# BROWN v. AMETEK, INC.

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · March 10, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10402864

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 10, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10402864

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that Title VII and the PHRA are assessed under the same standards
- holding that “taken together,” allegations that supervisor coerced the plaintiff into sexual relations, shared pornography with her, and scolded her for speaking with male colleagues, among other actions, supported severe or pervasive discrimination

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AMY BROWN

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-1475
AMETEK, INC.
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Rufe, J. March 10, 2022
Plaintiff Amy Brown has sued her former employer, bringing claims of discrimination on
the basis of sex, hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”).1 Defendant
AMETEK, Inc. has moved for summary judgment on all claims. For the reasons set forth below,
the motion will be granted.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
“The underlying purpose of summary judgment is to avoid a pointless trial in cases where
it is unnecessary and would only cause delay and expense.”2 A court will award summary
judgment on a claim or part of a claim where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”3 A fact is “material” if it could affect

1 As the liability standards for PHRA track those of Title VII claims, the Court will not discuss the PHRA
separately. See, e.g., Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 791 n.8 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that Title VII
and the PHRA are assessed under the same standards); Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher
Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 539 n.5 (3d Cir. 2006) (construing Title VII and the PHRA “consistently”).
2 Walden v. Saint Gobain Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 637, 641 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (citing Goodman v. Mead Johnson &
Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976)).
3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
the outcome of the suit, given the applicable substantive law.4 A dispute is “genuine” if the
evidence presented “is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.”5
In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court “must view the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party,” and make every reasonable inference in that party’s favor.6

Further, “a court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations.”7 Nevertheless,
the party opposing summary judgment must support each essential element of the opposition
with concrete evidence in the record.8 “If the evidence [opposing summary judgment] is merely
colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.”9 If, after
making all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the court determines that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, summary judgment is appropriate.10
II. BACKGROUND

The parties have stipulated to certain facts; where facts are not stipulated, they are viewed
in the light most favorable to Brown as the non-moving party. Brown joined AMETEK’s
Finance Department in March 2008 as the Manager of External Reporting, working at corporate
headquarters in Berwyn, Pennsylvania.11 In April 2011, Brown was promoted to Senior
Manager, External Financial Reporting.12 At all times, Brown reported to Jeffrey Stevens, who

4 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
5 Id.
6 Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
7 Boyle v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998).
8 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).
9 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (internal citations omitted).
10 Wisniewski v. Johns–Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987).
11 Statement of Stipulated Material Facts (“SMF”) ¶¶ 1–2, [Doc. No. 28-1].
12 SMF ¶ 5.
participated in hiring Brown and supported her promotion to Senior Manager.13
Until 2017, Brown was responsible for management of 401(k) audits, but at that time she
told Stevens that she had too much on her plate, and the responsibility for 401(k) was removed
from Brown’s portfolio.14 In early 2018, AMETEK began the “lease project,” a significant
undertaking that concerned the adoption of a new accounting standard.15 Brown did not express

interest in working on the lease project.16 In July 2018, Brown met with Stevens to discuss her
career development and presented a list of her responsibilities and accomplishments since
2015.17 Stevens reported to Thomas Montgomery, Senior Vice President and Comptroller, and
the two met in September 2018 to discuss the possibility of promotion for Brown.18 After that
meeting, Stevens told Brown that the final decision from Montgomery and William Burke, the
Chief Financial Officer, was that her work and effort were not at director level and there was no
guarantee or timeline for further promotion.19
Brown contrasts her path at AMETEK with that of Robert Virelli, who also reported to
Stevens.20 Virelli was hired in September 2006 as Manager, Financial Reporting.21 Virelli was
promoted to Senior Manager, Financial Reporting in April 2011.22 Virelli received a raise in

March 2015.23 However, although Brown and Virelli were both senior managers at that time, and

