violated because her “information”2 was
being used without her consent.
A
On July 21, 2021, Sesay filed Sesay v. YouTube, Civ. A. No. 21-3311 (ECF 2), her

first Complaint in this Court. She named YouTube and its Legal Department as
defendants and alleged her YouTube account was hacked, she was being harassed and
stalked because of her 2002 appearance in an adult magazine and that YouTube
violated its privacy policy and put Sesay and her children at risk. (Civ. A. No. 21-3311,
ECF 2 at 3-4.) On November 18, 2021, the Court granted Sesay leave to proceed in
forma pauperis, dismissed her federal claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and dismissed her state law claims without
prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. (Civ. A. No. 21-3311, ECF 9 & 10). Sesay could not
state a plausible constitutional claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because neither
YouTube, as a private social media company, nor its Legal Department, were state

actors subject to liability under the statute. (Civ. A. No. 21-3311, ECF 9 at 3-4.)
B
Sesay filed her second case, Sesay v. Kamara, Civ. A. No. 21-3315, on the same
day as her first. She subsequently filed an Amended Complaint and then a Second
Amended Complaint (ECF 9) became the operative pleading. Badora Kamara was the
sole defendant and Sesay alleged all her accounts were compromised and her images
sold to others for money as a result of surveillance conducted in her home without her

2 None of Sesay’s 2021 cases ever sufficiently described the nature of the “information” she
claimed the Defendants were using without her consent.
consent. (Civ. A. No. 21-3315, ECF 9 at 2-3.) While she did not directly tie Kamara to
her allegations, Sesay alleged his unspecified personal issues resulted in a data breach
and the illegal removal of her children. (Id. at 3-4.)
Sesay was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and her Second Amended

Complaint was dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and for lack of jurisdiction on December 9, 2021. (Civ. A. No.
21-3315, ECF 10 & 11.) Sesay did not state a plausible constitutional claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 because it was unclear whether Kamara was a state actor subject to §
1983 liability. (Id.) She was given leave to file a third amended complaint if she could
allege facts to show he was a state actor or if she could allege facts to establish diversity
jurisdiction for any state law claims. Because Sesay did not do so, on March 24, 2022
the Court dismissed her federal claims with prejudice and her state law claims without
prejudice without further leave to amend. (Civ. A. No. 21-3315, ECF 12.)
C

On July 23, 2021, just two days after filing her first and second cases, Sesay filed
a Complaint (ECF 1) in a third case: Sesay v. Walmart/Onn Unit, Civ. A. No. 21-3355.
She named Walmart and its Onn Unit, an in-house electronics manufacturer, as
defendants and alleged two Onn televisions she purchased at separate Pennsylvania
Walmart stores had illegal wiretaps and illegal surveillance installed in them and were
being used to extort her and convert her apartment into a production studio. (Civ. A.
No. 21-3355, ECF 1 at 2-4.) On November 19, 2021, the Court granted Sesay leave to
proceed in forma pauperis, dismissed her federal claims with prejudice for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and dismissed her state law
claims without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. (Civ. A. No. 21-3355, ECF 9 & 10).
Sesay did not state a plausible constitutional claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
because Walmart and Onn Unit were a private discount retailer and its in-house
electronics brand, not state actors subject to liability under the statute. (Id.)

D
Sesay filed her fourth lawsuit – Sesay v. Boost Mobile, Civ. A. No. 21-3638 – on
August 13, 2021 (ECF 2). Boost Mobile was the sole defendant and Sesay alleged her
phone and account were compromised, resulting in the release of her personal
information, as well as her being tracked and followed, placing her and her children’s
lives at risk and giving rise to claims for data breach, invasion of privacy, wiretap fraud
and surveillance fraud. (Civ. A. No. 21-3638, ECF 2 at 2-4.) The Court granted Sesay
leave to proceed in forma pauperis, dismissed her federal claims with prejudice for
failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and dismissed her
state law claims without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction on November 19, 2021. (Civ.

A. No. 21-3638, ECF 9 & 10). Sesay did not state a plausible constitutional claim
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Boost Mobile was a private wireless
communications carrier, and not a state actor subject to § 1983 liability. (ECF 9 at 5.)
E
On September 30, 2021, Sesay filed her fifth case: Sesay v. Onwulsbull, Civ. A.
No. 21-4379 (ECF 2). She named Uchechukau Onwulsbull, her ex-boyfriend, former
roommate and father of her minor child, as the sole defendant. (Civ. A. No. 21-4379,
ECF 2 at 3-5.) She alleged he was negligent in failing to inform her he worked in law
enforcement and was employed as a federal agent at DHS and claimed he illegally
placed her under surveillance without her consent, which put her and her children at
risk and somehow led to their illegal removal from her care. (Id. at 2-5.)
Sesay was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and her Complaint
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and for lack of jurisdiction on November 19, 2021. (Civ. A. No. 21-
4379, ECF 4 & 5.) She had not stated a plausible constitutional claim pursuant to
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389
(1971) because she failed to allege enough facts to demonstrate federal action. (Civ. A.
No. 21-4379, ECF 4 at 4-5.) The Court granted Sesay leave to amend her Complaint if
she could allege facts to demonstrate federal action or if she could allege facts to
establish diversity jurisdiction for any state law claims. Because she did not amend her
Complaint, the Court dismissed Sesay’s federal claims with prejudice and her state law
claims without prejudice without further leave to amend on January 5, 2022. (Civ. A.
No. 21-4379, ECF 6.)

II
Since the start of 2022, and after the dismissal of her first five actions, Sesay
filed fifteen new cases in this Court. Much like her 2021 cases, Sesay’s 2022 cases – the
subject of this Opinion – name a wide range of defendants including the United States
Military, Xfinity/Comcast (a cable communications company), the Southeastern
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority – SEPTA, the parliament of the country of
Sierra Leone, the Biden Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, the
Office of Children and Youth Services for Delaware County, the entertainment
company Roc Nation, and Mercy Fitzgerald Hospital, as well as several individuals
with whom she appears to have personal connections or to whom she appears to be
related.3
Sesay filed three complaints on January 6, 2022: Sesay v. Kamara, Civ. A. No.
22-0082 (ECF 1); Sesay v. Sescey, Civ. A. No. 22-0083 (ECF 2); and Sesay v. Sescey, Civ.

