# RIDPATH v. PROGRESSIVE ADVANCED AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · March 16, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10398629

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 16, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10398629

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that a court need not accept a plaintiff’s “bald assertions” or “legal conclusions”
- stating that courts must “assum[e] that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)”
- affirming the district court’s dismissal of an insurance bad faith claim that plead only “broad and conclusory statements”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MEGAN RIDPATH, :
Plaintiff : CIVIL ACTION
:
PROGRESSIVE ADV. NO. 19-5871
AUTO. INS. CO., :
Defendant : .
MEMORANDUM
PRATTER, J. MARCH 16, 2020
Megan Ridpath alleges that she sustained various injuries after an underinsured motorist
struck her car while she was riding in the passenger seat. Ms. Ridpath now sues her insurance
provider, Progressive Advanced Automotive Insurance Company, for its handling of the insurance
claim she filed as a result of this incident. Progressive moves to dismiss Ms. Ridpath’s bad faith
claim for her failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Because Ms. Ridpath
supports her bad faith claim with only conclusory, thread-bare allegations, the Court dismisses Ms.
Ridpath’s bad faith claim with leave to amend her complaint.
BACKGROUND!
An underinsured motorist struck Ms. Ridpath’s car while she was riding in the passenger
seat. As a result of the accident, Ms. Ridpath sustained bodily injuries, including dizziness, neck
pain, and acute post-traumatic cervical spine sprain and strain. Ms. Ridpath was insured by
Progressive at the time of the accident. Ms. Ridpath claims that the uninsured motorist caused the
accident and submitted a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to Progressive. Ms. Ridpath

As it must, the Court accepts the facts presented in the complaint in the light most favorable to Ms.
Ridpath and “all allegations as true.” ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994).

and Progressive have failed to agree on the amount of benefits that Ms. Ridpath is entitled to
recover.
Ms. Ridpath brought suit in state court against Progressive. The complaint contains two
counts: (1) a breach of contract claim and (2) a bad faith claim brought under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371.
In support of her bad faith claim, Ms. Ridpath alleges that despite Progressive owing her a duty to
act in good faith, Progressive breached its duty by (1) failing to negotiate her claim; (2) failing to
properly investigate and evaluate her claim; and (3) failing to request that Ms. Ridpath submit to
a defense medical examination. Compl. at §§ 16, 18(a)-(c) (Doc. No. 1). After removing the case
to federal court, Progressive moved to dismiss Ms. Ridpath’s bad faith claim.
LEGAL STANDARD
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint. Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, “to ‘give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” the plaintiff must provide
“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted) (alteration
in original).
To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Specifically, “[flactual allegations must be enough
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The question is
not whether the claimant “will ultimately prevail... but whether his complaint [is] sufficient to

cross the federal court’s threshold.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (citation and
quotations omitted).
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court adheres to certain well-recognized
parameters. For one, the Court “must consider only those facts alleged in the complaint and accept
all of the allegations as true.” ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994); see also
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (stating that courts must “assum[e] that all the allegations in the
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)”). Also, the Court must accept as true all reasonable
inferences emanating from the allegations and view those facts and inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. See Rocks v. City of Phila., 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1989);
see also Revell v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 598 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2010).
That admonition does not demand that the Court ignore or discount reality. The Court
“need not accept as true unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences.” Doug Grant, Inc.
v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). “[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also
Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (explaining that a court need
not accept a plaintiff’s “bald assertions” or “legal conclusions”) (citations omitted). Ifa claim “is
vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an
amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d
Cir. 2008). □

DISCUSSION
In Pennsylvania, an insured can bring a bad faith claim against his or her insurer under 42
Pa. C.S.A. § 8371. Although the statute does not define the term “bad faith,” Pennsylvania courts
have defined bad faith in this context as “[a] frivolous or unfounded refusal to pay proceeds of a
policy ... a breach of a known duty (i.e. good faith and fair dealing), through some motive of self-
interest or ill will; mere negligence or bad judgment is not bad faith.” Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Babayan, 430 F.3d 121, 137 (d Cir. 2005) (citing Terletsky v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
649 A.2d 680, 688 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)). To recover on a bad faith claim, the insured must prove
through clear and convincing evidence “(1) that the insurer did not have a reasonable basis for
denying benefits under the policy; and (2) that the insurer knew of or recklessly disregarded its
lack of a reasonable basis in denying the claim.” Td (citing Keefe v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co., 203 F.3d 218, 225 (3d Cir. 2000)); see Rancosky v. Wash. Nat'l Ins. Co., 170 A.3d 364, 365
(Pa. 2017). “Although the insurer’s conduct need not be fraudulent, ‘mere negligence or bad
judgment is not bad faith.” Babayan, 430 F.3d at 137 (quoting Brown v. Progressive Ins. Co.,
860 A.2d 493, 501 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004)). Instead, “[t]he insured must ultimately show that ‘the
insurer breached its duty of good faith through some motive of self-interest or ill will.” Id.
(quoting Brown, 860 A.2d at 501). Moreover, “bad faith is not present merely because an insurer
makes a low but reasonable estimate of an insured’s damages.” Johnson v. Progressive Inc. Co.,
987 A.2d 781, 784 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (citing Condio v. Erie Ins. Exch., 899 A.2d 1136, 1142-
43 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006)).
Bad faith claims are quite fact specific and turn on the insurer’s conduct toward the insured.
Dougherty v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 185 F. Supp. 3d 585, 598 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (citing
Condio, 899 A.2d at 1143). To survive a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff must plead specific facts