13 SMF ¶¶ 3, 6, 7.
14 SMF ¶¶ 19–21.
15 SMF ¶¶ 22–23.
16 SMF ¶ 24.
17 SMF ¶ 25.
18 SMF ¶ 26.
19 SMF ¶27.
20 SMF ¶ 31.
21 SMF ¶ 28.
22 SMF ¶ 30.
23 SMF ¶ 46.
both reported to Stevens, Stevens facilitated the raise for Virelli months earlier than for Brown,
whose own raise was approved in August 2015.24 Brown received the raise after pursuing the
issue and after Human Resources confirmed that Brown and Virelli’s data was similar and that
their pay should be kept at the same amount unless there were differences in their
responsibilities.25

From 2017 to 2018, Virelli worked on the Revenue Recognition project, which was a
significant change in the application of accounting principles to AMETEK.26 Virelli was
promoted to Director, Technical Accounting, effective May 1, 2018.27 The decision was made by
Montgomery and Burke, and approved by Chairman and Chief Executive Officer David
Zapico.28 There is no dispute that Virelli was qualified to be Director, Technical Accounting.29
Brown did not seek promotion to Director, Technical Accounting, and Virelli’s promotion did
not preclude Brown from being promoted to the director level as well.30
Brown sought promotion to Director, External Reporting. It does not appear from the
summary judgment record that anyone was appointed as Director, External Reporting. In July

2018, Brown sought a promotion to Director, Executive Compensation, as that position was
available. Stevens told Brown he supported her promotion, but when she met again with
Montgomery, he told her “not to bother” applying because Human Resources was going in a

24 Def’s Supp. Interrog. Resp. 4–5; Brown Dep. [Doc. No. 30-2] 170–72.
25 Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. [Doc. No. 31] Ex. A #(AMETEK 164/P-Dep-59).
26 SMF ¶¶ 32–33. Brown contends that the Revenue Recognition project was within the scope of Virelli’s duties.
Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. [Doc. No. 30] at 21.
27 SMF ¶ 34. The promotion was announced in early April 2018. Id.
28 SMF ¶ 35.
29 SMF ¶ 40.
30 SMF ¶¶ 38–39.
different direction.31 Todd Henderson was hired in August 2018 as Director, Executive
Compensation.32 Henderson had 25 years of management experience, an MBA with a
concentration in Management and Human Resources, and certifications in compensation and
employee benefits.33 Brown does not have these credentials.34
Brown and Vitelli received the same performance ratings from 2014 through 2016.35 The

2016 forms identified promotion to director as the “Next Assignment” for both senior
managers.36 Brown maintains that in 2017, Stevens again assessed Brown and Virelli as equally
strong performers, but Burke and Montgomery downgraded Brown’s evaluation when they
decided to promote Virelli, but not Brown, to the director level.37
Brown asserts that when she learned of Virelli’s pending promotion, she spoke to
Montgomery, and that he defended Virelli’s promotion but gave her no feedback on her own
promotion prospects.38 Brown then spoke to Jennifer Reynolds, Corporate Counsel, about the
situation, and Reynolds confirmed that Brown was aware that she would be making a complaint
of gender discrimination by presenting a chart that compared Brown’s career progression to that

31 Pl’s Resp. to Def.’s Interrog. No. 1 6–7 [Doc. No. 30-2]; Montgomery Dep. [Doc. No. 31] at 137-40.
32 SMF ¶ 51.
33 SMF ¶ 52.
34 SMF ¶ 53.
35 Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. [Doc. No. 30] at 9.
36 See Montgomery Dep.[Doc. No. 31] 110–11. Brown also cites documents “P-DEP 32” and “P-DEP 38” in Exhibit
A. to Plaintiff’s opposition, that appear to be placeholders for electronic exhibits that were not provided to the Court,
and therefore have not been reviewed. However, for purposes of summary judgment, the Court has accepted
Brown’s representations of the content of such documents and the characterization thereof.
37 See Montgomery Dep. [Doc. No. 31] at 113–15 (discussing the two different versions of Plaintiff’s 2017
evaluation, one listing her as “promotable” and the other listing her as “expandable”).
38 Pl’s Resp. to Def.’s Interrog. No. 1 6–7, [Doc. No. 30-2]. Brown left work for the rest of the day after this
meeting, which Montgomery and Burke considered unprofessional and showed a lack of maturity. Montgomery
Dep.[Doc. No. 31] 121–26; ,Burke Dep.[Doc. No. 31] 112–13.
of Virelli.39 Brown also met with Gina Alm-Myers, Human Resources Manager in April 2018.40
Comparing her career path at AMETEK to Virelli’s (and noting that she and Virelli were both
promoted to Senior Manager in 2011 and that Virelli received a raise six months earlier than
Brown), Brown asked when it would be her time to be promoted.41 In this meeting, Brown did
not specifically state that there was discrimination or bias on the basis of sex.42 Brown states that

