# AHMED v. WEST COAST SERVICING INC.

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · May 24, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10401051

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** May 24, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RAFEEQ AHMED : CIVIL ACTION
:
v. : NO. 20-3327
:
WEST COAST SERVICING INC., et al. :

MEMORANDUM
KEARNEY, J. May 24, 2021
A mortgage servicer and its lawyers allegedly provided highly inflated payoff numbers to
a borrower facing a sheriff’s sale on his mortgaged property in early 2020 after the state court
entered judgment in April 2015 for failing to make mortgage payments. The borrower stayed an
earlier sheriff’s sale through a lengthy bankruptcy. The borrower contacted the servicer’s lawyers
asking for a payoff amount one day before the sheriff’s sale scheduled after a bankruptcy court
dismissed the borrower’s bankruptcy. The servicer’s lawyer responded with a voicemail
identifying a payoff number which the borrower knew then, and claims now, to be wildly inflated.
The borrower chose not to satisfy the judgment and the servicer’s lawyers acquired the mortgaged
property at sheriff’s sale. The borrower promptly sued the servicer and its lawyers claiming their
misrepresented payoff number violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Pennsylvania’s
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. Based in part on admissions adduced in
discovery, we today grant the servicer’s and lawyers’ motions for summary judgment on the
Pennsylvania Consumer Protection Law claim as the borrower admits he never justifiably relied
upon numbers he always knew to be false. We deny the motions on most of the borrower’s debt
collection practices claim requiring we resolve fact disputes after evaluating the credibility of
witnesses in our upcoming non-jury trial.
I. Undisputed material facts.1
Rafeeq Ahmed purchased a vacant lot on Horsham Road in Montgomery County,
Pennsylvania in 2002.2 He refinanced an existing mortgage and borrowed $135,000 from Fleet
National Bank to build a home on the property.3 He mortgaged the property to Fleet Bank and

agreed to repay the $135,000 loan through monthly payments of $755.97 over thirty years
beginning on October 1, 2003.4 Fleet Bank required Mr. Ahmed to “pay when due the principal
of, and interest on, the debt evidenced by the Note and any prepayment charges and late charges
under the Note.”5 Fleet Bank further required Mr. Ahmed to “pay funds for Escrow Items” as
defined in the mortgage.6 PHH Mortgage Corporation acquired the servicing rights to the mortgage
at a later point.7
Mr. Ahmed and his family lived at the Horsham Road property beginning in 2002.8 Mr.
Ahmed moved to a home he purchased in New Jersey in 2005 or 2006.9 Mr. Ahmed moved to
Texas three years later in 2009.10 Mr. Ahmed leased his Horsham Road property to various tenants
from 2009 to 2020.11 Mr. Ahmed currently lives in Texas.12

Mr. Ahmed defaults and the bank forecloses on the mortgage in state court.
Mr. Ahmed failed to make mortgage payments to PHH from February to June 2010.13 On
June 16, 2010, PHH sent Mr. Ahmed a Notice of Intention to Foreclose on the property due to
$7,592.10 in missed payments.14 PHH filed a foreclosure action on the property in the
Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas in February 2012, alleging Mr. Ahmed owed
$142,758.15 as of October 21, 2011.15 On September 8, 2014, the state court entered judgment in
rem in favor of PHH and against Mr. Ahmed for $177,360.36.16
On April 7, 2015, PHH obtained a writ of execution for the sale of the Horsham Road
property.17 The writ of execution totaled $189,115.48, including the $177,360.36 judgment plus
interest of $11,755.12.18
Mr. Ahmed’s bankruptcy stayed the sheriff’s sale.

Mr. Ahmed petitioned for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas on July 28, 2015.19 Home Servicing,
LLC—the mortgage servicer for the Horsham Road property at the time of his bankruptcy—filed
a proof of claim for $150,986.06.20 Mr. Ahmed made certain (but not all) payments to the
bankruptcy trustee during his bankruptcy.21 He also made eight payments to West Coast Servicing,
who acquired the servicing rights to the mortgage in 2015.22 Richard Bustamante, the West Coast
servicing manager who handled the transfer of Mr. Ahmed’s loan, admitted to a “clerical mistake”
in applying some of Mr. Ahmed’s payments.23
Mr. Ahmed attempted to sell the Horsham Road property for $240,000 in December 2018
and requested a payoff figure for the mortgage.24 West Coast provided a $254,902 payoff
amount.25 Mr. Ahmed disagreed, believing he could pay off the debt for less than $200,000.26 He

spoke to West Coast representatives about his disagreement.27 He admits knowing West Coast
incorrectly reported his debt.28 It seemingly did not matter then because he could not close on the
sale of the Horsham Road property for unrelated reasons.29
Mr. Ahmed remained in bankruptcy and filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy
against West Coast on January 17, 2019, alleging West Coast misapplied payments and
inaccurately calculated the payoff amount to be $254,902.31.30 West Coast moved to dismiss Mr.
Ahmed’s adversary complaint.31 Mr. Ahmed agreed to dismiss the adversary proceeding.32 The
bankruptcy court dismissed Mr. Ahmed’s adversary complaint.33 The bankruptcy court further
dismissed Mr. Ahmed’s bankruptcy case in June 2019 for failure to pay the trustee.34
West Coast’s post-bankruptcy execution efforts.
Mortgage servicer West Coast retained the law firm of Norris McLaughlin, P.A. to recover
on the September 8, 2014 judgment.35 Norris McLaughlin employs at least three attorneys to

handle foreclosure matters.36 Norris McLaughlin’s creditors’ rights practice group—which
involves representing creditors to enforce obligations owed to them—represents two to five
percent of its overall practice.37 Attorney Richard Somach led his law firm’s efforts on West
Coast’s behalf. He swore he handled “hundreds” of debt collection matters since he joined Norris
McLaughlin in 2009 and these matters comprise “less than ten percent” of his practice.38
Attorney Somach obtained a writ of execution on September 30, 2019 for the sale of the
Horsham Road property.39 The writ reflected the amount due as $212,720.06, consisting of
$177,360.36 in principal and $35,359.70 in interest.40 The sheriff set the sale of the Horsham Road
property for January 29, 2020.41 Attorney Somach mailed the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale under Rule
3129.2 of the Pennsylvania Code and a Notice of Owner’s Rights to Mr. Ahmed.42 The Notice of

