# Richards v. Commissioner Social Security Administration

> District Court, D. Oregon · April 20, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10394729

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** April 20, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

CHRISTIAN R.!
Plaintiff, Civ. No. 3:20-ev-00603-CL
v. OPINION AND ORDER
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY .
ADMINISTRATION, —

Defendant.

MARK D. CLARKE, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Christian R. (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of the final decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying his claim for social security □
disability insurance benefits. Full consent to magistrate jurisdiction was entered on March 3,
2021 (Dkt. #19). For the reasons provided below, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.
BACKGROUND _
Plaintiff Christian R. was born on January 23, 1997, and he is currently 25 years old. He
has a limited education and is able to communicate in English. He alleges he is unable to sustain

‘In the interest of privacy, this Opinion and Order uses only the first name and the initial of the last name
of the non-governmental party or parties in this case.
] - Opinion and Order □ .

fulltime work activity due to bipolar disorder, depression, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and oppositional defiance disorder (ODD).
Plaintiff received child disability benefits until he turned 18, when the Social Security
Administration conducted a continuing disability review and determined he was no longer
eligible for benefits as an adult. Tr. 48-51, 205, 287. Plaintiff was not represented by counsel at
that time and did not appeal that determination. Jd.
Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income benefits on January 19,
2017, alleging disability since January 23, 1997, Tr. 150-53. He was initially denied on April 26,
2017, and again on reconsideration on June 15, 2017. Tr. 79-82, 88-89. Plaintiff had a hearing on
November 20, 2018, before ALJ De Monbreum. Tr. 30-53. He amended his alleged onset date to
his filing date of January 19, 2017. Tr. 36. On March 14, 2019, Judge De Monbreum issued a
decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled from January 19, 2017, through the date of the
decision. Tr. 15-25, Plaintiff appealed that decision on April 26, 2019, and was denied by the
Appeals Council on February 21, 2020, making the ALJ’s decision the final agency decision: Tr.
1-5, 147, 225-29. This appeal followed.
DISABILITY ANALYSIS
A claimant is disabled if he or she is unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which ... has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(1)(A). “Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential process for
determining whether an applicant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.”
Keyser Comm’r. Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011). Each step is potentially

2 - Opinion and Order

dispositive. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The five-step sequential process asks
the following series of questions:

1. Is the claimant performing “substantial gainful activity’? 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(1);_ 416.920(a)(4)(). This activity is work involving □
significant mental or physical duties done or intended to be done for pay or
profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1510; 416.910. If the claimant is performing such
work, she is not’ disabled within the meaning of the Act. 20 CFR.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(2); 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the claimant is not performing
substantial gainful activity, the analysis proceeds to step two.
2. Is the claimant’s impairment “severe” under the Commissioner’s
regulations? 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)ii); 416.920(a)(4)Gi). Unless
expected to result in death, an impairment is “severe” if it significantly
limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(a); 416.921 (a). This impairment must have lasted or
. taust be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1509; 416.909. If the claimant does not have a severe
impairment, the analysis ends. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii);
416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant has a severe impairment, the analysis □□
proceeds to step three.

3. Does the claimant’s severe impairment “meet or equal” one or more of the |
impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? If so, then
the claimant is disabled. 20 CFR. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)Gii);
416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment does not meet or equal one or more of
the listed impairments, the analysis proceeds to the “residual functional
capacity” (“RFC”) assessment.

. a. The ALJ must evaluate medical and other relevant evidence to assess
and determine the claimant’s RFC. This is an assessment of work- .
related activities that the claimant may still perform on a regular and
continuing basis, despite any limitations imposed by his or her
impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e); 404.1545(b)-(c); 416.920(e);
416.945(b)-(c). After the ALJ determines the claimant’s RFC, the
analysis proceeds to step four.
4. - Can the claimant perform his or her “past relevant work” with this RFC
assessment? If so, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv); 416.920(a)(4) (iv). If the claimant cannot perform his
or her past relevant work, the analysis proceeds to step five.