Alm-Myers told her she needed to soften her delivery, and that after Brown expressed some
concern about the reaction from her managers of involvement by Human Resources, Alm-Myers
recommended that she not become involved.43 Brown was aware of, but did not consult
AMETEK’s non-discrimination and anti-harassment policy or call the hotline AMETEK
maintains to report concerns about gender bias.44
On August 1, 2018, Brown’s evaluation form again listed her as promotable, after the
2017 form downgraded her to “expandable.” However, for the first time, the evaluation stated
that Brown needed to improve her communication skills.45 In December 2018, Brown took a
medical leave of absence that she attributes to the discrimination and retaliation she faced.46 On

January 8, 2019, Brown filed an administrative complaint of discrimination and retaliation with
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission.47 On May 10, 2019, at the end of her approved

39 Pl’s Resp. to Def.’s Interrog. No. 1 7–8 [Doc. No. 30-2]. Defendant disputes that this meeting happened.
40 SMF ¶ 45.
41 SMF ¶¶ 46–47.
42 SMF ¶ 48.
43 Brown Dep.[Doc. No. 31] 235–42.
44 SMF ¶¶ 11–13.
45 Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. [Doc. No. 30] at 15; Montgomery Dep. 147–48 [Doc. No. 31] (discussing
“communication skills” being listed as Brown’s “Key Development Needs” on her 2018 evaluation).
46 Compl. ¶ 116.
47 Compl. ¶ 117.
unpaid medical leave of absence, Brown resigned.48
Brown argues that AMETEK is rife with gender imbalance. Internal survey results in
2015 showed that 82% of supervisors, 90% of directors, and 94% of those at vice president or
higher, were men.49 Plaintiff contends that high-ranking executives in the Finance Department
resisted diversity initiatives from Human Resources and operated as a “boy’s club.”50

Brown has produced evidence that Stevens had no patience for training sessions in
unconscious bias,51 that Stevens interrupted and spoke over Brown and other women in
meetings,52 that Stevens made dismissive comments about his wife on several occasions,53 and
that Stevens told her that a woman colleague resigned due to “mother’s guilt.”54 Brown cites to
similar remarks from Burke, Montgomery, and other high-ranking executives, and argues that
women were not given the opportunity to succeed above a certain level.55
III. DISCUSSION
A. Employment Discrimination
“Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual with
respect to compensation or terms, conditions, or privileges of employment on the basis of race or