Owner’s Rights instructed Mr. Ahmed to call Attorney Somach to determine the required payment
to prevent the sheriff’s sale.43 Mr. Ahmed received the notices on October 21, 2019.44
Mr. Ahmed did not try to contact West Coast since the attempted sale of the Horsham Road
property in December 2018.45 But he contacted Attorney Somach on January 27, 2020, the week
of the sheriff’s sale, to determine the amount needed to stop the sheriff’s sale.46 Attorney Somach
returned Mr. Ahmed’s call and left him a voicemail, explaining the payoff amount was
approximately $283,000.47 The next day—the day before the scheduled sheriff’s sale—Mr.
Ahmed emailed Attorney Somach, stating, “Hi, Richard. I got your voicemail yesterday about my
property…. Please tell me what is the amount I need to send you to stop the sheriff[’s] sale and
any other instructions to send the payment.”48 Attorney Somach emailed Mr. Ahmed less than half
an hour later, stating “[a]ttached are the firm’s wiring instructions. The total payoff of this account
as of today is $284,000.00. The wire must be received today, otherwise, the property will be going

to sheriff’s sale tomorrow. Please advise as to when the wire is sent so that I can have our
accounting department look for it.”49 Mr. Ahmed admits knowing Attorney Somach incorrectly
reported his debt.50 Mr. Ahmed remained in default on his loan obligations.51
Norris McLaughlin attended the sheriff’s sale the next day. It announced an upset bid for
the Horsham Road property for $295,262.90.52 The sheriff sold the Horsham Road property to
West Coast’s lawyers at Norris McLaughlin for $1,978.68.53 On June 22, 2020, West Coast sold
the Horsham Road property for $280,280.54
Mr. Ahmed sues West Coast and its lawyers.
Mr. Ahmed sued West Coast and Norris McLaughlin last July alleging they each violated
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law.55 Mr. Ahmed alleged West Coast “misapplied tens of thousands of dollars in

[mortgage] payments” made during his bankruptcy in or about May 2016 and “provided a
knowingly inaccurate Payoff Statement” in December 2018.56
Mr. Ahmed separately alleged conduct after the court dismissed his bankruptcy for failing
to pay the trustee. He alleged Norris McLaughlin misrepresented the payment needed to stop the
sheriff’s sale, improperly announced an upset price at the sheriff’s sale to discourage bidding, and
failed to provide the amount needed to reinstate the loan.57
West Coast and Norris McLaughlin moved to dismiss the amended Complaint.58 West
Coast argued the debt collection claim should be dismissed as time-barred as to its conduct and
Mr. Ahmed did not sufficiently allege Norris McLaughlin’s vicarious liability.59 It further argued
for dismissal of the Consumer Protection Law claim, arguing Mr. Ahmed is not a “consumer” and
the economic loss doctrine barred the claim.60 Norris McLaughlin made similar arguments.61 We
denied both motions and allowed the parties to proceed to discovery.62 We agreed the statute of

limitations barred Mr. Ahmed’s allegations as to West Coast’s specific conduct during the
bankruptcy but concluded Mr. Ahmed plausibly alleged an agency relationship between West
Coast and Norris McLaughlin for West Coast to be held vicariously liable for Norris McLaughlin’s
conduct.63
II. Analysis
Norris McLaughlin and West Coast now move for summary judgment on the remaining
claims challenging the disclosures on the balance owed at the January 29, 2020 sheriff’s sale.64
Norris McLaughlin argues Mr. Ahmed’s debt collection claim fails because it is not a debt
collector, its communications with Mr. Ahmed were not attempts to collect a debt, and its mere
communication of information provided by its client, West Coast, did not violate the law. It argues

Mr. Ahmed’s Consumer Protection Law claim fails because Mr. Ahmed failed to adduce specific
facts as to violative conduct, Mr. Ahmed is not a consumer under the law, and Mr. Ahmed did not
suffer damages because of its conduct.
West Coast first argues the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and res judicata bar Mr. Ahmed’s
claims. Even assuming those doctrines do not apply, West Coast argues Mr. Ahmed’s Consumer
Protection Law claim fails because Mr. Ahmed is not a consumer under the law and Mr. Ahmed
fails to adduce evidence of the necessary elements of the law, including deceptive conduct,
justifiable reliance, and ascertainable loss.65
We conclude genuine issues of material fact exist as to most of the debt collection claim
requiring we review these issues after evaluating the credibility of witnesses and studying exhibits
at our scheduled non-jury trial. But we need not resolve the Pennsylvania Consumer Protection
Law claim at trial as Mr. Ahmed fails to show a disputed fact contrary to his admission of never

relying on Norris McLaughlin and West Coast’s alleged misrepresentations as required under the
Consumer Protection Law.
A. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine and res judicata do not bar Mr. Ahmed’s claims
against West Coast.