A. No. 22-0119 (ECF 2). She filed a fourth complaint on January 31: Sesay v. Kamara,
Civ. A. No. 22-1158 (ECF 1). Before the Court could address her January 2022 filings,
Sesay filed four more complaints on March 7, 2022: Sesay v. United States
Military/Army, Civ. A. No. 22-0934 (ECF 2); Sesay v. Xfinity/Comcast, Civ. A. No. 22-
0936 (ECF 2); Sesay v. Roc Nation/Music, Civ. A. No. 22-0938 (ECF 2); and Sesay v.
Mercy Fitzgerald Hospital, Civ. A. No. 22-0939 (ECF 2). On March 14, 2022, Sesay filed
six more lawsuits: Sesay v. CYS/Delco, Civ. A. No. 22-1026 (ECF 2); Sesay v. SEPTA
Transportation, Civ. A. No. 22-1061 (ECF 2); Sesay v. United States Military, Civ. A.
No. 22-1062 (ECF 2); Sesay v. United States Military, Civ. A. No. 22-1067 (ECF 2);
Sesay v. Sierra Leone Parliament, Civ. A. No. 22-1068 (ECF 2); and Sesay v. Roc

Nation/Kamara Turney Family, Civ. A. No. 22-1069 (ECF 2). Sesay filed her twentieth
Complaint on March 31, 2022: Sesay v. Biden Administration, Civ. A. No. 22-1254
(ECF 2). All fifteen of the 2022 cases warrant dismissal.
A
Sesay v. Kamara (Kamara II), Civ. A. No. 22-0082 (ECF 1), Sesay’s sixth case,
names Badora Kamara and Uchechukau Onwulsbull as Defendants. (Civ. A. No. 22-
0082, ECF 1 at 2.) While the Court granted Sesay leave to file amended pleadings

3 When summarizing the facts taken from Sesay’s pleadings in each of her cases the Court
adopts the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF system.
against these defendants in the independent actions she first initiated against them –
Kamara, Civ. A. No. 21-3315 and Onwulsbull, Civ. A. No. 21-4379 – Sesay instead
appears to have filed a single, new action against both. In Kamara II, Sesay checked
the box indicating she seeks to bring a Bivens action against federal officials. (Civ. A.

No. 22-0082, ECF 1 at 3.) Like her 2021 cases, Sesay alleges repeatedly, in broad,
conclusory terms, that Kamara and Onwulsbull are using her information without her
consent but does not otherwise describe the information at issue or how they are using
it. (Id. at 3, 5.) She references “False Imprisonment” approximately six times without
any supporting details. (Id. at 4-7.) She also makes references to “illegal surveillance”,
“wiretap fraud”, and “sexual scandal”, but provides no factual allegations or context for
her use of these terms. (Id. at 5.)
B
Sesay’s seventh Complaint, Sesay v. Sescey (Sescey I), Civ. A. No. 22-0083 (ECF
2), names Abdul Kay Sescey as the sole Defendant. Sesay identifies him as a CIA

Informant, makes repeated general allegations that he has been using her information
without her permission or consent for the past four years and contends his conduct is
illegal. (Civ. A. No. 22-0083, Compl. at 3-5, 7.) Sesay checked the box showing she
seeks to bring the case as a Bivens action and references “illegal imprisonment”
approximately four times with no facts or context for her use of that term. (Id. at 3-4, 6-
7.) She also alleges the “[s]ubject illegally removed [her] kids using grandfather’s rights
and using [her] SSI numbers and . . . money[.]”4 (Id. at 5.)

4 The nature of the relationship between Sesay and Abdul Kay Sescey is unclear, though the
Complaint suggests he may be her father and the grandfather of her children.
C
Sesay filed her eighth Complaint at the same time as her sixth and seventh
cases: Sesay v. Sescey (“Sescey II”), Civ. A. No. 22-0119 (ECF 2). Sescey II, also marked
as a Bivens action, names Maryann K. Sescey5 as the sole Defendant and alleges she

has used Sesay’s information for personal gain without her consent for the past four
years. (Civ. A. No. 22-0119, ECF 2 at 3-5.) Sesay references “illegal False
Imprisonment” and “False Imprisonment by inserting illegal IP camera” but does not
provide additional facts. (Id. at 4, 6.) As relief, Sesay “want[s] the Defendant to pay
back money for all [her] accounts linked to [her].” (Id. at 5.)
D
Sesay filed her ninth case on January 31, 2022: Sesay v. Kamara6 (Kamara III),
Civ. A. No. 22-1158 (ECF 1). The Complaint names Bility Kamara and Katie Sesay-
Lewis as Defendants and is marked as another Bivens action. (Civ. A. No. 22-1158,
Compl. at 2-3.) On page three of the Complaint, Sesay writes simply “Stay home” and

the remainder of the Complaint is completely blank. Sesay makes no other factual
allegations against these Defendants, does not assert any additional legal claims or
seek any form of relief.
E
On March 7, 2022, Sescey filed her tenth civil action: Sesay v. United States

5 The nature of the relationship between Sesay and Maryann K. Sescey is unclear, though it
again appears that the parties in this action share an unspecified familial relationship.

6 When it was filed, the Complaint in Kamara III was erroneously docketed as an Amended
Complaint in Kamara II, Civ. A. No. 22-0082, because the respective first Defendants in Kamara II
and Kamara III, Badora Kamara and Bility Kamara, have similar names. The Clerk’s Office has
corrected this error and Kamara III was opened as a new action on March 28, 2022 with its proper
January 31, 2022 filing date.
Military/Army (US Military I), Civ. A. No. 22-0934 (ECF 2).7 She names the United
States Military/Army as the sole Defendant and brings the case pursuant to Bivens and
42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 2-3.) Sesay alleges that at some unspecified time she “began
to get harassed by the United States Army” because someone in her family had a fight

and the Military was using her to get back at this unidentified family member. (Id. at
3.) She appears to claim officials in the Military were “selling [her] book and tapes” and
seeks a cash settlement as a result. (Id.) She also appears to claim she was
discriminated against and her “women’s right[s,] civil rights, [and] Constitutional
rights” were violated because she was involved with a “political sex scandal.” (Id. at 4.)
Sesay also claims she was forced to involuntarily resign from her job as a nurse as a
result of the reaction to her case against the Military. (Id.)
Sesay alleges she has “been recorded in her” apartment since 2018 or 2019, there
is a “radio room” in the basement, and she “double record[s] so they can’t lie.” (Id. at 5.)
Sesay claims the recordings are used like a show and “they” are making money through

her accounts with T-Mobile, Boost Mobile, Xfinity, and YouTube. (Id.) Sesay makes
repeated references to “false imprisonment” without any further indication for her use
of that term. (Id. at 6.) She seeks money damages from the Military for her and her
kids for the rest of their lives. (Id.)
F
On the same day, Sesay filed her eleventh case: Sesay v. Xfinity/Comcast
(Xfinity), Civ. A. No. 22-0936 (ECF 2). Asserting claims pursuant to Bivens and § 1983,
she names Xfinity, a cable communications company, as the sole Defendant. Her

7 The Complaint in US Military I is the first of four (4) complaints filed on the same day.
allegations are wide-ranging and difficult to categorize, but generally relate to her
contention that her information, images or account are being used without her
permission and Xfinity is making money off of her. (Civ. A. No. 22-0936, Compl. at 3-4.)
Sesay notes she is a former exotic dancer and alleges she is “on a sex tape called hit it

from the back” and contends “Xfinity is making money from” her, presumably from the
alleged distribution and viewing of this tape. (Id. at 4-5.) She also contends her Xfinity
account was compromised in some way, and as a result claims she “began getting
threatened and stalked and harassed by some law enforcement because they can see
[her] in the camera that came with [her] home security [system] from Xfinity[.]” (Id.)
Sesay alleges Xfinity is “illegally recording” her and “making money off a fake show” in
addition to making money off her YouTube account without her consent. (Id. at 4.) She
again seeks a cash settlement. (Id. at 3.)
G
Also on March 7, 2022, Sesay filed her twelfth Complaint (her third that day):

