# Bondick v. Mitchell Sanchez

> District Court, D. Oregon · January 30, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10395812

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** January 30, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

ROBERT BONDICK, Civ. No. 6:22-cv-00722-AA

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

MAILYNN MITCHELL SANCHEZ and
OREGON MEDICAL BOARD,

Defendants.

__ ______________________________________
AIKEN, District Judge:
Plaintiff Robert Bondick seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in
this action. ECF No. 2. Plaintiff alleges libel and malpractice against Defendant
Oregon Medical Board (“the Board”) and Defendant Dr. Mailynn Mitchell Sanchez
(“Dr. Mitchell Sanchez”). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF
No. 1, DISMISSED with leave to amend; Plaintiff’s Motion for the Appointment of
Pro Bono Counsel, ECF No. 3, is DENIED with leave to refile; the Board’s Motion to
Dismiss, ECF No. 11, is GRANTED and the Board is DISMISSED from this case with
prejudice; and Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand, ECF No. 16 is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings state law claims against Defendants for malpractice and libel.
Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, consists of a single paragraph in which Plaintiff

alleges that he “obtained medical records containing libel allegations.” Compl. at 1.
Plaintiff alleges that he asked Dr. Mitchell Sanchez to amend his medical record to
“have [the] allegation removed” and that Dr. Mitchell Sanches “plainly refused.” Id.
Plaintiff asked the Board to review Dr. Mitchell Sanchez’s decision and the Board
“simply obliged the matter.” Id. In his prayer for relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary
damages in the amount of $8,400.00 in pain and suffering, $84,000.00 in punitive
damages, and $8,316.00 in interest.

The Board filed a Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”), ECF No. 11, contending that it
is entitled to immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. MTD at 2.
Plaintiff responded, adding a legal claim and offering additional facts, ECF No.
13 (“Resp.”). First, Plaintiff argues that if Defendants are entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity, they are nevertheless liable under the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act of 1986 (“the HCQIA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101–11152 (1988). Resp. at

2. Plaintiff asserts that under HCQIA, a “Board review body is no longer afforded
immunity from damages.” Id. He explains that the Board reviewed Dr. Mitchell
Sanchez’s decision not to amend Plaintiff’s medical file, and that the Board concluded
that Dr. Mitchell Sanchez did not violate Oregon law. Id. Plaintiff further states
that the Board explained to Plaintiff that he could request Dr. Mitchell Sanchez to
“add a note” to his patient file stating that Plaintiff disagrees with details in his
medical record, but that Dr. Mitchell Sanchez has not added the note. Id.
Plaintiff asks the Court for leave to amend his Complaint to add a claim under
the HCQIA and to seek as relief a the Court’s declaration that Defendants must fully

amend the medical record to remove the “libelous statements” or append a note
demonstrating Plaintiff’s disagreement to the statements. Id.
Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Remand, ECF No. 16, requesting “permission
to remand this case,” explaining that “[c]ause is justified for remanding as plaintiff
has to save enough money for each defendant to be served.” ECF No. 16 at 1.
Defendants replied to Plaintiff’s Response arguing that HCQIA does not
provide a private right of action and asserting that Plaintiff should not have leave to

amend because any amendment would be futile and would not cure the defects in
Plaintiff’s Complaint. ECF No. 18 at 2. Defendants also responded to Plaintiff’s
Motion to Remand, arguing that the Court cannot remand this case because there is
nowhere for the case to be remanded to—it was filed in this Court. ECF No. 19 at 1
(citing Azodi v. TEPL, Inc., Case No. 12cv3069-IEG (BGS), 2013 WL 3751869, *2 (S.D.
Cal. July 15, 2013) (“[F]ederal courts do not have the authority to remand an action

originally commenced in federal court…to a state tribunal[.]”).
LEGAL STANDARD
Generally, all parties instituting any civil action in United States District
Court must pay a statutory filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the federal IFP
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), provides indigent litigants an opportunity for
meaningful access to federal courts despite their inability to pay the costs and fees
associated with that access. To authorize a litigant to proceed IFP, a court must make
two determinations. First, a court must determine whether the litigant is unable to
pay the costs of commencing the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Second, it must assess