West Coast first argues the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Mr. Ahmed’s claims regarding
the 2019 sheriff’s sale as a challenge to a state court foreclosure judgment.66 West Coast further
argues res judicata bars Mr. Ahmed’s claims because the claims could have been litigated during
the state court foreclosure proceedings but were not.67 Mr. Ahmed argues his claims are not barred
because they involve conduct occurring years after the foreclosure judgment and the writs of
execution and do not challenge those underlying state court judgments.68 He relatedly argues he
could not have challenged this post-judgment conduct in the state courts.69 We agree with Mr.
Ahmed.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits a district court from exercising subject matter
jurisdiction in certain circumstances. The doctrine is “‘confined to … cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’”70
Our Court of Appeals states four requirements must be met for the doctrine to apply: “(1) the
federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-
court judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the
plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.”71 The doctrine does
not apply when the plaintiff alleges injury caused by the defendant’s conduct and not by the state
court judgment.72
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to bar claims where the alleged injury stems
from collection practices used by debt collectors rather than from state court judgments. In Rivera

v. Ragan & Ragan, P.C., for example, Judge Kelly found the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not
apply to bar a consumer’s debt collection claims against a law firm for its communications with
the consumer after entry of a state court judgment against the consumer.73 The consumer alleged
he called the law firm to inquire about the judgment and various representatives from the law firm
engaged in violative conduct, for example, by refusing to assist him with his inquiries and
informing him they had very little information about his debt.74 Judge Kelly concluded the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine did not bar the claims because “[consumer] does not challenge the judgment
against him in state court, but rather, only claims that [law firm]’s collection practices violated
sections of the FDCPA.”75
We disagree with West Coast’s theory Mr. Ahmed’s claims require us to review and reject

earlier state court judgments. Mr. Ahmed’s debt collection claim challenges Attorney Somach’s
alleged misrepresentation of the payoff amount and his alleged failure to inform him of
reinstatement figures. He crucially does not challenge the amounts reflected in the underlying
foreclosure judgment or writ of execution and instead challenges Norris McLaughlin’s (and, by
extension, West Coast’s) post-judgment conduct. Mr. Ahmed’s claim under the Consumer
Protection Law similarly does not dispute the validity of an underlying state court judgment and
instead challenges West Coast’s admitted misapplication of payments, which occurred post-
foreclosure. We need not review and potentially reject those underlying state court judgments to
evaluate Mr. Ahmed’s claims against West Coast.
West Coast’s reliance on Todd v. U.S. Bank, National Association is misplaced.76 The
plaintiff in Todd asserted breach of contract and debt collection claims against a mortgage servicer
and a law firm for (1) incorporating attorney’s fees without a lodestar analysis in the default
judgment entered in a foreclosure action and subsequently-issued writs of execution and (2) adding
interest to the default judgment in various reissued writs.77 Judge Jones dismissed the complaint,

concluding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived the court of jurisdiction over the claims.78
Judge Jones found the claim regarding attorney’s fees only challenged fees already approved and
finalized in the default judgment.79 Judge Jones similarly found the claim as to interest challenged
the underlying default judgment because the default judgment approved the accrual of interest
sought by the defendants.80 Unlike the plaintiff in Todd, Mr. Ahmed does not dispute the validity
of the underlying state court judgments but instead disputes West Coast’s application of payments
and West Coast’s and Norris McLaughlin’s representations as to payoff amounts.
Res judicata does not bar Mr. Ahmed’s claims for many of the same reasons. The doctrine
of res judicata bars a party from initiating a second suit against the same adversary based on the
same “cause of action” as the first suit.81 Res judicata applies when three elements are met: (1) a

final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving; (2) the same parties or their privies; and (3)
a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.82 “The doctrine of res judicata bars not only
claims that were brought in a previous action, but also claims that could have been brought.”83
Res judicata bars claims in this context when the claims are based on allegations relating
to the underlying mortgage, events leading up to the execution of the mortgage or foreclosure, or
the accuracy of the amounts sought or validity of the debt in the foreclosure action.84 Mr. Ahmed
brings different claims; he contends West Coast inflated the payoff amount by approximately
$100,000 after the state court entered judgment in the foreclosure action. He does not dispute the
validity or amount of the judgment reached in the foreclosure action. Nor does he dispute the
validity of the writ of execution. He instead contends Norris McLaughlin improperly inflated the
payoff amount and failed to inform him of his right to reinstate his mortgage in its subsequent
communications with him. Mr. Ahmed did not—and could not—bring these claims in state court

proceedings.
B. Norris McLaughlin is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on most of
Mr. Ahmed’s Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim.

To prevail on his debt collection claim, Mr. Ahmed must prove (1) he is a consumer; (2)
Norris McLaughlin is a debt collector; (3) Norris McLaughlin’s challenged practice involves an
attempt to collect a “debt” as the Act defines it; and (4) Norris McLaughlin violated a provision of
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act in attempting to collect the debt.85 Norris McLaughlin
argues Mr. Ahmed fails to prove his claim because it is not a debt collector, its communications
with Mr. Ahmed do not qualify as attempts to collect a debt, and Mr. Ahmed cannot prove Norris
McLaughlin violated the Act through alleged inaccuracies in the payoff amount or through failing
to inform him of his right to reinstate his loan. We disagree with Norris McLaughlin as to the
inaccuracies in the payoff amount but agree as to informing him of a right to reinstate the loan.
1. Norris McLaughlin is a “debt collector” under the Act.
Norris McLaughlin initially argues Mr. Ahmed’s claim fails because it does not qualify as
a “debt collector” under the Act as a matter of law.86 It argues it does not regularly collect debts
because debt collection constitutes “less than [two percent]” of the firm’s practice.87 Mr. Ahmed
argues Norris McLaughlin is a debt collector because it admittedly handles hundreds of debt
collection matters.88 We agree with Mr. Ahmed.
The Act defines a “debt collector” as “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate
commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of debts, or
who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted
to be owed or due another.”89 The Act does not define “regularly” but, as Mr. Ahmed points out,
courts interpreting the term have developed two frameworks.90 The “aggregate” framework
considers the amount of debt collection performed in the aggregate and establishes percentages of

