# Parker v. CENLAR FSB

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · January 4, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10400241

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** January 4, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10400241

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that plaintiff could advance retaliation claim under § 1981 after suffering retaliation for complaining about the violation of another person’s rights

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JARVIS PARKER,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 20-02175
v.
CENLAR FSB, a subsidiary of Cenlar
Capital Corporation,
Defendant.
PAPPERT, J. January 4, 2021
MEMORANDUM
Jarvis Parker sued Cenlar FSB alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act. He has amended his complaint twice and Cenlar now
moves to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. The Court denies in part and grants
in part Cenlar’s Motion for the reasons that follow.
I
In October of 2019, Parker sought temporary employment through firstPRO,
Inc., an employment agency in Philadelphia. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 25.)
FirstPro placed Parker with Cenlar, a savings and loan holding company, where he
worked as a Technical Project Manager from October until March of 2020. (Id. at ¶¶ 5,
9). Parker did not have an employment contract with Cenlar. Instead, firstPRO and
Cenlar contracted with one another. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Pursuant to that agreement, Cenlar
paid firstPRO $75 for each hour Parker worked. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Presumably, firstPRO
would then pay Parker all or some of that total. Despite this indirect payment
structure, Parker alleges that he did not accept work assignments from firstPRO and
worked only at Cenlar’s offices performing work in Cenlar’s normal course of business.
(Id. at ¶ 10.) Cenlar provided him materials necessary to perform his job functions,
controlled when and for how long he worked and “directed [his] daily employment

activities.” (Id.) Cenlar’s employees supervised Parker, provided any necessary
training and verified his hours worked. (Id.)
Parker claims that as one of eight Technical Project Managers at Cenlar, his job
performance was “outstanding.” (Id. at ¶ 12.) In fact, Parker was so well-regarded at
Cenlar that his direct supervisor, Henry Lieb, discussed full-time employment with him
in late January of 2020. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Lieb and Parker discussed a six-figure salary, job
duties and where Parker might work if hired full-time. (Id.) Parker told Lieb that he
enjoyed working at Cenlar and would accept a full-time position if offered. (Id.) Then
Parker informed a firstPRO employee that Cenlar intended to hire him. (Id.)
This positive development notwithstanding, Parker, who is African-American,

was allegedly the target of racial discrimination by Cenlar’s Vice President of
Technology, Michael Rainer. (Id. at ¶ 26.) In November, January and February,
Parker lodged verbal complaints with Lieb about Rainer’s conduct. (Id.) Lieb took no
action in response. (Id.) In early February, shortly after Parker discussed full-time
employment with Lieb, Parker verbally complained to both Lieb and Lieb’s supervisor,
Margaret Boutcher, about Rainer’s conduct. (Id.) Lieb and Boutcher did not
investigate the complaint or follow any normal company procedures. (Id.) Instead,
they “blamed” Parker for the situation with Rainer and began treating him “differently
and worse” than before he complained. (Id.)
On March 10, Parker learned that a professor at the Rutgers University
Business School, where he was a student, tested positive for COVID-19. (Id. at ¶¶ 18–
19.) Two days later, he emailed Lieb and Boutcher to share this news, but claims he
told them that he did not attend in-person classes at the school. (Id. at ¶ 20.) When

Parker reported for work the next day, Lieb told him he should work remotely,
seemingly because of the possibility that he was exposed to COVID-19. (Id. at ¶ 21.)
But as Parker was leaving, Lieb asked him to return his laptop, preventing him from
working remotely. (Id.)
On March 17, Cenlar terminated Parker, citing a lack of work. (Id. at ¶ 23.)
Contrary to that position, however, Parker was working on two projects at the time,
and Cenlar hired a non-African-American Technical Project Manager a few weeks later
and continued to advertise for open Technical Project Manager positions in May and
June. (Id. at ¶ 25.) When Cenlar terminated Parker, he was the longest-tenured and
only African-American Technical Project Manager. (Id. at ¶¶ 13–14.) Cenlar did not

