# HURDLE v. DANTOS

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · November 17, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10399980

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** November 17, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10399980

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that district courts should dismiss complaints under the PLRA with leave to amend “unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RAMELL SCOTT HURDLE :
Plaintiff :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-CV-5595
:
JUDGE MARIA L DANTOS, et al., :
Defendants :

M E M O R A N D U M
QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J. NOVEMBER 17, 2020
Plaintiff Ramell Scott Hurdle, a pretrial detainee being held at Lehigh Count Prison
(“LCP”), filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on allegations related to his
placement in segregation. Hurdle names as Defendants Judge Maria L. Dantos, of the Lehigh
County Court of Common Pleas, Lehigh County Senior Deputy District Attorney Robert William
Schopf, LCP Warden Kyle Russell, and LCP Deputy Warden Steven Miller. Hurdle seeks to
proceed in forma pauperis and has submitted a copy of his institutional account statement. For
the reasons set forth, the Court will grant Hurdle leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss
his Complaint, in part, with prejudice, and, in part, without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Hurdle’s allegations are brief. He asserts that June 30, 2020, Defendant Schopf filed a
motion before Judge Dantos to restrict Hurdle’s communications. (ECF No. 2 at 4.)1 Shortly
thereafter, on July 6, 2020, Hurdle was placed in segregation and no corrections officers could tell

1 The Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.
him why. (Id.) He was denied permission to call his attorney on seven occasions between July
10, 2020 and September 15, 2020 while he was in segregation. (Id.)
Hurdle received a hearing at LCP on August 27, 2020. The hearing was conducted by
Defendant Miller, Lt. Albert and Case Manager Leadbedder. (Id.) Hurdle asked to contact his

lawyer and his family and to be moved to a different unit. (Id.) He also asked for mental health
services and access to legal research and hygiene products. (Id.) Miller denied his requests. (Id.)
Hurdle asserts that Defendants Schopf and Dantos violated his civil rights by preventing him from
communicating with his attorney. (Id.) He asserts that Defendants Russell and Miller violated his
civil rights by placing him in segregation. (Id.)
A review of public records confirms that Hurdle was arrested on May 15, 2019 on charges
of trafficking in individuals and prostitution related charges, see Commonwealth v. Hurdle, CP-
39-CR-0002509-2019 (C.P. Lehigh). Defendant Dantos was the judge initially assigned to CP-
39-CR-0002509-2019 and conducted Hurdle’s arraignment and bail hearing. Defendant Schopf is
the district attorney listed as prosecuting the case. Hurdle was represented by Attorney Steven

Mills, but counsel was later granted leave to withdraw and, after Hurdle proceeded pro se for a
brief period, he was represented by Attorney Richard Webster as of February 26, 2020. Attorney
David Knight entered an appearance for Hurdle on May 18, 2020.
Hurdle posted bail on May 7, 2020. However, on May 26, 2020, the Commonwealth filed
an emergency motion to revoke bail and Judge Dantos granted the motion the same day. The
reason for the emergency motion appears to be Hurdle’s arrest on May 22, 2020 on charges of
strangulation and harassment, see Commonwealth v. Hurdle, CP-39-CR-0002577-2020 (C.P.
Lehigh). Defendant Schopf is listed as the district attorney on that case as well and Hurdle is
represented by Attorney Knight. The docket for the 2020 case notes a sealed entry by Judge Dantos
on June 30, 2020. The date of the sealed order is the same date Hurdle alleges that Judge Dantos
approved a motion filed by Defendant Schopf to restrict Hurdle’s communications.
Hurdle asserts claims under the Civil Rights Act for violations of his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. He seeks money damages.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court grants Hurdle leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that he is
incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action.2 Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) applies, which requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a
claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the
same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to
determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations
omitted). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Id. As Hurdle is proceeding pro se, the Court
construes his allegations liberally. Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011).
III. DISCUSSION

The vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal court is
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code, which provides, in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

2 However, as Hurdle is a prisoner, he will be obligated to pay the filing fee in installments
in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the Constitution and/or laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988).