how much debt collection activity qualifies as “regular,” while the “frequency” framework focuses
on the consistency of the defendant’s debt collection, regardless of its relation to the defendant’s
other business activities.91
Our Court of Appeals has not yet adopted one framework but appears to endorse the
“frequency” approach. In Oppong v. First Union Mortgage Corp., for example, our Court of
Appeals found a bank regularly engaged in debt collection practices—and therefore constituted a
debt collector under the Act—because it handled hundreds of debt collection matters in a typical
eighteen-month period, even though this constituted a small proportion of its overall business.92
In Silva v. Mid Atlantic Management Corp., Judge Kelly similarly found a law firm regularly
engaged in debt collection practices by accepting at least ten debt collection matters annually for
a couple of years.93 Judge Kelly expressly rejected the law firm’s argument it did not regularly

engage in debt collection because these matters amounted to less than one percent of its total
volume of cases and revenue.94 Judge Kelly concluded debt collection services could be rendered
“regularly” even though those services amount to a small fraction of a firm’s total activity.95
Like the businesses in Oppong and Silva, Norris McLaughlin is a “debt collector” because
it regularly handles debt collection matters. While these matters may amount to less than ten
percent of Attorney Somach’s practice and less than two percent of Norris McLaughlin’s practice,
Attorney Somach testified he has handled “hundreds” of debt collection matters since he joined
the firm over ten years ago.96 He further testified at least three other attorneys at the firm handle
similar matters.97 This is sufficient evidence Norris McLaughlin “regularly” engages in debt
collection practices such that it qualifies as a “debt collector” under the Act.
2. Norris McLaughlin’s communications may constitute “attempts to
collect a debt.”

Norris McLaughlin next argues it did not violate the Act because it did not attempt to
collect a debt.98 It argues Attorney Somach’s calls and emails leading to the sheriff’s sale cannot,
as a matter of law, be considered attempts to collect a debt because they only responded to Mr.
Ahmed questions.99 Mr. Ahmed argues he called Attorney Somach only because the notices he
received from Norris McLaughlin directed him to call to determine the amount owed.100 We agree
with Mr. Ahmed.
In determining whether a communication is made in furtherance of the collection of debt,
courts draw a distinction between a communication initiated by a debt collector and a
communication sent in response to a consumer inquiry.101 Our Court of Appeals has not yet opined
on the issue. As Norris McLaughlin concedes, two district courts in this Circuit have found a debt
collector’s response to a consumer inquiry can constitute an attempt to collect a debt.102 In Trunzo
v. City Mortgage, for example, Judge Hornak found a responsive letter from a law firm sent to
homeowners providing instructions about how to avoid foreclosure could constitute an attempt to
collect a debt.103 Judge Hornak explained that, while the law firm’s letter explicitly stated it was
sent in response to an inquiry, it also contained a disclaimer explaining, “[p]lease be advised that

this firm is a debt collector attempting to collect a debt …,” making clear the letter also constituted
a collection attempt.104 Judge Hornak also found it significant that the mortgage servicer—the law
firm’s client—expressly directed the homeowners to contact the law firm for inquiries about the
foreclosure notice they received.105 He explained, “[t]he fact that [the consumer] took the bait and
reached out to [the law firm] does not transform the purpose of [the mortgage servicer and law
firm’s] actions—the collection of a delinquent mortgage debt—into a benign exchange of helpful
information.”106
Judge Conaboy in Chlubicki v. PennyMac Loan Services, LLC also found responses to
consumer-initiated phone calls could constitute attempts to collect a debt under the Act because,

during the phone call, the debt collectors misrepresented that a loan was in active foreclosure and
asserted that the consumer should immediately bring the loan current to avoid the consequences
of foreclosure.107 Judge Conaboy, explicitly agreeing with Judge Hornak’s reasoning in Trunzo,
explained “[n]othing in [the Act] compels, or even suggests, that a debt collector may enjoy ‘open
season’ on a consumer who initiates contact with a legitimate concern.”108
Norris McLaughlin’s attempts to distinguish its conduct from Trunzo and Chlubicki are
unavailing. Even assuming Mr. Ahmed initiated the communications, we agree with Judges
Hornak and Conaboy. Norris McLaughlin is not immune from liability under the Act because its
made alleged false statements in response to questions. Like the mortgage servicer in Trunzo,
Norris McLaughlin expressly instructed Mr. Ahmed to call Attorney Somach. In response to Mr.

Ahmed’s inquiry, Attorney Somach provided the payoff amount—which Mr. Ahmed disputes the
accuracy of—and instructed this amount would need to be wired to his firm the next day to avoid
the sheriff’s sale. Attorney Somach’s voicemail and subsequent email, like the communications at
issue in Trunzo and Chlubicki, could easily constitute a response to a consumer inquiry as well as
a collection attempt.
3. Norris McLaughlin may be held liable for inaccuracies in loan
calculations.

