# Xu v. Lightsmyth Technologies, Inc.

> District Court, D. Oregon · May 25, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10396054

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** May 25, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10396054

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- describing adverse action as “reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

HUI XU, an individual, Case No.: 6:20-cv-01201-MC
Plaintiff,
vs. OPINION AND ORDER
LIGHTSMYTH TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
a Delaware Corporation, and FINISAR, a
Delaware Corporation,
Defendants.
_______________________________
MCSHANE, J.:
Plaintiff Hui Xu brings this employment action against Defendants Lightsmyth
Technologies, Inc., and Finisar Corporation, asserting claims of discrimination, retaliation,
hostile work environment, wrongful discharge, and failure to provide reasonable
accommodation. Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 44–62, ECF No. 1. On December 27, 2022, Defendants moved
for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J.,
ECF No. 62. For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
LightSmyth is a Eugene, Oregon based manufacturing company and subsidiary of Finisar
Corporation. Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 2. In January of 2012, Plaintiff began working for LightSmyth as a

Manufacturing Technician, and was later promoted to Supply Chain Manager. Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶
10–11. While at Lightsmyth, Plaintiff earned a reputation for being a difficult coworker and
employee; her former colleagues describe her as confrontational, defensive, insulting, and
incapable of accepting criticism. Berg Decl. Ex. 2, at 8, ECF No. 63; Berg Decl. Ex. 5, at 4
(“[S]he was confrontational. She liked to yell and scream repeatedly.”); Berg Decl. Ex. 24, at 2
(If it's a job that she doesn’t like . . . she started getting very argumentative and she would insult
people.”). Despite her own problematic behavior, Plaintiff frequently reported trivial personal

disagreements with her coworkers to Human Resources, often characterizing her work
environment as hostile, toxic, and discriminatory, based on her protected status as a 65-year-old
Asian woman. See e.g., Berg. Decl. Ex. 18, at 1, 11; Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 7. Plaintiff estimates that she
made about 80-100 reports to HR during her employment. Berg Decl. Ex. 1, at 62.
The complaints escalated in June of 2016, when Defendants assigned Catherine Brown as
Plaintiff’s new supervisor. Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 17. This relationship was strained from the beginning;
Plaintiff repeatedly voiced her opinion that Ms. Brown was unqualified to supervise Plaintiff and
her peers. See Berg Decl. Ex. 1, at 40; Ex. 29, at 1 (Plaintiff stating in a letter to CEO Chuck
Mattera that Defendants “assigned an obviously unqualified, poorly educated Caucasian woman

to supervise the new person”). Plaintiff also had a tense relationship with her “Clean Room
Lead,” Liza Dayton, who Plaintiff describes as “rude and disrespectful toward Plaintiff but not to
[her] male colleagues.” Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 21. Lead Dayton avers that Plaintiff often became “very
argumentative” and would insult Dayton when Plaintiff was assigned to a disfavored task. 1 Berg
Decl. Ex. 24, at 2–3 (“Every time there’s a job that she doesn’t like, she will start saying that
she’s being harassed and she’s being attacked.”).

1 See Berg Decl. Ex. 24, at 3 (“Q. What did [Plaintiff] say to you that you found insulting? A. She called
me stupid. She would insult me by calling me stupid many times. She would tell me that I'm uneducated.
And she would keep going that she was – you know, she went to a very prestigious school in China, that
she supervised 500 students in China and that she would teach the teachers in China. And I was nothing
compared to her, and she would go on and on about that.”).
In November of 2016, Defendants formally disciplined Plaintiff for slapping Lead
Dayton in the buttocks several times in front of their coworkers. Berg Decl. Ex. 1, at 78. Rather
than terminating Plaintiff for sexual harassment, Defendants reviewed the company code of
conduct with Plaintiff, issued a “Performance Assessment & Improvement Plan,” and warned
Plaintiff that any further misconduct would result in “further disciplinary action, up to and

including termination.” Id. Plaintiff contends that the company “knew or should have known that
Plaintiff and others engaged in horseplay in the workplace,” that her supervisors unfairly targeted
Plaintiff,2 and that “Defendants’ disciplinary action chilled Plaintiff's complaints for a couple
months.” Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 21.
Around this same time, Plaintiff reported that she was having difficulty with her eyes and
requested a magnifying glass to help her label products. Berg Decl. Ex. 1, at 68. Defendants
provided this accommodation immediately. Id. (“They gave you a magnifying glass when you
requested one without delay, correct? A. Correct.”). Then in April of 2017, Plaintiff submitted a
doctor’s note stating that Plaintiff suffers from “cataract and dry eye” and that she would need

“frequent breaks from looking through the microscope and should be excused from looking
through the scope for continuous periods greater than 30 minutes.” Lafky Decl. Ex. 5, at 1, ECF
No. 80. Defendants accommodated this request and adjusted Plaintiff’s break schedule
accordingly.3 Berg Decl. Ex. 1, at 69.

2 Plaintiff alleges that on a previous occasion, Lead Dayton choked Plaintiff and slapped her in the
buttocks. Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 21. Plaintiff has not provided any evidence to substantiate this claim.