A. Claims Against Judge Dantos
Hurdle has named Judge Dantos as a Defendant because she entered an order in his criminal
case. This claim is not plausible. Judges are entitled to absolute immunity from civil rights claims
that are based on acts and/or omissions taken in their judicial capacity, so long as they do not act
in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978);
Harvey v. Loftus, 505 F. App’x 87, 90 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d
302, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). An act is taken in a judge’s judicial capacity if it is “a
function normally performed by a judge.” Gallas v. Supreme Ct. of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d
Cir. 2000). Moreover, “[g]enerally . . . ‘where a court has some subject matter jurisdiction, there
is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes.’” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443-44

(3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1122 (6th Cir. 1997)).
Because the claim for money damages against Judge Dantos is based on actions taken in
her judicial capacity in Hurdle’s criminal case over which she unquestionably had jurisdiction, she
is immune from Hurdle’s civil rights claim. Therefore, the claim against her is dismissed, with
prejudice.
B. Claims Against DA Schopf
Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for acts that are
“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process” such as “initiating a
prosecution and . . . presenting the State’s case.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31
(1976). Absolute immunity extends to the decision to initiate a prosecution, Imbler, 424 U.S. at
431, including “soliciting false testimony from witnesses in grand jury proceedings and probable
cause hearings,” Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1465 (3d Cir. 1992), presenting a state’s
case at trial, Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, and appearing before a judge to present evidence. Fogle v.

Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 2020). Further, District Attorneys and other supervisory
prosecutors are likewise entitled to absolute immunity from claims based on their role in pursuing
a prosecution on behalf of the Commonwealth. See Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 348-
49 (2009).
Hurdle’s claim against Defendant Schopf is based on Schopf filing a motion with Judge
Dantos in Hurdle’s criminal case. This clearly falls within the ambit of acts “intimately associated
with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” The motion was filed after the criminal charges
were initiated and presented to Judge Dantos to seek relief for the Commonwealth. While the
exact nature of the sealed motion is unclear from the public record, it is clear Schopf was acting
as an advocate for the Commonwealth when the motion was filed. Accordingly, he is immune and

the claims against him are dismissed, with prejudice.
C. Claims Against Russell and Miller
Hurdle has named LCP Warden Kyle Russell as a Defendant and, other than listing him in
the caption, Hurdle’s only allegation against Russell is that, as Warden, he “imposed this violation
thus violating me once more by housing me on a punishment unit.” (ECF No. 2 at 4.) Miller
allegedly conducted the hearing and denied Hurdle’s requests to contact his lawyer and his family,
to be moved to a different unit, and for mental health services, access to legal research and hygiene
products. (Id.)
1. Placement in Segregation
To the extent Hurdle’s allegations attempt to assert a claim involving his placement in
segregation and the denial of his request thereafter to be moved to a different unit, the claim is not
plausible. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs claims brought by

pretrial detainees. Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166 (3d Cir. 2005). To establish a basis for
a Fourteenth Amendment violation, a prisoner must allege that his conditions of confinement
amount to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979). Restrictions on pretrial
detainees will constitute punishment prohibited by the Due Process Clause when: (1) “there is a
showing of express intent to punish on the part of [those] [ ] officials”; (2) “the restriction or
condition is not rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive government purpose,” i.e., “if it is
arbitrary or purposeless”; or (3) “the restriction is excessive in light of that purpose.” Steele v.
Cicchi, 855 F.3d 494, 504 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 67-68 (3d
Cir. 2007)) (alterations in original).
“[M]aintaining internal security and order in jails and prisons are ‘legitimate governmental

objectives’” that may justify the placement of a detainee in segregation, and “courts must give
prison officials considerable discretion to manage internal security in their institutions.” Id. In
other words, if officials can articulate a legitimate managerial concern for placement of the
detainee in restricted housing, a substantive due process claim is foreclosed. Stevenson, 495 F.3d
at 69 (“Although the substantive and procedural due process evaluations are distinct, a showing
by the prison officials that a restrictive housing assignment is predicated on a legitimate managerial
concern and is therefore not arbitrary or purposeless, will typically foreclose the substantive due
process inquiry”).
From a procedural standpoint, “[t]he degree of process required varies depending on the
reason for the transfer [to segregated housing], with greater process accorded to prisoners who are
confined for disciplinary infractions than those moved for purely administrative reasons.” Id. at
70. “[T]he procedures required by Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), apply if the restraint