terminate any other Technical Project Managers at the time it fired Parker. (Id. at
¶ 25.)
Parker claims Cenlar violated Title VII and the PHRA when it terminated him
based on his race and in retaliation for complaining of racial discrimination (Counts I
and II). (Id. at ¶ 34.) Parker also contends Cenlar violated § 1981 by abandoning its
intention to hire him as a full-time employee after he complained of racial
discrimination (Count III). (Id. at ¶¶ 44–45.) In the alternative, he argues Cenlar
violated § 1981 by discriminating against him as an independent contractor or that he
was an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract between firstPRO and Cenlar,
which prohibited racial discrimination and retaliation. (Id. at ¶¶ 47–48.) Next, Parker
claims Cenlar violated the ADA and PHRA by terminating him based on a perceived
disability—exposure to COVID-19 (Counts IV and V). (Id. at ¶ 54.) Finally, Parker
advances a claim for intentional infliction of emotion distress, claiming Cenlar’s

“extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly caused [him] severe
emotional distress” (Count VI). (Id. at ¶ 68.)
Cenlar moves to dismiss all claims, arguing Parker failed to exhaust his
remedies under the PHRA and that he fails to state a claim for relief on any of the
claims. (Mot. to Dism. Sec. Am. Compl. 3–4, ECF No. 26-1.)
II
To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially

plausible when the facts pled “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that
[a] defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “[W]here the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is
entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
When the complaint includes well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court “should
assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). However, this “presumption of truth attaches only to
those allegations for which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible
on their face.” Schuchardt v. President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016)
(internal quotation and citation omitted). “Conclusory assertions of fact and legal
conclusions are not entitled to the same presumption.” Id. This plausibility

determination is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on
its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. (quoting Connelly, 809 F.3d at 786–87).
III
A
In Counts I and II respectively, Parker alleges that Cenlar violated Title VII and
the PHRA by terminating him based on his race and in retaliation for complaining
about discrimination.1
1
Title VII forbids race-based discrimination by employers and other entities. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)–(d). Parker alleges that Cenlar was his employer and

discriminated against him on the basis of race and retaliated against him.
“Accordingly, in order to prevail on his Title VII claim, he must demonstrate the
existence of an ‘employment relationship’” with Cenlar. Faush v. Tuesday Morning,
Inc., 808 F.3d 208, 212 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Covington v. Int’l Ass’n of Approved
Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 2013)). To determine whether a
plaintiff has established an employment relationship for purposes of Title VII, the
Third Circuit applies the test announced in Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503

1 Courts assess Title VII and PHRA claims under the same legal standard. Fasold v. Justice,
409 F.3d 178, 184 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005); Ahern v. Eresearch Tech., Inc., 183 F. Supp. 3d 663, 668 (E.D.
Pa. 2016).
U.S. 318 (1992). Faush, 808 F.3d at 213. The non-exhaustive list of factors courts
consider under Darden includes
the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the
location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties;
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the
hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how
long to work; the method of payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and
paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the
hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of
employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.

Darden, 503 U.S. at 323–24 (quotation marks and citation omitted). No single factor is
determinative. Courts must consider “all of the incidents of the relationship.” Id. at
324 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Parker’s allegations in Paragraph 10 of the
Second Amended Complaint closely follow this list of factors. Although those
allegations appear fairly conclusory, it is plausible that Cenlar, not firstPRO, would
control Parker’s day-to-day employment activities, set and control his hours, and
supervise him. Moreover, like in Faush, Cenlar did not pay firstPRO a fixed rate for
Parker’s services. Instead, Cenlar paid firstPRO “for each hour worked by [Parker] at
an agreed-upon hourly rate.” Faush, 808 F.3d at 215–16. Thus, at this early stage of
the litigation, Parker has satisfied his burden of alleging facts that establish an
employment relationship with Cenlar.
2
To survive a motion to dismiss on his racial discrimination claim, Parker must
also plead sufficient factual matter to permit the reasonable inference that he
experienced an adverse employment action because of his race. See Golod v. Bank of
Am. Corp., 403 F. App’x 699, 702 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Goosby v. Johnson & Johnson
Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 318–19 (3d Cir. 2000)); see also Huggins v. Coatesville Area
Sch. Dist., No. 07-4917, 2008 WL 4072801, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2008) (“[A] plaintiff
need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination in order to survive a motion to
dismiss because a prima facie case is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading
standard.”). An inference of discrimination may be developed “in a number of ways,