Sesay v. Roc Nation/Music (Roc Nation I), Civ. A. No. 22-0938 (ECF 2). Beyond
identifying herself as the Plaintiff and Roc Nation/Music as a Defendant in the caption
and filling in her phone number and email address, the Roc Nation I Complaint is
completely blank. (Id. at 1, 11.) It contains no factual assertions or legal claims of any
kind and does not request any form of legal relief. (Id. at 2-10.)
H
Sesay’s thirteenth Complaint – her fourth submitted on March 7, 2022 – Sesay v.
Mercy Fitzgerald Hospital, (“Mercy Fitzgerald”), Civ. A. No. 22-0939 (ECF 2), names
Mercy Fitzgerald Hospital in Darby, Pennsylvania as the sole Defendant. She purports
to bring this action pursuant to Bivens and § 1983. (Id. at 2-3.) Sesay identifies herself
as an “ex exotic dancer” who is “having issues with discrimination in the U.S.” (Id. at
4.) She alleges that on January 8, 2022, she went to the emergency room at Mercy
Fitzgerald Hospital with “level 10 stomach pains” seeking “care for [a] bacteria [sic]

infection[.]” (Id. at 3, 5.) Sesay contends she was “refused care,” leading to sepsis. (Id.
at 3.) Sesay alleges she was told she did not “need bacteria meds and was asked to
leave[,]” the staff was very rude to her, discriminated against her and called the police.
(Id. at 5.) She claims she returned to the emergency room at Mercy Fitzgerald on
January 20, 2022 for the same issues and a CAT scan was ordered. (Id.) She alleges
she received various medications at that time which did not work, causing the bacterial
infection to spread to her bloodstream resulting in sepsis. (Id.) Sesay seeks money
damages for “what happened . . . because it was discrimination.” (Id.)
I
On March 14, 2022, Sesay filed another six lawsuits – the most in a single day to

date, marking an escalating pattern of continuing filings against an increasing number
of new and repeat defendants. The first of the March 14 Complaints – her fourteenth
overall – Sesay v. CYS/Delco (CYS), Civ. A. No. 22-1026 (ECF 2), is brought pursuant
to Bivens and alleges the Office of Children and Youth Services of Delaware County
violated her and her children’s constitutional rights. (Id. at 2-3.) Sesay claims she and
her children are being discriminated against because she is an “artist and ha[s] a[n]
adult tape that leaked.” (Id. at 4.) Sesay asserts she is not a child molester and
maintains there is no evidence of her being an unfit parent. (Id.) Sesay contends the
agency “has been illegally harassing” her since 2019, claiming her “mental health is
declining[.]” (Id.) She alleges that in May 2021, she returned from the store to find her
“kids and their clothes were gone” and contends “someone paid to get [her] kids picked
up while [she] was out at the store[.]”8 (Id. at 4-5.) Sesay claims her children were
removed in retaliation for a lawsuit she filed in March 2021 in the “Media

Courthouse[.]” (Id. at 5.) She seeks the return of her children and a cash settlement
for emotional suffering and abuse she and her children have endured as a result of
these “false accusations” and false claims about her mental health. (Id. at 5, 7.)
J
Sesay’s fifteenth Complaint – the second one filed on March 14, 2022 – Sesay v.
SEPTA Transportation (SEPTA), Civ. A. No. 22-1061 (ECF 2) is marked as a Bivens
action and names SEPTA as sole Defendant. It alleges SEPTA “spreads information
and footage of a private sex tape” and Sesay is being blackmailed, followed, and
harassed because of this sex scandal and the tape’s release. (Id. at 2-5.) Sesay also
contends her “constitutional rights have been violated while riding the bus” and she is

refusing to pay, presumably the necessary rider fares, as a result of this
“discrimination” based on her belief that SEPTA is profiting from her. (Id. at 3, 5.) She
repeatedly makes a request to “see the judge” for a cash settlement as compensation for
what she claims happened to her. (Id. at 4, 7.)
K
Sesay v. United States Military/All Law Enforcement (“US Military II”), Civ. A.
No. 22-1062 (ECF 2) is her sixteenth case and the third Complaint filed on March 14,

8 The Complaint seems to suggest that two individuals by the names of Maya Banks and Jennifer
Albrite, who are not CYS workers, were somehow involved in the removal of her children, but does
not provide any additional details.
2022. It begins with the phrases “false imprisonment” and “grievance for cash
settlement[.]” (Id. at 1.) Thereafter, Sesay brings the case as a Bivens action against a
Defendant she identifies as “United States Military, All Law Enforcement, Federal
Government, Across 52 States.” (Id. at 2-3.) She alleges generally that she has been

“harassed for the past 2 years by these agencies because [she is] a former entertainer.”
(Id. at 4; see also id. at 5.) Sesay goes on to repeat the phrase “False Imprisonment”
several more times without providing any additional details and lists phrases like
“wiretap fraud”, “surveillance fraud”, and “infringement” against an “artist”. (Id. at 6-
7.)
L
Sesay’s seventeenth Complaint – the fourth filed on March 14, 2022 – is Sesay v.
United States Military (“US Military III”), Civ. A. No. 22-1067 (ECF 2). It names
multiple Defendants, each of whom are named in at least one of Sesay’s other cases: (1)
United States Military/All Law Enforcement; (2) Roc Nation; (3) CYS/Delco; (4) Mercy

Fitzgerald Hospital; (5) Xfinity/YouTube; and (6) the Kamara Family. (Id. at 2-3.)
Sesay conclusorily alleges her “Constitutional rights [and] all [her] rights have been
violated” and “[a]ll these Defendants are being brought to court at [her] request for all
the listed accusation[s]/[a] cash settlement[.]” (Id. at 3-4.) Sesay also contends she
“started noticing that the local law enforcement [was] . . . having problems with [her]
family.” (Id. at 4.) Sesay asserts the “whole world is a witness” to her allegations
because “all social media returns from here to the White House.” (Id. at 4.) Sesay
claims she has not sustained any injuries but alleges her life and her children’s lives
have been altered so she seeks compensation for defamation of character to be able to
relocate with her family. (Id. at 4-5.)
M
Sesay’s eighteenth Complaint – her fifth filed on March 14, 2022 – is Sesay v.
Sierra Leone Parliament (“Parliament”), Civ. A. No. 22-1068 (ECF 2). Beyond naming

herself as the Plaintiff and the Parliament of the country of Sierra Leone as a
Defendant in the caption, the Complaint is completely blank. (Id. at 1-11.) Like
several of Sesay’s recent filings, it contains no factual assertions or legal claims of any
kind and does not request any form of legal relief. (Id. at 2-10.)
N
Sesay’s nineteenth Complaint – her sixth and final March 14, 2022 submission –
is Sesay v. Roc Nation (“Roc Nation II”), Civ. A. No. 22-1069 (ECF 2). It begins by
stating that “[t]he Federal Supreme Court never have a case valid at all AKA against
Nenneh Sesay, the real ‘Moet.’” (Id. at 1.) Sesay purports to bring the case as a Bivens
action against several Defendants named in prior actions, including Roc Nation,