3 - Opinion and Order

7S, Considering the claimant’s RFC and age, education, and work experience,
is the claimant able to make an adjustment to other work that exists in □
significant numbers in the national economy? If so, then the claimant is not
disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v); 416.920(a)(4)(v); 404.1560(c);
416,960(c). If the claimant cannot perform such work, he or she is disabled.
See also Bustamante vy. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2001).
The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. /a. at 954. The
Commissioner bears the burden of proof at step five. Jd at 953-54. At step five, the
Commissioner must show that the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy, “taking into consideration the claimant’s residual functional
“capacity, age, education, and work experience.” Tackett vy. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1100 (9th Cir.
1999) (internal citations omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1566; 416.966 (describing “work
which exists in the national economy”). If the Commissioner fails to meet this burden, the

_ Claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v); 416.920(a)(4)(v). If, however, the

Commissioner proves that the claimant is able to perform other work existing in significant

numbers in the national economy, the claimant is not disabled. Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 954-55;
Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1099.
THE ALJ’S FINDINGS
Applying the above analysis, the ALJ made the following findings: -

1. Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2017, the -
application date. Tr. 17.
2. Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: history of ADHD; history of learning
disorder; history of PTSD; bipolar disorder type IJ; anxiety disorder; schizoid
personality traits. Tr. 17.

3. Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 18.

4 - Opinion and Order

4. Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all .
exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: he has the ability to
understand, remember, and carry out short, simple, and routine job instructions with a
DOT GED reasoning level of 2 or less, consistent with unskilled work. He should not
interact with the public. He should have only occasional interaction with coworkers
and supervisors. Tr. 19. -
5, Plaintiff has no past relevant work. Tr. 24.
6. Plaintiff was born on January 23, 1997, and was 19 years old, which is defined as a
younger individual age 18-49 on the date the application was filed. Tr. 24.
7. Plaintiff has a limited education and is able to communicate in English. Tr. 16.

. 8. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because Plaintiff does not have any past
relevant work. Tr. 24. - □
9. Considering Plaintiffs age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that
exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform,
including Night Cleaner, Hand Packager, and Auto Detailer. Tr. 24.
10. Plaintiff was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since
January 1, 2017, the date the application was filed. Tr. 25.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The reviewing court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on the proper
legal standards and the legal findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g); Batson v. Comm ’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004); see
also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). ‘“Substantial evidence’ means.
‘more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance,’ or more clearly stated, ‘such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Bray v.
Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53
F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). In reviewing the Commissioner’s alleged errors, this Court

. must weigh “both the evidence that supports and detracts from the [Commissioner’s]
conclusions.” Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). Variable interpretations

S - Opinion and Order □

of the evidence are insignificant if the Commissioner’s interpretation is rational. Burch v.
Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005).
If the decision of the Appeals Council is the final decision of the Commissioner, this
Court must review the decision of the Appeals Council to determine whether that decision is
supported by substantial evidence. Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484 (9th Cir. 1986). Where
the evidence before the ALJ or Appeals Council is subject to more than one rational
interpretation, the Commissioner’s conclusion must be upheld. Batson, 359 F.3d at 1198 (citing
Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1041). “However, a reviewing court must consider the entire record as a □
whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’”
Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466.F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hammock, 879 F.2d at
501). Additionally, a reviewing court “cannot affirm the [Commissioner’s] decision on a ground
that the [Administration] did not invoke in making its decision.” Stout v. Comm’r Soc. Sec.
Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Finally, a court may not reverse
the Commissioner’s decision on account of an error that is harmless. Jd. at 1055-56. “[T]he
burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency’s
determination.” Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009). ,

Even where findings are supported by substantial evidence, “the decision should be set
aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and making the
decision.” Flake vy. Gardner, 399 F.2d 532, 540 (9th Cir. 1968). Under sentence four of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), the reviewing court has the power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript
record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner, with or
without remanding the case for a rehearing.
DISCUSSION

6 - Opinion and Order

Plaintiff presents the following issues for review:
1. Whether the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony.
2. Whether the ALJ properly evaluated the medical opinion of Dr. Alvord. |
3. Whether the ALJ properly evaluated and included all supported limitations in the residual
functional capacity (RFC)?
For the following reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ properly evaluated the evidence. The
decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.