3 See Berg Decl. Ex. 1, at 69 (“And it's true, is it not, that Finisar promptly made an accommodation
consistent with the recommendation of your written doctor's note? A. Yes. Q. Do you contend that
Finisar/LightSmyth failed to in some way accommodate your alleged eye disability in this time frame? A.
No.”).
Over the next year, tensions further escalated between Plaintiff, Supervisor Brown, and
Lead Dayton. On February 25, 2018, Plaintiff made a formal complaint to General Manager Gil
Cohen, detailing what she perceived as “prima facie examples of abuse of power, retaliation, and
discrimination.” Lafky Decl. Ex. 20, at 2. The essence of Plaintiff’s grievance involved her
disagreements with Lead Dayton about her product packaging duties. Id. Plaintiff also alleged

that Brown and Dayton conspired to “make her life as difficult as possible at Lightsmyth.” Id. In
this letter, Plaintiff requested a new supervisor “who is reasonable, and appreciates my
contributions.” Id. In response to Plaintiff’s complaint, Neel Dhar, Finisar’s Sr. HR Manager,
flew up to Eugene from San Jose, California to interview Plaintiff, Dayton, Brown, and several
other employees. Defs.’ Mot. 12; Berg Decl. Ex. 37, at 1. On March 27, 2023, Ms. Dhar notified
Plaintiff that based on the inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s interview, Ms. Dhar was “unable to
substantiate” Plaintiff’s claims. Id.; Berg Decl. Ex. 27, at 6.
March–April 2018 Restructuring of Plaintiff’s Job Duties
On March 15, 2018, Plaintiff requested further accommodation for her vision, and

submitted a doctor’s note indicating that she was “not able to perform visual inspection of subtle
surface defects.” Lafky Decl. Ex. 5, at 2. Since, according to Defendants, visual inspection was
an essential function of Plaintiff duties, Defendants decided to restructure her role. Berg Decl.
Ex. 39, at 1. On March 26, 2018, Plaintiff’s official title changed from “Supply Chain Manager”
to “Manufacturing Technician,” which also changed her status from an overtime-exempt,
salaried employee to a non-exempt, hourly employee. Id. Plaintiff’s primary duties included
“packaging all out going shipments,” “optical efficiency of standard material supply and
customer gratings,” and “loading and unloading the parts washer.” Id. Supervisor Brown advised
Plaintiff,
We will restructure your role as described above as an accommodation to you, and
will “try out” the restructured position for a period of one month. After that time,
Neel [Dhar] and I will meet with you again to discuss how this accommodation is
working, whether Finisar can continue to offer you this accommodation, and
whether there may be some other available accommodation that Finisar can offer
to you.

Id. Defendants also promised to work with IT to adjust the font size of the OE station monitor
and to provide Plaintiff with special safety glasses equipped with magnifying lenses. Id. at 2.
After 30 days, the accommodation seemed to be working, and Plaintiff’s new role was made
permanent on April 26, 2018. Pl.’s Resp. 8, ECF No. 79.
May 2018 Annual Performance Review
On May 8, 2018, Plaintiff received her annual performance evaluation from Supervisor
Brown. Berg Decl. Ex. 40, at 1–3. The report indicated that Plaintiff “met expectations” in every
category and “exceeded expectations” in the “commitment to quality” category. Id. at 1–2. In the
“goals and objectives” section, Supervisor Brown opined that Plaintiff could work on “packaging
single pieces in 5 minutes or less[,]” and should “[c]ontinue to work on clear communication
with lead and manager.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff avers that the suggestion to increase her productivity
was “one of the most offensive and hostile occurrences that happened” during her employment.
Berg Decl. Ex. 1, at 98; Defs.’ Mot. 14.
October 2018 Admonition About Respecting Coworkers
On October 2, 2018, after another employee notified management that several “Accelink
wafers” showed signs of dripping and “significant walk off,” Lead Dayton suggested in an email
that Plaintiff might be responsible for the wafer walk off. Berg. Decl. Ex. 17, at 3–4. (Dayton
stating, “I didn't change the set up that Hui's been working this morning I wonder if this is the
problem that she is having of significant walk off.”). Plaintiff was deeply offended by Lead
Dayton’s statement, and in a follow-up email to Supervisor Brown, Plaintiff accused Dayton of
lying, attacking her, and damaging Plaintiff’s reputation. Id. at 1. On October 15, 2018, after
Supervisor Brown received reports that Plaintiff told several coworkers that “Liza [Dayton] lied
in the email,” Brown set up a meeting with Plaintiff to discuss Finisar’s policy against spreading
rumors and disrespecting coworkers. Berg Decl. Ex. 43. Plaintiff describes this meeting as
“hostile and offensive” and alleges that Brown treated her “inhumanly” (1) based on Brown’s

“tone and mannerisms” by (2) “deny[ing] all of the facts” and (3) by prohibiting Plaintiff from
discussing the email with anyone else. Berg Decl. Ex. 1, at 605–607. Plaintiff also avers that
Brown used her “maximum power to protect the defamation [of Plaintiff].” Id. at 607.
November 2018 Offer of Severance
On November 1, 2018, Plaintiff provided Defendants with a third doctor’s note and
accommodation request. Lafky Decl. Ex. 8, at 9. In the note, Dr. Jane Mossberg, M.D.,4 stated
that she treats Plaintiff for hypertension, depression, anxiety, and shingles, and that these
conditions were “severely exacerbated by the work harassment [Plaintiff] has been having to
tolerate.” Id. Dr. Mossberg opined that Plaintiff’s position should be changed to “avoid certain

harassing co-workers and managers.” Id. Defendants denied this request. On November 11,
2018, Plaintiff made another formal complaint to Neel Dhar and again requested a new
supervisor. Pl.’s Resp. 8. Ms. Dhar then called Plaintiff and explained that she had already
looked into the allegations of harassment, that Finisar had made every reasonable
accommodation for Plaintiff’s eyes, and that they would not issue Plaintiff a new supervisor.
Berg Decl. Ex. 27, at 8. Ms. Dhar also suggested that if Plaintiff was unhappy working for the
company, then they could offer Plaintiff a severance package, and that the decision was up to
her. Id. at 8–10 (“Q. What was her response to that? A. Like I said to her, I don't want an answer