whether the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
With respect to the second determination, district courts have the power under
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints even before service of the complaint on
the defendants and must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim. Courts apply
the same standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as when addressing a motion to

dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d
1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive a motion to dismiss under the federal pleading
standards, the complaint must include a short and plain statement of the claim and
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility
standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. The court is not required to accept legal conclusions, unsupported
by alleged facts, as true. Id.
Pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards than pleadings by
attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972). That is, the court should
construe pleadings by pro se plaintiffs liberally and afford the plaintiffs the benefit of

any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.
1988). Additionally, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the
complaint and the opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies cannot
be cured by amendment. Id.
DISCUSSION
I. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

A threshold issue in this case is whether all or some of Defendants are immune
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State,” U.S. Const. amend. XI. Under the Eleventh
Amendment, a state is immune from suit in federal court unless (1) Congress has

abrogated the state's immunity or (2) the state itself has waived it. Va. Office for
Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253–54 (2011). This grant of immunity
covers not just the state itself, but also the state's agencies. P. R. Aqueduct & Sewer
Auth. v. Metcalf, 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993). The Ninth Circuit has found that a medical
board is a “state agency.” See Forster v. Cty. of Santa Barbara, 896 F.2d 1146, 1149
(9th Cir. 1990).
A. The Board

Neither the Complaint nor Plaintiff’s Response identifies an abrogation of state
sovereign immunity. The State of Oregon and its agencies have not consented to be
sued in federal court or otherwise waived its immunity. Delong Corp v. Oregon State
Hwy. Comm'n, 343 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir), cert denied, 382 U.S. 877 (1965). Thus,
Plaintiff “cannot sue the State of Oregon or any of its agencies, including the Oregon
Medical Board, in this court.” Ogle v. Yates, No. 3:12-CV-571-ST, 2012 WL 2529210,
at *2 (D. Or. Apr. 6, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:12-CV-00571-
BR, 2012 WL 2609344 (D. Or. June 28, 2012), aff'd, 576 F. App'x 679 (9th Cir. 2014).
Further, the Oregon Legislature has expressly provided members of the Board,

members of its administrative and investigative staff, medical consultants, and its
attorneys acting as prosecutors or counsel with the same immunity from civil
proceedings arising out of their official actions as prosecuting and judicial officers of
the state. ORS § 677.335(1).
The members of the Board are specifically mentioned in the statute and
entitled to immunity for official actions. Plaintiff’s allegations arise out of the Board’s

review of Dr. Mitchell Sanchez’s medical decisions, and thus clearly relate to the
Board’s official actions. Consequently, the Board is entitled to immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment and as such, the Board is DISMISSED from this case with
prejudice.
B. Dr. Mitchell Sanchez
Dr. Mitchell Sanchez is alleged to be a physician at PeaceHealth in Eugene.
Compl. at 1. It does not appear from the Complaint that Dr. Mitchell Sanchez is an
agent of the state. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Dr. Mitchell Sanchez are

not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
II. Failure to State a Claim

For Plaintiff’s remaining claims against Dr. Mitchell Sanchez, the Court has
authority to screen Plaintiff’s Complaint for deficiencies prior to granting him leave
to proceed IFP. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed
to state a plausible claim for relief for malpractice, libel, or his purported claim under
the
A. Malpractice

In Oregon, the elements of a claim for medical malpractice are: (1) a duty that
runs from the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) harm that is
measurable in damages; and (4) a causal link between the breach and the harm. Zehr
v. Haugen, 318 Or. 647, 653–54 (1994). To demonstrate “harm,” Plaintiff must allege
that he has suffered an adverse medical outcome. Martineau v. McKenzie-Willamette
Med. Ctr., 320 Or. App. 534, 554 (2022).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to include a “short and plain statement of the claim”
that “contain[s] sufficient factual matter” to show how Dr. Mitchell Sanchez is liable
for malpractice. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff must plausibly allege facts
demonstrating that Dr. Mitchell Sanchez owed Plaintiff a medical duty and that she
breached that duty. Plaintiff also must show that he was harmed by Dr. Mitchell’s
breach of that duty. Plaintiff appears to combine his claim for libel and malpractice.
That is insufficient. Plaintiff must set forth separate claims for relief demonstrating
what Dr. Mitchell Sanchez did that was wrong and how Plaintiff was harmed.

Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his Complaint to do so.
B. Libel

Libel is defamation by written or printed words. Neumann v. Liles, 358 Or.
706, 712 (2016). To state a claim for libel, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to
establish that the defendant (1) published to a third person (2) a defamatory
statement about the plaintiff. Mouktabis v. M. A., 315 Or. App. 22, 23 (2021). To be
actionable, a communication must be both false and defamatory. Reesman v. Highfill,
327 Or. 597, 603, 965 P.2d 1030, 1034 (1998). A defamatory statement is one that
would subject the plaintiff “to hatred, contempt or ridicule * * * [or] tend to diminish
the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which [the plaintiff] is held or to excite
adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against [the plaintiff].”
Farnsworth v. Hyde, 266 Or. 236, 238, 512 P.2d 1003 (1973) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

Here, Plaintiff has not pled facts establishing that Dr. Sanchez Mitchell wrote
false or defamatory information about Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not alleged what was
written, nor has he explained how any purportedly false information in his medical
record subjected him to hatred, contempt or ridicule. To survive a motion to dismiss
under the federal pleading standards, the complaint must include a short and plain
statement of the claim and “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged. The plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. The court is not required to accept legal
conclusions, unsupported by alleged facts, as true. Id.
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief for libel against Dr. Mitchell
Sanchez. However, Plaintiff shall have leave to amend his Complaint according to
the Court’s above discussion.

C. Claim under the HCQIA

The HCQIA was enacted in 1986 to improve the quality of medical care by
restricting the ability of physicians who have been found to be incompetent from
repeating malpractice by moving from state to state without discovery of such finding.
See 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (congressional findings). The HCQIA establishes a national
reporting system to follow doctors when they move from state to state and provides
immunity from damages for persons participating in professional review activities.
Id. Congress found it necessary to provide qualified immunity from damages actions
for hospitals, doctors, and others who participate in the professional review process.
Thus, 42 U.S.C. § 11101 provides that persons participating in professional review
activities that meet the standards outlined in 42 U.S.C. § 11112, ‘shall not be liable
in damages under any law of the United States or any State’ with respect to the
person's participation in such activities.”
Plaintiff appears to contend that the HCQIA waives immunity from suit the
medical Board for its review of Plaintiff’s complaint against Dr. Mitchell Sanchez.
First, it does not appear from Plaintiff’s Response that the HCQIA applies to the facts

in this case. Second, even if it did apply, it does not stand for what Plaintiff asserts—
that is, it does not waive immunity from suit—it protects doctors engaged in a peer
review process from suit. Third, it does not appear to the Court that this claim could
possibly apply where Dr. Mitchell Sanchez has not engaged in any sort of review
process established by HCQIA.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff shall have leave to amend his Complaint to explain his
legal theory. In doing so, Plaintiff must plead facts that allow the Court to draw the

reasonable inference that Dr. Mitchell Sanchez is liable for misconduct under HCQIA.
In amending, Plaintiff should bear in mind that the court is not required to accept
legal conclusions, unsupported by alleged facts, as true.
III. Motion to Remand

Plaintiff moves to remand this case. ECF No. 16. Remanding a case means,
essentially, to send the case back the state court where it was originally filed. But
Plaintiff filed this case in federal court. The Supreme Court has held that federal
tribunals lack authority to remand to the state court system an action initiated in
federal court. Levin v. Com. Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413, 428 (2010). Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is DENIED.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained, Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED
with leave to amend. Plaintiff shall have 30 days from the date of this Order to

submit an amended Complaint or the case will be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel, ECF No. 3, is DENIED with leave to
refile. Plaintiff has shown ample ability to represent his interests in this case, but if
that changes, he may later renew his request. Defendant Medical Board’s Motion to
Dismiss, ECF No. 11 is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 30th day of January 2023.

________/_s_/A__n_n_ _A_i_k_e_n_______
Ann Aiken
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10395812. Public record. Not legal advice.
