# Richards v. U-Haul International, Inc.

> District Court, D. Oregon · June 22, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10396085

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** June 22, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10396085

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming dismissal of breach of contract claims against individual Board members when the plaintiff alleged “the contract was only with the Board and not with the individual defendants”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

MARY RICHARDS, in her capacity as No. 3:23-cv-00062-HZ
Personal Representative for the Estate of
Jeffery Ferris, deceased, and in her OPINION & ORDER
capacity as Guardian Ad Litem for
Cameron Ferris, a minor,

Plaintiff,

v.

U-HAUL INTERNATIONAL, INC., a
foreign corporation, AMERCO, a foreign
corporation, REPWEST INSURANCE
CO., a foreign corporation, U-HAUL CO.
OF OREGON, a domestic corporation, and
U-HAUL CO. OF WASHINGTON, a
domestic corporation,

Defendants.
Travis Stephen Eiva
Eiva Law
1165 Pearl Street
Eugene, OR 97401

Attorney for Plaintiff
James T. McDermott
Gabriel M. Weaver
Ciaran P.A. Connelly
McDermott Weaver Connelly Clifford LLP
1000 S.W. Broadway, Suite 960
Portland, OR 97205

Attorneys for Defendants

HERNÁNDEZ, District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c). ECF 12. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) and
the parties’ filings related to the Motion to Remand and are taken as true unless otherwise noted.
On November 16, 2020, Suzie Chu1 rented a truck from a U-Haul location in Vancouver,
Washington2 for a one-way trip to Arizona. Chu signed an equipment contract that provided in
pertinent part:
An automobile liability insurance policy or a qualified self-insurance
arrangement provides the authorized driver with the minimum limits
required by the automobile financial responsibility or compulsory
insurance law of the jurisdiction in which the accident occurs.

Flatten Decl., ECF 18, Ex. 1 at 1. A few minutes later Chu opted to add “Safe Move”3 coverage
and signed an amended equipment agreement that provided in relevant part: “An automobile
liability insurance policy or a qualified self-insurance arrangement provides the authorized driver

1 Chu is not a party to this action.
2 “U-Haul of Washington is the exclusive entity that rents U-Haul trucks in the state of
Washington.” Flatten Decl. ¶ 6.
3 The rental contract addendum included a description of Safe Move in relevant part as follows:
“Safestor Mobile is insurance providing protection, subject to Exclusions, for loss or damage to
your goods.”
with the minimum limits required by the automobile financial responsibility or compulsory
insurance law of the jurisdiction in which the accident occurs.” Id., at 3. The rental contract
addendum provided in pertinent part:
This Agreement is between the Customer (defined as the individual(s)
signing the individual rental contract and/or paying for the rental of the
EQUIPMENT) (“Customer”, “I”, “Me” or “My”) and the local “U-Haul”
Marketing Company where the Agreement is entered into. . .
(“Company”).

* * *

3. LIABILITY PROTECTION

An automobile liability insurance policy or a qualified self-insurance
arrangement provides the Authorized Driver with the minimum limits
required by the automobile financial responsibility or compulsory
insurance law of the jurisdiction in which the accident occurs. The
protection provided by the Company is excess or secondary to any
insurance coverage of the Customer or an Authorized Driver.

* * *

4. NO-FAULT BENEFITS & UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED
MOTORIST PROTECTION

. . . . To the extent required by applicable law, the Company provides . . .
UNINSURED/ UNDERINSURED PROTECTION to Authorized Drivers
and passengers, limited as follows: the Company’s no-fault and/or
UNINSURED/ UNDERINSURED PROTECTION does not apply until
after exhaustion of all other no-fault insurance and/or other protection
available to the Authorized Driver and/or passenger(s) . . . and then the
Company’s protection applies to the extent it is needed to meet, on a
cumulative basis with all such other insurance and/or protection available
to the Authorized Driver and/or passenger(s), the minimum benefits
required by applicable law.

