# LEVIEN v. HIBU PLC

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · July 30, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10399393

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** July 30, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

THOMAS LEVIEN, et al.
CIVIL ACTION
v.
NO. 19-3239
HIBU PLC, et al.

MEMORANDUM RE: MOTION TO DISMISS

Baylson, J. July 27, 2020

I. Introduction
Thomas Levien and James Westhead (“Plaintiffs”) bring this action on behalf of
themselves and a class of similarly situated individuals alleging violations of British law. Plaintiffs
have sued various corporate entities and individuals (collectively, “Defendants”) associated with
the Yell/hibu family of companies, which published the Yellowbook phone and advertising
directory.1 Federal subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity as expanded by the Class
Action Fairness Act. The Amended Complaint states four claims to relief:
• Count One: Deceit under British Common Law, asserted against all
Defendants;

• Count Two: Fraudulent Misrepresentation under Section 2(1) of the British
Misrepresentation Act of 1967, asserted against all Defendants;

• Count Three: Violation of the British Financial Services and Markets Act
(“FSMA”) of 2000, Section 90A, asserted against Defendant hibu plc; and

• Count Four: Negligent Misstatements under British Common Law, asserted
against all Defendants.

1 The original company, “Yell Group plc,” was renamed “hibu plc” in July 2012. For events that
occurred prior to the renaming, this Memorandum will refer to “Yell.” For events that occurred
after the renaming, this Memorandum will refer to “hibu.” Collective references will be to “the
Company” or “Yell/hibu.” The “H” in hibu is not capitalized in hibu’s formal corporate name,
and this Memorandum follows that convention.
On January 6, 2020, Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 9(b) (requirements for pleading fraud); Rule 12(b)(2) (lack of
personal jurisdiction); Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim); Rule 17(b)(2) (corporate capacity to
be sued), and the doctrine of forum non conveniens. (ECF 17.) Plaintiffs responded in opposition,

(ECF 22), and Defendants replied in support, (ECF 25). Oral argument was held on July 20, 2020.
For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, England is the proper forum to hear this case. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss will be granted and the Amended Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.
II. Background

A. Parties
Plaintiffs. There are two named Plaintiffs.
Plaintiff Thomas Levien, a Pennsylvania resident, is a son of a founder of Yellowbook
(the predecessor to Yell/hibu) and was a shareholder and employee of Yell/hibu. (ECF 14, Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 1–3.)
Plaintiff James Westhead, a citizen of the United Kingdom, was a shareholder and the
director of hibu Shareholders Grouping Limited, which was an unincorporated group of members
who held shares in the Company. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4–5.)
Defendants. There are eight Corporate Defendants and nine Individual Defendants in this
action. The Corporate Defendants can be subdivided into United Kingdom entities and United
States entities. The U.K. Corporate Defendants (collectively, “hibu U.K.”) are:
• hibu plc, which was a holding company for various subsidiaries engaged in
the business of selling classified advertising and business directories. hibu
plc succeeded Yell Group plc. (Am. Compl. ¶ 12.) hibu plc was ultimately
dissolved in January 2016.
• hibu Group Limited, which was the successor to hibu plc. (Am. Compl.
¶ 15.)

• hibu (UK) Limited, which was a subsidiary of hibu plc. (Am. Compl. ¶
16.)

• YH Holdings, which was a subsidiary of hibu plc. (Am. Compl. ¶ 18.)

The U.S. Corporate Defendants (collectively, “hibu U.S.”) are:
• hibu Inc., formerly known as Yellowbook, Inc., which was the successor in
interest to the U.S. subsidiary of hibu plc. (Am. Compl. ¶ 19.) hibu Inc. had
“substantial operations” in King of Prussia. (Am. Compl. ¶ 20.)

• hibu (USA) LLC, which was the successor in interest to the U.S. subsidiary of
hibu plc. (Am. Compl. ¶ 22.) hibu (USA) LLC had “substantial operations” in
King of Prussia. (Am. Compl. ¶ 22.)

• hibu of Pennsylvania, Inc., which was the successor in interest to the U.S.
subsidiary of hibu plc. (Am. Compl. ¶ 23.)2 hibu of Pennsylvania, Inc. had
“substantial operations” in King of Prussia. (Am. Compl. ¶ 23.)

• hibu Holdings (USA) Inc., which was the successor in interest to the U.S.
subsidiary of hibu plc. (Am. Compl. ¶ 25.) hibu Holdings (USA) Inc. had
“substantial operations” in King of Prussia. (Am. Compl. ¶ 25.)

The Individual Defendants are:
• The Estate of John Michael Pocock. (Am. Compl. ¶ 28.) During the relevant
time period, Mr. Pocock was Yell’s Chief Executive Officer and a member of
the Board of Directors of Yell, which later became hibu plc. (Am. Compl. ¶
27.)

• Antony Jeffrey Bates, who was the Chief Financial Officer of Yell, which later
became hibu plc. (Am. Compl. ¶ 29.) Mr. Bates was also a member of Yell’s
Board of Directors. (Am. Compl. ¶ 29.)

• Robert Charles Michael Wigley, who was the Chairman of the Board of
Directors of Yell, which later became hibu plc. (Am. Compl. ¶ 30.)

2 Plaintiffs allege, upon information and belief, that hibu (USA) LLC and hibu of Pennsylvania,
Inc. merged into hibu Inc. (Am. Compl. ¶ 24.)
• Elizabeth Grace Chambers, John Bernard Coghlan, Toby Rufus Coppel,
Carlos Espinosa de los Monteros, Kathleen Ruth Flaherty,3 and Richard
Hooper, all of whom were members of Yell’s Board of Directors during the
relevant time. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31–36.)