Maryanne Sesay, and Uchechukau Onwulsbull. (Id. at 2-3.) She alleges her “rights
were violated as well as [her] kids [rights]” and her “personal info was used and
leaked[.]” (Id. at 3.) Sesay contends she “never gave this company permission to record
[her] . . . or [her] children[.]” (Id. at 6.) She makes multiple references to “false
imprisonment” as well as defamation of character, harassment, and stalking, but does
not further specify the nature of her claims or offer clear supporting factual allegations.
(Id. at 4, 6, 8, 11.)
O
Sesay filed her twentieth case on March 31, 2022: Sesay v. Biden
Administration (Biden Administration), Civ. A. No. 22-1254 ((ECF 2). The caption of
the Complaint names the Biden Administration and “DHS vis Homeland Security” as
Defendants. (Id. at 1.) However, on the designated line for the first defendant in the
body of the Complaint, Sesay wrote “DHS via Homeland Security including All of my

family members involved No PDA on File All atys [sic] involved.” (Id. at 2.) Sesay
again seeks to proceed pursuant to Bivens and states she is “requesting a compensation
hearing” and a “cash settlement” based on violations of her civil and constitutional
rights. (Id. at 3.) She claims she is entitled to compensation because her “family
members and DHS etc., made a witness protection deal without [her] consent[.]” (Id. at
4.) She reiterates her allegations that she is “in a[n] illegal jail” and subject to “false
imprisonment” and is being “illegally recorded and harassed” apparently in connection
with her prior employment as an exotic dancer. (Id.) Sesay claims she has not yet
sustained any injuries beyond “verbal threats [in] violation of every constitutional
right[.]” (Id. at 5.)

III
A
When a person submits an affidavit including a statement of assets
demonstrating an inability to pay, the Court may authorize them to commence a civil
action without prepaying fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); Piskanin v. Ct. of Common
Pleas of Lehigh Cnty. & all of its Judges, 359 F. App’x 276, 278 (3d Cir. 2009) (per
curiam). Although the in forma pauperis statute refers to prisoners, federal courts
apply it “to all persons applying for IFP status, and not just to prisoners.” Lister v.
Dep’t of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005); see also Haynes v. Scott, 116
F.3d 137, 39-40 (5th Cir. 1997) (“There is no indication in the statute or legislative
history . . . that Congress meant to curb i.f.p. suits by nonprisoners . . . .”).
While a litigant may have been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in
prior actions, the statute does not authorize the Court to commence a new action based

on “prior grants of pauper status.” Piskanin, 359 F. App’x at 278. Rather, “[e]ach new
lawsuit filed requires an up-to-date affidavit of poverty[.]” Id. In determining whether
a plaintiff is eligible to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court must assess the plaintiff’s
financial status. See Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1084 n.5 (3d Cir. 1995).
“When exercising its discretion to approve or deny a motion to proceed IFP, a District
Court ‘must be rigorous . . . to ensure that the treasury is not unduly imposed upon.’”
In re Mock, 252 F. App’x 522, 523 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Walker v. People
Express Airlines, Inc., 886 F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 1989) (alteration in original)).
With respect to the fifteen cases Sesay filed in 2022, she seeks leave to proceed
in forma pauperis in all but one.9 Unfortunately, Sesay’s IFP applications are not

consistent across the cases and many are deficient in various respects. For example,
some are unsigned. (See, e.g., SEPTA, Civ. A. No. 22-1061, ECF 1 at 3; US Military II,
Civ. A. No. 22-1062, ECF 1 at 3.) Several others are incomplete and do not provide
sufficient information regarding her current financial circumstances. (See, e.g., Sescey
I, Civ. A. No. 22-0083, ECF 1 at 3-5; Sescey II, Civ. A. No. 22-0119, ECF 1 at 3-5; US
Military II, Civ. A. No. 22-1067, ECF 1 at 3-4.) At least one of Sesay’s IFP applications
is completely blank. (See Parliament, Civ. A. No. 22-1068, ECF 1 at 1-3.) In several

9 Sesay did not submit an IFP application with the Complaint she filed in Kamara III on
January 31, 2022.
cases, Sesay submitted the short form IFP application used by prisoners. (See, e.g.,
CYS, Civ. A. No. 22-1026, ECF 1; SEPTA, Civ. A. No. 22-1061, ECF 1; US Military II,
Civ. A. No. 22-1062, ECF 1; Roc Nation II, Civ. A. No. 22-1069, ECF 1; Biden
Administration, Civ. A. No. 22-1254, ECF 1). Despite these deficiencies, several of

Sesay’s IFP applications are complete, signed, provide adequate financial information
and are submitted on the proper IFP form. (See, e.g., Kamara II, Civ. A. No. 22-0082,
ECF 2; US Military I, Civ. A. No. 22-0934, ECF 1; Xfinity, Civ. A. No. 22-0936, ECF 1;
Roc Nation I, Civ. A. No. 22-0938, ECF 1; Mercy Fitzgerald, Civ. A. No. 22-0939, ECF
1.)
While the Court could issue an order for each case in which Sesay’s IFP
application is deficient (or where no IFP application has been filed) and direct her to
cure those deficiencies, it would only serve to delay resolution of these matters and
likely result in Sesay filing additional cases with similar deficiencies. Accordingly, in
the interest of judicial economy, and considering Sesay’s submission of fourteen

separate IFP applications in just over sixty days, the Court reviews her requests to
proceed in forma pauperis together and considers the cumulative effect of all available
financial information to determine her current ability to pay the filing fees. Cf. Wooten
v. Terry, No. 07-1703, 2007 WL 4526515, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2007) (concluding the
interests of judicial economy were best served by deeming an incomplete IFP
application to have made the required showing rather than engaging in further court
orders that would only cause further delay).
Considering Sesay’s pending IFP applications together, it appears she is not
capable of paying the fees required to commence all fifteen of her pending cases and she
may proceed in forma pauperis in each. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
B
Because Sesay is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to screen
her Complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which requires dismissal if, among

other things, they are frivolous or fail to state a claim. This screening obligation
applies whether or not the in forma pauperis plaintiff is a prisoner. See Atamian v.
Burns, 236 F. App’x 753, 755 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he provisions of § 1915(e) apply to all in
forma pauperis complaints, not simply those filed by prisoners.”); Stamos v. New Jersey,
No. 09-5828, 2010 WL 457727, at *2 n.3 (D.N.J. Feb. 2, 2010)(“While much of the
language in section 1915 addresses ‘prisoners,’ section 1915(e)(2) applies with equal
force to prisoner as well as nonprisoner in forma pauperis cases.”), aff’d, 396 F. App’x
894 (3d Cir. 2010).
A complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact,”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The use of the term “frivolous” in § 1915