Id. at 6.
On November 18, 2020, Chu’s fiancé, Jeffrey Ferris, was driving the rented U-Haul truck
southbound on highway 97 in Oregon and Cameron Ferris was his passenger. SAC, ECF 1, Ex.
A at ¶ 3. Liam Pagel4 was driving his vehicle northbound on highway 97, left his lane of travel,
crossed into the southbound lane, and collided head-on with the U-Haul truck. Jeffrey Ferris was
killed in the collision and Cameron Ferris “suffered severe life-altering injuries.” Id. Plaintiff
alleges Pagel is liable for causing the wrongful death of Jeffrey Ferris and for causing the severe
injuries to Cameron Ferris. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. Plaintiff alleges Pagel’s vehicle was uninsured or

underinsured within the meaning of Oregon Revised Statute § 742.500 et seq., because “Pagel’s
liability insurance coverage to pay for the . . . losses was subject to policy limits of $100,000/
$300,000.” Id. at ¶ 7.
On September 23, 2022, Plaintiff in her capacity as the personal representative of the
estate of Jeffrey Ferris and the guardian ad litem for Cameron Ferris filed a complaint in
Multnomah County Circuit Court against U-Haul International, Incorporated (“UHI”);
AMERCO5; and RepWest6 in which she alleged, among other things, that “[i]n Oregon [Jeffrey
Ferris] rented a moving truck and purchased auto liability insurance from defendant.”7 Notice of
Removal, Ex. A at ¶ 1(h). Plaintiff further alleged Oregon law . . . requires that any such liability

insurance must include uninsured and underinsured motorist (‘UM/UIM’) coverage.” Id. at ¶ 8.
Plaintiff brought claims against “defendant Insurance Company”8 for breach of contract for UIM

4 Pagel is not a party to this action.
5 Plaintiff alleges AMERCO is “engaged in the business of providing insurance, moving, storage,
support, and oversight services for” Defendants UHI, “U-Haul Company of Washington, and U-
Haul of Oregon.” SAC at ¶ 1(e).
6 Plaintiff alleges RepWest “provides insurance and claim handling services of liability and
underinsured motorist claims involving U-Haul and AMERCO and their customers.” SAC at
¶ 1(f).
7 Plaintiff did not specify from which defendant Jeffrey Ferris purchased liability insurance.
8 Plaintiff defined “defendant Insurance Company” as UHI, AMERCO, and RepWest. Notice of
Removal, Ex. A at ¶ 1(h).
benefits for the estate of Jeffrey Ferris and for Cameron Ferris. Plaintiff did not attach a copy of
the amended equipment agreement to the complaint.
On November 4, 2022, counsel for Defendants, Gabriel Weaver, spoke with Plaintiff’s
counsel, Travis Eiva, and asserted that “AMERCO, [UHI], [and] RepWest were [not] appropriate
defendants. . . . Rather, based . . . on the . . . allegation in the Complaint that the truck was rented

by Mr. Ferris in Oregon, . . . the proper defendant would be U-Haul Co. of Oregon.” Weaver
Decl., ECF 19, at ¶ 3. At the time of their conversation Weaver did not have a copy of the
amended equipment agreement. Id.
On November 8, 2022, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in Multnomah County
Circuit Court in which she added U-Haul Company of Oregon (“UHOR”) as a Defendant and
continued to allege that “[i]n Oregon [Jeffrey Ferris] rented a moving truck and purchased auto
liability insurance from defendant.”9 Notice of Removal, Ex. A at ¶ 1(j). Plaintiff did not attach
the amended equipment agreement to the amended complaint.
In the course of investigating the allegations of the amended complaint Weaver learned

that Plaintiff’s allegations were inaccurate: Jeffrey Ferris did not rent the U-Haul truck in
Oregon, rather Chu rented the U-Haul truck from a location in Washington. On December 5,
2022, Weaver informed Eiva that the amended equipment agreement and the rental contract
addendum (together “the rental agreement”) were entered into by Chu at a Washington U-Haul
provider. Weaver provided Eiva with a copy of the rental agreement reflecting this information
and asked Plaintiff to “amend her complaint to correct the inaccuracies, include a full copy of the

