# Veritas Allies LLC v. Schiappacasse

> District Court, D. Oregon · October 5, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10396514

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** October 5, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10396514

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the “purposeful direction test” requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant “(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION

VERITAS ALLIES LLC, an Oregon Limited
Liability Company,
Plaintiff, Case No. 3:22-cv-00903-YY
v. OPINION AND ORDER
HEATHER SCHIAPPACASSE, an individual,
Defendant.

YOU, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Veritas Allies, LLC, an Oregon company, has brought suit against defendant
Heather Schiappacasse, alleging a claim of intentional interference with economic relations.
Notice Removal, Ex. A (“Compl.”) at 4, ECF 1. Currently pending is Schiappacasse’s motion for
summary judgment on personal jurisdiction. ECF 17. Because Schiappacasse is a Texas resident

and plaintiff has not produced evidence establishing that Schiappacasse has the necessary
minimum contacts with Oregon, the motion for summary judgment for lack of personal
jurisdiction is granted and the case against Schiappacasse is dismissed without prejudice.
I. Background
David Vizzini, who is plaintiff’s founder and chief executive officer, and Schiappacasse
met at a health care industry conference sometime in 2017 or 2018.1 Over the next several years,

1 Engrav Decl., Ex. 8 (Schiappacasse Dep.) 36:4–16, ECF 22-1. Although the parties’ briefing is
not entirely clear on the point, both Vizzini and Schiappacasse are involved in or operate various
Vizzini and Schiappacasse talked often over the phone and would see each other at various
conferences.2 In 2019, a company in which Schiappacasse was involved entered into a marketing
contract with another of Vizzini’s companies, EquitasDx, LLC.3 Around 2019 or 2020, Vizzini
offered Schiappacasse a job at one of his companies, but she declined.4 Around that same time,

Vizzini was in the process of divorcing former defendant Cynthia Free; he and Schiappacasse
often talked about the divorce and Vizzini’s feelings about it.5 Over time, Vizzini and
Schiappacasse’s “friendship . . . progress[ed],” and around July of 2021, they became involved in
what Schiappacasse characterized as a romantic relationship.6
In October of 2021, both Schiappacasse and Vizzini attended the Self Insurance Institute
of America conference in Austin, Texas.7 At the conference Schiappacasse “conducted a
business meeting” with plaintiff’s executive team including Vizzini; at Vizzini’s request,
Schiappacasse had prepared a list of her clients that might be interested in hearing about
plaintiff’s products. 8 Later in the conference, Schiappacasse facilitated some introductions with
potential clients.9

businesses that offer services to the health care industry. See Engrav Decl., Ex. 9 at 1, ECF 22-1
(“[Veritas] is an Oregon company . . . [that] provides highly complex, cost containment services
to providers and payors operating in the health care industry.”).
2 Schiappacasse Dep. 78:3–23, ECF 22-1.
3 Id. at 22:10–17; Engrav Decl., Ex. 1 at 1, 6, ECF 22-1. Plaintiff asserts that EquitasDx was a
subsidiary of plaintiff, Resp. 4, ECF 22, but does not cite any evidence in the record establishing
that fact. See id.
4 Schiappacasse Dep. 81:9–25, ECF 22-1.
5 Id. at 72:16–22, ECF 22-1; id. at 78:1–80:16.
6 Id. at 80:5–16; Pitt Decl., Ex. 3 at 1, ECF 18.
7 Schiappacasse Dep. 37:12–22, ECF 22-1; Compl. ¶ 4, ECF 1-1.
8 Schiappacasse Dep. 40:15–41:23, ECF 22-1.
9 Id. at 42:2–14, 54:14–23.
At some unspecified time during the conference, Schiappacasse learned that her
relationship with Vizzini was not as it seemed.10 The Complaint alleges that at the conference,
Vizzini, Schiappacasse, and several other people were at the hotel bar when an argument of some
kind broke out; Schiappacasse was allegedly intoxicated and announced that she was going to
“embarrass” Vizzini and ruin his business.11 Precisely what happened is not clear based on the

evidence in the record, but suffice it to say, the relationship between Schiappacasse and Vizzini
ended, and Schiappacasse’s alleged efforts to make good on those threats are at the heart of the
current dispute.
Plaintiff alleges that Schiappacasse tortiously interfered with its business relationships in
two ways. First, Schiappacasse allegedly made false statements about plaintiff and Vizzini to
others in the health care industry, which in turn caused plaintiff to lose current and prospective
clients.12 Specifically, plaintiff produced evidence that two companies, Diversified Benefit
Administrators and Leading Edge Administrators, terminated or changed their working
relationship with plaintiff based on Schiappacasse’s statements or conduct, and plaintiff lost

substantial revenue as a result.13
Second, plaintiff alleges that Schiappacasse coordinated with Vizzini’s ex-wife Free to
commandeer the entity name “Veritas Allies, LLC” to prevent plaintiff and Vizzini from using
the name.14 After the conference in Texas, Schiappacasse began a long-running correspondence
with Free, who lived in Oregon.15 The two bonded over a shared belief that Vizzini had