B. Factual History
Corporate Defendant hibu plc was preceded by Yell Group plc (“Yell”), which produced
and sold advertising directories known as the “Yellowbook.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 69.) The “Yell”
entity was renamed “hibu” in July 2012. (Am. Compl. ¶ 133.) Yell/hibu, a public company, was
traded on the London Stock Exchange. (Am. Compl. ¶ 70.) The events that gave rise to this
litigation occurred over a three-year period from 2010 to 2013.
1. October 2010–January 2011: Efforts to Seek a Buyer for Yell’s
American Businesses

In October 2010, Yell’s Board of Directors requested that Yell’s U.S. subsidiary,
Yellowbook, Inc. (known as hibu Inc. after the Company’s renaming), seek a buyer for the
American businesses. (Am. Compl. ¶ 80.) The effort to solicit buyers was not disclosed to
Plaintiffs or to the shareholders. (Am. Compl. ¶ 82.) Yell subsequently restructured its
management team, which included hiring Defendant Pocock as Yell’s CEO in November 2010.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 83.)
Shortly after, in December 2010, the CEO of Yellowbook, Inc. reported to Yell’s Board
that two offers were made for the purchase of Yell’s American businesses: an offer for “at least”
$1.6 billion and an offer for “up to” $1.9 billion. (Am. Compl. ¶ 88.) Pocock and Yell’s Board
rejected these offers and in January 2011 advised Yellowbook, Inc. that they were no longer
interested in locating a buyer for the American businesses. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 90–91.) The offers

3 Plaintiffs allege, upon information and belief, that Ms. Flaherty passed away in August 2018, and
her Estate has been named as the relevant defendant. (Am. Compl. ¶ 35.)
(and the rejection of the offers) were not disclosed to Yell’s shareholders. (Am. Compl. ¶ 92.)
2. July 2011: The Transition Strategy
Yell retained a consultant, Booz & Co., to help turn the Company around. (Am. Compl. ¶
96.) Booz & Co. devised a program—the “Transition Strategy”—that was designed to focus Yell

on updating the Yellowbook directory to an internet-accessible format. (Am. Compl. ¶ 97.) The
Transition Strategy, which was announced publicly, projected that Yell’s “2011 revenue mix, 75
percent of earnings from print sources and 25 percent from digital sources, would move to 75
percent digital and 25 percent print by 2015.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 100.) Additionally, Yell
communicated projections of “significant overall growth in revenue, earnings, and cash flow” to
shareholders. (Am. Compl. ¶ 100.)
Yell publicized the Transition Strategy “to shareholders and lenders through written
documents and meetings, many of which were held in the United States.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 99.)
Plaintiffs allege that some of the United States meetings were held at the Company’s King of
Prussia location, and that at these meetings Company leadership “cooperated in efforts to push

[C]ompany employees . . . to invest in the future of the [C]ompany by the purchase of its stock.”
(Am. Compl. ¶ 99.)
Notwithstanding the positive predictions for the Transition Strategy, Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants “could not have reasonably believed those projections were achievable.” (Am. Compl.
¶ 101.) Defendants Pocock and Wigley continued to send “unrealistically optimistic” reports to
the Yell Board and to shareholders, exaggerating claims that the Company was making progress
under the Transition Strategy. (Am. Compl. ¶ 106.) Plaintiffs allege that despite knowing the
Transition Strategy “was a failure in every respect,” the Yell Board painted a misleadingly positive
picture of Yell’s financial situation. (Am. Compl. ¶ 106.)
3. 2011–2012: Expressed Optimism Despite Signs of Decline
Plaintiffs allege that despite the Company’s decline, Defendants’ statements and actions
projected optimism about Yell’s profitability. Plaintiffs highlight two specific examples of actions
taken by Defendants that projected a misleading confidence in Yell’s financial viability: a July

2011 Regulatory News Service (“RNS”) announcement, in which Defendant Bates represented
that Yell was “cash generative and profitable,” (Am. Compl. ¶ 113), and a November 2011 RNS
announcement in which Defendant Wigley stated that he was so “convinced about the strength of
the [C]ompany” that he was purchasing £ 1 million in Yell debt, (Am. Compl. ¶ 114).
But as early as March 2012, Plaintiffs allege that Yell began to “transfer significant assets
to subsidiaries and was planning other accounting maneuvers, the undisclosed goal of which was
to enable the [C]ompany to go into administration.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 119.) Plaintiffs allege that
red flags—flags that were not disclosed to shareholders—followed. For example, in Yell’s 2012
Annual Report, the Company portrayed a one-time impairment charge of £ 1.8 billion as a “routine
accounting adjustment.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 124.) Plaintiffs allege that this was “intended to disguise

the [C]ompany’s poor financial condition and its anticipated poor performance in 2013.” (Am.
Compl. ¶ 125.) According to Plaintiffs, the impairment charge “constituted an example of the
stripping of assets from the [C]ompany.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 142.) Plaintiffs point to the Company’s
transfer of “over £ 1.065 billion in cash” to a nontrading subsidiary as another example of the
Company’s efforts to “move assets and steer the [C]ompany toward administration” that was not
disclosed to Plaintiffs. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 143, 144.)
Two other significant events occurred in the summer of 2012.
First, in July 2012 the Company decided to “abandon” its “Yell” name in favor of the
“hibu” name, described by Plaintiffs as “a new, nonsensical and inexplicable lower-case name.”
(Am. Compl. ¶ 133.)
Second, in August 2012, a six-member “Coordinating Committee,” known as “CoCom,”
was constituted to represent the interests of the Company’s lenders. (Am. Compl. ¶ 134.)
4. 2013: hibu Became a Private Company

The Company’s financial deterioration continued into 2013. On July 25, 2013, hibu’s
directors suspended trading of the Company’s stock on the London Stock Exchange and declared
the stock worthless. (Am. Compl. ¶ 151.) Shortly after, the Company announced it had come to
an agreement with CoCom (the committee of lenders): CoCom “agreed to write off £ 800 million
of the total £ 2.3 billion” of the Company’s debt load in exchange for control of the Company and
the elimination of the shareholders’ interests. (Am. Compl. ¶ 152.)
In response to this announcement, and because the Board did not call a meeting of its own,
the shareholders called for an extraordinary general meeting (“EGM”). (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 153–54.)
The Board advised that “if a material number of the new directors proposed by the shareholders
were appointed at the EGM, the [C]ompany expected to place itself into administration.” (Am.