1. The ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiffs subjective symptom testimony; he gave clear
and convincing reasons to discount the severity of his symptoms and the ALJ’s
conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s treatment of his testimony regarding his limitations and
severity of his symptoms. When deciding whether to accept the subjective symptom testimony
of a claimant, the ALJ must perform a two-stage analysis. In the first stage, the claimant must
produce objective medical evidence of one or more impairments which could reasonably be
expected to produce some degree of symptom. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th
Cir. 2007). The claimant is not required to show that the impairment could reasonably be
expected to cause the severity of the symptom, but only to show that it could reasonably have
caused some degree of the symptom. Id.
In the second stage of the analysis, the ALJ must consider the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of the alleged symptoms based on the entire record. SSR 16-3p at *7-8, The
ALI will consider the “[l]ocation, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms”
reported by the claimant, any medical sources, and any non-medical sources. Jd. The ALJ’s
decision must contain “specific reasons for the weight given to the individual’s symptoms, be
consistent with and support by the evidence, and be clearly articulated so the individual and any
subsequent reviewer can assess how the adjudicator evaluated the individual’s symptoms.” Jd.
Additionally, the evidence upon which the ALJ relies must be substantial. See Holohan v.

7 - Opinion and Order

Massinari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001); Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345-46 (9" Cir. 1991).
In rejecting claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms, the ALJ must give
“specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Brown-Hunter y. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487,
493 (9th Cir. 2015).
Here, the ALJ determined that Plaintiffs statements concerning the intensity, persistence,
and limiting effects of his symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and
other evidence in the record. Tr. 20. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ gave only the blanket
statement that the allegations were not consistent with the medical record and other evidence,
and “did not make any other clearly articulated arguments” for rejecting the subjective symptom
- testimony. However, the ALJ discussed the medical record and other evidence thoroughly, and,
throughout that discussion, made several findings that discount the allegations. The ALJ’s
findings should be upheld if supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record; if
evidence exists to support more than one rational interpretation, the court is bound to uphold that
interpretation. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004).
Because the Court can infer from the ALJ’s decision the reasons for discounting the subjective
symptom testimony, and the ALJ’s conclusion is reasonable, the conclusion will be upheld.
The ALJ’s decision includes three clear and convincing reasons to reject the severity of
Plaintiff's alleged symptoms: 1) Plaintiff’s conditions showed improvement with treatment, 2)
the medical evidence was inconsistent with Plaintiffs subjective complaints, and 3) Plaintiff's

_ activities undermined his complaints. These findings are supported by substantial evidence.

First, the effectiveness of treatment is relevant to the evaluation of a claimant’s symptom
treatment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)-(v), 416.929(c)(3)(iv). Such evidence of medical

8 - Opinion and Order

treatment successfully relieving symptoms can undermine a claim of disability. Wellington v.
Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017). □

Here, Plaintiff presented with complaints of lifelong mental health issues resulting in
irritability and anger. Tr. 20 (citing e.g., Tr. 38-39). He received treatment off and throughout
his life, and his childhood benefits were terminated at his 18-year disability review. Tr. 20, 50.
At the 18-year psychodiagnostic evaluation in 2015, Plaintiff reported that he last received
mental health treatment in December 2014 and could live with his family, manage his grooming,
complete some chores weekly, prepare some meals, independently travel via public
transportation, shop, and manage his own funds. Tr. 20 citing Tr. 255, 258. He also reported that
he enjoyed watching television, playing video games, listening to music, exercising, and seeing a
few friends four times a week. Jd. The ALJ pointed out that despite an acute exacerbation
following an incident involving an assault (Tr. 20 citing Tr. 297-98), Plaintiff testified that he has
made significant progress with his treatment after his legal issues resolved, Tr. 20 citing Tr. 38-
39, Plaintiff stated that, while he had some anger issues when talking on the phone to family or
his girlfriend, the forced interaction in jail was good for him and he did not have any anger □□□□□□ .
in the jail. Jd. This testimony comports with treatment records where Plaintiff reported he was “a
lot better” after his stay in jail, where he forced to interact with his cellmates, and that he was not
“even feeling that anxious, mostly just bored.” Tr. 20 (citing Tr. 38, 393, 399). The ALJ. □
specifically noted that, after his release, Plaintiff reported his anxiety was two out of ten, that he
was spending time with his friends and his family, was able to quit smoking cigarettes, and was
feeling more calm and relaxed, without anger or anxiety issues. Id. His counselor observed
Plaintiff to be pleasant and cooperative despite an aloof presentation, to have very good mood
with only mildly constricted affect, and that Plaintiff reported benefit from medications with no