9 Plaintiff again did not specify from which defendant Jeffrey Ferris allegedly purchased liability
insurance.
rental agreement, and either dismiss the defendants other than UHWashington, or articulate a
theory under which those other defendants could possibly be liable.” Weaver Decl. ¶ 6.
On December 20, 2022, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint in Multnomah
County Circuit Court in which she added U-Haul of Washington (“UHWA”) as a Defendant but
did not dismiss UHOR. Plaintiff alleges Jeffrey Ferris “was an authorized driver of a truck rented

from defendant U-Haul10 and insured by defendant Insurance Company11 under one or more
insurance policies and, as such, he is and was a beneficiary of certain insurance benefits under
such insurance policies.” SAC at ¶ 1(j). Plaintiff brings claims for breach of contract for UIM
benefits for the estate of Jeffrey Ferris and for Cameron Ferris and seeks $43,100,000 in
economic and noneconomic damages.
Plaintiff served the second amended complaint on December 22, 2022. On January 14,
2023, UHWA removed the matter to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. In their
Notice of Removal Defendants allege Jeffrey and Cameron Ferris were and are Oregon residents,
Defendant UHI is a Nevada corporation with its principal place of business in Arizona,

Defendant RepWest is an Arizona company with its principal place of business in Arizona,
Defendant UHWA is a Washington corporation with its principal place of business in
Washington, AMERCO is a Nevada corporation with its principal place of business in Arizona,
and UHOR is an Oregon corporation, but UHOR’s citizenship should be disregarded because it
was fraudulently joined.

10 Plaintiff does not specify which U-Haul entity the truck was rented from, but the amended
equipment agreement indicates it was rented from a U-Haul location in Washington.
11 Plaintiff defines “defendant Insurance Company” as UHI, AMERCO, RepWest, UHOR, and
UHWA. SAC at ¶ 1(h).
On February 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand this action to Multnomah
County Circuit Court. The Court took this matter under advisement on April 24, 2023.
STANDARDS
28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) provides in pertinent part: “A defendant or defendants desiring to
remove any civil action . . . from a State court shall file in the district court of the United States

for the district and division within which such action is pending a notice of removal."
The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), is strictly construed against removal
jurisdiction. Sharma v. HSI Asset Loan Obligation Tr. 2007-1 by Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 23
F.4th 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2022). Courts, therefore, “reject federal jurisdiction ‘[when] there is
any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.’” Martinez v. Am.'s Wholesale Lender,
764 F. App'x 592 (9th Cir. 2019)(quoting Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566-67 (9th Cir.
1992)). See also Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102,
1106-07 (9th Cir. 2010)(federal jurisdiction must be rejected “if there is any doubt as to the right
of removal.”). Due to the strong presumption against removal jurisdiction, “[a] ‘defendant

seeking removal has the burden to establish that removal is proper.’” Sharma, 23 F.4th at 1169
(quoting Canela v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 971 F.3d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 2020)).
A motion to remand is the proper procedure for challenging removal. Moore-Thomas v.
Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009).
DISCUSSION
I. Timely Removal
Plaintiff concedes UHWA removed the matter to this Court within 30 days of service of
the second amended complaint on UHWA, but notes removal occurred more than 72 days after
“the first Amended Complaint was served on defense counsel’s other U-Haul clients including
[UHOR].” Pl. Mot. to Remand at 5. To the extent that Plaintiff is asserting that removal was
untimely, the Court disagrees.
The Ninth Circuit has adopted the “last-served defendant rule,” which provides “each
defendant is entitled to thirty days to exercise his removal rights after being served.” Destfino v.
Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2011). It is undisputed that UHWA was the last Defendant

served and that it removed the matter within 30 days of being served with the second amended
complaint. Accordingly, the Court finds Defendants removal of this action was timely.
II. Fraudulent Joinder Standard
“Diversity removal requires complete diversity, meaning that each plaintiff must be of a
different citizenship from each defendant.” Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by & through Mills, 889
F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2018)(citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996)). When
“determining whether there is complete diversity, district courts may disregard the citizenship of
a non-diverse defendant who has been fraudulently joined.” Grancare, 889 F.3d at 548 (citation
omitted).