on liberty is imposed for disciplinary reasons; if the restraint is for ‘administrative’ purposes, the
minimal procedures outlined in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) are all that is required.”
Lewis v. Williams, Civ. A. No. 05-013, 2011 WL 2441377, at *17 (D. Del. June 13, 2011) (citing
Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 70). The procedures set forth in Wolff “include the right to receive written
notice of the charges at least 24 hours before the hearing, the opportunity to present witnesses and
documentary evidence, and a written statement of the reasons for the disciplinary action taken and
the supporting evidence.” Kanu v. Lindsey, 739 F. App’x 111, 116 (3d Cir. 2018); see also Quiero
v. Ott, 799 F. App’x 144 at n.6 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Hewitt requires that, within a
reasonable time, a detainee be told the reason for the administrative transfer and given an
opportunity to respond. Steele, 855 F.3d at 507; Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 70 (citations omitted).

Hurdle asserts that he received a hearing after his transfer to segregation that was presided
over by Defendant Miller at which time he had the opportunity to challenge his placement in
segregation. Because he admits that he received all the process that was due under Hewitt, a
procedural due process claim is not plausible. Given Hurdle’s allegations, as well as the public
record concerning the sealed order being entered at approximately the same time as Hurdle was
placed in segregation after his bail was revoked, it appears that any substantive due process claim
based on prison officials’ motivations in placing him in segregation is not plausible since his
segregation appears to have been done for administrative purposes to comply with a judicial order
and there is no allegation by Hurdle that the placement was arbitrary or purposeless. Moreover, if
Hurdle was placed in segregation in response to a judicial order, the defendants taking the action
are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. See Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 782-83 (3d Cir.
2003) (it is well-settled that “action taken pursuant to a facially valid court order receives absolute
immunity from § 1983 lawsuits for damages.”). However, because the Complaint and state court

docket are not entirely clear on the nature of the order, the Court cannot say, at this time, that
Hurdle can never state a plausible substantive due process claim based on his placement in
segregation. Accordingly, the dismissal of this portion of the claim will be without prejudice.
Hurdle is granted leave to file an amended complaint if he is able to cure the defects the Court has
identified in the substantive due process claim.
2. Access to Counsel
“Under the Sixth Amendment, a pretrial detainee has a right to utilize counsel to defend
against a criminal case that the state has brought against him.” Prater v. City of Philadelphia, Civ.
A. No. 11-1618, 2015 WL 3456659, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 1, 2015) (on remand) (citing Benjamin
v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 186 (2d Cir. 2001)). With respect to restrictions on attorney contact with

clients, “[t]he Supreme Court [has] held that ‘inmates must have a reasonable opportunity to seek
and receive the assistance of attorneys’ and that [prison] ‘[r]egulations and practices that
unjustifiably obstruct the availability of professional representation . . . are invalid.’” Id. at 184
(fourth alteration in original) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974)). Thus,
where an institutional restriction impedes a pretrial detainee’s access to criminal counsel, “‘the
practice must be evaluated in the light of the central objective of prison administration,
safeguarding institutional security.’” Id. at 187 (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 547). A prison
regulation restricting a pretrial detainee’s contact with his attorney will be unconstitutional where
it “‘unreasonably burden[s] the inmate’s opportunity to consult with his attorney and to prepare
his defense.’” Id. (quoting Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 133 (2d Cir. 1978)).
Notably, unlike a First Amendment access to the courts claim, discussed below, a claim of
unreasonable interference with a pretrial detainee’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not

