# CARTER v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · December 8, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10402272

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** December 8, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LANGDON CARTER, : CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff, :
:
v. :
:
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, :
Defendant. : No. 20-545

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Timothy R. Rice December 8, 2021
U.S. Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Langdon Carter alleges that Defendant City of Philadelphia is responsible for the
loss of his home and possessions because police assisted in his illegal eviction. See Compl. (doc.
1). He brings claims for: (1) violations of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process
(Count I); (2) violations of his Fourth Amendment right against unfounded search and seizure
(Counts II and III); (3) wrongful eviction (Count IV); and (4) conversion (Count V). Id. ¶¶ 37-
62. The City seeks summary judgment, and its motion is granted because Carter failed to
provide evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the City liable under any of his claims.
I. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
evidence and any inferences from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. See Ray v. Warren, 626 F.2d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2010). If reasonable minds
could conclude that there are sufficient facts to support a plaintiff’s claims, summary judgment
should be denied. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary
judgment should be granted only if no “reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party,” based on the evidentiary record. Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 2010).
A plaintiff may bring a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against any person who
allegedly deprived the plaintiff of his federal constitutional rights while acting pursuant to state
law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). To prevail on a claim involving a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process, Carter must show: (1) a protected

property interest; and (2) a procedure that did not afford meaningful notice and an opportunity to
be heard. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972); Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir.
2000). To establish a violation of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable “search and
seizure,” Carter must show his home or person was searched or seized without “probable cause.”
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018). To prove a “wrongful eviction” claim,
Carter must show a “wrongful act by the landlord which result[ed] in an interference of [his]
possession” of the property. Pollock v. Morelli, 369 A.2d 458, 460 (Pa. Super. 1976) (citing,
inter alia, Minnich v. Kauffman, 108 A. 597 (Pa. 1919) (landlords who interfere with the implied
covenant of quiet enjoyment of their tenants are liable for damages)). Finally, to prove a
conversion claim, Carter must show the City deprived him of property without his consent and

without “lawful justification” by “an act intended to affect” the property. Shonberger v. Oswell,
530 A.2d 112, 114 (Pa. Super. 1987)
Carter also must satisfy the legal standard for suing municipalities.1 With respect to his
constitutional claims, Carter must show that the constitutional violation was the result of an
officially adopted policy or well-established custom or practice. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.
of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). With respect to his state law claims, Carter must show
liability is not precluded by the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8541 (“Tort

1 In March 2011, Carter dropped his claim against the property owner who carried out the
illegal eviction. See 3/11/21 Notice of Voluntary Dismissal (doc. 8). He also failed to bring any
claims against the individual police officers involved in this dispute.
Claims Act”), which states that “no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of
any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof
or any other person,” with limited exceptions.
II. Facts Most Favorable to Carter

On the evening of September 25, 2019, Carter was in his home at 2026 North 20th Street
in Philadelphia, recovering from a seizure. Def. Mem. Ex. B, Carter Dep., at 65, 106. He had
been living there since 2009. Id. at 20. Carter had been a handyman at the building and arranged
with the owner to reside rent-free in exchange for maintenance services. Id. After the owner
died intestate, Carter applied to participate in Philadelphia’s Owner Occupied Property (“OOP”)
program. Def. Mem. Ex. C (April 2018 Application and Agreement for OOP). As part of that
program, Carter agreed to maintain the property, pay back taxes, and record a deed establishing
ownership within three years. Id.; see also Pl. Mem. Ex. D (5/18/18 Agreement to pay back
taxes on the 20th Street property). Carter complied with his agreement as of September 25,
2019.2 Carter Dep. at 30, 49 56.

In August 2019, Demetrius Thornton, a relative of the deceased prior owner, sought to
name himself the prior owner’s sole heir and claim ownership of the property. Compl. ¶ 22. On
September 25, 2019, Thornton brought three people with him to evict Carter from the 20th Street
property. Carter Dep. at 70. One of the people accompanying Thornton identified himself as a
police officer and another identified himself as the property’s purchaser. Id. They directed

2 There is some evidence that Carter may have improperly filled out his original OOP
paperwork, and that the person he hired to record the deed in his name may have intentionally
failed to do so. Compare Carter Dep. at 149 (he paid someone $400 to establish title), with id. at
157-58 (“Mr. Carter was scammed on this issue[.]”). I nonetheless view the facts in the light
most favorable to Carter and assume he was in full compliance and properly established a legal
interest in the property. Ray, 626 F.2d at 173.
Carter to leave the property immediately because it had been sold. Id. at 66-71; see also Def.
Mem. Ex. H (9/26/19 Deed Transfer).
Thornton and several of Carter’s neighbors independently called the police. Carter Dep.
at 65-67, 96. Police asked Carter for identification and he produced an identification card with a