9 - Opinion and Order

side effects. Jd. citing Tr. 395-97." Thus, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that
Plaintiff's symptoms improved with treatment, and this was a clear and convincing reason to
discount the severity of these symptoms.
Second, an ALI may discount a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony that is
contradicted by medical evidence. Carmickle v. Comm Sac. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1161 (9th
Cir. 2008). Here, the ALJ determined that the medical record contradicted Plaintiffs allegations
of persistent debilitating anxiety. Tr. 20. As discussed above, the treatment notes show Plaintiff
reported that his anxiety was much better after his stay in jail, rating it a 2 out of 10 when it was
previously an 8 out of 10. Plaintiff reported that things at home were going fine; he felt more
calm and relaxed, and he was not having any anger or anxiety issues. He reported that he was not
even feeling anxious, mostly just bored. His mental exam showed that he was pleasant and
cooperative and had very good mood. /d. citing Tr. 395. He reported improvement with
medication with no side effects. Jd. citing Tr. 397. While this reasoning overlaps with the other
two reasons, there is substantial support in the treatment notes and mental status exam to infer
that the ALJ reasonably determined that the medical record undermined Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints. .
Third, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff's daily activities during the relevant period
reflected greater functioning than he alleged. An ALJ may consider a claimant’s activities when
evaluating the reliability of the claimant’s symptom allegations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i)
(2017). There are two grounds for using daily activities to discount a claimant’s testimony: (1)
activities “contradict [the claimant’s] other testimony” or (2) activities “meet the threshold for
transferable work skills. ” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 639 (9th Cir. 2007). The first basis
applies here. An ALJ may reject a claimant’s symptom allegations by referencing □

10 - Opinion and Order

“contradictions in the claimant’s own testimony about his activities of daily living.” Batson v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff alleged that he could not work because he could not interact with others without
irritability and anger outbursts and that he could not maintain enough attention to even watch a
movie. Tr. 20 citing Tr. 42. However, the ALJ pointed out that he made contradictory reports,
such as being able to play video games, watch television, and socialize with friends multiple
times a week without incident, as well as take public transportation, manage his own money, and
shop independently. Tr. 20-22 citing Tr. 258. The ALJ reasonably found that these activities
contradicted Plaintiff allegations of totally debilitating social anxiety and attention deficits.
The Court finds that the ALJ sufficiently reviewed the evidence, and while Plaintiff may
disagree with the ALJ’s ultimate conclusions, the ALJ’s interpretation and conclusions are not
unreasonable as a matter of law. The court will uphold the ALJ's conclusion when the evidence
is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035,
1038 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, Plaintiff's interpretation of the evidence is reasonable, but so is the
ALJ’s interpretation. The ALJ’s decision includes clear and convincing reasons, and substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s assessment regarding Plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony.
II. ALJ properly evaluated the medical opinion of Dr. Alvord.
Plaintiff's application was filed on January 1, 2017, before the new rules were in effect.
For cases filed before March 27, 2017, Federal Regulations 20 C.E.R. §§ 404.1527 and 416.927
instruct administrative law judges (ALJs) how to evaluate opinion evidence, and require ALJs to
apply the following factors: whether the source has examined the individual, how long the source
has known and how frequently the source has seen the individual, the nature and extent of a □
treatment relationship, whether the source is a specialist in the relevant medical issues, how