“embraces not only the inarguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual
allegation.” Id. Section 1915 accords judges “the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are
clearly baseless[,]” including claims that describe “fantastic or delusional scenarios[.]”
Id. at 327. “[A] finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged
rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible[.]” Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed
by the same standard as motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires
the Court to consider whether Sesay has alleged “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). At this “early stage of the litigation,”, the Court

accepts the facts alleged “as true,” draws all “reasonable inferences” in Sesay’s favor,
and asks only whether a complaint, “liberally construed,” contains enough facts to state
a plausible claim. Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (citation
omitted). Conclusory allegations are not enough. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Sesay is
proceeding pro se, the Court construes her allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th
182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45
(3d Cir. 2013)). Moreover, “if the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
A complaint also may be dismissed if it does not comply with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8. Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 91 (3d Cir. 2019). To

conform to Rule 8, a pleading must contain a short and plain statement showing Sesay
is entitled to relief. See Travaline v. U.S. Supreme Court, 424 F. App’x 78, 79 (3d Cir.
2011). In determining Rule 8’s “plain” statement requirement is met, the Court should
“ask whether, liberally construed, a pleading ‘identifies discrete defendants and the
actions taken by these defendants’ in regard to the plaintiff’s claims.” Garrett, 938 F.3d
at 93 (citation omitted). A pleading may satisfy this requirement “even if it is vague,
repetitious, or contains extraneous information” and “even if it does not include every
name, date, and location of the incidents at issue.” Id. at 93-94. The important
question is whether “a pro se complaint’s language . . . presents cognizable legal claims
to which a defendant can respond on the merits.” Id. at 94.
“[A] pleading that is so ‘vague or ambiguous’ that a defendant cannot reasonably
be expected to respond to it will not satisfy Rule 8.” Id. at 93; see also Fabian v. St.
Mary’s Med. Ctr., No. 16-4741, 2017 WL 3494219, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2017)

(“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that pleadings provide enough information
to put a defendant on sufficient notice to prepare their defense and also ensure that the
Court is sufficiently informed to determine the issue.”) (quotations omitted). Rule 8
dismissals are “‘reserved for those cases in which the complaint is so confused,
ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well
disguised.’” Garrett, 938 F.3d at 94 (quoting Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d
Cir. 1988)).
IV
Every Complaint Sesay filed in 2022 is deficient. Rather than addressing the
pleading deficiencies on a case-by-case basis, the Court addresses them by category and

identifies the relevant Complaints.
A
To begin, despite Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8’s requirements, it is difficult
to discern the full scope of Sesay’s claims in any of her lawsuits. Several do not contain
a short and plain statement explaining why she is entitled to relief.
Indeed, some of her Complaints contain no allegations at all. Specifically, the
Complaints in Roc Nation I, Civ. A. No. 22-0938, Parliament, Civ. A. No. 22-1068, and
Kamara III, Civ. A. No. 22-1158 are essentially blank. To the extent there is “a genuine
dispute that supports a viable legal claim” in these cases, that “genuine dispute” is
“impossible to discern” because Sesay proffers no supporting factual allegations. Talley
v. Harper, No. 14-1411, 2017 WL 413069, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2017). Absent from
the Complaints in Roc Nation I, Parliament, and Kamara III, are the necessary “who,
what, where, when, and why” allegations Rule 8 requires in order to state a potential

claim for relief. See Coates v. Erickson, No. 12-11839, 2013 WL 1282424, at *3 (D.
Mass. Mar. 26, 2013) (finding pro se plaintiff’s “sparse complaint [was] incoherent” and
failed “to set forth plausible claims in accordance with Rule 8, because it lack[ed] the
necessary ‘who, what, where, when, and why’” information”).
Many of Sesay’s other Complaints also violate Rule 8’s short and plain statement
requirement because they contain only repeated, broad-based, conclusory legal terms or
phrases without any additional factual support. For example, the Complaint in
Kamara II references “False Imprisonment” six times and references “illegal
surveillance”, “wiretap fraud” and a “sexual scandal” but does not provide any actual
factual allegations or relevant context. Civ. A. No. 22-0082 (Compl. at 4-7.) The

Complaint in Sescey I mentions “illegal imprisonment” four times without supporting
facts and repeatedly alleges in general terms that Abdul Kay Sescey has been using
Sesay’s information for the last four years without her permission or consent. Civ. A.
No. 22-0083 (Compl. at 3-7.) This pattern of repeatedly referencing general legal terms
or phrases is present in several other Complaints. (See, e.g., Sescey II, Civ. A. No. 22-
0119, Compl. at 3-6; US Military II, Civ. A. No. 22-1062, Compl. at 1-7); Roc Nation II,
Civ. A. No. 22-1069, Compl. at 4-8, 11; Biden Administration, Civ. A. No. 22-1254,
Compl. at 4-7.)
These Complaints also violate Rule 8 because Sesay does not identify actions
undertaken by discrete defendants and does not present legal claims to which any
defendant could respond on the merits. See Garrett, 938 F.3d at 93-94. Because
they represent some of the rare instances where the pleadings are “so confused,
ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well

disguised[,]’” id. at 94, dismissal under Rule 8 is warranted in: (1) Karama II, Civ.
A. No. 22-0082; (2) Sescey I, 22-0083; (3) Sescey II, Civ. A. No. 22-0119; (4) Roc
Nation I, Civ. A. No. 22-0938; (5) US Military II, Civ. A. No. 22-1062;
(6) Parliament, Civ. A. No. 22-1068; (7) Roc Nation II, Civ. A. No. 22-1069;
(8) Kamara III, Civ. A. No. 22-1158; and (9) Biden Administration, Civ. A. No. 22-
1254.
B
Reviewed as a whole, the majority – seventeen – of Sesay’s 2021 and 2022 cases
are frivolous.10 They assert her belief that she is the target of a far-reaching scheme of
discrimination meant to subject her to “illegal surveillance” through video and audio

recordings of her that result in others using her information for their financial gain in
myriad unspecified ways. The alleged scheme is orchestrated by private individuals
(including Sesay’s family members), private businesses (such as Xfinity, Walmart, Roc
Nation, Boost Mobile and YouTube) and state and federal government entities (such as
the Office of Children and Youth Services of Delaware County, SEPTA and the United
States Military), all working together to profit from Sesay’s information, allegedly
violating her and her children’s constitutional rights. As best the Court can tell, Sesay
believes this scheme is connected to a “political sex scandal” arising from her prior