There are two ways to establish fraudulent joinder: “‘(1) actual fraud in the pleading of
jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-
diverse party in state court.’” Grancare, 889 F.3d at 548 (quoting Hunter v. Philip Morris USA,
582 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009)). “Fraudulent joinder is established the second way [when]
a defendant shows that an “‘individual[ ] joined in the action cannot be liable on any theory.’”
Grancare, 889 F.3d at 548 (quoting Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir.
1998)). If, however, “there is a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a
cause of action against any of the resident defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder
was proper and remand the case to the state court.” Grancare, 889 F.3d at 548 (quoting Hunter v.
Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2009))(emphasis in Grancare). “A defendant
invoking federal court diversity jurisdiction on the basis of fraudulent joinder bears a ‘heavy
burden’ since there is a ‘general presumption against [finding] fraudulent joinder.’” Grancare,
889 F.3d at 548 (quoting Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046). “Because the purpose of the fraudulent
joinder doctrine is to allow a determination whether the district court has subject matter

jurisdiction, the standard is similar to the ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous’ standard for
dismissing claims under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of federal question jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Bell
v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1946)). “The relative stringency of the standard accords with the
presumption against removal jurisdiction, under which we ‘strictly construe the removal statute,’
and reject federal jurisdiction ‘if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first
instance.’” Id. (quoting Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566).
The Ninth Circuit has “upheld rulings of fraudulent joinder” when defendants have
established plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statue of limitations or when defendants have
“present[ed] extraordinarily strong evidence or arguments that a plaintiff could not possibly

prevail on her claims against the allegedly fraudulently joined defendant.” Grancare, 889 F.3d at
548 (citations omitted). See, e.g., United Comput. Sys. Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 298 F.3d 756, 761
(9th Cir. 2002)(finding fraudulent joinder when the plaintiff's claims against the alleged sham
defendant were all predicated on a contract to which the defendant was not a party); Kruso v.
Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 872 F.2d 1416, 1426–27 (9th Cir. 1989)(same). The court, however, has
declined to uphold fraudulent joinder rulings when “a defendant raises a defense that requires a
searching inquiry into the merits of the plaintiff's case, even if that defense, if successful, would
prove fatal.” Id. at 548-49.
III. Merits
Plaintiff asserts in her Motion to Remand that she is an Oregon citizen, UHOR is an
Oregon citizen, and UHOR was not fraudulently joined. According to Plaintiff, therefore, the
parties are not diverse and this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff alleges there are
“numerous” ways in which Plaintiff “could prevail against defendant [UHOR] under Oregon

insurance law, self-insurance standards, and duties to ensure that vehicles under its control
satisfy insurance laws, particularly when the court, . . . considers the myriad of ways that
plaintiff could seek to amend the current pleading.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff lists several Oregon statutes
related to vehicle insurance requirements, self-insurance requirements, and UIM coverage
requirements, but does not present specific facts or argument relating those statutes to the
circumstances here. Plaintiff also states she served Defendants with requests for production
seeking “all insurance coverage related to the U-Haul truck involved in the collision,” however,
Defendants did not provide any documents responsive to that request. Pl. Mot. at 4. Plaintiff
concludes that UHWA and “its counsels [sic] evidentiary silence and failure to meet the removal

burden is telling. That is particularly so when related defendants and the same counsel were
silent about such potential fraudulent joinder for 72 days after service of the action and even
suggested that [UHOR] should be joined in the first place.” Id. at 10.
Defendants assert there is no possibility that a state court would find that the SAC states a
cause of action against UHOR and, therefore, joinder of UHOR was fraudulent. Specifically,
Defendants assert Plaintiff cannot establish her breach of contract claims as to UHOR because
UHOR and UHWA are separate and independent corporate subsidiaries of UHI, UHOR was not
a party to the rental agreement,12 and any requirement to provide UIM benefits or insurance to
Plaintiff arises solely out of the rental agreement between Chu and UHWA. In addition,
Defendants explain in their Response that they believed UHOR was an appropriate party when
Weaver spoke to Eiva in November 2022 based on the allegations in Plaintiff’s original and first
amended complaints that Jeffrey Ferris rented the truck in Oregon and on Plaintiff’s failure to