Norris McLaughlin next argues Mr. Ahmed’s claim fails because Norris McLaughlin did
not service the mortgage and is not responsible for alleged miscalculations provided by its client
West Coast.109 Mr. Ahmed argues Norris McLaughlin can be held liable under the Act for
providing false information.110 We agree with Mr. Ahmed.
Norris McLaughlin misconstrues the plain language of the Act. The Act expressly extends
to persons “who regularly collect[] or attempt[] to collect … debts owed … another.”111 It therefore

applies to law firms who are engaged to collect debts owed to their client mortgage servicers. The
Act further imposes liability without proof of an intentional violation.112 Section 1692(e)(2)(A),
which makes it unlawful for a debt collector to make a “false representation” as to “the character,
amount, or legal status of any debt” when attempting to collect a debt, does not require knowledge
by the debt collector. It instead “creates a straightforward, objective standard” and “[n]othing
suggests that an allowance is to be made for a defendant’s lack of knowledge or intent.”113 Norris
McLaughlin cannot claim ignorance as a defense.
Our Court of Appeals’s decision in McLaughlin v. Phelan Hallihan & Schmieg, LLP is
instructive.114 In McLaughlin, a debtor brought claims under various provisions of the Act,
including Section 1692e(2), against a law firm retained by the debtor’s mortgage company,
alleging a letter sent to him by the law firm misrepresented the amount due on the loan.115 The law

firm argued the dismissal of the claim should be affirmed, in part because the letter only contained
estimates of the amount owed.116 Our Court of Appeals disagreed with the law firm’s
characterization of the letter as only setting forth estimates and concluded the debtor stated a claim
under the Act.117 In doing so, the court of appeals explained, “[a]s the drafter of the letter, [the law
firm] is responsible for its content and for what the least sophisticated debtor would have
understood from it.”118
The cases cited by Norris McLaughlin are inapposite. In Martsolf v. JBC Legal Group,
P.C., for example, a debtor alleged a debt collector violated the Act by, among other things,
mispresenting an attorney had reviewed her debts and reached an opinion they were accurate under
Section 1692e(3) of the Act, which prohibits a debt collector from “false[ly] representing or
impl[ying] that any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney” if, in
fact, no attorney reviewed the debt.119 Judge Conner held an attorney debt collector who represents

anotherattorney personally evaluated the debtor’s accounts must have actually performed such a
review or otherwise included a disclaimer describing the level of the attorney’s involvement in
analyzing the debt.120
In contrast, Mr. Ahmed does not contend Norris McLaughlin misrepresented the nature of
its review of the debt owed in violation of Section 1692e(3). He instead contends Norris
McLaughlin misrepresented the amount of debt owed. As explained by our Court of Appeals in
McLaughlin, the law firm—acting as a debt collector—is responsible for its communications to
debtors; a lack of knowledge or intent does not absolve the law firm of liability. Norris McLaughlin
can be held liable for inaccuracies in the payoff amount it told Mr. Ahmed.
4. Norris McLaughlin did not violate the Act by failing to inform Mr.
Ahmed of his right to reinstate his loan.

Norris McLaughlin finally argues it did not violate the Act by failing to inform Mr. Ahmed
of his right to reinstate his loan because (1) Mr. Ahmed never requested reinstatement figures and
(2) it does not have a duty to advise Mr. Ahmed of his contractual rights.121 Mr. Ahmed argues,
without support, Norris McLaughlin can be liable for misleading him by failing to provide him a
reinstatement figure.122 We agree with Norris McLaughlin.
We analyze communications from debt collectors to consumers from the perspective of the
“least sophisticated debtor.”123 This low standard “comports with the basic purpose of the [Act]:
…to protect all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd … from abusive debt collection
practices.”124 It also, however, “prevents liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of
collection notices by preserving a quotient of reasonableness and presuming a basic level of
understanding and willingness to read with care.”125
Mr. Ahmed fails to cite authority—nor can we find any—suggesting a law firm collecting
debt on behalf of a client is required to advise the consumer of his right to negotiate. We cannot

find authority suggesting Congress requires debt collectors to become mandated negotiators
including offering reinstatement of his mortgage. Mr. Ahmed contacted Attorney Somach in
accord with the Notice of Owner’s Rights detailing actions Mr. Ahmed needed to take to stop the
sheriff’s sale. Attorney Somach responded by providing him a payoff amount. While Norris
McLaughlin may be held liable for inaccurate payoff numbers provided by Attorney Somach in
response to Mr. Ahmed’s questions, it cannot be held liable for also failing to affirmatively advise
Mr. Ahmed of his options beyond those detailed in the Notice of Owner’s Rights. Mr. Ahmed does
not claim the Notice of Owner’s Rights is misleading. He asks we graft additional rights. We
decline to do so.
C. We grant summary judgment dismissing Mr. Ahmed’s Consumer Protection
Law claim.

