# HENDERSON v. MATTHEWS

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · November 9, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10399933

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** November 9, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

HELEN E. HENDERSON, et al. : CIVIL ACTION
:
v. :
:
JUSTIN MATTHEWS, et al. : NO. 19-3040

MEMORANDUM

Bartle, J. November 9, 2020

Plaintiffs Helen Henderson and her son, Ramil Hughes,
bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Philadelphia
Police Officers Justin Matthews, Marcus Baker, and former
Philadelphia Police Officer Brandon Pinkston (“defendants”) for
violations of their rights under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.1 Among other claims, plaintiffs
specifically allege: (1) First Amendment retaliation for
complaining of police misconduct; (2) equal protection violation
(selective treatment); (3) excessive force in violation of the
Fourth Amendment; and (4) false arrest. Before the court is the
motion of defendants for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

1 The City of Philadelphia was also named as a defendant.
The Court has dismissed the city for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. See Henderson, et al. v.
Matthews, et al., Civil Action No. 19-3040 (E.D. Pa. April 29,
2020).
I
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a
reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254
(1986). We view the facts and draw all inferences in favor of
the nonmoving party. See In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig.,
385 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is granted
where there is insufficient record evidence for a reasonable
fact finder to find for the non-movant. See Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 252. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the [nonmoving party]’s position will be
insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could

reasonably find for [that party].” Id.
II
The following facts are undisputed or taken in light
most favorable to plaintiffs. On February 10, 2018 at 3:45
a.m., plaintiff Helen Henderson called the Philadelphia Police
Department to request that police remove Alisha Henderson, her
son’s girlfriend and her homecare aide, from her home. Matthews
and Baker arrived at Helen Henderson’s house and ordered Alisha
Henderson to leave. At around 4:22 a.m., police were alerted a
second time of a disturbance at the home of Helen Henderson.
Matthews, Baker, and Pinkston arrived at the scene and observed
Alisha Henderson lying motionless on the floor, surrounded by
blood. Officers Eric Miller and Samira Rasheed had arrived

earlier and were also inside the home, attending to Alisha
Henderson. Helen Henderson was not present in the house when
the officers arrived. The officers then put Alisha Henderson in
an ambulance so that she could receive medical care.
When the officers arrived at the scene, they
encountered plaintiff Helen Henderson’s son, plaintiff Hughes,
inside of the home with blood on his shirt. He stated to the
officers, “look what my mom did to my girl.” The officers
handcuffed Hughes because he was upset, had blood on his
clothes, and it was not clear what transpired or if Hughes was
involved in the attack. After he was questioned and calmed

down, the officers removed Hughes’s handcuffs.
Sometime thereafter, Baker observed Helen Henderson
exit the home of a neighbor, located at 5150 Reno St. She
confessed to striking Alisha Henderson over the head with a
bottle of wine. After her confession, Helen Henderson was
handcuffed and taken into custody for aggravated assault.
Miller then transported Hughes to the Southwest
Detective Division for further questioning. During his
interview with Detective McDermott, Hughes stated that after the
officers left the first time, Helen Henderson let Alisha
Henderson back into the house, and they began arguing. At some
point, Hughes went to the bathroom and when he came out, Alisha

Henderson was on the floor bleeding and his mother, Helen
Henderson, was missing.
Following her arrest around 5:30 a.m., Helen Henderson
was taken to the Penn Presbyterian Medical Center emergency
department under police custody. During her medical
examination, she admitted to consuming half a gallon of rum
during the day before the altercation with Alisha Henderson and
being under the influence of marijuana. Her medical records
disclosed that she also “mention[ed] right foot pain.” At 8:10
a.m., an x-ray of Helen Henderson’s right foot showed a “spiral
fifth metatarsal fracture.” An orthopedic examination and

additional x-rays showed a “mildly comminuted spiral fracture
through the fifth metatarsal shaft with minimal medial and
dorsal displacement of the distal fracture fragment.” As a
result, Helen Henderson was placed in a “non-weight-bearing cast
with crutches” and was given “aspirin for DVT prophylaxis.”
Helen Henderson testified that she had hired Alisha
Henderson to “care for [her], wash clothes, run errands, do
[her] hair, [and] prepare [her] food” through the “First Staff”
government program. She also testified that she has: “a problem
with falling”; “issues with [her] memory”; and “suffers from
postpartum depression.”
III
We first turn to plaintiff Hughes’s false arrest claim

against Baker and Pinkston. Hughes claims that he was arrested
and handcuffed twice on February 10, 2018. He does not
challenge his first arrest, but contends that the second time he
was handcuffed, it was a false arrest because he was:
handcuffed after it was determined he was
not a suspect to any crime, he had already
provided information to the police they
requested, [and] he in no way interfered
with the police investigation or created any
risk of physical injury to anyone.