4 Jane Mossberg is the ex-wife of Tom Mossberg, former Lightsmyth CEO, and Plaintiff’s close friend.
Lafky Decl. Ex. 24, at 1.
from you, think about it. She was thankful. She said, okay, I will think about it and let you know.
Q. Was there ever a specific severance package offered? A. No, we just talked about it.”).
In an email to Ms. Dhar two days later, Plaintiff stated, “I am very sad that Finisar has
decided to offer me a package to force me out of the employment with the company.” Lafky Ex.
8, at 8. Plaintiff also accused Ms. Dhar of stating that Plaintiff’s harassment-related health

conditions were Plaintiff’s problem, rather than the company’s.5 Id. In response, Ms. Dhar
reminded Plaintiff that the decision to leave was completely up to her. She also suggested that
Plaintiff could take a leave of absence for her health as another option.6 Berg Decl. Ex. 45, at 1.
Plaintiff and Defendants Part Ways
On February 4, 2019, Plaintiff requested paid time off to take care of her terminally ill
sister and Defendants immediately granted this request. Berg Decl. Ex. 1, at 42–45. After
Plaintiff maximized her PTO days, she notified Defendants that her “situation [was] not
changing” requested six months of unpaid leave. Berg Decl. Ex. 47, 49. HR specialist Jessica
Pastor informed Plaintiff that caring for her sister was not a qualifying event under the Family

Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), however, Finisar would provide Plaintiff with an additional 30
days of unpaid leave. Berg Decl. Ex. 49; Ex. 51, at 1. Ms. Pastor also explained that 30 days was
the maximum number of days allowed under the company policy7 and that if Plaintiff did not

5 Ms. Dhar has consistently denied making this statement. Berg Decl. Ex. 27, at 10; Berg Decl. Ex. 45.

6 In her response to Plaintiff, Ms. Dhar stated that the “Company wanted to give you the option to leave
and seek employment elsewhere, while providing you with some financial security as you sought a new
opportunity. We have no desire to push you out; indeed, as I mentioned in my last email, Catherine thinks
you are doing good work in your role as a Technician. The decision to accept or reject that package was
entirely up to you, and now that you have declined the severance package, we will not discuss it further.”
Berg Decl. Ex. 45, at 1.

7 Finisar’s ‘personal leave of absence’ policy states:

Under special circumstances, employees with at least one year of employment may be
granted a leave of absence without pay when the employee has no other leave available to
return to work on March 25, 2019, “we will be unable to hold your job and will assume that you
have voluntarily resigned from your position.” Id. Plaintiff accepted the proposal, and on March
24, 2019, Plaintiff informed Ms. Pastor that she would not be returning to work and that she had
cleared out her locker. Berg Decl. Ex. 48, at 1.
The following month, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Bureau of Labor and Industries

(BOLI) alleging that she was subject to (1) discrimination based on her race, national origin and
disability, (2) retaliation, (3) workplace harassment (4) wrongful termination, and (5) that
Defendants failed to accommodate her disability. Berg Decl. Ex. 52. On April 23, 2020, BOLI
dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for “lack of substantial evidence linking the alleged harm to
[Plaintiff’s] membership in a protected class.” Berg Decl. Ex. 54, at 2. On July 23, 2020,
Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit, alleging identical claims. See generally Pl.’s Compl. Defendant
moves for summary judgment on all claims.
STANDARD
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) expressly permits a party to move

for summary judgment on a claim or defense.” E.E.O.C. v. Fred Meyer Stores Inc., 954 F. Supp.
2d 1104, 1112 (D. Or. 2013) (internal quotations and emphasis in original omitted). This Court
must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An
issue is “genuine” if a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving party. Rivera v.

them. The granting of this type of leave is normally for compelling reasons and requires
the manager’s approval, which may be granted or withheld for any reason. Leaves may not
exceed one month . . .

Berg Decl. Ex. 50, at 21 (emphasis added).
Phillip Morris, Inc., 395 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A fact is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the case. Id.
The Court reviews evidence and draws inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 988 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)). When the moving party has met its burden, the

nonmoving party must present “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986) (quoting Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(e)) (emphasis in original). The “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support
of the plaintiff’s position [is] insufficient” to avoid summary judgment. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. at 252. Uncorroborated allegations and “self-serving testimony” are also insufficient.
Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002).
DISCUSSION
I. Majority of Claims are Time-barred.
Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims occurring prior to April 25, 2018.