10 Id. at 115:19–25, ECF 22-1; Schiappacasse Decl., Ex. 1 at 1, ECF 19.
11 Compl. ¶¶ 7–10, ECF 1.
12 Id. ¶¶ 14–18.
13 See Resp. 10–12, ECF 22; Engrav Decl., Ex. 4 at 1, ECF 22-1; id., Ex. 11 at 1–4, ECF 22-1.
14 Compl. ¶¶ 19–23, ECF 1.
15 See Schiappacasse Dep. 72:2–25, ECF 22-1.
mistreated them, and they communicated often, exchanging hundreds of texts and phone calls.16
On October 8, 2021, Free texted a picture to Schiappacasse and wrote: “Look what I just did!!”17
Free had noticed that “Veritas Allies, LLC.” had been administratively dissolved by the Oregon
Secretary of State on August 19, 2021, because Vizzini had apparently neglected to renew its
business registration.18 Free then registered her own entity, “Veritas Allies, LLC,” which

subsequently prevented Vizzini from renewing his original registration using the “Veritas Allies,
LLC” name.19 Schiappacasse responded, “You registered his LLC in your name?!? . . . OMG –
THAT’S hysterical . . . He’s going to FREAK the f[***] out.”20 Later, Schiappacasse asked
Free, “How do we secure the Veritas Allies name [n]ationally?”21 The two also discussed
transferring the Veritas Allies name to Schiappacasse, though that never happened; Free
eventually transferred the name back to Vizzini as part of the divorce settlement.22
Plaintiff initially filed this case in Oregon state court against both Free and
Schiappacasse, who lives in Texas.23 Schiappacasse moved to dismiss based on, among other
things, a lack of personal jurisdiction.24 Prior to the state court hearing on that motion, Vizzini

and Free settled the divorce proceeding; as part of the agreement, Free transferred the “Veritas
Allies, LLC” business name to Vizzini and Vizzini agreed to dismiss Free from the case.25 The

16 Id. at 156:7–19.
17 Engrav Decl., Ex. 2 at 17, ECF 22-1.
18 Pitt Decl., Ex. 4 at 11, ECF 18. The period at the end of the entity’s name was included in the
registration. Id.
19 See Engrav Decl., Ex. 13 ¶ 3, ECF 22-1.
20 Id., Ex. 2 at 17–18, ECF 22-1.
21 Id. at 24.
22 Pitt Decl., Ex. 10 at 1–8, ECF 18.
23 Id., Ex. 2 at 4, ECF 18.
24 See Engrav Decl., Ex. 9 at 1, ECF 22-1.
25 Pitt Decl., Ex. 10 at 1–8, ECF 18.
Oregon state court denied Schiappacasse’s motion to dismiss,26 but Free’s dismissal from the
case created complete diversity, and Schiappacasse then removed the case to this court in June of
2022.27 ECF 1. The parties engaged in a settlement conference in August of 2022, and then
conducted discovery. ECF 11, 14. Schiappacasse then filed the currently pending motion for

summary judgment on the basis that this court lacks personal jurisdiction and plaintiff’s claims
otherwise fail as a matter of law. Mot. Summ. J. 1–3, ECF 17.
II. Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment
if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The party moving for summary judgment bears the
initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying portions of
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits that demonstrate
the absence of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Once the moving party does so, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings” and

“designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Id. at 324 (citing Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The court “does not weigh the evidence or determine the truth of the matter,
but only determines whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Balint v. Carson City, Nev., 180
F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). “Reasonable doubts as to the existence of material factual issue