48 Compl. ¶¶ 119, 121.
49 Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A #(AMETEK 1571) [Doc. No. 31].
50 Pl’s Resp. to Def.’s Interrog. No. 1 8 [Doc. 30-2].
51 Id. at 10.
52 Brown Dep. [Doc. No. 30-2] at 189; Sena Dep. [Doc. No. 30-2] at 20; Corsi Decl. [Doc. No. 30-2] ¶ 20; Palmer
Decl. [Doc. No. 30-2] ¶¶ 14–15. As Defendant points out, Plaintiff testified in her deposition that Stevens also spoke
over men. Brown Dep [Doc. No. 30-2] at. 189.
53 Brown Dep. [Doc. No. 30-2] at 54–55, 191–93; Palmer Dep. [Doc. No. 30-2] 44–45.
54 Pl’s Resp. to Def.’s Interrog. No. 1 11–12 [Doc. No. 30-2]. Defendant disputes that Stevens made this comment.
55 For example, Brown points to a meeting in December 2018 where Montgomery asked what time the next day’s
meeting started and she said 9:00 a.m.. Montgomery said he thought Brown had previously told him 8:30 a.m., and
then said it was “like when your wife tells you an earlier time to be ready when you are planning on going out as she
does not want you to be late.” Compl. ¶¶ 114–15.
gender.”56 A plaintiff may pursue a claim for employment discrimination under either the mixed-
motive theory set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins57 or the pretext theory set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.58 Brown pursues this case under the pretext theory, which
applies a burden-shifting framework under which the plaintiff first must establish a prima facie
case.59 A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that “(1) the

plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) the plaintiff was qualified for the position that he
sought to retain; (3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, e.g., termination of his
employment; and (4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances that could
give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.”60
To establish that the circumstances surrounding an adverse employment action could give
rise to an inference of intentional discrimination,
a plaintiff may either: (1) introduce evidence of comparators (i.e., similarly
situated employees who (a) were not members of the same protected class and
(b) were treated more favorably under similar circumstances); or (2) rely on
circumstantial evidence that otherwise shows a causal nexus between his
membership in a protected class and the adverse employment action.61

“If the plaintiff successfully demonstrates a prima facie case of discrimination, the
burden of production (but not the burden of persuasion) shifts to the defendant to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision.”62 A defendant

56 Collins v. Kimberly-Clark Pa., LLC, 247 F. Supp. 3d 571, 588 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)),
aff’d, 708 F. App’x 48 (3d Cir. 2017).
57 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
58 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 213 (3d Cir. 2008).
59 Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994).
60 Greene v. V.I. Water & Power Auth., 557 F. App’x 189, 195 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707
F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2013); Makky, 541 F.3d at 214).
61 Greene, 557 F. App’x at 195 (citing Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 n.7 (3d Cir. 2003)).
62 Mascioli v. Arby’s Rest. Grp., 610 F. Supp. 2d 419, 433 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (citing Simpson v. Kay Jewelers Div. of
Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 644 n.5 (3d Cir. 1998)).
“answers its relatively light burden” of production by “introducing evidence which, taken as true,
would permit the conclusion that there was a . . . [legitimate] reason for the unfavorable
employment decision.”63
“Once the defendant has satisfied its burden of production at the second stage of the

McDonnell Douglas tripartite framework, a court’s analysis turns to the third and final aspect of
the inquiry.”64 “At this point, the court focuses on whether there is sufficient evidence from
which a jury could conclude that the purported reasons for defendant’s adverse employment
actions were in actuality a pretext.”65 “[A] plaintiff may defeat a motion for summary judgment
. . . by pointing ‘to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder would
reasonably either: (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that
an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause
of the employer’s action.’”66
Brown’s claim is predicated on the fact that she was not promoted to director. The failure
to promote may constitute an adverse employment action.67 AMETEK argues that Brown cannot

establish her prima facie case because she was not qualified for a director-level position as she
did not perform the “extra” required for promotion and instead (1) offloaded certain assignments
for which she had responsibility and (2) did not take on special projects or other tasks beyond her

63 Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763 (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508 (1993)).
64 Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 412 (3d Cir. 1999).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 413 (quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764; Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1067 (3d
Cir. 1996)).
67 Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 166 F.3d 139, 152–53 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation and quotations omitted) (“The
Supreme Court has defined a tangible employment action as a significant change in employment status, such as
hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits.”).
normal workload.68 In particular, AMETEK cites the fact that Brown asked to have management
of 401(k) audits removed from her responsibilities and did not take on the special “lease
project.”69 Brown does not dispute these facts.70
Brown testified in deposition that she felt that she was worthy of a promotion by the

