# BROWN v. FRIEL

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · April 10, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10398742

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 10, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

BLANCHE A. BROWN : CIVIL ACTION
:
v. : No. 16-1819
:
POLICE CHIEF JOSEPH FRIEL :
IN HIS INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL :
CAPACITY, et al. :

MEMORANDUM
Juan R. Sánchez, C.J. April 10, 2020
Pro se Plaintiff Blanche A. Brown alleged Defendants Police Chief Joseph Friel, Judge
Grover Koon, Valley Township Police Department, Valley Township Manager/Administrator, and
Valley Township and Governing Board/Supervisors improperly charged her with harassment. The
Court dismissed Judge Koon from the case, granted summary judgment in favor of the remaining
defendants, and denied Brown’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Brown now asks the Court
to reconsider its decision to grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, alleging errors of
law and fact. She also seeks relief from the order denying her summary judgment motion, alleging
fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by Defendants. The Court will deny the motion for
reconsideration because it did not make any mistakes of law or fact when granting summary
judgment. The Court will also deny the motion for relief because Defendants did not fraudulently
prevent Brown from litigating her case.
BACKGROUND
In April 2014, Brown and her half-brother each complained to the Valley Township police
about harassing communications from the other. The police instructed both Brown and her half-
brother to stop communicating with each other. The police then issued two citations to Brown for
harassment because they believed she failed to comply with that instruction. Over the next several
months, Brown continued to complain to police that her half-brother was stalking, harassing, and
threatening her, and the police continued to respond and investigate her complaints. In September
2014, the two harassment citations against Brown were withdrawn, and she was never punished
or fined for these citations.

On April 4, 2016, Brown filed this case alleging the Police Department’s response to her
complaints and the two harassment citations against her violated her civil rights. Two months later,
Brown filed an Amended Complaint alleging twenty-five causes of action, including violations of
her constitutional rights under the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, violations of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and common law claims for conspiracy, negligence, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. In January 2017, Brown filed a motion to compel discovery. While that motion
was pending, Defendants moved for summary judgment on January 24, 2017. A few weeks later,
the Court granted in part Brown’s motion to compel. After the Court granted Brown two extensions
to respond to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, she filed her response as well as a cross-
motion for summary judgment on March 1, 2017. After hearing oral argument on both summary

judgment motions, the Court denied Brown’s motion and granted Defendants’ motion. Brown then
filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s order granting Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Brown also filed a motion for relief
from the Court’s order denying her motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b).
DISCUSSION
The Court will deny both motions. The Court will deny the motion for reconsideration
because the Court did not make any errors of law or fact. The Court will also deny the motion for
relief because Brown has not produced clear and convincing evidence of fraud, and she was not
prevented from litigating her case. The Court will address each motion in turn.
A motion for reconsideration is meant “to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present
newly discovered evidence.” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting

Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999)). A party seeking
reconsideration under Rule 59(e) must show at least one of the following: “(1) an intervening
change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not available when the
court granted the motion . . .; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent
manifest injustice.” In re Vehicle Carrier Servs. Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 71, 87 (3d Cir. 2017)
(quoting Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Only the third basis, a need to prevent a clear
error of law or fact or prevent manifest injustice, is relevant here.
The Court did not make a mistake of law or fact in granting Defendants’ summary
judgment motion, nor did the Court’s decision on that motion create a manifest injustice. The Court

wrote a lengthy memorandum opinion explaining why summary judgment was warranted on all
twenty-five of Brown’s claims. This memorandum addressed not only Brown’s claims as pleaded,
but also several alternative possible theories of her case. In making its decision, the Court reviewed
evidence submitted by both parties. See Mem. 1 n.2, Aug. 26, 2019, ECF No. 143. This included
the evidence filed by Brown that was attached to her opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment
motion. Id. The Court also articulated the appropriate legal standard and viewed the evidence in
the light most favorable to Brown. See id. at 7-8.
Brown attempts to point to several errors in the Court’s opinion, but her arguments are
meritless. As an initial matter, Brown repeats many arguments the Court already rejected in its
memorandum, and the Court will not readdress those arguments here. See, e.g., Taksir v. Vanguard
Grp., Inc., 273 F. Supp. 3d 539, 544 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“[M]otions for . . . reconsideration should
be granted sparingly and may not be used to rehash arguments which have already been briefed by
the parties and considered and decided by the Court.” (internal citations omitted; alterations in