26 Engrav Decl., Ex. 14, ECF 22-1.
27 The caption of the complaint mentions both intentional interference and defamation claims. At
the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff’s counsel clarified that the defamation
claim was asserted only against Free, who has since been dismissed from the case. See Pitt Decl.,
Ex. 10 at 4, ECF 18. Accordingly, the analysis here considers only plaintiff’s intentional
interference claims asserted against Schiappacasse.
are resolved against the moving parties and inferences are drawn in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party.” Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).
III. Personal Jurisdiction
“Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction

over persons.” Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125
(2014)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). Oregon’s long-arm statute is co-extensive with
constitutional standards, and thus this court need only determine whether its exercise of personal
jurisdiction is consistent with constitutional due process standards. Gray & Co. v. Firstenberg
Mach. Co., 913 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Or. R. Civ. P. 4L); Swank v. Terex Utilities,
Inc., 274 Or. App. 47, 57 (2015).
Constitutional due process requires that a defendant “have certain minimum contacts with
[the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citations omitted).
“In giving content to that formulation, the Court has long focused on the nature and extent of ‘the

defendant’s relationship to the forum State.’ ” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.,
141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021) (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of California,
San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779 (2017)). That focus led to the recognition of two kinds
of personal jurisdiction: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. Id. (citing Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). General jurisdiction extends
to “any and all claims” brought against a defendant, but a court may exercise general jurisdiction
only when a defendant is “essentially at home” in the forum state. Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at
1024 (citation omitted). Individuals are subject to general jurisdiction in their place of domicile.
Id. (citing Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 137). Defendant is domiciled in Texas, so there is no general
jurisdiction in Oregon. Notice Removal ¶ 15, ECF 1.
Specific jurisdiction applies to a broader class of defendants than general jurisdiction, but
only for a “narrower class of claims.” Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at 1024. “The inquiry whether a

forum State may assert specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant focuses on the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277,
283 (2014) (simplified). “Specifically, the defendant’s suit-related conduct must create a
substantial connection with the forum State” and the “primary concern is the burden on the
defendant.” Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2017)
(simplified). The connection between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation must “arise out
of contacts that the defendant . . . creates with the forum State.” Id. (quoting Bristol- Meyers
Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1780). “[T]he minimum contacts analysis examines the defendant’s
contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there,”
meaning that “a defendant’s relationship with a plaintiff or third party, standing alone, is an

insufficient basis for jurisdiction.” Id. (simplified).
The Ninth Circuit employs a three-prong test for analyzing specific jurisdiction. First, the
defendant “must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the
forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the
privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws.” Glob. Commodities Trading Grp., Inc. v. Beneficio de Arroz Choloma, S.A., 972 F.3d
1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797,
802 (9th Cir. 2004)). Second, the claim must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s forum-
related activities, though a strict causal relationship is not required. Id.; Ford Motor, 141 S. Ct. at
1026. Third, the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e.,
it must be reasonable. Glob. Commodities, 972 F.3d at 1107. The plaintiff bears the burden of
satisfying the first two prongs of the test. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. If the first two
prongs are met, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish the exercise of personal

jurisdiction would not be reasonable. Id. “When defending against a summary judgment motion
for lack of personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving jurisdiction by a
preponderance of the evidence.” Stoliarov v. Marshmello Creative, LLC, No. 2:19-cv-03934-
PSG-JPR, 2021 WL 1781870, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2021), aff’d, No. 21-55442, 2022 WL
819800 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 2022) (citing Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund, Ltd.,
784 F.2d 1293, 1396 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1986); Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d
1280, 1286 n.6 (9th Cir. 1977)).
Plaintiff’s intentional interference with economic relations claim sounds in tort, and thus
the Ninth Circuit’s three-part “effects” test for purposeful direction applies. Axiom Foods, 874 F.
3d at 1069 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)). “The defendant must have (1)

committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the
defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Id. (simplified). “[T]o establish the
basis for specific personal jurisdiction [under Calder], a tort must involve the forum state itself,
and not just have some effect on a party who resides there.” Morrill v. Scott Fin. Corp., 873 F.3d
1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 2017).
The first element is not disputed. Rather, the primary focus of the arguments raised by
Schiappacasse’s motion is whether plaintiff can show that Schiappacasse “expressly aimed” any
tortious conduct at Oregon. See Mot. Summ. J. 11–12, ECF 17; Resp. 14–16, ECF 22; Reply 10–
12, ECF 27. The crux of plaintiff’s argument for personal jurisdiction is that Schiappacasse
“purposefully directed her activity towards Oregon” by “targeting” Vizzini’s businesses,
including plaintiff, by contacting plaintiff’s clients and making disparaging comments about
Vizzini in an attempt to convince those clients to stop doing business with him, and
Schiappacasse’s substantial text messages and phone calls with Free, in which Schiappacasse