beginning of 2017, but had no evidence that AMETEK’s decision not to promote her as of
December 2017 was the result of gender bias.71 Brown agreed that Virelli was qualified to be
Director of Technical Accounting and deserved the promotion in 2018 but stated that she was not
promoted even though she was doing more work than Virelli in the 2017–18 time period.72
Brown testified that she could not comment as to Henderson’s qualifications.73 Brown testified
that she agreed that Montgomery and Burke actually thought that she was not promoted because
her work and effort were not at director level.74
The only definitive action to which Brown can point is that Montgomery and Burke
downgraded her 2017 evaluation from “promotable” to “expandable,” and that Montgomery and
Burke changed Virelli’s 2018 evaluation (prepared after the decision to promote Virelli had been
made) to raise his overall ranking from 4 (the same as Brown’s) to 5.75 However, Brown’s

evaluation was raised again to “promotable” in 2018, and there is no evidence that there was

68 Def.’s Reply Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. [Doc. No. 32] at 14.
69 Id. at 14–15.
70 AMETEK also argues that by June 2018, Brown was “working the minimum to get a pay check.” Id. at 15 (citing
Brown Dep. [Doc. No. 32-1] at 273–75; Def.’s Reply Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Ex. B.[Doc. No. 32-1]. The Court
has not considered these comments, of which Defendant was unaware at the time, in granting summary judgment.
71 Brown Dep. 78, ECF No. 32-1.
72 Id. at 88.
73 Id. at 287. Henderson’s predecessor as Director of Executive Compensation was Cindy Goodman, a woman. Id. at
281.
74 Id. at 280.
75 Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. Ex. A #(P-Dep 039, 040) [Doc. No. 31]..
anything untoward or unusual in Burke and Montgomery revising the evaluations initially
prepared by Stevens. Nor is there any evidence that these documents formed the basis for the
promotion decisions, or that they were assessed on a comparative basis.
For the purpose of summary judgment, the Court will assume that Brown has established

a prima facie case. Brown has produced evidence that her supervisor, Stevens, advocated for her
promotion, and that her record was comparable to that of Virelli, who was promoted. The burden
then shifts to AMETEK, which as discussed above, has produced evidence that Brown was not
promoted because she did not take on special projects and offloaded some of her responsibilities.
The burden therefore shifts back to Brown to produce sufficient evidence from which a jury
could conclude that the purported reasons for defendant’s adverse employment actions were in
actuality a pretext for discrimination. Brown has not met this burden.
After a full opportunity for discovery, there is nothing more than speculation that Brown
was not promoted because she is a woman. Although Brown argues that AMETEK has a track
record of not promoting women above a certain level and “demographics can, in some instances,
support an inference of . . . discrimination, context is key.”76 Brown has not supplied that context

here. Brown agreed in her deposition that Montgomery and Burke actually thought that she was
not promoted because her work and effort were not at director level (which is not to say that
Brown agreed with that assessment).77 Brown has not shown that these individual decision
makers were motivated by discrimination on the basis of sex.

76 Jacobs v. Mayorkas, No. 21-165, 2021 WL 3929718 at * 6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2021) (citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339–40 (1977)).
77 Brown Dep. 280, ECF No. 32-1.
B. Retaliation
Under Title VII, an employer may not discriminate against an employee “because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”78 A plaintiff states a claim “if she pleads

sufficient factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence
. . . (1) she engaged in conduct protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took adverse action
against her; and (3) a causal link exists between her protected conduct and the employer’s
adverse action.”79 Complaints to management may constitute opposition to discrimination.80
For purposes of summary judgment, the Court accepts Brown’s account of her meetings
with Reynolds and Alm-Myers, which reasonably may be viewed as raising a complaint of
discrimination.81 The alleged retaliatory conduct, however, is limited to the continued failure to
promote Brown to the position of Director, and the fact that her 2018 evaluation stated that she
needed to work on her communication skills.