Defendants deny that Hughes was arrested or handcuffed
a second time. Defendants argue that summary judgment should be
granted with respect to Hughes’s false arrest claim because he
has been inconsistent in identifying which officer arrested him
the second time. Defendants maintain that based on the
undisputed evidence, no reasonable jury could find that either
Baker or Pinkston falsely arrested Hughes.
We first address Hughes’s false arrest claim against
Baker. Plaintiffs first filed their complaint against
defendants on July 12, 2019. The original complaint did not
allege a false arrest claim against any of the defendants. A
few months later, during his deposition on December 19, 2019,
Hughes testified that he was handcuffed a second time and the
officer who handcuffed him was “the other African American
officer. It wasn’t Pinkston this time.” Subsequently,
plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on February 13, 2020,

which stated, in relevant part:
Defendant Baker arrested and handcuffed
Plaintiff Hughes for a substantial period of
time the second time he was handcuffed
February 10, 2018 without probable cause or
due to needs of investigation safety or any
other legitimate law enforcement interest.

See Doc. # 18. On July 1, 2020, plaintiffs filed a motion for
leave to file another amended complaint in which they continued
to allege that Baker arrested Hughes the second time. The court
denied plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a second amended
complaint on August 25, 2020 for reasons that had nothing to do
with the allegations against Baker. See Doc. # 75.
Discovery proceeded and plaintiffs filed a partial
motion for summary judgment on September 11, 2020 and defendants
filed their motion for summary judgment on September 14, 2020.
In their motion for partial summary judgment, plaintiffs
reiterated that Baker arrested Hughes the second time.
Nevertheless, on October 2, 2020, Hughes submitted a
signed affidavit dated October 1, 2020 as an exhibit to
plaintiffs’ response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
In that affidavit he swore, “Pinkston later handcuffed me a
second time.” Hughes provided no explanation for this sudden
change refuting his allegations against Baker. On October 29,
2020, Hughes submitted another affidavit dated October 21, 2020,
this time stating that his previous recollection at his

deposition that “it wasn’t Pinkston” who arrested him a second
time, “was a mistake” and that “now [he] want[s] to tell the
truth.”
It is undisputed that through these two affidavits,
Hughes admits that Baker did not arrest him a second time.
Indeed, Hughes states, “Baker did not handcuff me.” The court
will grant the motion of defendant Baker for summary judgment on
Hughes’s false arrest claim based on the ground that Hughes now
admits that Baker did not arrest him the second time.
With respect to Pinkston, Hughes’s affidavit dated
October 1, 2020 is the first time plaintiffs claim that Pinkston

falsely arrested Hughes the second time. This is a significant
change of material fact and directly contradicts Hughes’s
testimony that, “it wasn’t Pinkston this time.” Our Court of
Appeals has held that, “a party may not create a material issue
of fact to defeat summary judgment by filing an affidavit
disputing his or her own sworn testimony without demonstrating a
plausible explanation for the conflict. Hackman v. Valley
Fair, 932 F.2d 239, 241 (3d Cir. 1991). When a party does not
explain the contradiction between the subsequent affidavit and
the prior deposition, the “alleged factual issue in dispute can
be perceived as a sham, thereby not creating an impediment to a
grant of summary judgment based on the deposition.” See Baer v.
Chase, 392 F.3d 609, 624 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and

citations omitted). The “sham affidavit” doctrine refers to a
trial courts’ “practice of disregarding an offsetting affidavit
that is submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
when the affidavit contradicts the affiant’s prior deposition
testimony.” Id. (Internal quotations and citations omitted).
Here, Hughes provided no explanation for this
contradictory change of material fact when he submitted his
affidavit. Only after this was pointed out by defendants in
their response, on October 29, 2020, Hughes filed another
affidavit dated October 21, 2020, stating that his previous
recollection at his deposition “was a mistake” and that “now