including, but not limited to, comparator evidence, evidence of similar racial
discrimination of other employees, or direct evidence from statements or actions by
[plaintiff’s] supervisor suggesting racial animus.” Golod, 403 F. App’x at 703 n.2 (citing
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511–12 (2002)).
Parker alleges Rainer subjected him to racial discrimination. When he
complained to Lieb and Boutcher, they failed to investigate the claims, blamed Parker
and began treating Parker worse than before he reported Rainer’s conduct. Then
Cenlar fired him, citing a lack of work, before hiring a non-African-American
replacement the next month. When Cenlar fired Parker, he was the only African-
American, and longest tenured, Technical Project Manager. Although these facts more

readily support a retaliation claim, at this early stage of the litigation they nudge the
discrimination “claim[] across the line from conceivable to plausible,” albeit just barely.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Cenlar is free, of course, to renew its argument on a fuller
record at summary judgment.
3
Title VII also makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee
for opposing the employer's discriminatory conduct or for bringing or supporting an
action arising from the employer’s discriminatory conduct. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). To
state a claim for retaliation under Title VII, Parker must allege that: (1) he engaged in
a protected activity, (2) Cenlar took an adverse action against him and (3) there was a
causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.
Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340–41 (3d Cir. 2006).
Formal and informal complaints of discrimination constitute protected activity

under Title VII. See Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of New Jersey, 260 F.3d 265,
288 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he complaints to [defendant], whether oral or written, formal or
informal, are sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the prima facie case, provided the
complaints expressed [plaintiff]’s opposition to a protected activity under Title VII.”).
Parker claims he verbally complained to Lieb three times and that he complained once
to both Lieb and Boutcher. If true, these complaints would be protected activity.
Parker undoubtedly suffered an adverse employment action; he was terminated.
Thus, the only remaining thing Parker must establish is a causal connection between
his complaints and his termination. Parker need not prove but-for causation at this
early stage of the litigation to satisfy the final element. See Carvalho-Grevious v.

Delaware State University, 851 F.3d 249, 258–60 (3d Cir. 2017). Instead, the Court
considers whether Parker alleged facts “from which a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that [his] engagement in a protected activity was the likely reason for the
adverse employment action.” Id. at 261. Although Parker’s Second Amended
Complaint provides several possible explanations for his termination, he has met his
burden at this early stage of the litigation. He claims Lieb and Boutcher blamed him
and treated him poorly after he complained of Rainer’s misconduct. He also alleges
inconsistencies with Cenlar’s purported reason for firing him (lack of work) and its
conduct thereafter (hiring a replacement). Accepting all of Parker’s allegations as true,
he plausibly states a causal connection between his complaints and Cenlar’s decision to
terminate him.
4
Cenlar argues the Court must dismiss Parker’s PHRA claims for another reason:

because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by dual-filing his EEOC
charge with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. Cenlar supports this
claim by showing Parker did not check the “FEPA” box on his EEOC charge. (Mot. to
Dism. at 2); (Mot. to Dism., Ex. C.) Pennsylvania law requires plaintiffs to exhaust
administrative remedies under the PHRA before filing a civil action in court. 43 Pa.
Con. Stat. § 962(c)(1); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 925 (3d Cir. 1997).
Under the PHRA, when a claimant files a discrimination claim with the PHRC, it has
exclusive jurisdiction over the claim for one year; a complainant may not file a lawsuit
during that period. 43 Pa. Con. Stat. § 962(c)(1). Unlike the process under Title VII, a
notice of the right to sue is not required to bring a PHRA claim; rather, once the one-

year period has expired, a complainant may file suit notwithstanding the fact that he
has not received a letter from the PHRC. Burgh v. Borough Council of Borough of
Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2001).
Although Parker did not check the FEPA box, he did clearly indicate his intent
to file his charge with both the PHRC and the EEOC by writing in “Pennsylvania
Human Relations Commission” on his charge. (Mot. to Dism., Ex. C.) Still, he has not
exhausted his administrative remedies under the PHRA. He filed his charge on July
31, 2020. (Id.) He filed the Second Amended Complaint on November 2, 2020 and does
not allege that he received a right to sue letter from the PHRC. (ECF No. 25.) Thus,
the PHRC retains exclusive jurisdiction over his PHRA claims until July 31, 2021.
Courts in the Third Circuit take a flexible approach to PHRA exhaustion
requirements, allowing plaintiffs to maintain PHRA claims if the period of exhaustion