attach the amended equipment agreement to either of those complaints. Defendants removed the
action only after they discovered Chu rented the truck in Washington and Plaintiff added UHWA
as a defendant but did not remove UHOR. Defendants assert, therefore, that these facts are not an
indication that joinder of UHOR was not fraudulent.
To state a claim for breach of contract under Oregon law a plaintiff “must allege the
existence of a contract, ‘its relevant terms, plaintiff's full performance and lack of breach and
defendant's breach resulting in damage to plaintiff.’” Slover v. Or. Bd. of Clinical Soc. Workers,
144 Or. App. 565, 570 (1996)(quoting Fleming v. Kids and Kin Head Start, 71 Or. App. 718,
721 (1985)). In addition, “the plaintiff must allege the defendant was a party to the contract or is

otherwise bound by the terms of the contract.” Franson v. United States, No. 3:19-cv-01983-AC,
2021 WL 2232054, at *4 (D. Or. May 10, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:19-
CV-1983-AC, 2021 WL 2229045 (D. Or. June 2, 2021)(citing E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, 534
U.S. 279, 294 (2002)(“It goes without saying that a contact cannot bind a nonparty.”); Slover,
144 Or. App. at 572 (affirming dismissal of breach of contract claims against individual Board
members when the plaintiff alleged “the contract was only with the Board and not with the
individual defendants”)).

12 Defendants note Jeffrey Ferris was not a party to the rental agreement, but state that for
purposes of their opposition to the Motion to Remand only, they assume that Plaintiff could
allege that Jeffrey Ferris was a third-party beneficiary of the rental agreement.
The rental agreement stated in pertinent part: “This Agreement is between the Customer
(defined as the individual(s) signing the individual rental contract and/or paying for the rental of
the EQUIPMENT) . . . and the local ‘U-Haul’ Marketing Company where the Agreement is
entered into. . . (‘Company’).” Flatten Decl., Ex. 1 at 6. It is undisputed that Chu entered into the
rental agreement with a U-Haul location in Washington and that UHWA “is the exclusive entity

that rents U-Haul trucks in the state of Washington.” Flatten Decl. ¶ 6. The rental agreement,
therefore, was between Chu and UHWA. In addition, the rental agreement notes “[a]n
automobile liability insurance policy or a qualified self-insurance arrangement provides the
Authorized Driver with the minimum limits required by the automobile financial responsibility
or compulsory insurance law of the jurisdiction in which the accident occurs. The protection
provided by the Company is excess or secondary to any insurance coverage of the Customer or
an Authorized Driver ” Id. These two sentences make clear that UHWA is the entity that has
either an automobile liability insurance policy or a qualified self-insurance agreement that,
pursuant to the rental agreement, provided Jeffrey Ferris with the minimum automobile

insurance limits required under Oregon law secondary to any insurance of Chu or Jeffrey
Ferris.13 The rental agreement further provides: “To the extent required by applicable law, the
Company [UHWA] provides . . . UNINSURED/ UNDERINSURED PROTECTION to
Authorized Drivers and passengers, limited as follows: the Company’s no-fault and/or
UNINSURED/ UNDERINSURED PROTECTION does not apply until after exhaustion of all
other no-fault insurance and/or other protection available to the Authorized Driver[.]” Id. This
suggests that UHWA, pursuant to the rental agreement, could provide UIM coverage for Jeffrey
Ferris after exhaustion of all other relevant insurance available to Jeffrey Ferris. The rental