require a showing of actual injury. See Benjamin, 264 F.3d at 185 (pretrial detainee has standing
to assert unreasonable interference with Sixth Amendment right even if the interference did not
result in “actual injury”). Although the Third Circuit has not ruled on this issue in a published
opinion, the court in Prater noted that the district court had failed to address the detainee’s Sixth
Amendment interference with right to counsel claim and disagreed with the district court’s implicit
conclusion that the claim required a showing of actual injury. 542 F. App’x at 138, n.5 (affirming
in part on alternate basis) (citing Benjamin, 264 F.3d at 185). As Hurdle alleges that he was denied
permission to call his attorney on seven occasions between July 10, 2020 and September 15, 2020
while he was in segregation, his allegation may be plausible.
However, the only Defendants against whom he seeks to assert this claim are Judge Dantos

and Prosecutor Schopf who are immune from suit. Further, as stated above, if another Defendant
was acting pursuant to a judicial order when he or she barred Hurdle from access to counsel that
person would be entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Because this claim may be viable, the Court
will permit Hurdle to file an amended complaint if he can name a non-immune defendant whose
actions allegedly violated his Sixth Amendment right to contact his criminal counsel.
3. Access to Legal Research
Hurdle mentions that he asked for access to legal research during his hearing, but the
request was denied by Miller. This portion of the claim, which the Court deems to be a claim
alleging a violation of the First Amendment right of access to the courts, see Johnston v. Artist,
Civ. A No. 12-4460, 2013 WL 1164501, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2013) (treating complaint asserting
that access to the prison law library and legal research as an access to courts claim), is not plausible.
“A prisoner making an access-to-the-courts claim is required to show that the denial of
access caused actual injury.” Jackson v. Whalen, 568 F. App’x 85, 87 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam)

(quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996)). This is because the right of access to the
courts “rest[s] on the recognition that the right is ancillary to the underlying claim, without which
a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536
U.S. 403, 415 (2002). In other words, a prisoner claiming that he was denied access to the courts
must allege an injury traceable to the conditions of which he complains. Diaz v. Holder, 532 F.
App’x 61, 63 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of denial of access claims where
plaintiff failed to tie alleged deficiencies in library to harm in underlying action). In general, an
actual injury occurs when a prisoner demonstrates that a “nonfrivolous” and “arguable” claim was
lost because of the denial of access to the courts. Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415. “[T]he underlying
cause of action, . . . is an element that must be described in the complaint.” Id. Furthermore, the

right to access the courts may be satisfied if the plaintiff has an attorney. Diaz, 532 F. App’x at
63 (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 831 (1977) and Peterkin v. Jeffes, 855 F.2d 1021, 1042
(3d Cir. 1988)); see also Prater v. City of Phila., 542 F. App’x 135, 137 n.4 (3d Cir. 2013) (per
curiam).
As Hurdle does not assert that he lost a nonfrivolous and arguable claim as a result of his
placement in segregation, and the public record shows (1) he was represented by counsel during
the time he was in segregation, and (2) his criminal case has not been resolved against him, this
claim is not plausible. As it appears that any attempt to amend this claim would prove futile for
these same two reasons, the claim is dismissed, with prejudice. See Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108, 110 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that district courts should dismiss
complaints under the PLRA with leave to amend “unless amendment would be inequitable or
futile.”).
4. Access to Mental Health Services and Hygiene Products

Finally, Hurdle mentions he asked for access to mental health services and hygiene
products during his hearing. However, he provides no details about his requests, his need for
mental health services, or how he was injured from the lack of hygiene products. As the Court
cannot say at this time that Hurdle can never assert a plausible claim against a non-immune
defendant concerning the denial of mental health services and hygiene products, Hurdle will be
granted leave to amend this portion of his claim as well.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Hurdle’s Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as to all Defendants and all claims. Defendants Dantos
and Schopf are dismissed, with prejudice, and Hurdle’s procedural due process and access to the
courts claims are also dismissed, with prejudice. All other claims against Defendants Russell and
Miller are dismissed, without prejudice, and Hurdle may file an amended complaint if he can cure
the defects the Court has identified in his remaining claims against non-immune
Defendants. An appropriate Order follows.

NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO
Judge, United States District Court

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10399980. Public record. Not legal advice.