[he] want[s] to tell the truth.” We are not convinced.
Plaintiffs waited far too long to seek to amend their complaint
and provide no reasonable explanation for their undue delay.
“If a party who has been examined at length on deposition could
raise an issue of fact simply by submitting an affidavit
contradicting his own prior testimony, this would greatly
diminish the utility of summary judgment as a procedure for
screening out sham issues of fact.” Id. (quoting Perma Research
& Development Co. v. Singer Co., 410 F.2d 572, 577–78 (2d Cir.
1969)). We deem Hughes’s affidavit to be a sham. Thus Hughes
has no claim against Pinkston.2
IV
We turn next to plaintiffs Helen Henderson and Ramil

Hughes’s First Amendment retaliation claim. The First Amendment
prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to
retaliatory actions for engaging in protected speech. Hartman
v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006). To prevail on a § 1983
First Amendment retaliation claim, plaintiff must prove that:
(1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, (2) the
defendant engaged in retaliatory action sufficient to deter a
person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional
rights, and (3) a causal link [existed] between the
constitutionally protected conduct and the retaliatory action.
Palardy v. Twp. of Millburn, 906 F.3d 76, 80–81 (3d Cir. 2018)

(internal quotations omitted).
Defendants argue that this court should grant summary
judgment in their favor on the First Amendment retaliation issue

2 On November 4, 2020, this court denied the motion of
plaintiffs for leave to file a second amended complaint alleging
that Pinkston and not Baker handcuffed Hughes the second time.
It did so on the ground that plaintiffs did not meet the
standard for relation back set forth under Rule 15(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Doc. # 95.
because plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they engaged
in a protected activity at the time of the alleged retaliatory
conduct or that defendants were motivated by retaliatory animus.
According to defendants, plaintiffs have “set forth zero
instances” where they had protested police misconduct or
otherwise engaged in protected speech.

Plaintiffs counter that they were retaliated against
because they both complained to the officers about the way the
investigation into the altercation between Helen Henderson and
Alisha Henderson was handled. Plaintiffs maintain that they
were arrested because the officers wanted to “retaliate against
[them], silence [them], cover up their excessive force[,] and
intimidate [them].”
With respect to Helen Henderson’s First Amendment
retaliation claim, it is undisputed that when police officers
arrived at her home the second time, they found Alisha Henderson
lying in a pool of her own blood. It is also undisputed that

when officers encountered Helen Henderson at her neighbor’s
house, she confessed to hitting Alisha Henderson over the head
with a wine bottle. There is simply no evidence in the record
that Helen Henderson’s arrest was motivated by any reason other
than the fact that she had “just smashed a wine bottle over
another woman’s head, knocking her unconscious.” The court
will grant the motion of defendants for summary judgment in
their favor as to Helen Henderson’s claim for First Amendment
retaliation.
With respect to Hughes’s First Amendment retaliation
claim, it is based on his allegation that Baker arrested him the
second time. As discussed above, Hughes admits that Baker did
not arrest him the second time. As a result, the motion of

defendants for summary judgment in their favor as to Hughes’s
claim for First Amendment retaliation will be granted.
V
Defendants also seek summary judgment on Helen
Henderson’s claim of selective treatment in violation of the
equal protection clause. The equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the discriminatory enforcement of
facially valid laws. See Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d
118, 125 (3d Cir. 2005). To establish a selective-enforcement
claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that she was treated
differently from other similarly situated individuals, and (2)

that her selective treatment was based on an unjustifiable
standard, such as race, or religion, or some other arbitrary
factor, or to prevent the exercise of a fundamental right.
Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 184 n.5 (3d Cir.
2010).
The first element, which is “an essential element of a
claim of selective treatment under the Equal Protection Clause,”
requires a plaintiff to present evidence that similarly situated
parties were treated differently than she was. See Startzell v.
City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir. 2008).
“Persons are similarly situated under the Equal Protection
Clause when they are alike in all relevant aspects.” Id.
(Internal citations and quotations omitted).