Defs.’ Mot. 18. Under Oregon law, civil actions alleging wrongful employment practices must
be commenced within one year after the occurrence of the unlawful incident “unless a complaint
has been timely filed under ORS 659.820.” 8 Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.875(1)(a). For Plaintiff’s
federal claims, the filing window is even narrower. Claims brought under Title VII and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) require plaintiffs to file a complaint with the Equal

8 Although claims brought under ORS § 659A.030 are now subject to a five-year statute of limitations,
the new statutory period only applies to incidents occurring on or before September 29, 2019. See Oregon
Workplace Fairness Act, S.B. 726, § 6(b), 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019). Because all of Plaintiff’s
allegations of unlawful employment practices occurred before September 29, 2019, the one-year statute of
limitations applies. See Thompson v. Inman, No. 6:21-CV-01231-MK, 2022 WL 17658245 at *4, n.4 (D.
Or. Sept. 30, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:21-CV-01231-MK, 2022 WL 17979740
(D. Or. Dec. 28, 2022).
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 300 days of the alleged unlawful act. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). The “filing date” is the date that a plaintiff files a
civil action or files a complaint with an administrative agency. OAR 839-003-0025(5). Since
Plaintiff filed her BOLI complaint on April 25, 2019, all incidents of discrimination and
retaliation occurring prior to April 25, 2018, are time-barred.9

II. Remaining Claims of Disparate Treatment
Plaintiff brings four timely claims alleging race, national origin and gender
discrimination under ORS § 659A.030 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, 10 and retaliation under ORS §
659A.030(1)(f) and ORS § 659A.199 (Whistleblower).
Discrimination claims are subject to the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-804 (1973). First, Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case
of discrimination by showing: 1) she belongs to a protected class; 2) she was qualified for the
position; 3) she was subject to an adverse employment action; and 4) similarly situated
individuals outside of her protected class were treated more favorably. Davis v. Team Elec. Co.,

520 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008). Next, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a

9 Plaintiff concedes that “evidence of retaliation and discrimination endured by Plaintiff prior to April 25,
2018 may not be directly actionable[.]” Pl.’s Resp. 14. However, Plaintiff argues that the Court may
consider all of Plaintiff’s allegations of discrimination and retaliation based on the continuing violations
doctrine. Id. at 13. The Court disagrees. Timely discrimination and retaliation claims must be based on
independent and discrete occurrences of adverse action. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S.
101, 112–113 (2002). In contrast, the doctrine of continuing violations is applicable “where there is no
single incident that can fairly or realistically be identified as the cause of significant harm,” such as in a
hostile work environment claim. Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002). See Morgan,
536 U.S. at 117 (“Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire
time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining
liability.”).

10 Plaintiff’s federal and state claims under Title VII and ORS § 659.030 have the same legal standard of
review. DeWeese v. Cascade Gen. Shipyard, No. 08-cv-860-JE, 2011 WL 3298421, at *7 (D. Or. May 2,
2011).
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged disparate treatment. Id. at 1091. Finally, the
employee must offer evidence that the employer’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the alleged disparate treatment is a pretext for discrimination. Id.
In the discrimination context, an adverse action is one that “materially affect[s] the
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of [employment].” Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis,

Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court described such an
action as a “tangible employment action.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760
(1998). Not every reassignment or even demotion suffices. Id. Instead, “[a] tangible employment
action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits.” Id. at 761.
Claims for retaliation are subject to the same McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
analysis as discrimination claims. To establish a prima facie claim for retaliation, an employee
must establish 1) her involvement in protected activity, 2) an adverse employment action, and 3)

a causal link between the two. Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 969 (9th Cir.
2001). The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the adverse employment action. Id. at 970. Finally, the employee must offer evidence that
the employer’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged adverse
employment action is a pretext for retaliation. Id.
In contrast to the standard for discrimination claims noted above, an adverse employment
action in the context of a retaliation claim is “any adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory
motive and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected
activity.” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2000). In establishing a causal
link between the protected activity and adverse employment action, an employee must prove the
employer’s “desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.”
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352 (2013). Absent direct evidence of
retaliatory intent, causation may be inferred solely from timing when the “adverse employment
action follows on the heels of protected activity.” Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1065.

A. March 26, 2018 Restructuring of Plaintiff’s Duties
Plaintiff characterizes the decision to change her role from Supply Chain Manager to
Manufacturing Technician as a retaliatory adverse action. Pl.’s Resp. 19. As an initial matter, the
parties dispute whether this act falls within the one-year statute of limitations. Defendants argue
that the relevant date is March 26, 2018, when HR notified Plaintiff of her new role and
commenced the 30-day trial. Defs.’ Mot. 19. Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ retaliatory
action occurred on April 26, 2018, when the trial period expired and her role was made
permanent. Pl.’s Resp. 16. Assuming, without deciding, that this act occurred within the statutory
period, Plaintiff’s claim still fails because a reasonable jury could not find that the change in her

role was a retaliatory adverse action.
Plaintiff’s prima facie claim is weak at best. There is no doubt that Plaintiff engaged in
protected activity on February 25, 2018, when she emailed Gil Cohen regarding Lead Dayton
and Supervisor Brown’s alleged “abuse of power, retaliation, and discrimination.” Lafky Decl.
Ex. 20, at 2. In response to Plaintiff’s complaints, Neel Dhar conducted an internal investigation
and concluded on March 27, 2018, that Plaintiff’s allegations were unfounded. The day before
Ms. Dhar shared her findings, Defendants restructured Plaintiff’s job, which Plaintiff describes
as a “demotion.” Plaintiff interprets these facts as showing a causal connection between
Plaintiff’s complaint to HR and her role restructuring. Pl.’s Resp. 19
However, the facts indisputably show that on March 15, 2018, while the investigation
was ongoing, Plaintiff made a separate accommodation request, this time seeking exemption
from “performing visual inspections of subtle surface defects,” which was an essential function
of her job. Lafky Decl. Ex. 5, at 2; Berg Decl. Ex. 39. Defendants simply complied with
Plaintiff’s request and restructured her duties accordingly. Plaintiff contends that Defendants’