Compl. ¶ 155.) The Board ultimately placed hibu into administration and hibu became a private
company, “hibu Group Limited,” that was controlled by the lenders. (Am. Compl. ¶ 158.)
C. Statements Alleged to be Misleading
The statements that Plaintiffs allege were misleading are set forth in the substantive counts
of the Amended Complaint. The allegedly misleading statements include the following:
• The statement in a July 20, 2011 RNS announcement that “Yell was ‘cash
generative and profitable.’” (Am. Compl. ¶ 166(d); Am. Compl. ¶ 179(d); Am.
Compl. ¶ 200(b); Am. Compl. ¶ 212(d).)

• The statement in a November 15, 2011 RNS announcement that “the
[C]ompany was in a position of financial strength.’” (Am. Compl. ¶ 166(e);
Am. Compl. ¶ 179(e); Am. Compl. ¶ 200(c); Am. Compl. ¶ 212(e).)
• The statement in a July 25, 2012 RNS announcement that hibu plc “was
positioned to fully meet its interest payments and generate sufficient cash to
repay its debts.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 166(m); Am. Compl. ¶ 179(m); Am. Compl.
¶ 200(k); Am. Compl. ¶ 212(m).)

D. Declarations and Affidavit4

Three declarations and one affidavit were submitted in connection with Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss.
Defendants included two declarations in support of their Motion:
• The declaration of Christian Wells. (ECF 18.) Christian Wells is General
Counsel for Defendant Hibu Group Limited. Mr. Wells’ declaration concerns
the organization and structure of the Corporate Defendants.

• The declaration of Lord David Neuberger. (ECF 20.) Lord Neuberger is a
legal expert. His declaration opines on the adequacy of the English courts; the
merits of Plaintiffs’ claims; and hibu plc’s capacity to be sued.

Plaintiffs included one affidavit and one declaration in support of their Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion:
• The affidavit of Thomas Levien. (ECF 23.) Named Plaintiff Thomas Levien
is a former employee of the hibu organization. His declaration discusses the
change in operations after Defendant Pocock assumed the role of CEO.

• The declaration of Susan Ann Laws. (ECF 24.) Susan Laws is a solicitor
admitted to the practice of law in England and Wales. Ms. Laws’ declaration
addresses the company restoration process under English law.

III. Procedural History

Plaintiffs commenced this action on July 25, 2019. (ECF 1.) Defendants moved to dismiss
the original complaint, (ECF 10), following which Plaintiffs timely filed an Amended Complaint,

4 A motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens “may be resolved on affidavits presented by
the parties.” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1988); see also Copia Commc’ns,
LLC v. AMResorts, L.P., No. 16-5575, 2017 WL 4012687, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 11, 2017)
(Baylson, J.) (“Courts often decide the issue of forum non conveniens based only on affidavits
submitted by the parties.”).
(ECF 14). Because the filing of the Amended Complaint mooted the pending Motion to Dismiss,
the Court denied that motion. (ECF 15.)
On January 6, 2020, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint. (ECF 17.) Plaintiffs responded in opposition, (ECF 22), and Defendants replied in

support, (ECF 25).
The Court held oral argument on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on July 20, 2020. (ECF
27.) The discussion during oral argument focused on questions the Court submitted to the parties
in advance of the argument.
IV. Parties’ Contentions

Defendants articulate six reasons why this case should be dismissed. Plaintiffs respond in
opposition to each point except the last.
First, Defendants argue that because the Company was dissolved in 2016, it does not have
the capacity to be sued under English law and therefore must be dismissed from this case.5 (ECF
17-2, Mot. to Dismiss at 9.) Plaintiffs respond that under English law, a dissolved entity can be
“restored” and forced to answer to litigation, but that Defendants have not provided the information
necessary for Plaintiffs to evaluate the possibility of restoration. (ECF 22, Opp’n at 26–27.)
Second, Defendants contend that neither the Corporate Defendants nor the Individual
Defendants are subject to the personal jurisdiction of this Court. (Mot. to Dismiss at 9–16.)
Plaintiffs respond with various reasons for why either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction
(or both) exists over each Defendant. (Opp’n at 28–61.)
Third, Defendants urge the Court to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens and

5 Rule 17(b)(2) provides that: “Capacity to sue or be sued . . . for a corporation [is determined] by
the law under which it was organized.”
dismiss this case because it should have been brought in England. (Mot. to Dismiss at 17–22.)
Plaintiffs oppose forum non conveniens dismissal, reasoning that since the statute of limitations
has expired for Plaintiffs’ claims in England, there is no adequate alternative forum where this
case can be heard. (Opp’n at 62–72.) Plaintiffs rely heavily on their argument that Defendants

have not carried the burden of persuasion.
Fourth, Defendants argue that Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for claims of
deceit, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligent misstatement, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(7),
bars all of Plaintiffs’ claims since the original complaint was not filed until six years after the
causes of action accrued. (Mot. to Dismiss at 23.) Plaintiffs respond that the statute of limitations
is an affirmative defense that should be pleaded in an answer (not asserted in a motion to dismiss),
so it cannot provide a basis for dismissal. (Opp’n at 93–96.)
Fifth, Defendants assert that if the Court reaches the merits, Plaintiffs fail to state viable
claims under English law. (Mot. to Dismiss at 23–36.) Plaintiffs refute Defendants’ contention
that the claims are insufficiently pleaded. (Opp’n at 76–92.)