repeatedly expressed her intention to “ruin [Vizzini’s] business “and “get him out of the industry
once and for all,” among other similar sentiments. Resp. 14–15, ECF 22.
However, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Walden, “courts tend to decline
jurisdiction in intentional interference cases when a plaintiff’s only showing of express aiming is
that the out-of-state defendant’s extra-forum actions caused harm to the plaintiff in the forum
state.” Mot. Summ. J. 11 n.42, ECF 17 (quoting GPMI Co. v. Michelin Lifestyle Ltd., No. 2:21-
cv-00299-GMS, 2022 WL 657352, at *4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 4, 2022) (collecting cases); see also
Control Sols., Inc. v. MicroDAQ.com, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 3d 1182, 1191 (D. Or. 2015)
(explaining that, after Walden, “express aiming at a forum resident is jurisdictionally relevant
only insofar as it constitutes a single contact with the forum state, and is insufficient without

more to satisfy the express aiming requirement, which requires contacts created by the defendant
directly with the forum state, and not merely with a forum-state resident”). The specific business
relationships that plaintiff has identified as damaged by Schiappacasse’s alleged actions are with
companies not based in Oregon. Diversified Benefits Administrators is located in Thomasville,
Georgia, and Leading Edge Administrators is a New York entity with offices in New York and
Florida, and there is no evidence in the record that either company conducts any business in
Oregon.28 Schiappacasse’s acts were directed at these entities, and thus the only tie these acts
have to Oregon is that plaintiff’s principal place of business is in Oregon, which is insufficient

28 Pitt Supp. Decl., Ex. 3 at 4, ECF 28; id., Ex. 4 at 1, ECF 28.
under Walden to establish personal jurisdiction over Schiappacasse here. See Paragon Bioteck,
Inc. v. Altaire Pharms., Inc., No. 3:15-cv-00189-PK, 2015 WL 4253996, at *8 (D. Or. July 10,
2015) (declining to find specific jurisdiction where the “allegedly tortious conduct consists of
interfering with [plaintiff’s] relationship with another out-of-state entity” because the injury was

not “tethered to Oregon in any meaningful way beyond the fact that [plaintiff’s] principal place
of business is in Oregon”); Infusion Partners v. Otono Networks, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-2288-AC,
2017 WL 1959225, at *8–9 (D. Or. Apr. 12, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No.
3:16-cv-02288-AC, 2017 WL 1960661 (D. Or. May 9, 2017) (“[Plaintiff] claims personal
jurisdiction exists because [d]efendant knew [plaintiff’s] place of business was in Oregon and
that their actions were likely to cause . . . harm in Oregon. That [plaintiff] may have suffered an
injury in Oregon is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction[.]”).
As for Schiappacasse’s communication with Free or another Oregon resident with ties to
Vizzini29, those texts and emails, even if numerous, are insufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction over Schiappacasse. See Resp. 8, ECF 22; Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1262

(9th Cir. 1985) (“The making of telephone calls and the sending of letters to the forum state [is]
legally insufficient to enable the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the non-resident
defendant.”); Amazon.com Servs. LLC v. Paradigm Clinical Rsch. Inst., Inc., 631 F. Supp. 3d
950, 964 (W.D. Wash. 2022) (same); Morrill, 873 F.3d at 1144 (“Any links to Arizona, which
included Defendants’ communications with Plaintiffs by telephone and email . . . occurred only
because it happened to be where Plaintiffs resided.”); cf. Adidas Am., Inc. v. Bobosky, No. 3:10-
cv-00603-PK, 2010 WL 4365795, at *5 (D. Or. Oct. 8, 2010), report and recommendation

29 This individual’s name is not important to the analysis and intentionally omitted from this
decision.
adopted, No. 3:10-cv-00603-PK, 2010 WL 4364609 (D. Or. Oct. 28, 2010) (“Further, even
lengthy exchanges of business documents and communications with an entity in the forum state
does not constitute purposeful availment.”). Moreover, Schiappacasse’s text and phone
conversations with Free and the other Oregon resident are not the allegedly tortious acts that

plaintiff claims caused it harm; rather, it was the statements Schiappacasse made to out-of-state
companies that purportedly led those companies to terminate or change their business
relationship with plaintiff. Those latter acts and statements were directed entirely at places other
than Oregon and thus do not create any jurisdictionally relevant contacts with Oregon. See
Walden, 571 U.S. at 290 (2014) (“Regardless of where a plaintiff lives or works, an injury is
jurisdictionally relevant only insofar as it shows that the defendant has formed a contact with the
forum State. The proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or
effect but whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.”);
Love v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601, 609 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding no personal
jurisdiction because “discussions [with people in California] did not enable or contribute to the