accommodation was an adverse action because (1) her new role was less prestigious, (2) she had
to switch from a cubicle to a locker (to make room for her replacement), and (3) her status
changed from an overtime-exempt salaried employee to a non-exempt hourly employee. Xu
Decl. ¶ 13, ECF No. 81; Berg Decl. Ex. 39.
Although Plaintiff’s title and exemption status changed, Plaintiff offers no evidence that
that her pay and benefits significantly decreased or that her duties significantly changed. See
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761 (describing adverse action as “reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”) (emphasis added);
Maclin v. SBC Ameritech, 520 F.3d 781, 789 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding no adverse action where

title changes “but position remains the same in terms of responsibilities, salary, benefits and
opportunities for promotion”). In fact, by exempting Plaintiff from performing visual
inspections, Defendants merely limited her role to duties that she had already been performing
under her previous role. See Berg Decl. Ex. 37 (Plaintiff stating on February 25, 2018, “for over
a year, I have mainly been assigned to do packaging and clean dishes in the parts washer”). But
even if restructuring Plaintiff’s role was considered adverse, Plaintiff fails to meet the third
element: a causal connection between the change in her title and her protected activity. To
succeed on a retaliation claim, Plaintiff would need to show that but for her filing of the
complaint, Defendants would not have changed her title and status. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 352
(emphasis added). Here, Defendants would have restructured Plaintiff’s role to accommodate her
alleged disability, regardless of whether she engaged in previous protected activity.
Plaintiff fails to meet the elements of a prima facie case of retaliation; and even if she
could, Defendant’s met their burden of providing a reasonable and nondiscriminatory
explanation for their actions. Little, 301 F.3d at 970. Plaintiff overs no evidence, other than her

self-serving speculation,11 that Defendant’s accommodation was a pretext for retaliation. Id; See
Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 106 (“Uncorroborated allegations and self-serving testimony are []
insufficient” to avoid summary judgment).
B. May 8, 2018 Annual Performance Review
Plaintiff also characterizes her May 8, 2018, performance review as evidence of
discrimination and retaliation. Pl.’s Resp. 19. Plaintiff contends that the review was
“significantly more negative” – in terms of scores, language, and tone – than her previous
reviews. Id. at 18. The record does not support this argument. Plaintiff’s 2017 and 2018 reviews
contain almost identical ratings; both indicate that Plaintiff either “met expectations” or

“exceeded expectations” in every category, and that Plaintiff’s “overall performance” met
expectations. Berg Decl., Ex. 40; Ex. 57. The 2018 review offers several positive comments; for
instance, Plaintiff “has a strong desire to do well, likes to be helpful[,] [i]s opening [sic] to
learning,” and “keeps her area clean and clutterfree [sic].” Berg Decl. Ex. 40, at 1–2.
Although the review states that Plaintiff should work on her packaging efficiency and
should continue to communication with her supervisors, this hardly qualifies as a “negative
review.” Id. Nor was the suggestion unfounded. Only a few weeks before, Plaintiff met with
Supervisor Brown and Vice President Dmitri Iazikov to discuss Plaintiff’s difficulty with

11 See Berg Decl. Ex. 1, at 111 (Plaintiff calling Defendant’s accommodation a “coverup”).
meeting her production quotas. Berg Decl. Ex. 1, at 98. An undeserved performance review may
constitute a cognizable adverse employment action. Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376
(9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added). However, “[a] low performance evaluation which does not
affect the employee’s work does not amount to an adverse employment action.” Hess v.
Multnomah Cnty., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1154 (D. Or. 2001) (citing Kortan v. Cal. Youth

Auth., 217 F.3d 1104, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2000)). Plaintiff’s performance review was neither
undeserved, nor significantly more negative than her previous reviews.12
In any event, Plaintiff fails to show how the review is causally connected to her protected
class or her protected activity.13 A plaintiff’s “failure to allege specific facts sufficient to
establish the existence of a prima facie case renders a grant of summary judgment appropriate.”
Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1374; See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s discrimination
and retaliation claim fails.
C. October 15, 2018, Admonition about Respecting Coworkers
Plaintiff additionally fails to support a discrimination claim based on her October 15,

2018, meeting with Supervisor Brown. Brown’s reminder to respect Plaintiff’s coworkers and to
refrain from spreading rumors was neither an adverse action, nor linked to Plaintiff’s protected
class. Berg Decl. Ex. 43; Defs.’ Mot. 23. Although Plaintiff contends that she was treated
“inhumanely” because Brown “denied all the facts,” the evidence does not show that Plaintiff
was harshly criticized or even formally reprimanded. Berg Decl. Ex. 1, at 605–607. An adverse
action requires some tangible employment action “such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,

12 In fact, Plaintiff’s 2016 Performance Assessment and Improvement Plan, which was issued following
Plaintiff’s spanking incident, is the most negative review in the record. See Berg Decl. Ex. 34.