West Ontario Street address, not the address of the 20th Street property. Id. at 60, 83, 93. Police
concluded that Carter was a “professional squatter.” Id. at 45 (Police told Carter, “Open your
mouth, you go [to] jail.”). Carter was warned by several police officers that he could never
return to the 20th Street property or even re-enter to gather his personal effects. Id. at 101
(officer told Carter he could not go back inside the property to retrieve his shoes), 104-05, 110-
11. Carter heard one officer tell another that Carter had a right to produce his documents to
prove his ownership of the property, but the first officer was instructed to “cuff him” regardless.
Pl. Mem. Ex. L (Interrogatory Answers), Int. 12.
Police handcuffed Carter and put him in a police vehicle. Carter Dep. at 98. Police did
not interfere as Thornton and his companions boarded up the 20th Street property, effectively

barring Carter’s re-entry. Carter Dep. at 98. Police also discovered that Carter was subject to an
outstanding out-of-state arrest warrant. Statement of Undisputed Facts (doc. 18-1) (“Undisputed
Facts”) ¶ 22; see also Def. Mem., Ex. F (9/25/19 Complaint/Incident Report noting “arrest in ref
to warrant OCH 10ST061391”). After processing Carter, police released him at 3 a.m. on
September 26, 2019. Carter Dep. at 109.
III. Discussion
The City seeks summary judgment on Carter’s constitutional claims because he cannot
show his losses were caused by an official policy or custom.3 I agree.
To show that his constitutional deprivation was caused by a municipal policy, Carter
must identify the “official proclamation, policy, or edict” that was issued by a leader with the
authority to do so. Mulholland v. County of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d Cir. 2013). To show

that his deprivation was caused by a “custom,” Carter must identify a practice that is “so
permanent and well-settled as to virtually constitute law.” Id.
The parties have identified two relevant policies. The first, Policy Directive 3.17, governs
how “police personnel will enforce statutes prohibiting” self-help eviction practices, i.e., “any
action or threatened action taken, without legal process, by a landlord or a landlord’s agents,
which is intended to dispossess a tenant from a dwelling unit or prevents the tenant from lawfully
occupying the dwelling unit.” Def. Mem. Ex. I (doc. 17-12) (“Directive 3.17”). Pursuant to
Directive 3.17, police officers called to a self-help eviction dispute must: (1) establish the

3 The City also argues Carter lacks standing to file suit. Def. Mem. at 5-8. It contends that
the OOP does not create property interests, and that Carter has failed to produce evidence
showing the City deprived him of a protected property interest. Id. at 7 (because Carter “failed
to seek and record title . . . there is no basis for him to claim that his OOP[] agreement
constituted a legally protected interest in the subject property”). An equitable property interest,
however, is sufficient to establish standing. Matos v. Berks Cty. Tax Claim Bureau, 228 A.3d
976, 980-81 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2020). Carter has testified that the prior owner wanted him to
own the property after her death, Carter Dep. at 143-44, that he paid off the property’s second
mortgage, id. at 147, financed improvements to the property, id. at 24, established and paid for
the property’s utilities, id. at 23-24, 43, and obtained property insurance, Pl. Mem. Ex. J (2018
USAA homeowners insurance policy for the 20th Street property in Carter’s name). A
reasonable jury could find this evidence establishes an equitable interest in the property. Moore
v. Keller, 98 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (finding appellant who “had been living at the
Property for 18 years and had invested substantial sums in capital improvements and had been
paying the tax bill,” was “an equitable owner of the Property” despite not being named “on the
last registered deed to the Property”). The City further argues Carter lacks standing because he
cannot establish the City ever took possession of his property. Def. Mem. at 8. This ignores,
however, Carter’s argument that Thornton took his property with “an implicit assist from the
police.” Pl. Mem. at 6. Although I find the City cannot be held liable based on based on Monell
and the Tort Claims Act, there is sufficient evidence to establish standing. Moore, 98 A.3d at 4.
parties’ identities; (2) issue to all parties and ask all parties to read the “Tenant’s Referral
Notice”; (3) require the landlord to produce the “Alias Writ of Possession” and, if the landlord is
unable to do so, “[i]nform the tenant that they are entitled to regain possession of the premises
immediately”; (4) “[i]nform the landlord to take prompt remedial action to restore access or

habitability to the dwelling unit or issue a Non-Traffic Summary Citation”; (5) let the landlord
know they need an Alias Writ of Possession from the Municipal Court to go forward with the
eviction; (6) “provide stand-by assistance while the tenant regains immediate entry to the
dwelling unit”; and (7) “[p]repare a Complaint or Incident Report (75-48) listing all pertinent
information and action taken by police.” Directive 3.17 at 2-3. If a landlord violates the law
against self-help evictions, police must issue a Non-Traffic Summary Citation and prepare a
Complaint/Incident Report. Id. at 3.
The other policy, Directive 77, governs police execution of out-of-state warrants. Def.
Mem. Ex. G (doc. 17-10). Under Directive 77, police apprehending a fugitive must ensure they
have the right person by verifying the arrestee’s identity, checking at least the: (1) name; (2) date