promotion activities that actually gave rise to the law suit. The intentional acts that allegedly
harmed [the plaintiff] . . . . were directed entirely at markets in the United Kingdom and
Ireland”).
To the extent Schiappacasse’s statements to Free and the other Oregon resident could be
characterized as expressing an intent to engage in allegedly tortious conduct in other states, that
does not create a jurisdictionally relevant contact with Oregon. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco
Metals, Ltd., 905 F.3d 565, 577 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Express aiming is an ill-defined concept that
we have taken to mean something more than a foreign act with foreseeable effects in the forum
state.”) (simplified). Nor does Schiappacasse’s communications with Free about Free’s act of
registering the “Veritas Allies, LLC” business name in her own name create a relevant contact
for personal jurisdiction over Schippacasse. For one, the undisputed evidence in the record
shows that Free alone actually acquired the business name without prompting from
Schiappacasse, and this unilateral act of a third party cannot be the basis of personal jurisdiction
over Schippacasse.30 Ha v. Gulick, 567 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1270 (D. Or. 2021) (“For an exercise

of jurisdiction to be proper, minimum contacts must proximately result from actions by the
defendant . . . not the unilateral activity of a plaintiff or a third person.”) (simplified) (quoting
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984)). And plaintiff has not adequately explained
how Schiappacasse’s statements expressing some satisfaction in Free’s actions, or discussing
potential future plans with Free as to what the two might do with the business name, caused
plaintiff any harm or is any way connected with plaintiff’s claim for economic interference based
on the business name registration, which could only be brought against Free and not
Schiappacasse. See Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1069 (explaining that the “purposeful direction

test” requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant “(1) committed an intentional act, (2)
expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be
suffered in the forum state”) (citation omitted).
None of the other facts plaintiff has raised changes the conclusion that this court lacks
personal jurisdiction over Schiappacasse. Plaintiff asserts that Schiappacasse “consummated” a
transaction with plaintiff, Resp. 15, ECF 22, but the evidence shows that it was Schiappacasse’s
company and not Schiappacasse herself, that entered into a contract with EquitasDx, a different

30 Engrav Decl., Ex. 2 at 17–18, ECF 22-1.
one of Vizzini’s businesses in August of 2019.31 “Personal jurisdiction over an individual who
acts as an agent of a third party [such as a corporation] must be assessed on the individual’s
actions alone,” Glob. Commodities, 972 F.3d at 1109, and plaintiff has not alleged, much less
produced, any evidence showing that Schiappacasse and her company are alter egos such that the

company’s contacts with Oregon could be imputed to Schiappacasse for jurisdictional purposes.
See Apple Inc. v. Allan & Assocs. Ltd., 445 F. Supp. 3d 42, 51–52 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (“[U]nder the
federal law governing the exercise of personal jurisdiction, if a corporation is the alter ego of an
individual defendant, or one corporation the alter ego of another, the Court may pierce the
corporate veil jurisdictionally and attribute ‘contacts’ accordingly.”) (simplified). Other facts are
similarly irrelevant to the jurisdictional analysis. Schiappacasse apparently planned a visit to
Oregon to meet with Free and others, but the trip never happened.32 Vizzini offered
Schiappacasse a job with one of his companies, but she declined.33 Schiappacasse “came close”
to investing in one of Vizzini’s business, Resp. 16, ECF 22, but decided against it.34 None of
these are actual contacts with Oregon. Plaintiff also suggests that Schiappacasse contacted one of

Vizzini’s former employers based in Oregon, but the evidence plaintiff cited in support of that
assertion does not establish that Schiappacasse actually made that contact. Resp. 7, ECF 22; id.
at 14.
In sum, the only relevant contacts plaintiff has established are (1) the injury it suffered in
Oregon when it allegedly lost two clients, and (2) Schiappacasse’s phone and text

31 Id., Ex. 1 at 1–7, ECF 22-1.
32 Schiappacasse Dep. 167:21–168:13, ECF 22-1.
33 Id. at 81:9–25.
34 Id. at 59:22–60:14.
correspondence with two Oregon residents. These limited contacts are insufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction over Schiappacasse in Oregon for this case.
ORDER
Defendant Heather Schiappacasse’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Personal

Jurisdiction (ECF 17) is granted. This action against defendant Schiappacasse is dismissed
without prejudice.
DATED October 5, 2023.

/s/ Youlee Yim You
Youlee Yim You
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10396514. Public record. Not legal advice.