Mr. Ahmed claims West Coast and Norris McLaughlin violated Pennsylvania’s Consumer
Protection Law by, among other things, engaging in fraudulent or deceptive conduct creating a
likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding. We disagree because Mr. Ahmed admits West
Coast’s and Norris McLaughlin’s representations never deceived him. He knew they were wrong
all along.
Pennsylvania’s Consumer Protection Law seeks to prevent “[u]nfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce
….”126 It provides a private cause of action for “[a]ny person who purchases or leases goods or
services primarily for personal, family, or household purposes and thereby suffers any
ascertainable loss of money or property” due to the seller’s unfair or deceptive acts or practices.127
To establish liability under the Consumer Protection Law’s catchall provision, Mr. Ahmed must
adduce evidence demonstrating: (1) a deceptive act likely to deceive a consumer acting reasonably
under similar circumstances; (2) justifiable reliance; and (3) justifiable reliance caused
ascertainable loss.128

Norris McLaughlin and West Coast argue Mr. Ahmed’s claim under the Consumer
Protection Law fails because he is not a consumer, he cannot (as a non-resident) assert a claim
against a non-resident company, he fails to demonstrate justifiable reliance on the alleged
misrepresentations and resulting injury from that reliance, and he does not specifically allege any
deceptive conduct.129 We find Mr. Ahmed fails to adduce evidence of justifiable reliance or
resulting injury. He admittedly did not rely on the alleged misrepresentations because he knew all
along of the wrong numbers. He did nothing in reliance because he did not believe the numbers.
The Consumer Protection Law is not strict liability for false information. It requires a justifiable
reliance on the false statements causing the consumer harm. Mr. Ahmed cannot meet this burden

by his admission. We grant summary judgment on this claim without reaching the merits of the
remaining arguments.
West Coast argues Mr. Ahmed’s claim fails because he has not proven he justifiably relied
on an alleged misrepresentations made, and instead testified he always knew their representations
about the amount owed on the loan were incorrect.130 Mr. Ahmed argues he has demonstrated
justifiable reliance because West Coast’s conduct “caused [Mr. Ahmed] to cancel the sale.”131 We
agree with West Coast.
To prevail on a claim under the Consumer Protection Law, Mr. Ahmed must make an
affirmative showing of “justifiable reliance.”132 “Evidence of reliance must go beyond simply a
causal connection between the misrepresentation and the harm; a plaintiff must ‘show that he
justifiably bought the product in the first place (or engaged in some other detrimental activity)
because of the misrepresentation.’”133 While justifiable reliance is typically a question of fact, we
may grant summary judgment where a plaintiff fails to adduce sufficient evidence of justifiable
reliance.134

Whether reliance on a representation is justified “depends on whether the recipient knew
or should have known that the information supplied was false.”135 “If a man knows the truth about
the representation, he is neither deceived nor defrauded, and any loss he may sustain is in effect
self-inflicted.”136 “This is because ‘knowledge negates the affirmative element of reliance.’”137
Judge Brody’s dismissal of an unfair trade practice claim in Plumbers’ Local Union No.
690 Health Plan v. Apotex Corp. is instructive.138 In Plumbers, a health insurance plan alleged
drug manufacturers artificially inflated the average wholesale prices for their drugs and the plan
suffered harm by overpaying providers using a reimbursement formula based on the allegedly
inflated average wholesale prices.139 Judge Brody dismissed the claim for lack of justifiable

reliance because the plan failed to allege it ever believed the average wholesale prices provided by
the manufacturers were the actual average wholesale price of their drugs.140 Judge Brody
explained the plan could not credibly make such an allegation because the plan’s involvement in
earlier related class actions regarding a scheme to inflate average wholesale prices “clearly
demonstrates that [the plan] knew the [average wholesale prices] were not the actual average
wholesale prices.”141
Like the plan in Plumbers, Mr. Ahmed fails to demonstrate he justifiably relied on West
Coast’s representation of the payoff amount because he never believed it. Ahmed swore he
consistently knew the amounts represented by West Coast as due on the loan were inaccurate. Mr.
Ahmed testified, for example, he disagreed with the amounts West Coast represented as owing in
its statements soon after it took over the servicing rights for his loan.142 Mr. Ahmed further swore
he knew of the falsity of the $254,000 payoff figure provided by West Coast in December 2018
because “those three, four things [West Coast] calculated, the late payment, the included interest,

I knew that was incorrect” and even testified he could easily calculate the correct amount due
himself.143 As Judge Brody found in Plumbers, Mr. Ahmed could not have justifiably relied on
West Coast’s representations as to amounts due shortly before the sheriff’s sale in 2019 because
he testified he never believed West Coast accurately accounted for the debt. At most, he
demonstrates some connection between West Coast’s payoff representation and his property sale
falling through. But this connection is insufficient to demonstrate justifiable reliance.
This deficiency also exists as to Mr. Ahmed’s claim against Norris McLaughlin. Mr.
Ahmed’s deposition testimony as to the $284,000 payoff figure provided by Attorney Somach
undermines an assertion of justifiable reliance. When asked whether the $284,000 figure looked
correct to him, Mr. Ahmed said “[n]o.”144 When asked what specifically was incorrect, Mr. Ahmed
explained, “[t]here were added fees and charges. It was incorrect.”145 Mr. Ahmed’s knowledge

regarding the veracity of the payoff figure precludes him from claiming he justifiably relied on the
payoff amount to his detriment. At most, Mr. Ahmed establishes a connection between the payoff
figure and his inability to stop the sheriff’s sale. As explained above, this is insufficient to establish
justifiable reliance as required under the Consumer Protection Law.
III. Conclusion
We grant in part West Coast and Norris McLaughlin’s motions for summary judgment.
West Coast and Norris McLaughlin are entitled to summary judgment as to the claim under the
Consumer Protection Law because Mr. Ahmed fails to adduce evidence he justifiably relied on an
alleged misrepresentation. He admits he did not. But we find genuine issues of material fact exist
as to the debt collection claim (other than failure to offer reinstatement) requiring we resolve these
issues in the non-jury trial beginning June 9, 2021.