of birth; (3) physical description; (4) fingerprints; and (5) social security or other identifying
number. Directive 77 at 6. Police also must verify that the issuing jurisdiction still seeks the
arrest and allow the fugitive to leave after six hours if the other jurisdiction has not responded.
Id. at 5. Further, police are required to prepare reports establishing probable cause for the arrest
and check for other outstanding warrants. Id. at 5-6.
Due Process
Carter argues the City is liable based on its failure “to adopt and implement a needed
lockout enforcement policy better calibrated, and with a greater likelihood of preventing said
deprivations.” Pl. Mem. at 4. Carter alleges that police should have arrested Thornton at the
scene. Id. at 5. He claims that either the City failed to “adopt and train” officers in a policy that
would allow them to arrest landlords who, like Thornton, illegally evict tenants or, if police had
the authority to arrest Thornton but chose not to do so, that this constitutes a police “custom” of
not arresting landlords pursuing illegal evictions.4 Id.

There is no dispute that Directive 3.17 outlines the steps the police should follow when
responding to a self-help eviction. Although the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
Carter, shows that the police did not abide by those steps in responding to Thornton’s eviction of
Carter,5 it is insufficient to show that the police had a custom of not following Directive 3.17
when responding to evictions.
Municipalities can be held liable when their “failure to train” employees constitutes a
custom that demonstrates “deliberate indifference.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S.
378, 387 (1989) (“if a concededly valid policy is unconstitutionally applied by a municipal

4 In his Complaint, Carter alleges the City conspired to deprive him of his due process
rights. Compl. ¶¶ 37-42. However, he makes no argument to support this assertion. See
generally, Pl. Mem. He has produced no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that
the police, some of whom were by his own account summoned by his neighbors to protect his
interests, agreed with Thornton to deprive him of due process. Carter Dep. at 95 (police were
called by Thornton and multiple neighbors). Moreover, as explained, infra, he has failed to
produce evidence of a “separate underlying intentional or criminal act that can support a civil
conspiracy claim” since “[s]trict liability and negligence counts are insufficient to support [] civil
conspiracy claim[s].” Goldstein v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 854 A.2d 585, 590 (Pa. Super. 2004).

5 Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Carter, the police did not permit Carter to
go back into the premises to produce documentation showing he was entitled to live at the 20th
Street property once they saw his identification card with another address. Carter Dep. at 60.
The police also did not require Carter and Thornton to read the Tenant’s Referral Notice.
Although the police stated in their Incident Report that they informed Thornton that he needed an
Alias Writ of Possession from the Municipal Court to go forward with the eviction, they did not
tell Thornton or Carter that Carter had the right to re-enter the premises. Def. Mem. Ex. E
(Incident Report stating Thornton was advised to obtain an Eviction Notice when he complained
Carter refused to leave his property). The police did not issue a Summary Citation when they
saw Thornton blocking Carter’s re-entry to the property and even assisted in keeping him out.
Finally, the police were specifically authorized to “provide stand-by assistance while [Carter]
regain[ed] immediate entry to the dwelling unit” but failed to do so. Directive 3.17 at 3.
employee, the city is liable if the employee has not been adequately trained and the constitutional
wrong has been caused by that failure to train”). To succeed on a failure to train claim, however,
Carter must produce evidence that the municipal employees lacked appropriate training. See,
e.g., id. at 382 (noting that failure to train claim was supported by testimony that “shift

commanders were not provided with any special training”). Perhaps discovery may have
uncovered evidence of a practice or custom of deviating from Directive 3.17, as police did here,
but Carter has failed to present it.
Instead, he argues that Directive 3.17 is insufficient because it does not specifically
authorize the police to arrest landlords who continue to pursue an illegal eviction, rendering
police “powerless to prevent” his loss. Id. at 9. He fails, however, to show that such a specific
authorization is necessary if the police otherwise comply with the safeguards of Directive 3.17.
He also concedes that nothing in Pennsylvania law prevents the police from arresting landlords
pursuing an illegal eviction. Pl. Br. at 8.
Although Carter has produced evidence that unidentified and uncharged officers may

have failed to fully comply with departmental policy in Directive 3.17, he has failed to produce
sufficient evidence that, viewed in the light most favorable to him, would permit a reasonable
jury to conclude that he suffered a constitutional deprivation caused by the City’s policies,
practices, or customs. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Canton, 489 U.S. at 387.
Search and Seizure
Carter also claims that police conducted an illegal search and seizure when they entered
the vestibule of his home (Count II) and arrested him (Count III). Compl. ¶¶ 43-52.
Carter has disputed the City’s assertion that officers never entered his home, stating they
entered its vestibule. Statement of Disputed Facts (doc. 22-1) ¶ 19. The deposition transcript he
cites, however, fails to support his claim. Carter testified that Thornton entered the vestibule.
Carter Dep. at 90. When asked whether uniformed officers entered his home, Carter answered
“no.” Id. at 91. Moreover, Carter also testified that, when he argued to the police that he could
prove he was the property’s owner because his belongings were inside, they refused to enter and