Sixth, Defendants argue that “at a minimum” the Corporate Defendants should be
dismissed from this case because there are no allegations of specific misconduct committed by
them. (Mot. to Dismiss at 36–37.) Plaintiffs offer no response to this argument.
V. Discussion
Although Defendants raise a threshold jurisdictional objection, the Court will temporarily
bypass that issue and instead address Defendants’ argument that this case should be dismissed on
the grounds of forum non conveniens (or “FNC”). Determining personal jurisdiction would be a
“difficult” task because different issues apply to the various categories of Individual and Corporate
Defendants. Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 436 (2007).
Therefore, in the interest of “convenience, fairness, and judicial economy,” the Court will turn first
to forum non conveniens. Id. at 432. Application of that doctrine compels the conclusion that
England is the proper forum for Plaintiffs’ claims. Therefore, the Amended Complaint will be
dismissed and the Court will not reach the personal jurisdiction or other arguments raised by
Defendants.6

A. Legal Standard: Forum Non Conveniens
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, “a federal district court may dismiss an action
on the ground that a court abroad is the more appropriate and convenient forum for adjudicating
the controversy.” Id. at 425. If trial in the plaintiff’s chosen forum would “establish such
oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant as to be out of all proportion to plaintiff’s convenience”
or if “trial in the chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court’s
own administrative and legal problems,” dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens may be
appropriate. Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947). “[T]he
district court is accorded substantial flexibility in evaluating a forum non conveniens motion, . . .

and each case turns on its facts.” Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 529 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); see also Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 54 U.S. 235, 257 (1981) (“The forum
non conveniens determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.”).
The Third Circuit has articulated a three-part test for analyzing forum non conveniens
motions. First, the district court must “determine whether an adequate alternative forum can

6 Although Defendants’ remaining arguments in support of their Motion to Dismiss will not be
considered, these issues may be raised anew in the English court. See Auxer v. Alcoa, Inc., No.
9-995, 2010 WL 1337725, at *7 n.6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2010) (dismissing on FNC grounds and
noting that the defendant “shall not be hindered in any way from moving for a dismissal of the
actions in Australia based upon the same arguments before this Court”).
entertain the case.” Windt v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 529 F.3d 183, 189–190 (3d Cir. 2008).
Second, “[i]f such a forum exists, the district court must . . . determine the appropriate amount of
deference to be given the plaintiff’s choice of forum.” Id. at 190. Third, “the district court must
balance the relevant public and private interest factors.”7 Id. Defendants bear the burden of

persuasion on each of these elements. Lony v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 935 F.2d 604, 609
(3d Cir. 1991). The Court must “supply specific reasons and develop adequate facts to support its
decision.” Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 862 F.2d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 1988) (“Lacey I”).
B. Analysis
Each of the three forum non conveniens inquiries will be analyzed separately. First, the
Court concludes that England is an adequate alternative forum notwithstanding the expiration of
England’s six-year statute of limitations. Second, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ choice of forum
is entitled to a moderate amount of deference because one of the named Plaintiffs is from
Pennsylvania. Third, the Court has determined that the balance of the public and private interests
clearly weighs in favor of dismissal for forum non conveniens. On the public interest side,

England’s interest is far greater than that of Pennsylvania, retaining this case would necessitate
learning and applying English law, and if forum non conveniens dismissal is denied, a
Pennsylvania federal jury would be tasked with resolving a dispute that bears little connection to
this state. On the private interest side, the vast majority of evidence relevant to this case is located
in England.

7 Other Third Circuit cases have presented the sequence of the forum non conveniens inquiry in
slightly different terms. See Kisano Trade & Inv. Ltd. v. Lemster, 737 F.3d 869, 873 (3d Cir.
2013). Because the Third Circuit recently reiterated the Windt articulation, see Trotter v. 7R
Holdings LLC, 873 F.3d 435, 442 (3d Cir. 2017), and because both parties agreed at oral argument
that there is no substantive difference between the two formulations, the Court will apply the Windt
framework.
1. Availability of Adequate Alternative Forum
The first step in the forum non conveniens analysis is to determine whether an adequate
alternative forum exists. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22 (“At the outset of any forum non
conveniens inquiry, the court must determine whether there exists an alternative forum.”). The

Supreme Court has instructed that an alternative forum will be deemed adequate for purposes of
forum non conveniens if “the defendant is amenable to process in the other jurisdiction.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In the “rare circumstances . . . where the remedy
offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory, the other forum may not be an adequate
alternative.” Id. (emphasis added). An alternative forum may be inadequate where, for example,
it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action, id., where the plaintiff “cannot access evidence
essential to prove” her claims, Eurofins Pharma US Holdings v. BioAlliance Pharma SA, 623 F.3d
147, 161 n.14 (3d Cir. 2010), or where the plaintiff would face “profound and extreme” delay,
Bhatnagar v. Surrendra Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1228 (3d Cir. 1995). However,
“[i]nadequacy of the alternative forum is rarely a barrier to forum non conveniens dismissal.”

Tech. Dev. Co., Ltd. v. Onischenko, 174 F. App’x 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2006) (nonprecedential).
As numerous courts have recognized, the judicial system in England is plainly adequate.
Wilmot v. Marriott Hurghada Mgmt., Inc., 712 F. App’x 200, 204 (3d Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential)
(“[T]he United Kingdom is an adequate alternative forum”); Jennings v. Boeing Co., 660 F. Supp.
796, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (Vanartsdalen, J.) (“[O]rdinarily courts of . . . the United Kingdom are
adequate alternatives to United States courts.”). Lord Neuberger’s declaration confirms that “the
English courts would be a competent and appropriate forum” to litigate Plaintiffs’ claims, (ECF
20, Neuberger Decl. ¶ 10), and that Plaintiffs “would receive a fair hearing in the English courts,”
(id. ¶ 12).
Plaintiffs argue that England is an inadequate forum because Plaintiffs’ claims are now
time-barred there. Both parties agree that if Plaintiffs filed suit in England now, the claims would
be barred by the applicable statute of limitations.8 (Opp’n at 65; ECF 25, Reply at 5.) Where
Plaintiffs and Defendants diverge is in their views about how the expired statute of limitations in

England affects the forum non conveniens analysis. According to Plaintiffs, because there is “no
question” that Plaintiffs’ claims are now time-barred in England, England is not an adequate forum
“as a matter of law.” (Opp’n at 66.) Plaintiffs cite a number of courts of appeals cases for the
proposition that an expired statute of limitations prevents the conclusion that an alternative forum
is adequate.9 Defendants reply that Plaintiffs’ claims are also time-barred in this Court, so
consideration of the other forum non conveniens elements is appropriate.10 See, e.g., Auxer, 2010
WL 1337725, at *8 (“The fact that the applicable Australian statute of limitations may bar many
of the claims . . . does not make Australia an inadequate forum.”).