expires during the pendency of the litigation. Eldridge v. Municipality of Norristown,
828 F. Supp. 2d 746, 758 (E.D. Pa. 2011). District courts may therefore allow plaintiffs
to amend their complaints after the mandatory one-year period has elapsed. See, e.g.,
Logan v. In-Ter-Space Servs., Inc., 2007 WL 2343868 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2007). Parker’s
PHRA claims for racial discrimination and retaliation in Count II are dismissed
without prejudice to his right to amend his Second Amended Complaint after July 31,
2021.
B
In Count III, Parker alleges Cenlar’s decision not to hire him as a full-time
employee violated § 1981. Section 1981 “protects the equal right of ‘[a]ll persons within

the jurisdiction of the United States’ to ‘make and enforce contracts’ without respect to
race.” Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 474–75 (2006) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a)). “Section 1981 offers relief when racial discrimination blocks the
creation of a contractual relationship . . . so long as the plaintiff . . . would have rights
under the . . . proposed contractual relationship.” Id. at 476.
1
Parker claims racial discrimination motivated Cenlar’s decision not to form an
employment contract with him. To establish a right to relief under § 1981, Parker must
show that (1) he is a member of a racial minority; (2) Cenlar intentionally discriminated
against him on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination concerned his right to make
and enforce contracts. See Pryor v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 569
(3d Cir. 2002); Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 181–82 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he
substantive elements of a claim under section 1981 are generally identical to the

elements of an employment discrimination claim under Title VII.”) Parker’s racial
discrimination claim under § 1981 survives at this early stage of the litigation for the
same reasons his Title VII claim survives; he alleges just enough facts from which the
Court can reasonably infer that Cenlar interfered with his right to contract with it
because of his race. Parker claims Cenlar initiated discussions about full-time
employment then discontinued those discussions and terminated him after he
complained to Lieb and Boutcher about racial discrimination. And despite citing a lack
of work as the reason for terminating him, Cenlar did not terminate any non-African-
Americans or shorter-tenured Technical Project Managers and hired a non-African-
American replacement weeks later. Again, although these facts more readily suggest

retaliation, they just barely establish that Cenlar interfered with Parker’s right to
make and enforce an employment contract based on his race.
2
Parker also claims Cenlar denied his right to contract in retaliation for his
complaints against Rainer. Section 1981 encompasses retaliation claims. See CBOCS
West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 446 (2008) (holding that plaintiff could advance
retaliation claim under § 1981 after suffering retaliation for complaining about the
violation of another person’s rights). Parker states a plausible retaliation claim under
§ 1981 for the reasons discussed above.2
C
In Counts IV and V respectively, Parker alleges Cenlar violated the ADA and the

PHRA when it terminated him based on its perception that he may have been exposed
to COVID-19. To state a claim for discrimination under the ADA, Parker must show:
(1) he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is otherwise qualified to
perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations
by Cenlar; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment decision as a result of the
discrimination. See Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999).
The ADA defines a disability as: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a
record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42
U.S.C. § 12102(1). Parker argues Cenlar regarded him as being disabled based on his

possible exposure to COVID-19. But this claim fails because, notwithstanding whether
contracting COVID-19 is a disability under the ADA, possible exposure to COVID-19 is
not “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
D
Count VI alleges a claim for IIED. Cenlar contends that Title VII and § 1981
preempt this claim and that, even if they do not, Parker fails to state a claim. (Mot. to

2 Because Parker argues them only in the alternative, the Court will not address his
arguments that Cenlar violated his rights under § 1981 based on his status as an independent
contractor and an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract between firstPRO and Cenlar. See
(Sec. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 47–48).
Dism. at 23–24.) The Court need not determine whether those anti-discrimination
statutes preempt Parker’s claim because he has not stated a claim for IIED.
Under Pennsylvania law the elements of an IIED claim are: “(1) the conduct [of
the defendant] must be extreme and outrageous; (2) it must be intentional or reckless;