verify his statements. Id. at 81 (“My mail [wa]s right here at the door in the mailbox but they
didn’t want to come in.”). I grant judgment to the City on Count II because Carter has produced
no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that police entered the home.
The City is also entitled to judgment on Count III because the out-of-state warrant
provided probable cause for Carter’s arrest. United States v. White, 75 F. App’x 894, 896–97
(3d Cir. 2003) (a valid warrant provides probable cause for arrest). Carter does not dispute that
he was arrested on an outstanding warrant, nor does he challenge the warrant’s validity.
Undisputed Facts ¶ 22. Thus, he cannot show he was arrested without probable cause. See
Holmes v. McGuigan, 184 F. App’x 149, 151 (3d Cir. 2006) (affirming summary judgment
against plaintiff who had been arrested “after a computerized database and a conversation with

his dispatcher informed [police] of an outstanding warrant” despite plaintiff’s mistaken belief
that “the warrant had already been ‘taken care of’” when plaintiff “produced no evidence that
would tend to undermine the warrant’s validity.”).6
Wrongful Eviction and Conversion
Carter contends that his wrongful eviction was perpetrated with “an implicit assist” from

6 The City also argues Carter has failed to establish an equal protection claim, noting that
he has not produced evidence showing he was treated differently than other similarly situated
persons. Def. Mem. at 10 (citing, inter alia, Brown v. Borough of Mahaffey, 35 F.3d 846, 850
(3d Cir. 1994)). Although I agree, I find that Carter never brought an equal protection claim.
See Compl. ¶¶37-64 (averring claims based on due process (I), search and seizure (II and III),
wrongful eviction (IV), and conversion (V)).
police. Pl. Mem. at 6. He fails to explain, however, how his state law claims fit into one of the
limited exceptions to the Tort Claims Act’s restrictions on municipal liability. Pennsylvania
allows municipal liability only when damages would be available against a private individual, 42
Pa. C.S. § 8542(a)(1), the municipal actor was negligent, id. § 8542(a)(2), and, with respect to

damage or loss of real or personal property, the property was “in the possession or control of the
local agency,” id. §§ 8542(b)(2), 8542(b)(3).7
Carter testified that Thornton, not the police, stole his real property and barred access to
his personal property. Carter Dep. at 98 (Thornton and the buyer boarded up the home), 103-04,
166 (police took only his “pride” but made it possible for others to take his belongings). Carter
has failed to produce evidence from which a reasonable jury could find his state law claims
against the City exempted from the state law restrictions on municipal liability.8
An appropriate order follows.

7 Although the Tort Claims Act denies immunity to employees of local agencies for their
intentional torts, it does not strip immunity from the municipality itself. Cooper v. City of
Chester, 810 F. Supp. 618, 626 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (citing, inter alia, Marko v. Philadelphia, 576
A.2d 1193, 1193 (Pa. Commw. 1990), app. granted, 592 A.2d 46 (Pa. 1991); King v. Breach,
540 A.2d 976, 979 (Pa. Commw. 1988); Deluca v. Whitemarsh Township, 526 A.2d 456, 457
(Pa. Commw. 1987); Miller v. Emelson, 520 A.2d 913, 915 (Pa. Commw. 1987); Steiner v.
Pittsburgh, 509 A.2d 1368, 1369–70 (Pa. Commw. 1986); Dudosh v. Allentown, 629 F. Supp.
849, 856 (E.D.Pa.1985); Kuchka v. Kile, 634 F. Supp. 502, 513 (M.D. Pa.1985); Paul v. John
Wanamakers, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 219, 222–23 (E.D. Pa.1984)).

8 The City also argues Carter cannot show it is liable for wrongful eviction because it
cannot show a landlord-tenant relationship between the two parties. Def. Mem. at 16. It is
unclear, however, whether a wrongful eviction claim, which is based on the implied covenant of
quiet enjoyment between landlord and tenant, could be based on something akin to a tortious
interference with contract claim. See Maier v. Maretti, 671 A.2d 701, 707 (Pa. Super. 1995)
(noting that “one who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract
between another and a third person by causing the third person not to perform the contract is
subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the
third person to perform the contract”). Because Carter has failed to show his claims fall within
exceptions to the Tort Claims Act, I need not determine whether a wrongful eviction claim can
be pursued on a tortious interference theory.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10402272. Public record. Not legal advice.