original)); see also Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 415 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[M]otions [for
reconsideration] are not to be used as an opportunity to relitigate the case”). For example, Brown
claims her First Amendment rights were violated but the Court addressed this issue when it denied
her motion to amend her complaint to include First Amendment claims. See Mem. 28 n.24, Aug.
26, 2019, ECF No. 143. Brown also attempts to reargue whether Defendants had probable cause
for her harassment citations, which was also addressed in detail in the Court’s memorandum on
Defendants’ summary judgment motion. Id. at 11 n.11.
Brown’s motion for reconsideration is also based on several misunderstandings concerning
the Court’s legal analysis. For example, Brown argues the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort
Claims Act (PSTCA) does not apply to her federal law claims, but the Court applied this act to

Brown’s state tort law claims. See id. at 33-34. She also argues that the Court improperly
interpreted her Monell claims as based on respondeat superior, but the Court denied her Monell
claims because she failed to present evidence of any constitutional violations. Id. at 26-27. The
Court merely mentioned respondeat superior to note that this was not a basis for liability. See id.
at 10 n.10. Brown also argues the Court improperly adopted Defendant’s version of the facts rather
than deferring to her allegations. However, at the summary judgment stage, the Court must base
its decision on evidence, such as documents produced in discovery, deposition testimony, or sworn
affidavits. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). The Court cannot merely credit Brown’s unsupported
assertions when the evidence contradicts those assertions. See Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd.
of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 193 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A]t summary judgment a non-moving party may not
rest on mere allegations.”).
Many of Brown’s objections to the Court’s decision stem from her belief that the summary
judgment memorandum was written by a biased magistrate judge. This is incorrect. No magistrate

judge was involved in this case. The summary judgment memorandum is the Court’s opinion. The
Court is also not biased against Brown. The Court granted Defendants’ motion because Defendants
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, not because of any bias against Brown or in favor of
Defendants. Because the Court did not make any errors in its decision to grant summary judgment,
the Court will deny Brown’s motion for reconsideration of that decision.1
The Court will also deny Brown’s motion under Rule 60(b) for relief from the Court’s
order denying her summary judgment motion. As relevant here, Rule 60(b) allows a court to vacate
an order for “fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3).2 To be entitled to relief under this
provision, a party must establish by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the other party engaged

in fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct, and (2) this behavior prevented the moving party
from fully and fairly presenting her case. See Brown v. Pa. R.R. Co., 282 F.2d 522, 527 (3d Cir.
1960); Stridiron v. Stridiron, 698 F.2d 204, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1983).

1 To the extent that any of Brown’s arguments in favor of reconsideration are not addressed above,
the Court relies on its reasoning in its memorandum granting summary judgment.

2 Brown also mentions Rule 60(b)’s catchall provision which allows a court to vacate an order for
“any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). A court can grant relief under this
catch-all provision “only in extraordinary circumstances where, without such relief, an extreme
and unexpected hardship would occur.” Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 120 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal
citation and quotations omitted). Aside from her fraud allegations, Brown does not point to any
extraordinary circumstances here. The Court will therefore address only Rule 60(b)’s fraud
provision and not its catchall provision.
Defendants did not fraudulently prevent Brown from litigating her case here. First, Brown
does not present clear and convincing evidence of any fraud or misconduct by Defendants. She
argues Defendants’ fraudulently refused to send her discovery, but there is no evidence of any
willful misconduct on Defendants’ part. Defendants began sending Brown discovery on December