13 For example, Plaintiff provides no evidence that her non-female Caucasian coworkers received
significantly higher reviews than she did.
reassignment . . . [or a] change in benefits.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. Mere criticism of an
employees’ conduct, even when unjustified, does not “rise to the level of adverse employment
action.” Kraus v. Presidio Tr. Facilities Div./Residential Mgmt. Branch, 704 F. Supp. 2d 859,
865 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
D. November 18, 2018 Offer of Severance

Finally, Defendant’s severance offer does not constitute an act of discrimination or
retaliation. After Plaintiff’s fourth accommodation request, Ms. Dhar informed Plaintiff that a
new supervisor was not a reasonable accommodation and that HR had already thoroughly
investigated Plaintiff’s complaints of harassment. Berg Decl. Ex. 27, at 8. Ms. Dhar then offered
Plaintiff the choice of either remaining in her position, accepting a severance package, or taking
a brief leave of absence to take care of her mental health. Id. at 8–10; Berg Decl. Ex. 45, at 1.
Plaintiff had complete autonomy in how she wished to proceed and ultimately declined to accept
the package. An “offer of a severance agreement does not itself raise an inference of pretext.”
Miller v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 196 F. App'x 489, 490 (9th Cir. 2006); E.E.O.C. v. Nucletron

Corp., 563 F. Supp. 2d 592, 598–99 (D. Md. 2008) (“The mere offer of a severance agreement,”
without additional consideration, “is not adverse and therefore is not discriminatory. Id.
Plaintiff attempts to find evidence of unlawful motive where there is none. She claims,
without providing any evidence, that Ms. Dhar told Plaintiff that her health conditions were
Plaintiff’s problem, rather than the company’s problem. Lafky Decl. Ex. 8, at 8. Even so, the
health conditions that Plaintiff alleges here – anxiety, depression, and hypertension – are not
qualifying disabilities that Defendants were required to accommodate. See Section V, infra;
Berg Decl. Ex. 1, at 95 (Plaintiff admitting that her lazy eye was her only alleged disability).
Plaintiff also points to a December 17, 2018 email where HR Director Sheila Roberts calls
Plaintiff by the wrong name14 and suggests that Defendants “may be able to fight” Plaintiff’s
repeated requests for a new supervisor. See Lafkey Decl. Ex. 24, at 2. First, this email was sent
one month after Ms. Dahl’s conversation with Plaintiff, which negates any causal connection to
the severance offer. Second, calling Plaintiff by another generically Asian name on a single
occasion, does not rise to the level of disparate treatment. Third, Defendants were well within

their rights to “try to fight” Plaintiff’s request. Under the EEOC guidelines, a request for a new
supervisor is per se unreasonable. Roberts v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 690 F. App'x 535,
536 (9th Cir. 2017) (Memorandum Disposition). In sum, Plaintiff provides no evidence that the
offer of severance was made with retaliatory intent or was based on her protected status as an
Asian woman.
Because no reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff suffered any adverse employment
actions, the Court grants summary judgment on Plaintiff’s discrimination claims (I and VI) and
retaliation claims (I, II, and IV). 15
III. Hostile Work Environment

Plaintiff also brings a hostile work environment claim under ORS § 659.030 and 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a). To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff “must show: (1)
that she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a racial or sexual nature; (2) that the

14 Instead of calling Plaintiff “Hui,” Roberts called Plaintiff “Wei,” which, according to Plaintiff, is “the
most common Chinese name.” Lafkey Decl. Ex. 24, at 2.

15 Plaintiff also brings (1) a wage retaliation claim under ORS § 653.060(1)(a), alleging that “Defendants
constructively discharged and discriminated against Plaintiff because she inquired about and reported
violations of overtime laws,” and (2) an ADEA claim under 29 U.S.C. § 623 alleging age discrimination.
Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 59, 61. However, the parties do not address either of these claims in their briefings and
the Court is not aware of any evidence in the record concerning reports of a wage violation or
discriminatory treatment based on Plaintiff’s age. It is not the Court’s responsibility to “manufacture
arguments” on behalf of Plaintiff or to consider claims that were not actually argued by the parties. Indep.
Towers of Wa. v. Wa., 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003). “Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles
buried in briefs.” United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991). The Court grants summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth and Eleventh Claims.
conduct was unwelcome; and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the plaintiff’s employment and create an abusive environment.” Vasquez v. Cnty of
L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003). To determine whether conduct was sufficiently severe or
pervasive, courts consider the totality of the circumstances, “including the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it was physically threatening or humiliating, or a

mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work
performance.” Id. (quoting Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270-71 (2001)).
“‘[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)’ are not
sufficient to create an actionable claim under Title VII, but the harassment need not be so severe
as to cause diagnosed psychological injury.” Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest Prod., 847 F.3d 678,
687 (9th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 788 (1998)).
Plaintiff alleges the following incidents of “harassment” based on her gender and race:
(1) She was the only female working in the cleaning room other than Lead Dayton (who is also

an Asian woman) (2) Lead Dayton called Plaintiff and another female employee a “bitch” at a
retirement party (3) Lead Dayton frequently complained to Supervisor Brown about Plaintiff’s
“high pitched” voice (4) Lead Dayton asked Plaintiff, but not her white male colleagues, to
package with remnants16 (5) Lead Dayton enforced break policies with Plaintiff but not her male
co-workers (6) Lead Dayton “ridiculed”17 Plaintiff because of her failing eyes (7) and Sheila

16 Plaintiff claims that “remnants packaging was considerably more difficult and slowed [her]
performance significantly. Xu Decl. ¶ 30.