Defendants maintain that Helen Henderson has failed to
adduce any evidence of different treatment of similarly situated
individuals, or evidence of an unjustifiable standard necessary
for her equal protection claim. Defendants argue that there was
“disparate treatment” between Helen Henderson and Alisha
Henderson (one was arrested and the other was sent to the
hospital) because of the “physical conditions of the [two]
parties,” not some form of selective treatment.
Plaintiffs contend that Alisha Henderson and Helen
Henderson were similarly situated as both were “suspected of a
crime in a physical fight with another” but were treated

differently. According to plaintiffs, “Alisha Henderson was the
aggressor . . . [and] there was probable cause to charge [Alisha
Henderson] with aggravated assault,” and the officers “refused
to do any on the scene investigation.”
As noted above, the undisputed facts establish that
Helen Henderson had smashed a wine bottle on Alisha Henderson’s
head and police found Alisha Henderson lying on the floor “in a
pool of her own blood.” It is also undisputed that Alisha
Henderson needed immediate medical care. Helen Henderson on the
other hand, had no visible injuries when police first
encountered her at her neighbor’s house.
Even if Helen Henderson had successfully alleged
selective treatment, which she has not, there is no evidence

that her selective treatment was based on an unjustifiable
standard, such as race, or religion, or some other arbitrary
factor to prevent the exercise of a fundamental right. Indeed,
both individuals identify as African American women.
Accordingly, the court will grant the motion of
defendants for summary judgment in their favor on the issue of
selective treatment in violation of the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
VI
Finally, there is Helen Henderson’s excessive force
claim against the defendants. A claim that a police officer

used excessive force during a seizure is “properly analyzed
under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard.”
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). While “the
reasonableness of an officer’s actions is a pure question of
law,” we can only move to that analysis at the summary judgment
stage “once we identify the relevant facts and draw all
inferences in the non-movant’s favor.” Johnson v. City of
Philadelphia, 837 F.3d 343, 349 (3d Cir. 2016).
We first address the excessive force claim against
Baker. The operative amended complaint (Doc. # 18) alleges
that:
Defendants Matthews, Pinkston and/or Baker
used excessive force against Plaintiff HH in
their arrest and capture of her not
reasonably necessary under the circumstances
and caused her very serious physical injury.

Plaintiffs contend that since the Arrest Report states that
Baker answered the call, showed up at Helen Henderson’s house,
and was present during the arrest, a reasonable jury can infer
that he was involved in the “physical apprehension” of Helen
Henderson. This is mere speculation. There is no evidence that
identifies Baker as using excessive force against Helen
Henderson. Indeed, plaintiffs’ own eyewitness, Hughes, does not
identify Baker as one of the officers who “pulled” his mother
down the steps of their neighbor’s home. Aside from the
conclusory allegation in the complaint stated above, there is no
evidence to suggest otherwise. The motion of defendant Baker
for summary judgment will be granted with respect to the
excessive force claim.
Helen Henderson also contends that Matthews and
Pinkston used excessive force when they arrested her and caused
her to suffer a broken foot. According to the amended
complaint, the officers:
Very quickly without warning–without
attempting to first handcuff plaintiff
[Helen Henderson]–grabbed her, each one
grabbing one arm or hand, forcefully
hurrying her walking forward, using so much
unnecessary force that they caused her to
fall on stairs as they escorted her, and
suffer a mildly comminated [sic] spiral
fracture through the fifth metatarsal shaft
of her right foot with medial and dorsal
displacement of the distal fracture fragment
and suffer an injury to her back.

Helen Henderson testified at her deposition that she did not
recall which officers arrested her. She did remember that after
she was escorted out of her neighbor’s house, she “blank[ed] out
. . . until [she] felt pain . . . in [her] foot . . . and [she]
couldn’t get up and [the officers] had to pick [her] up.”
Hughes testified that he was standing outside when he witnessed
Matthews and Pinkston “yanking” and “pulling” Helen Henderson
down the steps of their neighbor’s house. He saw her fall and
watched Matthews and Pinkston carry her to the police car
because she was unable to walk properly. He testified that he
could hear Helen Henderson complain of pain. He also heard
Pinkston ask Matthews, “what did you hit her with?”
Defendants present conflicting evidence.
Specifically, there is inconsistent testimony on the crucial
questions of: (1) whether Matthews and Pinkston physically
apprehended Helen Henderson on February 10, 2018; (2) if they
did, whether they used excessive force; and (3) if excessive
force was used, whether it was the cause of Helen Henderson’s
foot fracture. Genuine disputes of material fact exist as to
these important questions and a reasonable jury could find for
the nonmovant.3

The motion of defendants Matthews and Pinkston for
summary judgment on the excessive force claim will be denied.

3 Under the circumstances, defendants’ claim of qualified
immunity is without merit.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10399933. Public record. Not legal advice.