2, 2017, several weeks before the discovery deadline. See Certificate of Service 1, Dec. 2, 2017,
ECF No. 56. While Defendants did send Brown some additional discovery in late January, this
discovery consisted of even-numbered pages omitted from a previously produced document. See
Certificate of Service 1, Jan. 27, 2017, ECF No. 78; Pl’s Mot. for Relief App. C., at 3, Sept. 25,
2019, ECF No. 146-4 (cover letter for January 27, 2017, production). There is no reason to believe
those pages were intentionally omitted from Defendants’ earlier productions; a much more likely
explanation is Defendants inadvertently photocopied only one side of a double-sided document.
Brown also argues Defendants fraudulently failed to send her their court filings, but this
argument is again undermined by the record. For example, Brown complains Defendants did not
mail a response to her motion to compel until January 25, 2017, but this was the deadline the Court

imposed for Defendants to respond to that motion. See Order 1, Jan. 20, 2017, ECF No. 71.
Defendants therefore had not filed their response until that date, so they could not have mailed it
to Brown any earlier. Brown also asserts Defendants fraudulently failed to send her their statement
of facts in support of their summary judgment motion, but Defendants filed a certificate of service
stating they mailed this document. Statement of Material Facts 6, Jan. 24, 2017, ECF No. 74. While
Brown may not have received the document, there is no proof that Defendants tried to hide it from
her. In fact, the document was publicly available because it was filed on the docket, which is how
Brown eventually discovered it. If Defendants intended to conceal this document from Brown,
they would not have filed it publicly.
Even if Brown were able to show Defendants willfully withheld documents from her, she
was not prevented from litigating her case as a result. Brown states she received Defendants’ last
document production in late January 2017. She therefore had over a month to incorporate that
production into her summary judgment motion, which was filed on March 1, 2017. She also had

another eight weeks after filing her motion to prepare for oral argument on the motion, which was
held in late April. The only document Brown allegedly did not receive until after she filed her
motion for summary judgment was Defendants five-page statement of material facts. However,
the information in this document was otherwise available to Brown because it was included in
Defendants’ memorandum in support of their summary judgment motion and in the exhibits
attached to that motion, both of which Brown admits she received. Therefore, Brown had all
relevant information, including all discovery, when she filed her motion for summary judgment.
Brown argues she was nonetheless prejudiced by Defendants’ discovery delays because
her motion for summary judgment was filed late. This argument is incorrect. The Court did not
deny Brown’s motion because it was untimely. The Court denied Brown’s because it was not

meritorious. When the Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, it explained why
each of Brown’s claims failed as a matter of law. Brown was therefore not entitled to summary
judgment in her favor regardless of when she filed her motion, and Defendants’ alleged discovery
delays did not prevent her from litigating her case.
Brown has failed to show clear and convincing evidence that Defendants committed fraud
or that she was denied a full opportunity to litigate her case as a result. The Court will thus deny
her motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(3).3

3 In her motion, Brown also alludes to discovery sanctions and striking documents filed by
Defendants. To the extent these allusions constitute a separate request for relief, that relief is
denied. As explained above, Brown has not shown Defendants behaved improperly so no relief is
CONCLUSION
Because there were no mistakes of law or fact in the Court’s memorandum granting
Defendants summary judgment, the Court will deny Brown’s motion for reconsideration pursuant
to Rule 59(e). Because Brown did not present evidence of fraud, misrepresentation or other

misconduct, and she was not prevented from litigating her case, the Court will deny her motion for
relief pursuant to Rule 69(b)(3).
An appropriate order follows.
BY THE COURT:

/s/ Juan R. Sánchez
Juan R. Sánchez, C.J.

warranted. Brown also appears to question the Court’s decision on her motion to compel. As she
did in that motion, Brown argues that Defendants document productions and responses to her
discovery requests were inadequate. The Court will not revisit these issues, which were resolved
in the Court’s order on Brown’s motion to compel.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10398742. Public record. Not legal advice.