17 Apparently Lead Dayton told Plaintiff’s coworkers that Plaintiff “has difficulty putting labels on,”
which made Plaintiff feel “insulted, humiliated, embarrassed and angered.” Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 19; Berg Decl.
Ex. 1, at 87–88.
Roberts referred to Plaintiff by the wrong name in an email. Pl.’s Resp. 12, 20, 23-24, 26; Lafky
Decl. Ex. 6, at 1; Ex. 12, at 3, Ex. 23, at 4–5.
Defendants argue that none of Plaintiff’s “hostile” interactions with her coworkers
occurred because of her protected status as an Asian woman. Defs.’ Mot. 27. Indeed, Plaintiff
and Lead Dayton’s acrimonious relationship seems far more attributable to a personality conflict
rather than Plaintiff’s protected class. In any event, none of these incidents were so ‘severe or

pervasive’ as to alter the conditions of Plaintiff’s employment. Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 642. The
Ninth Circuit has set a high bar for conduct that constitutes “severe or pervasive.” See Kortan,
217 F.3d at 1106–07 (Denying hostile work environment claim where supervisor stated female
employee “laughs like a hyena,” called female employees “regina,” “madonna,” “castrating
bitches” and called plaintiff “Medea.”); Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1031 (9th
Cir. 1990) (No hostile work environment where police department displayed racially offensive
cartoon, made racially offensive slurs, and provided Latino employees with unsafe vehicles and
inadequate police backup.). Being teased for vision problems, a high-pitched voice, or being
called a “bitch,” does not come close the level of harassment displayed in Kortan or Sanchez.18

In sum, Defendants’ conduct “did not so pollute the workplace that it altered the
conditions of [Plaintiff’s] employment. Manatt v. Bank of Am., N.A., 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir.

18 Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s conduct need not be as severe as the conduct displayed in Kortan
because Plaintiff suffered harassment over a continuous period from 2014 until 2019. Pl.’s Resp. 25
(citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (“the required showing of severity or
seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the
conduct.”)). Although Ellison supports the proposition that one or two egregious incidents of harassment
may be sufficient to show a hostile environment, it does not follow that a few offhand comments and
incidents of mild bullying over the span of several years also supports a hostile environment. Ellison, 924
F.2d at 878. Moreover, the evidence does not show that Plaintiff’s “harassment” was continuous; she only
provides factual allegations of a few isolated incidents, none of which are sufficiently severe or pervasive.
See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 642 (denying hostile work environment where Plaintiff claimed Defendant
“continually harassed him but provide[d] specifical factual allegations regarding only a few incidents”)
(emphasis added).
2003). Plaintiff appears to have been a difficult employee who struggled to maintain amiable
relationships with her coworkers. Although Plaintiff believes that she was treated unfairly, Title
VII was not enacted as a “general civility code” or meant to provide relief from “the ordinary
tribulations of the workplace.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. Plaintiff’s hostile work environment
claims (I and VI) fail.

IV. Wrongful Discharge
Plaintiff also brings a claim for retaliatory discharge under ORS § 659A.030, and 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2.19 Although Plaintiff seems confused20 as to whether she voluntarily resigned
or was terminated, she asserts her claim under a theory of constructive discharge. Defendants
argue that Plaintiff never actually resigned; instead, she was terminated when she failed to return
to work. Defs.’ Reply 10, ECF No. 76. The facts undisputedly show that Plaintiff requested
unpaid leave to care for her sister, and that Defendants warned Plaintiff that if she did not return
to work on March 25, 2019, “we will be unable to hold your job and will assume that you have
voluntarily resigned from your position.” Berg Decl. Ex. 51, at 1 (emphasis added). On March

24, 2019, Plaintiff wrote an email to Defendants stating, “I am disappointed that you will not
grant me any more leave. At this time I'm not able to return to work until my difficult situation is
resolved.” Berg Decl. Ex. 48, at 1 (emphasis added). Defendants then sent Plaintiff a letter

19 Plaintiff also brings a claim for common law wrongful discharge (Claim V). However, the Ninth
Circuit has “held that Title VII and ORS § 659A.030 provide adequate statutory remedies such that a
common law wrongful-discharge claim based on retaliation is not available.” Lindsey v. Clatskanie
People's Util. Dist., 140 F. Supp. 3d 1077, 1095 (D. Or. 2015).

20 In her briefing Plaintiff states that she “requested leave and was constructively discharged by
Defendants when she did not return from leave when told to.” Pl.’s Resp. 9. However, Plaintiff also states
that she “went on leave approximately six weeks later and was subsequently terminated.” Id. at 15
(emphasis added); Berg Supp. Decl. Ex. 1, at 3 (“Q: Who decided your termination? A: I am not clear
whether it was one person or multiple persons.”) (emphasis added).
stating the following: “This letter serves as confirmation that your employment with Finisar has
been terminated.” Berg Supp. Decl. Ex. 2, ECF No. 89 (emphasis added). Although the evidence
tends to point towards termination, the distinction is immaterial; Plaintiff cannot prove a
wrongful discharge claim under either theory.