13 Plaintiff does not allege whether Chu or Jeffrey Ferris had applicable insurance.
agreement does not indicate that any U-Haul entity other than UHWA was a party to the
contract, agreed to provide insurance coverage, or has insurance that covers UHWA customers
or drivers.
In addition, the record reflects UHWA and UHOR are separate corporate subsidiaries of
Defendant UHI. Courts have made clear that corporations are separate and individual entities that

are not liable for the acts of other corporations. See, e.g., Crystal Cruises, Inc. v. Moteurs Leroy-
Somer S.A., 545 F. App’x 647, 647-48 (9th Cir. 2013)(“Corporations are treated as separate and
distinct entities.”). Although under Oregon law shareholders of a corporation may be held liable
if the corporation is a “mere 'instrumentality' or 'alter ego' and [when] fraud or injustice has
resulted,” Brodle v. Lochmead Farms, Inc., No. 10–cv-6386–AA, 2011 WL 4913657, at *6 (D.
Or. Oct. 13, 2011)(quoting Amfac Foods, Inc. v. Int’l Sys. & Controls Corp., 294 Or. 94, 105
(1982)), “[g]enerally alter ego liability applies [only] to shareholders.” Id. When a corporation
does not have an ownership interest in another corporation, alter-ego liability does not apply
because “some evidence of an ownership interest is required for liability to attach.” Id. There is

no evidence that UHOR has any ownership interest in UHWA that would give rise to alter-ego
liability. The Court, therefore, concludes Defendants have established there is no possibility that
a state court would find UHOR is legally responsible for UIM insurance referenced in the rental
agreement or that the SAC states a cause of action against UHOR.
Plaintiff asserts in her Reply that rather than entitlement to UIM benefits under the rental
agreement, this is “a case for [UIM] benefits that should be provided under defendants’ liability
insurance policies for its fleet vehicles or through being an authorized self-insured entity for such
vehicles under Oregon law” and “arises out of defendants’ breach of providing insurance
benefits as required under governing state law.” Pl. Reply at 2-3. As explained, however, even if
UHI, AMERCO, RepWest, UHWA, or UHOR hold fleet insurance that might provide UIM
benefits to the driver of a rented vehicle, the only conduit for insurance coverage of the vehicle at
issue is the rental agreement between Chu and UHWA, which does not implicate UHOR because
UHOR is a separate entity from UHWA and had no relationship to the transaction.
Plaintiff asserts in her Reply that because “defendants have not cited evidence to [the]

Court of any liability insurance policy on the U-Haul fleet vehicle as required by Oregon law” or
provided evidence that “the vehicle was covered by a qualified self-insurer . . . in the absence of
an actual insurance policy,” it is possible that Defendants do not have an insurance policy and/or
are not properly self-insured, which would give rise to claims under Oregon law for failure to
insure their vehicles. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, however, the record contains evidence that
the vehicle at issue was insured. As noted, the rental agreement states “[a]n automobile liability
insurance policy or a qualified self-insurance arrangement provides the Authorized Driver with
the minimum limits required by the automobile financial responsibility or compulsory insurance
law of the jurisdiction in which the accident occurs.” The fact that Defendants have not produced

this policy or evidence of self-insurance at this early stage in the litigation is not sufficient for the
Court to infer that Defendants do not have either the insurance policy or self-insurance as stated
in the rental agreement. Plaintiff’s arguments are pure speculation and, as such, are insufficient
for the Court to find that there is a possibility that a state court would conclude that the SAC
states claims against UHOR for failure to insure.
Finally, the Court finds on this record that neither Weaver’s suggestion in his November
2022 conversation with Eiva that UHOR was an appropriate party nor Defendants’ failure to
remove this matter until 72 days after the original complaint was served is evidence that removal
was inappropriate.
The Court, therefore, concludes on this record that Defendants have met their burden to
establish there is no possibility that a state court would find that the SAC states a cause of action
against UHOR. Accordingly, the Court finds the joinder of UHOR was fraudulent and, therefore,
the Court will disregard UHOR’s citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c). ECF 12.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:_____J_u_n_e_ _2_2_, _2_0_2_3_______.

______________________________
MARCO A. HERNÁNDEZ
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10396085. Public record. Not legal advice.