The evaluation statement cannot constitute an adverse employment action, especially as
Brown was again categorized as promotable. Brown argues that she was retaliated against when
she was discouraged from applying for the Director, Executive Compensation role and that they
falsely stated that they had notified Human Resources of Brown’s interest in the position.
However, Brown cannot show a causal connection between the complaint and the alleged
retaliation. Brown met with Reynolds and Alm-Myers in April 2018, but did not meet with her

78 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a).
79 Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016).
80 Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 343 (3d Cir. 2006).
81 The filing of the administrative complaint under the PHRA cannot form the basis for a retaliation claim as Brown
was on medical leave at the time and never returned to AMETEK.
supervisors to express interest in the Director, Executive Compensation position until several
months later. This time gap, “without more, cannot create an inference of causation and defeat
summary judgment.”82 Brown has not produced sufficient evidence of a connection between the
complaint and not obtaining the promotion to Director, Executive Compensation, and summary

judgment therefore will be granted on this claim.
C. Hostile Work Environment
“When the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult
that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and
create an abusive working environment, Title VII is violated.”83 To state a claim for hostile work
environment, a plaintiff must allege that (1) they were intentionally discriminated against
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; (2) the discrimination was severe or
pervasive; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the discrimination would
detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like circumstances; and (5) there is a basis for
employer liability.84

In determining whether discrimination is severe or pervasive, a court must consider all of
the relevant circumstances including the “frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”85 Isolated incidents of

82 LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 233 (3d Cir. 2007).
83 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Hundley
v. Wawa, Inc., No. 21-0627, 2021 WL 2555440, at *9 (E.D. Pa. June 22, 2021).
84 Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013).
85 Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
discrimination, unless extremely serious, do not alter the conditions of employment and therefore
do not constitute a hostile work environment.86
Brown argues that the atmosphere at AMETEK led to her taking medical leave and
eventually forced her to resign and seek employment elsewhere. Although this is evidence that
she was subjectively affected,87 “[t]o be sufficiently severe or pervasive, harassment must be

shown to be both objectively and subjectively hostile or abusive.”88 The conduct, considered in
total, was not objectively intolerable. Brown has shown neither a “steady barrage” of offensive
comments89 nor comments or actions so egregious as to constitute a hostile work environment as
a matter of law.90 Moreover, as AMETEK points out, many of the incidents of which Brown
complains, such as inappropriate comments regarding diversity training and about wives, are
attributed to Stevens, who Brown acknowledges supported her efforts to be promoted to director.
In all, Brown conflates the tangible results of the boy’s club atmosphere at AMETEK with the
atmosphere itself. In other words, there is no indication that the conditions would have been
intolerable had Brown been promoted. Because Title VII does not establish “a general civility

code” for the workplace, and a reasonable factfinder could not conclude that the cited incidents
were objectively severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of Brown’s employment,
summary judgment will be granted on this claim.91

86 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
87 Plaintiff also testified at deposition that she perceived the comments to be “slightly intimidating and dismissive
and a put down,” which shows a less serious impact. Brown Dep. [Doc. No. 32-1] at 57.
88 Hatch v. Franklin Cnty., 755 F. App’x 194, 202 (3d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
89 Canada v. Samuel Crossi & Sons, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 3d 42, 58 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (citation omitted).
90 Conduct that has been held to reach the standard is far more egregious than has been alleged here. See, e.g.,
Starnes v. Butler Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 50th Jud. Dist., 971 F.3d 416, 428 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that “taken
together,” allegations that supervisor coerced the plaintiff into sexual relations, shared pornography with her, and
scolded her for speaking with male colleagues, among other actions, supported severe or pervasive discrimination).
91 Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006).
IV. CONCLUSION

Brown has not produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that
AMTEK’s decision not to promote Brown to the director level was because of discrimination on
the basis of sex or due to retaliation. Nor has Brown shown that the distasteful comments made
by supervisors constituted a hostile work environment. AMETEK’s motion for summary
judgment will be granted. An order will be entered.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10402864. Public record. Not legal advice.