10 This includes cases that have already been dismissed.
employment as an exotic dancer, a leaked sex tape and her prior appearance in an adult
magazine. Sesay appears to contend the scheme is being executed through several
channels, including televisions she purchased which conduct illegal surveillance,
compromised cell phone and social media accounts, false claims about her mental

health, a leaked private sex tape, wiretaps and other “illegal surveillance” in her
apartment, as well as threats, harassment and stalking by Defendants.
The cases predicated on this far reaching scheme “rise to the level of the
irrational or the wholly incredible[,]” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32, and are appropriately
dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) because they lack a basis
in fact. Federal courts routinely dismiss complaints asserting broad-based conspiracies
of computer hacking, surveillance, tracking and the like, as factually frivolous under
§ 1915 where the allegations are fanciful, fantastic, delusional, irrational or wholly
incredible. See, e.g., Nduka v. Williams, 410 F. Supp. 3d 719, 721-722 (E.D. Pa. 2019)
(finding pro se plaintiff’s allegations of “the existence of a wide-reaching conspiracy

among various rappers, producers, and their ‘affiliates’ specifically designed to thwart
his success in the music industry by hacking devices and engaging in a social media
campaign to taunt [plaintiff]” were wholly incredible and warranted dismissal as
factually frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)); Barnes-Velez v. Fed. Commc’n
Comm’n, No. 18-634, 2018 WL 4178196, at *1-3 (M.D. Fla. May 8, 2018) (dismissing pro
se complaint as frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) where it made “fanciful, fantastic, and
delusional” allegations against the FCC, FBI and NSA asserting defendants wiretapped
plaintiff’s cell phone and home phone, illegally hacked her computer and tablet,
installed cameras in her home, tampered with her mail and disclosed information
obtained from these efforts to third parties), R. & R. adopted, 2018 WL 4153937 (M.D.
Fla. Aug. 30, 2018); Morgan v. Unknown FBI Agents, No. 16-495, 2016 WL 11586214, at
*2-3 (W.D. Tx. May 3, 2016) (dismissing as frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) because
pro se plaintiff’s “Complaint [was] paranoid and delusional . . . [where] [s]he believe[d]

that government agents [were] following her, hacking her computer, spying on her with
a camera at her home, and implanting devices in her body.”), R. & R. adopted, 2016 WL
11586213 (W.D. Tx. May 31, 2016); Riches v. Swartz, No. 07-379, 2007 WL 2319819, at
*1-2 (W.D. Va. Aug. 13, 2007) (dismissing pro se plaintiff’s § 1983 claims as frivolous
under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) where he made “clearly fantastic” allegations that defendants
violated his rights by hacking his computer, illegally wiretapping him, phishing,
spamming and code cracking); cf. Campbell v. Brender, No. 10-325, 2010 WL 4363396,
at *2, 4-5 (N.D. Tx. Oct. 25, 2010) (finding pro se plaintiff’s claims against two
technology companies, federal judges, the Clerk of Court, several lawyers and a law
firm were “precisely the sort of fanciful, delusional claims that merit dismissal” where

plaintiff alleged a conspiracy “to hack into her home computer and certain public
library computers” and defendants more broadly “conspired to defeat her [prior]
employment suit by falsifying court records, burglarizing her home to steal files,
hacking into multiple computers, committing mail fraud, obstructing justice and
engaging in racketeering”); Hughes v. Whitlock, No. 07-1582, 2007 WL 3026910, at *1
(E.D. Mo. Oct. 16, 2007) (granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion where a complaint was
“obviously delusional” when pro se plaintiff alleged his neighbors were surveilling him
and hacking his computers on behalf of the United States government).
Sesay’s allegations of a widespread scheme of surveillance, wiretapping,
audio/video recording, harassment, discrimination, stalking, a political sex scandal and
a leaked sex tape are generalized, conclusory and speculative at best. 11 Because her
allegations are delusional, irrational, wholly incredible and lack a factual basis, the
following must be dismissed as frivolous: (1) Kamara I, Civ. A. No. 22-0082; (2) Sescey

I, Civ. A. No. 22-0083; (3) Sescey II, Civ. A. No. 22-0119; (4) US Military I, Civ. A. No.
22-0934; (5) Xfinity, Civ. A. No. 22-0936; (6) CYS, Civ. A. No. 22-1026; (7) SEPTA, Civ.
A. No. 22-1061; (8) US Military II, Civ. A. No. 22-1062; (9) US Military III, Civ. A. No.
22-1067; (10) Roc Nation II, Civ. A. No. 22-1069; and (11) Biden Administration, Civ. A.
No. 22-1254.12
Sescey’s Complaints are subject to dismissal for the additional reasons explained
below.
C
In many Complaints, Sesay contends her constitutional rights have been
violated, suggesting she is trying to raise claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In several

instances she checked the form complaint box indicating that is what she seeks to do.
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins,

11 The sole exception is Sesay’s Complaint in Mercy Fitzgerald, Civ. A. No. 22-0939. While it
makes vague and generalized references to this far-reaching scheme and the notion of false
imprisonment, it simultaneously appears to raise claims based on specific facts regarding Sesay’s
medical treatment for a bacterial infection that allegedly led to sepsis. Dismissal for frivolity is not
proper with respect to the allegations regarding Sesay’s medical treatment. Sesay’s claims in Mercy
Fitzgerald are addressed in more detail below.

12 These Complaints rely only on Sesay’s generalized allegations of this far-reaching scheme,
making them subject to dismissal for frivolity even though several are also subject to dismissal
under Rule 8.
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Whether a defendant is acting under color of state law — i.e.,
whether the defendant is a state actor — depends on whether there is “such a ‘close
nexus between the State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior
‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.’” Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339

(3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted).
Sesay purports to bring claims pursuant to § 1983 in: (1) US Military I, Civ. A.
No. 22-0934; (2) Xfinity, Civ. A. No. 22-0936; and (3) Mercy Fitzgerald, Civ. A. No. 22-
0939. Several other Complaints, while not explicitly citing § 1983, can also be liberally
construed to assert such claims. See Kamara II, Civ. A. No. 22-0082; Sescey I, Civ. A.
No. 22-0083; Sescey II, Civ. A. No. 22-0119; CYS, Civ. A. No. 22-1026; SEPTA, Civ. A.
No. 22-1061; US Military III, Civ. A. No. 22-1067; Roc Nation II, Civ. A. No. 22-1069;
Kamara III, Civ. A. No. 22-1158; and Biden Administration, Civ. A. No. 22-1254.
Sesay’s contentions regarding illegal surveillance and recording can be liberally
construed as § 1983 claims for Fourth Amendment violations. Generally, the Fourth

Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend.
IV. To be liable under § 1983, a defendant must have exercised power possessed by
virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the
authority of state law. Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 635 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir.
2011). “The Fourth Amendment protects citizens against government misconduct,
those who exercise the power of the state. It does not[, however,] create liability on the
part of any person or entity not exercising governmental power.” Sheriff v. Wireless,
No. 18-5057, 2018 WL 6725390, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2018).
The allegations in Kamara II, Sescey I, Sescey II, US Military I, Xfinity, Mercy
Fitzgerald, US Military III, Roc Nation II, Kamara III and Biden Administration fail to
state a claim against any Defendant13 under § 1983 because they are not state actors,
but are private entities, private individuals or federal actors.14 These Complaints do

not allege facts to support an inference of a “close nexus” between Defendants’ private
conduct and the state itself such that the challenged actions can fairly be treated as
actions of the state. Leshko, 423 F.3d at 339. Sesay also fails to allege any of these
Defendants had any connection to a state, county or local governmental entity and none
of her allegations suggest they were operating as anything other than private entities
or individuals. Cf. Hepfl v. Boot, No. 21-64, 2021 WL 1701801, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 8,
2021) (dismissing pro se plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against his ex-girlfriend (and the
mother of his child) because she was a private individual and not a state actor), R. & R.
adopted, 2021 WL 1700043 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2021); Linder v. Folcroft Police Dept, No.