A. Constructive Discharge
Under the constructive discharge doctrine, an employee’s reasonable decision to resign
because of unendurable working conditions is assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial
purposes. The inquiry is objective: Did working conditions become so intolerable that a
reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to resign?” Poland v.
Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 2007) Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141
(2004)). This is a high bar. Id. As described by the Ninth Circuit:
[A] constructive discharge occurs when the working conditions deteriorate, as a
result of discrimination, to the point that they become sufficiently extraordinary
and egregious to overcome the normal motivation of a competent, diligent, and
reasonable employee to remain on the job to earn a livelihood and to serve his or
her employer.
Id. (quoting Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir. 2000). The standard for a
constructive discharge is even higher than the “severe and pervasive” standard in a hostile work
environment claim. “This aggravated claim arises when plaintiff presents a worst case
harassment scenario, harassment ratcheted up to the breaking point”. Suders, 542 U.S. at 147–
148 (internal quotations omitted). Because Plaintiff has not shown that the harassment she
endured even meets the “severe and pervasive” standard for a hostile work environment claim,
her constructive discharge claim necessarily fails.
B. Wrongful Termination
As an alternative to her constructive discharge theory, Plaintiff also contends that she was
terminated because “she attempted to enforce her right to be free from discriminatory conduct
and hostility due to her race, age disability, national origin, and whistleblowing activity.” Pl.’s
Compl. ¶ 54. However, Plaintiff provides no evidence of an unlawful motive. The evidence
indisputably shows that Plaintiff ‘s employment ended because she refused to return to work,
after maximizing her 30-day leave. Plaintiff provides no evidence that her termination was
discriminatory or that Defendants inconsistently applied company policy. Berg Decl. Ex. 1, at

56–58 (“Q. The decision not to extend you more than 30 days of personal leave was consistent
with the company policy; correct? A. Correct. . . Q. Do you know of any employee who has
received more than 30 days of personal leave? . . . A. I do not know.”) Defendants show a
legitimate, lawful reason for ending Plaintiff’s employment and Plaintiff offers no evidence of
pretext. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claims (I, II, V, VI) fail.
V. Disability Claims
Finally, Plaintiff brings claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §
12112, and ORS § 659A.112(1), alleging theories of (1) discrimination on the basis of disability
and (2) failure to accommodate. Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 48–51, 57–58. Plaintiffs have 300 days after an

alleged discriminatory action to file a charge under the ADA and one year to file a charge under
Oregon law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.875(1)(a). Therefore, all alleged
incidents occurring before April 25, 2018 are time-barred.
A. Discrimination on the Basis of Disability
To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment based on disability, Plaintiff must
establish (1) that she is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA, (2) that she is
qualified with or without reasonable accommodation to perform the essential functions of the
job, and (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability. See
Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996). The ADA defines disability as a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a person’s major life activities,21 has a
record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. §
12102(1) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff contends that her eye condition qualifies as a disability under the ADA and that
she was discriminated against because of this condition.22 Pl.’s Resp. at 26. While Plaintiff’s lazy

eye may have impacted her ability to conduct finely detailed visual inspections, Plaintiff
provides no evidence that her lazy eye impacts her ability to perform activities of daily living,
such as seeing, reading, or concentrating. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); See Berg. Decl. Ex. 1, at 15
(Plaintiff admits that her condition “did not impact in any way on [her] daily life.”). Therefore,
Plaintiff is not disabled under the meaning of the ADA.
Even if Plaintiff’s lazy eye did qualify as a disability, she did not suffer any adverse
employment actions because of her lazy eye. As previously stated, (1) the restructuring of
Plaintiff’s job duties – to accommodate her alleged condition, (2) her 2019 annual performance
review, and (3) Defendants’ offer of a severance package do not constitute adverse employment

actions. Plaintiff fails to support a prima facie claim of discrimination based on a disability.
B. Failure to Accommodate
“The ADA treats the failure to provide a reasonable accommodation as an act of
discrimination if the employee is a qualified individual, the employer receives adequate notice,

21 Major life activities are defined as, but not limited to, “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning,
reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(i)(1) (2012).

22 See Berg. Decl. Ex. 1, at 63 (“Q. What is the disability -- your disability for which you allege you were
discriminated by defendant? A . . . Well, it's because of my eyes, my eyesight. I only have one good eye.
The other eye is what's called lazy eye. Q. Are there any other disabilities for which you allege defendants
discriminated against you? A. No.”)
and a reasonable accommodation is available that would not place an undue hardship on the
operation of the employer's business.” Snapp v. United Transp. Union, 889 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th
Cir. 2018) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)) (internal quotations omitted). “[A]n employer has
a mandatory obligation ‘to engage in an interactive process with employees in order to identify
and implement appropriate reasonable accommodations.” Anthony v. Trax Int’l Corp., 955 F.3d

1123, 1134 (9th Cir. 2020). While an employer is not required to provide a particular
accommodation requested by an employee, it still must offer a reasonable accommodation.
Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002). Reasonable accommodation
includes “job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, [or] reassignment to a vacant
position.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
Regardless of whether Plaintiff suffered from an actual qualifying disability, Defendants
treated her eye condition as such, and engaged in an “interactive process” with Plaintiff to
implement reasonable accommodations.23 Anthony, 955 F.3d at 1134. Plaintiff even concedes
that Defendants furnished every single one of her requests to accommodate her eye condition.

Berg Decl. Ex.1, at 69–75. The only “accommodation” that Defendants did not implement was
Plaintiff’s demand for a new supervisor, which, as a matter of law, is not a reasonable
accommodation. Roberts, 690 F. App'x at 536. No reasonable jury could find that Defendants
failed to accommodate Plaintiff’s eye condition. The Court grants summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s Third and Seventh Claims.
CONCLUSION

23 See Lafky, Decl. Ex. 14. (“After that time, Neel and I will meet with you again to discuss how this
accommodation is working, whether Finisar can continue to offer you this accommodation, and whether
there may be some other available accommodation that Finisar can offer to you”).
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 62) is GRANTED in full.
Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 25th day of May, 2023.
______/s/ Michael McShane_____
Michael McShane
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10396054. Public record. Not legal advice.