as evidence of bad faith and cannot rely on conclusory statements.” Toner v. GEICO Ins. Co., 262
F. Supp. 3d 200, 208 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (citing Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 506 F. App’x
133, 136 (3d Cir. 2012) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of an insurance bad faith claim
that plead only “broad and conclusory statements”). Rather than merely alleging that “an insurer
acted unfairly,” a plaintiff “instead must describe with specificity what was unfair.” Jd. (citing
Atiyeh v. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 742 F. Supp. 2d 591, 600 (E.D. Pa. 2010)). Courts in this
district and circuit routinely dismiss bad faith claims which fail to allege facts of the insurer’s
alleged wrongdoing with specificity.”
Because Ms. Ridpath’s bad faith claim rests entirely on conclusory and bare-bones
allegations, it does not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge. See Atiyeh, 742 F. Supp. 2d at 596
(quoting Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)). Ms. Ridpath alleges that
Progressive failed to negotiate her claim; failed to properly investigate and evaluate her claim; and
failed to request that Ms. Ridpath submit to a defense medical examination. Compl. at { 18(a)-(c)
(Doc. No. 1). In Kiessling v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 18-4281, 2019 WL 634639 (E.D.
Pa. Feb. 14, 2019), the court determined that nearly identical pleadings failed to allege a bad faith
claim. Jd. at **3, 5 (dismissing bad faith claim alleging that insurer “failed to: (1) negotiate their

See, e.g., Krantz v. Peerless Indem. Ins. Co., No. 18-3450, 2019 WL 1123150, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
12, 2019) (dismissing bad faith claim where plaintiff pleaded only “conclusory allegations” that the insurer
failed to make a good faith offer to settle the claim, promptly tender payment of the claim, and reasonably
investigate the claim); Sypeck v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 12-324, 2012 WL 2239730, at *3
(M.D. Pa. June 15, 2012) (dismissing bad faith claim supported by “conclusory allegations using boilerplate
language” that the insurer failed to objectively and fairly evaluate the claim; adopt and/or implement
reasonable standards in evaluating the claim; attempt to effectuate a fair, prompt, and equitable settlement,
and six other similar allegations); Eley v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 10-5564, 2011 WL 294031, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 31, 2011) (dismissing bad faith claim asserting that the insurer failed to negotiate the claim in good
faith and to properly investigate and evaluate the claim because such allegations were “simply threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements”) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).

underinsurance claims, (2) properly investigate and evaluate their claims, and (3) request that
Plaintiffs submit to a defense medical examination”). Ms. Ridpath’s counsel should be well aware
that such conclusory pleadings fail to state a claim inasmuch as he submitted the very complaint
which was dismissed in Kiessling for the very same reason.
Although “such assertions perhaps suggest that a bad faith claim is possible, they do not
allow for any non-speculative inference that a finding of bad faith is plausible. The Rule 12(b)(6)
standards, as interpreted by Twombly and Iqbal, require more.” Kiss v. State Farm Ins. Co., No.
15-6572, 2016 WL 2866540, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 2016) (emphasis in original). Without
additional facts concerning Ms. Ridpath’s insurance claim and the accompanying investigation,
negotiations, or communications in support of her assertion that Progressive’s conduct was
unreasonable and reckless, the Court cannot reasonably infer Progressive’s bad faith.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this memorandum, the Court grants Progressive’s motion to
dismiss Ms. Ridpath’s bad faith claim. Although the complaint does not currently state a bad faith
claim, the Court grants Ms. Ridpath leave to file an amended complaint in the event that she can
cure the above deficiencies. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236. An appropriate order follows.

BY THE COURT:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10398629. Public record. Not legal advice.