8 At oral argument, both parties confirmed that the statute of limitations expired (at the latest) on
July 25, 2019—exactly six years from the date that hibu’s board suspended trading of the
Company’s stock and Plaintiffs discovered the alleged fraud. (Am. Compl. ¶ 151; Opp’n at 93.)
The parties also confirmed that there is no savings statute or similar doctrine under English law
that would credit Plaintiffs with the date they originally filed their complaint in this Court.

9 See, e.g., DiFederico v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 714 F.3d 796, 801 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n expired
statute of limitations is usually dispositive in a forum non conveniens analysis”); Chang v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 599 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[I]f the plaintiff’s suit would be time-barred
in the alternative forum, his remedy there is inadequate”); Bank of Credit & Com. Int’l (Overseas)
Ltd. v. State Bank, 273 F.3d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A]n adequate forum does not exist if a
statute of limitations bars the bringing of the case in that forum.”); see also Carijano v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 643 F.3d 1216, 1235 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[I]t was an abuse of discretion to dismiss
on the basis of forum non conveniens without requiring [the defendant] to waive any statute of
limitations defenses”).

10 Defendants may be correct that Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred in this Court. Because this
action will be dismissed for forum non conveniens, the Court will not reach Defendants’ arguments
regarding Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations and the applicability of the borrowing statute.
Plaintiffs’ reliance on the now-expired statute of limitations in England is unpersuasive for
two reasons.
First, neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit11 have explicitly held that, in order
for an alternative forum to be adequate, the statute of limitations in that forum must be unexpired.

Instead, the Supreme Court has described the relevant test as whether the defendants are “amenable
to process” in the foreign forum, Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22, and the Third Circuit has
described the test as whether the defendants are “amenable to process and [the] plaintiffs’ claims
are cognizable” in the alternative forum, Kisano, 737 F.3d at 873. Plaintiffs correctly note that
some courts in this Circuit have seemed to require an unexpired statute of limitations or have
conditioned dismissal on the defendants’ agreement to waive statute of limitations defenses. See,
e.g., Doe v. Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, 666 F. App’x 180, 183 (3d Cir. 2016) (nonprecedential)
(“[T]he District Court reasonably concluded that . . . an adequate alternative forum [existed]
because Appellee was amenable to service of process there, the tort of negligence was recognized
there, and the applicable statute of limitations had not expired.” (emphasis added)); Jones v. FC

USA Inc., No. 17-1126, 2017 WL 5453497, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2017) (DuBois, J.) (“[T]he
Court determines that the Dominican Republic is an adequate alternative forum only if the
defendants agree to waive any statute of limitations defenses if plaintiff initiates a suit in the
Dominican Republic.”); Target Glob. Logistics Servs., Co. v. KVG, LLC, No. 15-4960, 2017 WL
1355371, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2017) (Perkin, M.J.) (“Generally, an adequate alternative forum
exists where a defendant is amenable to service of process, plaintiff’s claims are recognized there,

11 At oral argument, the Court asked if either party could cite a precedential Third Circuit case
addressing the adequacy of the foreign forum where the statute of limitations had expired in the
foreign forum. Neither party cited any precedential case law. The Court also has been unable to
locate any precedential Third Circuit decision addressing this issue.
and the applicable statute of limitations had not expired.”). However, Plaintiffs have not identified
any binding authority that would require this Court to treat the fact that England’s statute of
limitations has expired as dispositive to the forum non conveniens inquiry.
Second, Plaintiffs’ conduct suggests that they strategically filed their lawsuit in this Court

to avoid the possibility of refiling the case in England, which indicates that the expiration of
England’s statute of limitations should not end the forum non conveniens analysis. Footnote nine,
supra, summarizes various courts of appeals cases supporting the proposition that an expired
statute of limitations in a foreign forum prevents a forum non conveniens dismissal. However,
these cases include an important exception: if “it can be shown the plaintiff made a deliberate and
tactical decision to run the statute of limitations for the purpose of avoiding dismissal in her
preferred forum,” then the unavailability of another forum may not require rejection of the forum
non conveniens motion. DiFederico, 714 F.3d at 801; see also Chang, 599 F.3d at 736. In other
words, if there is “evidence . . . that the plaintiff deliberately maneuvered to avoid trying the case
in the alternative forum,” then dismissal may be appropriate—notwithstanding the expired statute

of limitations. DiFederico, 714 F.3d at 801–02.
The facts and history of this case, including the timing of the filing of Plaintiffs’ original
complaint, requires the conclusion that this exception applies. Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in this
Court on July 25, 2019—six years to the day that Plaintiffs “discovered Defendants’ fraudulent
conduct” on July 25, 2013. (Opp’n at 93.) At oral argument, the Court gave Plaintiffs’ counsel
multiple opportunities to explain Plaintiffs’ counsel’s delay in the filing of the original complaint.
The Court also asked Plaintiffs’ counsel to explain why Plaintiffs did not take action to preserve
their right to assert claims in an English forum (by, for example, filing the same complaint in a
court in England or pursuing a standstill agreement with Defendants).
Plaintiffs’ counsel, surprisingly, initially declined to answer citing the attorney-client
privilege. As the Court pointed out at the argument, however, the privilege issue could have been
avoided entirely if one or both of the named Plaintiffs had submitted affidavit(s) explaining the
reasons for the decision not to file in England.