1 Our Policies require a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“SUMF”) and an appendix in
support of summary judgment. West Coast filed its Motion and brief in support of summary
judgment and SUMF at ECF Doc. Nos. 72 and 73. Norris McLaughlin filed its Motion and brief
in support of summary judgment and SUMF at ECF Doc. Nos. 75 and 76. Mr. Ahmed responded
to the motions at ECF Doc. Nos. 83 and 84. Norris McLaughlin and West Coast filed a Joint
Appendix at ECF Doc. No. 71. We refer to the Defendants’ Joint Appendix as “Appx.” Mr. Ahmed
filed supplemental appendices at ECF Doc. Nos. 85 and 86-1. We cite to his appendices using their
ECF docket entry numbers and corresponding pagination.

2 Appx. 35a, 42a.

3 Appx. 133a–148a.

4 Appx. 151a–154a.

5 Appx. 136a.

6 Id.

7 Appx. 13a ¶ 12.

8 Id.

9 Id.

10 Appx. 13a.

11 Appx. 82a, 441a, 476a–479a, 480a–488a.

12 Appx. 11a ¶ 3.

13 Appx. 13a ¶¶ 14, 18.

14 Id. ¶ 18.

15 Appx. 163a–166a.

16 Appx. 496a–498a.
17 Appx. 499a–501a.

18 Id.

19 Appx. 175a.

20 Appx. 216a–220a.

21 Appx. 62a.

22 Appx. 506a. ¶¶ 9, 12.

23 ECF Doc No. 85-1 at 16-17. Mr. Bustamante explained he caught this mistake during the
litigation process. Id. at 17.

24 Appx. 65a–66a.

25 Appx. 66a–67a.

26 Appx. 66a–67a.

27 Appx. 67a–71a.

28 Appx. 71a.

29 Appx. 17a ¶ 43.

30 Appx. 368a–374a.

31 Appx. 509a–513a.

32 Appx. 73a.

33 Appx. 514a–515a.

34 Appx. 74a.

35 Appx. 389a–390a.

36 Appx. 543a.

37 Appx. 541, 544a.

38 Appx. 542a.

39 Appx. 389a–390a.
40 Id.

41 Appx. 391a.

42 Appx. 450a–456a.

43 Appx. 455a.

44 Id.

45 Appx. 123a.

46 Appx. 75a; Appx. 568a.

47 Appx. 116a–117a. In his voicemail, Attorney Somach specifically stated, “Mr. Ahmed, this is
Attorney Rich Somach. You called me this morning about your property that is on the sheriff's
sale list for Wednesday, I think. 2625 Horsham Road, Hatboro. I need you to return my call at
(484) 765-2291 and provide me with an e-mail address so that I can send you wire instructions.
Because if this is to be taken off the list on Wednesday, you need to wire this money to me today
or tomorrow at the latest. Tomorrow by noon. Because if we do not have the money here, we will
not continue the sale. And I'm going to tell you that your payoff is approximately $283,000.
$283,000. So that's what you should be prepared to be sending us. If there’s any question about
that, please call me right away. (484) 765-2291. If I do not hear from you today, then I will assume
you’re not paying this off and it will go to sale on Wednesday as scheduled.” Appx. 457a.

48 Appx. 459a.

49 Appx. 458a.

50 Appx. 119a.

51 Appx. 120a.

52 Appx. 557a–558a.

53 Appx. 410a.

54 Appx. 424a–427a.

55 ECF Doc. No. 1. Mr. Ahmed subsequently filed an amended complaint on October 29, 2020.
ECF Doc. No. 23.

56 ECF Doc. No. 23 ¶¶ 35, 41.

57 Id. ¶¶ 52, 55, 58.
58 ECF Doc. Nos. 27-28.

59 ECF Doc. No. 28-1 at 6–10.

60 Id. at 10–14.

61 See ECF Doc. No. 27-1.

62 ECF Doc. No. 29.

63 Id. at 1 n.2.

64 Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). “Material facts are those ‘that could affect the outcome’ of the proceeding, and ‘a dispute
about a material fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to return
a verdict for the non-moving party.’” Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir.
2017) (quoting Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 2011)). On a motion for summary
judgment, “we view the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant.” Pearson, 850 F.3d at 533-34 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378
(2007)). “The party seeking summary judgment ‘has the burden of demonstrating that the
evidentiary record presents no genuine issue of material fact.’” Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313,
323 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Willis v. UPMC Children’s Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 808 F.3d 638, 643
(3d Cir. 2015)). If the movant carries its burden, “the nonmoving party must identify facts in the
record that would enable them to make a sufficient showing on essential elements of their case for
which they have the burden of proof.” Willis, 808 F.3d at 643 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “If, after adequate time for discovery, the nonmoving party has not met its
burden, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the court must enter summary judgment
against the nonmoving party.” Willis, 808 F.3d at 643 (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-323).

65 West Coast also argues Mr. Ahmed’s debt collection claim fails because Norris McLaughlin is
not a “debt collector” and otherwise incorporates Norris McLaughlin’s arguments as to the debt
collection claim.

66 ECF Doc. No. 72 at 4-7.

67 Id. at 7-8.

68 ECF Doc. No. 83 at 10—14.

69 Id. at 15–16.

70 Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2010)
(quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).

71 Id. at 166 (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284).
72 Id. at 167.

73 No. 10-1619, 2010 WL 2635790, at *2–5 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 2010).

74 Id. at *1.

75 Id. at *4.

76 No. 15-2866, 2016 WL 127543, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2016).

77 Id.

78 Id.

79 Id.

80 Id.

81 Duhaney v. Attorney General of U.S., 621 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing In re Mullarkey,
536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008)).