13 These Defendants are: (1) Badora Kamara (private individual); (2) Uchechukau Onwulsbull
(private individual); (3) Abdul Kay Sescey (private individual); (4) Maryann K. Sescey (private
individual); (5) Bility Kamara (private individual); (6) Katie Sesay-Lewis (private individual);
(7) Xfinity/Comcast (private cable communications company); (8) Roc Nation (private entertainment
company); (9) Mercy Fitzgerald Hospital (private hospital); (10) the United States Military (federal
actor); (11) Biden Administration (federal actor); and (12) Department of Homeland Security (federal
actor).

14 Unlike some of Sescey’s other Complaints, US Military I fails to state a plausible § 1983
claim because the only named Defendant, the United States Military, is a federal actor, not a state
actor, and § 1983 claims require action taken under color of state, not federal law. See Davis v.
Samuels, 962 F.3d 105, 115 (3d Cir. 2020) (concluding that because “[a]ll of the defendants here . . .
are alleged to be federal actors or to have acted under color of federal law, . . . the 1983 claim cannot
stand.”) (citing Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 800 (3d Cir. 2001) (Section 1983 “is
addressed only to the state and to those acting under color of state authority” and “[i]t is well
established that liability under § 1983 will not attach for actions taken under color of federal law.”)).
Sesay’s § 1983 claims against the United States Military in US Military III fail for the same reason
(although her claims against the other US Military III Defendants do not). The same is true for
Biden Administration because neither the Biden Administration nor the Department of Homeland
Security are state actors for § 1983 purposes.
18-4844, 2019 WL 934992, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2019) (concluding Mercy Fitzgerald
Hospital was not a state actor subject to § 1983 liability); Sheriff, 2018 WL 6725390, at
*2 (dismissing pro se plaintiff’s constitutional claims against Verizon Wireless and
Verizon Fios because they were “private companies, rather than state actors” and could

not “as a matter of law violate the Fourth Amendment” and be subject to § 1983
liability); Massey v. Crady, No. 17-241, 2018 WL 4328002, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2018)
(“Private citizens . . . are not state actors, and therefore . . . any § 1983 claims against
[them] should be dismissed.”); Torrence v. U.S. Bankr. Court for N. Dist. of Illinois, E.
Div., No. 17-3120, 2017 WL 3593116, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2017) (dismissing pro se
plaintiff’s constitutional claims against Comcast because it was not a state actor); see
also Carver v. Plyer, 115 F. App’x 532, 537 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding St. Luke’s Hospital –
a private hospital – “is not a state actor for purposes of section 1983 under any of the
possible tests used to determine whether one’s conduct is attributable to the state”).15

15 To the extent the Complaints in CYS, Civ. A. No. 22-1026 and SEPTA, Civ. A. No. 22-1061
could be liberally construed to allege § 1983 claims, dismissal for failure to state a plausible claim on
the basis that Defendants are not state actors is not proper. Cf. Ford v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 374 F.
App’x 325, 326 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We have previously found that SEPTA is a state actor.”) (citing Dykes
v. Se. Pa. Trans. Auth., 68 F.3d 1564 (3d Cir. 1995)); see also Rose v. Adams Cnty., Pa., No. 14-420,
2014 WL 1321112, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2014) (finding a § 1983 claim against an Adams County
agency is really a claim brought against the County itself and subject to the municipal liability
standards annunciated in Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).

Nevertheless, these claims fail for other reasons. In SEPTA, any purported § 1983 claims
against SEPTA are subject to dismissal because her Complaint is frivolous pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

In CYS, Sesay’s § 1983 claim against the Office of Children and Youth Services of Delaware
County is really against the County itself and is subject to the municipal liability standards
annunciated in Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. To state a municipal liability claim, Sesay must allege the
defendant’s policies or customs caused the alleged constitutional violation. Id. at 694; see also Natale
v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003). She “must identify [the] custom
or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was.” McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d
636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). Allegations that simply paraphrase the municipal liability standard, are too
vague and generalized to support a claim. See, e.g., Szerensci v. Shimshock, No. 20-1296, 2021 WL
4480172, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2021) (“Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation, which generally
D
Sesay also checked the box on several form Complaints indicating she seeks to
bring constitutional claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971), the federal analogue to § 1983. See also

Vanderklok v. United States, 868 F.3d 189, 198 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[A]ctions brought
directly under the Constitution against federal officials have become known as ‘Bivens
actions.’”). The availability of Bivens as a cause of action is limited, and “the Supreme
Court has plainly counseled against creating new Bivens causes of action.” Vanderklok,
868 F.3d at 199 n.8 (citing Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118 (2012) (refusing to extend
Eighth Amendment Bivens action to individuals working at a private prison); FDIC v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (refusing to extend Bivens claim to federal agency
defendant); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (refusing to extend Bivens to
wrongful denials of disability benefits); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987)
(refusing to extend Bivens to claimed injuries suffered incident to military service);

Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (refusing to extend Bivens to racial
discrimination by military superiors)); see also Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 742-
43 (2020) (“[E]xpansion of Bivens is a disfavored judicial activity,” “it is doubtful” that
Bivens’ outcome would be the same if decided today, and “for almost 40 years, [the
Supreme Court] ha[s] consistently rebuffed requests to add to the claims allowed under
Bivens.”) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).
Sesay purports to bring Bivens claims in: (1) Kamara II, Civ. A. No. 22-0082;

paraphrases the relevant standard, is insufficient to state a claim for § 1983 liability under Monell.”)
(citing cases). Sesay’s Complaint in CYS completely fails to allege a plausible Monell claim against
Delaware County and must be dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
(2) Sescey I, Civ. A. No. 22-0083; (3) Sescey II, Civ. A. No. 22-0119; (4) US Military I,
Civ. A. No. 22-0934; (5) Xfinity, Civ. A. No. 22-0936; (6) Mercy Fitzgerald, Civ. A. No.
22-0939; (7) CYS, Civ. A. No. 22-1026; (8) SEPTA, Civ. A. No. 22-1061; (9) US Military
II, Civ. A. No. 22-1062; (10) US Military III, Civ. A. No. 22-1067; (11) Roc Nation II,