Plaintiffs’ counsel also later argued that Plaintiffs brought the case here (and only here)
because they felt there was a strong basis for jurisdiction and venue. This explanation is similarly
unpersuasive. Plaintiffs reasonably could have foreseen a forum non conveniens challenge given
the unique facts of this case.12 The fact that Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in Pennsylvania
federal court on the very day the six-year statute of limitations expired in England and have not
provided any credible explanation for this decision suggests a “deliberate choice” that justifies
disregarding the expiration of the statute of limitations in the alternative forum. Veba-Chemie
A.G. v. M/V Getafix, 711 F.2d 1243, 1248 n.10 (5th Cir. 1983).
This conclusion is consistent with the purpose of the forum non conveniens doctrine. The
Supreme Court has explained, and repeatedly emphasized, that “the plaintiff may not, by choice

of an inconvenient forum, ‘vex,’ ‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant by inflicting upon him
expense or trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy.” Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); see also Koster, 330 U.S. at 831–32 (noting that forum non conveniens
dismissal may be appropriate if there is a “clear showing of facts” that “establish such
oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant as to be out of all proportion to plaintiff’s
convenience”). Denying a forum non conveniens dismissal in this case simply because Plaintiffs’

12 These facts include that: all four causes of action are brought under British law; one of the two
named Plaintiffs is English; the parent company is organized under the laws of the United
Kingdom; the alleged misstatements occurred in England; and the parent company’s stock was
listed on the London Stock Exchange.
claims are now time-barred in England would contravene Gulf Oil. Plaintiffs waited to file their
original complaint until the very day the statute of limitations expired in England. They could
have pursued their right to a remedy by filing suit in England prior to the expiration of the statute
of limitations or by seeking a standstill agreement to preserve their right to assert claims in an

English forum.
The conclusion that Plaintiffs deliberately and strategically chose not to do either of these
things is compelled by the facts of this case. It is simply not fair to Defendants, to the Court, or to
a potential group of jurors to reward that strategic decision by denying Defendants’ forum non
conveniens motion. The Court must also emphasize that this case is based on diversity jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs could have brought their claims in Pennsylvania state court or in England, and there is
no valid reason to ignore precedent and require Defendants to defend in this Court.
In sum, the possibility that Plaintiffs’ claims may be time-barred in England does not
prevent a forum non conveniens dismissal in this case. Plaintiffs have not identified any Supreme
Court or binding Third Circuit decision that requires this Court to embrace the principle that an

expired statute of limitations is dispositive. Further, in these circumstances where Plaintiffs filed
their original complaint in this Court on the same day that the statute of limitations expired in
England but did not take any action to preserve their right to assert claims in England, it would
undermine the purpose of the forum non conveniens doctrine to hold that the alternative forum is
inadequate as a matter of law. The English courts will permit meaningful “litigation of the subject
matter of th[is] dispute,” and England is therefore an adequate forum for purposes of forum non
conveniens. Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22.
2. Amount of Deference Due to Plaintiffs’ Choice of Forum
The second step in the forum non conveniens analysis is to determine the amount of
deference that Plaintiffs’ choice of forum is entitled to. When the plaintiff is a domestic resident
or citizen, “a strong presumption of convenience exists” in favor of the chosen forum. Windt, 529
F.3d at 190. When the plaintiff is foreign, this presumption “applies with less force,” because the
“assumption that the chosen forum is appropriate is in such cases less reasonable.” Sinochem, 549

U.S. at 430 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiffs’ forum preference is the Eastern District of Pennsylvania since they chose to file
their lawsuit here. One of the two named plaintiffs, Thomas Levien, is a resident of Pennsylvania.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 1.) Approximately 320 putative class members reside in Pennsylvania as well.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 9.) The other named Plaintiff, James Westhead, is a citizen of the United Kingdom.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 4.) Therefore, looking to the citizenship of the parties does not resolve the question
of how much deference Plaintiffs’ choice of forum is entitled to because no matter where this case
is ultimately litigated, one of the named Plaintiffs will be in a foreign forum.
The Third Circuit has made clear that the focus of the deference analysis “is on
convenience, not on the particular significance of a party’s residence or citizenship or a party’s

ability to invoke a United States court’s jurisdiction.” Kisano, 737 F.3d at 875. Therefore, a
foreign plaintiff can “bolster the amount of deference due their choice by making a strong showing
of convenience.” Windt, 529 F.3d at 190 (emphasis added); see also Kisano, 737 F.3d at 876
(“[T]he greater the plaintiff’s or the lawsuit’s bona fide connection to the United States and to the
forum of choice and the more it appears that considerations of convenience favor the conduct of
the lawsuit in the United States, the more difficult it will be for the defendant to gain dismissal for
forum non conveniens.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Therefore, the amount
of deference that Plaintiffs’ choice of forum is entitled to turns on convenience.
Much of the relevant evidence will be in England, which suggests that litigating there will
be more convenient for the parties. Plaintiffs highlight “the activities that took place in King of
Prussia, Pennsylvania” and the need to obtain “discovery of witnesses and documents with respect
to these events.” (Opp’n at 71.) However, Plaintiffs’ contention that it is more convenient to
engage in discovery related to the King of Prussia meetings in this forum is belied by the Amended

Complaint, which alleges that the written communications “were accessed by computer.” (Am.
Compl. ¶ 53.) If the written communications are in a computer-accessible format, then the
convenience of engaging in discovery here as compared to England is reduced since the documents
can be transferred electronically. Cf. Markham v. Ethicon, Inc., No. 19-5464, 2020 WL 1158546,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2020) (Baylson, J.) (“Given the availability of modern technology, the
possible location of records elsewhere is of limited significance.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)); Lomanno v. Black, 285 F. Supp. 2d 637, 647 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (Kelly, J.) (“[T]he
technological advances of recent years have significantly reduced the weight of [the location of
books and records] in the balance of convenience analysis.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). Additionally, to the extent Plaintiffs seek discovery from Defendants Bates and Wigley