(3) it must cause emotional distress; [and] (4) that distress must be severe.” Hoy v.
Angelone, 691 A.2d 476, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), aff’d 720 A.2d 745. Stating an IIED
claim also requires an allegation of some sort of physical injury, harm or illness related
to the distress. Corbett v. Morgenstern, 934 F. Supp. 680, 684 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (citations
omitted). The Court must determine, as an initial matter, if the defendant’s conduct is
so extreme and outrageous to permit recovery. Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d
390, 395 (3d Cir. 1988). Notably, “[i]t is extremely rare to find conduct in the
employment context that will rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to provide a
basis for recovery for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Id.
Courts applying Pennsylvania law have repeatedly found that allegations of

racial discrimination, even when coupled with retaliatory conduct, do not meet the
“extreme and outrageous conduct” standard necessary to state a claim of IIED. See
Hargraves v. City of Phila., No. 05-cv-4759, 2007 WL 1276937, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26,
2007) (collecting cases); see also Lane v. Cole, 88 F. Supp. 2d 402, 406 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(“Invidious discrimination is not alone sufficient to support an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim.”) (citations omitted). Parker alleges Rainer subjected him to
unspecified racial discrimination and that his supervisors treated him “differently and
worse” after he complained. (Sec. Am. Compl. at ¶ 26.) He also claims he was
terminated based on his race and in retaliation for his complaints, and that as a result
of Cenlar’s conduct, he is generally suffering emotional distress, extreme harm, loss of
professional opportunities and other harms. (Id. at ¶¶ 26, 29–30.)
Parker’s alleged treatment was no more severe than allegations in other cases in
this district in which IIED claims have been dismissed. See, e.g., Watkins v. Pa. Bd. of

Prob. & Parole, No. 02-cv-2881, 2002 WL 32182088, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2002)
(dismissing IIED claim where plaintiff alleged pattern of racial discrimination in
workplace and termination based on race because the “harassment alleged [did] not
satisfy the element of extreme and outrageous conduct required to state this cause of
action”); Juisti v. City of Chester, No. 18-cv-2317, 2018 WL 5249930, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Oct.
22, 2018) (dismissing IIED claim where plaintiff “was ridiculed, disciplined without
merit, and denied favorable shifts to the point that he resigned his employment”);
Coney v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., No. 97-cv-2419, 1997 WL 299434, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May
29, 1997) (“[H]ighly provocative racial slurs and other discriminatory incidents do not
amount to actionable outrageous conduct.”).

Racial discrimination should certainly never be part of a workplace environment,
but, as alleged here, it does not rise to the level of “the most clearly desperate and ultra
extreme conduct” required to support an IIED claim under Pennsylvania law. Hoy v.
Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 754 (Pa. 1998). Furthermore, Parker’s bald, conclusory legal
allegations that he suffered generic harms, like “mental anguish,” are insufficient to
state a plausible claim of IIED.
IV
A court should grant a plaintiff leave to amend a complaint “when justice so
requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Third Circuit has instructed district courts to
“offer amendment—irrespective of whether it is requested—when dismissing a case for
failure to state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee
Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). After Cenlar
moved to dismiss, Parker amended his initial complaint under Rule 15(a)(1)(B). See

(Am. Compl., ECF No. 7). Then, after Cenlar’s Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint, Parker’s Response and Cenlar’s Reply, Parker sought leave to file a Second
Amended Complaint. See (Mot. for Leave to File a Sec. Am. Compl., ECF No. 18). The
Court granted leave to amend. (ECF No. 24.) Still, Parker fails to state claims for
relief for disability discrimination under the ADA and the PHRA, or IIED under
Pennsylvania law. Because Parker has had three chances to plead these claims, one of
which came after full briefing on a motion to dismiss, the Court dismisses them with
prejudice.
An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:
__/s_/_ G__e_r_a_l_d_ _J_._ P__a_p__p_e_r_t_
GERALD J. PAPPERT, J.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10400241. Public record. Not legal advice.