Civ. A. No. 22-1069; (12) Kamara III, Civ. A. No. 22-1158; and (13) Biden
Administration, Civ. A. No. 22-1542. In each except US Military II, US Military III and
Biden Administration, her Bivens claims fail and must be dismissed pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) because none of the Defendants named are federal actors, and Sescey
has not alleged any facts to demonstrate any Defendants acted under color of federal
law. Rather, they are private citizens, private companies or state entities.
US Military I, US Military II, US Military III and Biden Administration must be
dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for a different reason. Even assuming Bivens
applies in the context Sesay alleges, sovereign immunity bars her claims against the
United States Military, the Biden Administration and the Department of Homeland

Security. See FDIC, 510 U.S. at 475 (“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the
Federal Government and its agencies from suit.”); Treasurer of New Jersey v. United
States Dep’t of Treasury, 684 F.3d 382, 395 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Without a waiver of
sovereign immunity, a court is without subject matter jurisdiction over claims against
federal agencies or officials in their official capacities.”).
E
Beyond her constitutional claims, Sesay appears to assert state law tort claims
regarding her medical treatment in Mercy Fitzgerald. She is required to plead the
grounds for federal jurisdiction over any state law claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1);
Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 106 (3d Cir. 2015).
Diversity jurisdiction exists when “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Section 1332(a) requires “‘complete diversity between all

plaintiffs and all defendants,’ even though only minimal diversity is constitutionally
required. This means that ‘no plaintiff [may] be a citizen of the same state as any
defendant.’” Lincoln Benefit Life Co., 800 F.3d at 104 (quoting Lincoln Prop. Co. v.
Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) and Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412,
419 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal footnotes omitted)). An individual is a citizen of the state
where she is domiciled, meaning the state where she is physically present and intends
to remain. See Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011).
Sesay does not adequately allege her citizenship in Mercy Fitzgerald because she
does not do not name the state where she is domiciled, i.e., where she is physically
located and seeks to remain. See id. On the designated spot of her form Complaint she

sets forth only her name and a residential address in Darby, Pennsylvania. 16 (Compl.
at 2). Nor does she adequately allege the Hospital’s citizenship. She alleges only that it
is also located in Darby, Pennsylvania. (Id.) Her allegations are not enough to allow
the Court to determine citizenship for purposes of diversity.17
Absent diversity jurisdiction, and with the dismissal of Sesay’s federal claims,

16 None of Sesay’s other complaints adequately allege her citizenship for the same reasons.

17 Even if Sesay’s allegations were sufficient to establish citizenship, both Sesay and Mercy
Fitzgerald Hospital would be citizens of Pennsylvania. Complete diversity would be absent and the
Court could not maintain jurisdiction over her state law claims. It would thus be futile to allow
Sesay to amend her citizenship allegations.
the Court must decide whether to exercise its discretion to extend supplemental
jurisdiction over her state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See Carlsbad Tech., Inc.
v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009). The Court must decline to do so unless
considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness require otherwise.

Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995). They do not.
Sesay’s state law claims are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
without prejudice to her right to bring them in an appropriate state court.
F
“If a civil-rights complaint fails to state a claim, a district court must grant leave
to amend the complaint unless amendment would be futile or inequitable.”
Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Ass’n, 903 F.3d 100, 113 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing
Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2017)). Leave to amend is not required for
dismissals of frivolous claims. Grayson, 293 F.3d at 112-113.
After careful consideration, Sesay may not amend any of her Complaints because

amendment would be futile. Several of Sesay’s Complaints are frivolous and subject to
dismissal pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) which does not require leave to amend. See
Grayson, 293 F.3d at 112-113. To the extent she seeks to bring claims under § 1983,
most Defendants named are not state actors and there does not appear to be any set of
facts Sesay could plausibly allege to demonstrate state action. Amendment of Sesay’s
Bivens claims would be futile as most Defendants are not federal actors, nor could she
plausibly allege facts to show they are. Finally, amendment of the Complaints subject
to dismissal for violations of Rule 8 also would be futile given Sesay’s pattern of filing
repeated, groundless claims without heeding prior Court orders and opinions
explaining the proper basis for bringing various legal claims.
G
When “confronted with a pattern of conduct from which [the Court] can only
conclude that a litigant is intentionally abusing the judicial process and will continue to

do so unless restrained, [it] is entitled to resort to its power of injunction and contempt
to protect its process.” Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 1990). The
All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), provides a district court with the ability enjoin
“abusive, groundless, and vexatious litigation.” Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038
(3d Cir. 1993). However, this “broad” power “is limited by two fundamental tenets of
our legal system – the litigant’s due process and access to the courts.” Id.
Courts should not restrict a litigant from filing claims “absent exigent
circumstances, such as a litigant’s continuous abuse of the judicial process by filing
meritless and repetitive actions.” Id.; see also Matter of Packer Ave. Assoc., 884 F.2d
745, 747 (3d Cir. 1989). Here, those circumstances already exist. Sesay has filed

twenty separate civil actions in this Court since July of 2021 – a period of just over
eight months, with a noted escalation in pace since January 2022. While she filed five
civil actions in just over two months in 2021, she filed four cases in January 2022 alone
and another eleven in just over three weeks in March 2022. All twenty of Sesay’s
Complaints now have been dismissed on screening under § 1915(e)(2)(B) as legally
frivolous, for failure to state a claim or for some other legal defect. Her claims are not
confined to a single subject matter, defendant or type of defendant, or cause of action.
She has sued local, state and federal officials, large national companies ranging from
Xfinity to Walmart, social media companies like YouTube, and private individuals for
numerous perceived harms all apparently arising out of her belief that they are using
her information without her consent and illegally surveilling and recording her.
Although the Court previously dismissed her 2021 cases for failure to state a claim
under Bivens or § 1983, Sesay returned in 2022 with fifteen new civil actions that fail

for almost identical reasons. Sesay filed all her baseless lawsuits without expense or
consequence. Viewed as a whole, her pattern of litigation is abusive of the judicial
process and the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis.
Although the Court can screen and dismiss Sesay’s frivolous filings under the
screening provision of the in forma pauperis statute, “[f]rivolous claims amount to a
waste of judicial resources and divert attention from processing good faith claims.”
Brown v. City of Phila., Civ. A. No. 05-4160, 2009 WL 1011966, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14,
2009). In the case of a continuous abuse of process, the ability to screen cases for
frivolity under § 1915 “alone is not an efficacious remedy.” Abdul-Akbar, 901 F.2d at
333. Nevertheless, before the Court can preclude Sesay from filing further in forma

pauperis complaints, it must give her notice “to show cause” why she should not be
enjoined from filing new civil actions on an in forma pauperis basis: injunctive relief
that would “be narrowly tailored to fit the particular circumstances of the case before
the District Court.” Brow, 944 F.2d at 1038; see also Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d
81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987).
Accordingly, Sesay is hereby notified that if she continues to file repeated,
groundless complaints, the Court may consider the appropriateness of enjoining her
from filing future civil actions on an in forma pauperis basis.
An appropriate Order follows.18
BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gerald J. Pappert
GERALD J. PAPPERT, J.

18 To the extent Sesay has motions pending in any of her dismissed cases, those motions are
denied as moot.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10403154. Public record. Not legal advice.