(who sometimes accompanied Defendant Pocock to the King of Prussia meetings), litigating this
case in England would be more convenient than litigating here because both Bates and Wigley are
citizens of the United Kingdom. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51, 29–30.) Finally, notwithstanding the King
of Prussia meetings, “most relevant documents and witnesses will be in England, including
documents and witnesses of . . . the London Stock Exchange, the Company’s outside advisors, . .
. former employees, officers, or directors, [and the] hibu Shareholder Grouping.” (Mot. to Dismiss
at 19.)
Plaintiffs argue that litigating this case here is not as inconvenient as Defendants contend
because companies within the hibu family initiated and pursued litigation in nearby federal courts
on several recent occasions. Entities within the hibu hierarchy availed themselves of the
jurisdiction of United States courts at least twice: in 2013, when hibu plc brought a breach of
contract action in the Southern District of New York, (ECF 22-13), and in 2014, when the hibu
U.S. entities initiated bankruptcy proceedings in the Eastern District of New York, (ECF 22-10).

Plaintiffs contend that this undermines Defendants’ position that litigating here would be
inconvenient. Cf. Kisano, 737 F.3d at 876 n.2 (“If it is such a burden for [the plaintiff] to address
a lawsuit in a neighboring United States jurisdiction in the English language, it seriously
undermines an argument that his forum choice in this case was motivated by his convenience.”).
However, assuming that the existence of other litigation is germane to the forum non
conveniens analysis,13 neither the breach of contract case nor the bankruptcy case were related to
this action and, in any event, both of those cases have been closed. See In re hibu Inc., No. 14-
70323, ECF No. 38 (Order Closing Chapter 15 Cases); hibu plc v. Walsh, No. 13-3762, ECF No.
21 (Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice). Therefore, even assuming that there may
have been efficiencies from litigating this case here while the New York cases were pending

(which is questionable, since those cases were unrelated to this one), there is no additional
convenience since the New York cases have been resolved. See Windt, 529 F.3d at 197 (finding
that the district court did not “improperly ignore[]” U.S.-based litigation in granting FNC dismissal
because the other cases had been previously terminated or involved issues that were less
significant).

13 The Third Circuit has impliedly endorsed consideration of the existence of other litigation in the
FNC analysis. See Windt, 529 F.3d at 196–97 (confirming that the district court was permitted to
consider related litigation pending in the Netherlands to determine whether retaining the case
would be oppressive and vexatious to the defendant). Other courts of appeals have noted that the
existence of related litigation “is not listed as a relevant factor in the forum non conveniens analysis
laid out in [the Supreme Court’s decision in] Gilbert,” and so should not be given “decisive
weight.” Guidi v. Inter-Cont’l Hotels Corp., 224 F.3d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 2000).
In summary, the Court will accord Plaintiffs’ choice of forum some deference given that
one of the named Plaintiffs is a resident of Pennsylvania. However, the “considerable evidence”
demonstrating that England is, by far, the more convenient forum for the parties and the witnesses
indicates that “extending full deference” is not warranted. Kisano, 737 F.3d at 875.

3. Balance of Public and Private Interest Factors
Since an adequate alternative forum exists, Defendants must “show that the balance of [the
public and private interest] factors tips decidedly in favor of trial in [England]” to overcome the
moderate amount of deference given to Plaintiffs’ chosen forum and to prevail on their forum non
conveniens motion. Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 932 F.2d 170, 180 (3d Cir. 1991). Defendants
have satisfied that burden and have shown that the balance of relevant public and private interests
far outweighs the moderate amount of deference that Plaintiffs’ choice of forum is entitled to.
a. Public Interest Factors
Public interests that should be considered include “administrative difficulties arising from
increasingly overburdened courts; local interests in having the case tried at home; desire to have

the forum match the law that is to govern the case to avoid conflict of laws problems or difficulty
in the application of foreign law; and avoiding unfairly burdening citizens in an unrelated forum
with jury duty.” Kisano, 737 F.3d at 873. These factors overwhelmingly indicate that this case
should be dismissed on grounds of forum non conveniens.14
First, England’s interest in this case is far greater than Pennsylvania’s interest. The vast
majority of the parties are English; all four causes of action are brought under British law; the
allegedly fraudulent statements were published through the London Stock Exchange–owned RNS;

14 The first public interest factor—administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion—will
not be given any weight.
and the alleged fraud concerns an English company listed on the London Stock Exchange.
England’s interest in regulating companies organized and operating under its laws and ensuring
the proper application of its statutes indicates that dismissal is required here. Compare Eurofins
Pharma, 623 F.3d at 162 (“[D]ismissal on forum non conveniens grounds is appropriate because

the litigation is focused on French defendants’ alleged breaches of contract and fiduciary duties,
which took place in France, and, therefore France has a more significant interest in resolving the
dispute than Delaware.”), with In re Corel Corp. Inc. Sec. Litig., 147 F. Supp. 2d 363, 367 (E.D.
Pa. 2001) (Brody, J.) (finding a local interest in the case because “[m]any of plaintiffs’ securities
transactions were conducted in the United States, on United States stock exchanges, by United
States citizens”).
Said differently, “the locus of the alleged culpable conduct” is in England, and that conduct
has little connection to Plaintiffs’ chosen forum. Van Cauwenberghe, 486 U.S. at 528. To the
extent Pennsylvania has an interest, it is limited to the fact that one of the named Plaintiffs is a
resident of this state and that an unspecified number of corporate meetings attended by some