82 Id.

83 Id. (quoting In re Mullarkey, 536 F.3d at 225).

84 See, e.g., Easley v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 394 F. App’x 946, 948 (3d Cir. 2010); Rhodes
v. U.S. Bank National Ass’n, 238 F. Supp. 3d 648, 651 (E.D. Pa. 2017).

85 Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 417 (3d Cir. 2015).

86 ECF Doc. No. 75-1 at 17–18.

87 Id. at 18. Norris McLaughlin also argues it falls under the process server exception to the “debt
collector” definition, at least with respect to the two notices sent to Mr. Ahmed; the Notice of
Sheriff’s Sale and the Notice of Owner’s Right. The Act specifically exempts from its definition
of debt collector “any person while serving or attempting to serve legal process on any other person
in connection with the judicial enforcement of any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(D). This exception
only applies to those persons who physically serve or attempt to serve legal process. See
Kananavicius v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 15-1823, 2015 WL 5093050, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 28, 2015). It does not extend to those who hire or instruct a process server or those who
prepared the communication served on the consumer. See Flamm v. Sarner & Assocs., P.C., No.
02-4302, 2002 WL 31618443, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2002); Romea v. Heiberger & Assocs., 163
F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 1998). Norris McLaughlin therefore does not fall under this exception.

88 ECF Doc. No. 84 at 11–18.
89 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(6).

90 See Coles v. Zucker Goldberg & Ackerman, No. 14-1612, 2015 WL 4578479, at *6 (D.N.J. July
29, 2015).

91 Id.

92 215 F. App’x 114, 118–20 (3d Cir. 2007).

93 277 F. Supp. 2d 460, 465–66 (E.D. Pa. 2003).

94 Id.

95 Id. at 466.

96 Appx. 542a.

97 Appx. 543a.

98 ECF Doc. No. 75-1 at 18–22.

99 Id.

100 ECF Doc. No. 84 at 21.

101 See Trunzo v. Citi Mortg., 876 F. Supp. 2d 521, 535-36 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (citing DeHart v. U.S.
Bank, N.A. ND, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1056 (D.N.J. 2011)).

102 Id. at 536-37; Chlubicki v. PennyMac Loan Servs. LLC, No. 17-1485, 2018 WL 1251986, at
*2-3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2018).

103 Trunzo, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 536-37.

104 Id.

105 Id. at 537.

106 Id. (further noting “[t]he creation of such a large safe harbor for debt collectors under the [Act]
would seemingly cut against the purpose of the statute, which is to protect consumers and provide
a remedy for those individuals ‘who have been subjected to abusive, deceptive, or unfair debt
collection practices by debt collectors.’”) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a), (b)).

107 Chlubicki 2018 WL 1251986 at *2-3.

108 Id. at *3.
109 ECF Doc. No. 75-1 at 22-25.

110 ECF Doc. No. 84 at 23.

111 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (emphasis added); see also Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.,
137 S. Ct. 1718, 1722 (2017) (explaining this language “by its plain terms … seems to focus our
attention on third party collection agents working for a debt owner …”).

112 See Glover v. F.D.I.C., 698 F.3d 139, 149 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allen ex rel. Martin v. LaSalle
Bank, N.A., 629 F.3d 364, 368 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011)).

113 Id.

114 756 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2014).

115 Id. at 242–43.

116 Id. at 246.

117 Id.

118 Id.

119 No. 04-1346, 2008 WL 275719, at *7–10 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2008).

120 Id. at *8.

121 ECF Doc. No. 75-1 at 25–26.

122 ECF Doc. No. 84 at 23.

123 Brown v. Card Service Center, 464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 2006).

124 Id. (quotations and citations omitted).

125 Id. (citations and quotations omitted).

126 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 201-3(a).

127 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 201-9.2(a).

128 Slapikas v. First American Title Ins. Co., 298 F.R.D. 285, 292 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 7, 2014) (citing
Seldon v. Home Loan Servs., 647 F. Supp. 2d 451, 470 (E.D. Pa. 2009)).

129 See ECF Doc. No. 75-1 at 27-30; ECF Doc. No. 72 at 13-19.
130 ECF Doc. No. 72 at 15–17.

131 ECF Doc. No. 83 at 22–24.

132 Davis v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 13-5396, 2016 WL 427049, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2016) (citing
Hunt v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 538 F.3d 217, 219 (3d Cir. 2008)).

133 Slapikas, 298 F.R.D. at 292 (quoting Slemmer v. McGlaughlin Spray Foam Insulation, Inc.,
No. 12–6542, 2013 WL 3380590, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 8, 2013)).

134 See, e.g., Chandler v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 3d 551, 567-68 (W.D. Pa. 2018).

135 Corsale v. Sperian Energy Corp., 412 F. Supp. 3d 556, 566 (W.D. Pa. 2019) (quoting Porreco
v. Porreco, 811 A.2d 566, 571 (Pa. 2002)).

136 Id. (quoting Emery v. Third Nat’l Bank of Pittsburgh, 162 A. 281, 284 (Pa. 1932)).

137 Plumbers’ Local Union No. 690 Health Plan v. Apotex Corp., No. 16-665, 2017 WL 4235773,
at *7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2017) (quoting City of Phila. v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, No. 90-7064, 1992
WL 98482, at *3 n.4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1992)).

138 Id. at *7–8.

139 Id.

140 Id. at *8.

141 Id.

142 Appx. 78a.

143 Appx. 67a, 71a.

144 Appx. 119a.

145 Id.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10401051. Public record. Not legal advice.