Defendants occurred in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. This is not enough to transform the case
into a “local dispute.” Windt, 529 F.3d at 193; see also id. (concluding that a complaint that alleged
“fraud and mismanagement perpetrated on a Dutch company by executives, board members and a
corporate shareholder of that Dutch company” did not raise a “local dispute”). The minimal
interest of Pennsylvania compared to the significant interest of England weighs heavily in favor of
dismissal. See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509 (“There is a local interest in having localized
controversies decided at home.”).
This conclusion is consistent with Paraschos v. YBM Magnex International, Inc., 130 F.
Supp. 2d 642 (E.D. Pa. 2000). In Paraschos, Judge Newcomer found that Canada’s significant
interest in a case that “pertain[ed] to Canadian registered securities, [and was] brought by a
purported class of investors who [were] virtually all Canadian, against predominantly Canadian
defendants, concerning a Canadian corporation whose stock was sold only on Canadian stock
exchanges” justified forum non conveniens dismissal. Id. at 645. Here, similarly, this case is about

a company that was registered on the London Stock Exchange and is brought against
predominantly English defendants. It is readily apparent that, as in Paraschos, Pennsylvania’s
interest is slight compared to that of England, which indicates that this case should be dismissed.
Second, all four of Plaintiffs’ causes of action are brought under British law. At oral
argument, the parties agreed that if this case stays here English law will apply. Therefore, if the
Motion to Dismiss is denied, the Court will face the daunting task of learning and applying British
law. Plaintiffs acknowledge that this “admittedly carries some weight,” (Opp’n at 74), because as
the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, the need to apply foreign law weighs in favor of
dismissing the case. See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 260 n.29 (“[T]he need to apply foreign law
favors dismissal”); Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509 (“There is an appropriateness . . . in having the trial

of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather
than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign
to itself.”). The burden that learning and applying English law would impose on the Court if the
case is retained weighs heavily in favor of dismissal. See, e.g., Windt, 529 F.3d at 193 (affirming
the district court’s conclusion that the need to apply various provisions of the Dutch Civil Code
favored dismissal).
Third, if this case remains here and is not resolved before trial, then a Pennsylvania jury
will be tasked with hearing evidence related to the actions of mainly British defendants and
determining liability under a foreign legal regime. The significant burden this would impose is
not justified given that the dispute between Plaintiffs and Defendants has little connection to
Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508–09 (“Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be
imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation.”); Windt, 529
F.3d at 193 (“[W]ithout a dispute local to the community of New Jersey, there is little public

interest in subjecting that community to the burdens of jury service.”). The unfairness of burdening
Pennsylvania residents with jury duty to resolve a dispute that bears little connection to this district
weighs in favor of forum non conveniens dismissal.
b. Private Interest Factors
Private interests that should be considered include “the ease of access to sources of proof;
ability to compel witness attendance if necessary; means to view relevant premises and objects;
and any other potential obstacle impeding an otherwise easy, cost-effective, and expeditious trial.”
Kisano, 737 F.3d at 873. The parties focus their arguments on the factor assessing ease of access
to sources of proof.15 A party seeking dismissal based on forum non conveniens need not “describe
with specificity the evidence they would not be able to obtain if trial were held in the United

States.” Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 258. Instead, Defendants’ obligation is to “provide enough
information to enable the District Court to balance the parties’ interests.” Id. at 300 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, the Court has enough information to balance the parties’ interests and determine how
the private interests weigh. The vast majority of relevant documents, communications, and
witnesses are located in England. Four of eight Corporate Defendants and five of nine Individual
Defendants are in England. Many of the relevant nonparties, including the London Stock

15 Nothing in the record indicates that any of the other private factors weigh in favor of or against
dismissal.
Exchange (which listed Yell/hibu’s stock and published the RNS announcements that contained
many of the alleged misstatements) and hibu’s advisors and employees, are located in London.
Undoubtedly, some of the evidence in this case may be located in the United States. But most of
the witnesses that Plaintiffs identify as located in Pennsylvania are parties to this action (i.e., the

Corporate Defendants who are incorporated in Delaware and the 320 putative shareholders who
are located in Pennsylvania), and it is much easier to seek discovery from a party than from a
nonparty. See Auxer, 2010 WL 1337725, at *10 (“[D]ocumentary evidence from a party is much
more accessible than the evidence from Australian non-parties”). The significant amount of
evidence located in England “far outweighs the evidence in this forum,” which favors forum non
conveniens dismissal. Abiaad v. Gen. Motors Corp., 538 F. Supp. 537, 542 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(Weiner, J.); see also Eurofins Pharma, 623 F.3d at 162 (“[T]he location of the great majority of
proof and witnesses in France favors dismissal.”).
c. Balancing
All of the applicable public and private interest factors weigh in favor of dismissal. Some

of the interests, such as the interest in allowing a court in England to resolve a dispute that concerns
predominantly English actors, the need to apply foreign law, and the location of evidence, weigh
especially heavily in favor of the foreign forum. The “balance of factors is strongly in favor of . .
. [Defendants],” which indicates that the Court should not defer to Plaintiffs’ choice of forum and
should instead dismiss this case for forum non conveniens. Lacey I, 862 F.2d at 43.
C. Summary of Forum Non Conveniens Analysis
England is plainly an adequate forum that is competent to hear this case notwithstanding
the possible expiration of the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs’ choice of forum is entitled to a
moderate amount of deference since one of the named Plaintiffs is from Pennsylvania. However,
the deference to Plaintiffs’ choice of forum is overcome by the “balance of the public and private
interests [which] clearly favors” dismissing this case for forum non conveniens. Kisano, 737 F.3d
at 873. The public interests favor dismissal because (1) England’s interest far exceeds
Pennsylvania’s interest; (2) retaining this case would require that the Court learn and apply English

law; and (3) if the case is not dismissed, then a Pennsylvania jury would be burdened with resolving
a dispute that lacks a connection to this district. The private interests also favor dismissal as the
majority of evidence relevant to this case is located in England.
Litigating in England “will best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of
justice.” Koster, 330 U.S. at 527. Therefore, this case will be dismissed for forum non conveniens.
VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted and this case is
dismissed with prejudice.
An appropriate Order follows.
O:\CIVIL 19\19-3239 Levien et al v. Hibu PLC\19cv3239 Memorandum re Motion to Dismiss.docx

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10399393. Public record. Not legal advice.