11 - Opinion and Order

consistent the opinion is with other evidence, the degree to which the source presents relevant
evidence to support an opinion, and how well the source explains the opinion. 20 C.F.R.§
416.927(c).
Scott Alvord, Psy.D., conducted a psychological evaluation of Plaintiff in April of 2017
and issued a report of his findings and an assessment of his functioning. Tr. 286-90. Dr. Alvord
opined that Plaintiff would have difficulty performing detailed and complex tasks; accepting
instructions from supervisors; interacting with coworkers and the public; performing work
activities consistently without special or additional instructions or accommodations; maintaining
regular attendance; completing anormal workday or workweek without interruptions from his
psychological symptoms; and dealing with the usual stress of a workplace. Tr. 290,
The ALJ did not reject this opinion but interpreted it and incorporated more concrete
limitations into the RFC. The ALJ is responsible for translating and incorporating clinical
findings into a succinct RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546(c); Rounds v. Comm’r Sec. Sec. Admin.,
807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015). Vague statements fail to specify a claimant’s functional
limits and are thereby “inadequate for determining RFC.” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1156 (9th
Cir. 2020). Here, Dr. Alvord’s report did not provide specific functional or occupational
limitations, merely stating that Plaintiff “would have difficulty” with certain tasks and
expectations. The ALJ thus limited Plaintiff's RFC to short, simple, and routine working
instructions with a GED reasoning level of two or less, limited all interaction with the public, and
limited interaction with coworkers and supervisors to only “occasional.”
The ALJ did reject Dr, Alvord’s opinion regarding attendance, noting that more recent
treatment notes and Plaintiff's testimony did not provide adequate support for limiting Plaintiff's
attendance at work. Tr. 22. citing Tr. 39, 393. Similarly, the ALJ noted that the evidence “shows

12 - Opinion and Order .

the claimant has no problems dealing with stress in the workplace, so long as the stress is not
induced by others.” Thus, the ALJ limited Plaintiff's RFC to no contact with the public and
allowed only minimal contact with supervisors and coworkers. The ALJ reasonably incorporated.
Dr. Alvord’s opinion and translated it into concrete functional limitations for purposes of the

_ RFC, and he gave clear and convincing reasons for the portion of the opinion he did not credit.
II. The RFC is supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ reasonably assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity. A residual
functional capacity represents “the most [a person] can still do despite [that person’s]
limitations,” and is assessed based on all relevant evidence in the case record. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545; SSR 96-8p, available at 1996 WL 374184, at 1. Determining the claimant’s residual
functional capacity is the ALJ’s responsibility. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c), The ALJ must consider
whole record and weigh the medical and testimonial evidence. SSR 96-8p at 1. The Court
affirms the ALJ’s determination of the residual functional capacity if the ALJ applied the proper
legal standards and the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427
1211, 1217 (9th Cir, 2005).
Here, substantial evidence supported the residual functional capacity finding, and the
ALJ did not err in applying any legal standards. As discussed above, the ALJ did evaluate and
assess limitations related to Plaintiff's anger and attention problems, such as limiting his
interaction with others and limiting Plaintiff to short, simple, and routine job instructions. Tr. 19,
21-23. Additionally, no credited medical opinion opined Plaintiff could not sustain simple
routine tasks despite his attention deficits. Tr. 19, 21-23 citing 259, 290, 61-62, 74-75. Dr.
Alvord stated Plaintiff would “have difficulty” performing work activities on a consistent basis.

without special accommodation; maintaining regular attending; and completing a normal

13 - Opinion and Order

workday/week without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, but as explained
above, those limitations are too vague to be vocationally useful, and the ALJ reasonably adapted
them to more concrete limitations for the RFC.
The ALJ’s residual functional capacity determination took into account the limitations for
which there was record support and properly excluded the limitations that the ALJ found
unsupported by substantial evidence in the record. Plaintiffs alternative interpretation of the
evidence is not enough to show error. As discussed above, the court will uphold the ALJ's
conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. Tommasetti
y, Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).
ORDER
The ALJ did not err in evaluating the evidence. The final decision of the Commissioner is
affirmed,
. L oO
. > 20) oe er
It is so ORDERED and DATED this * day.of April, 2022:
a a
oo YO :
CO
fo. & a
MARK D, CLARKE
. United States Magistrate Jud

14 - Opinion and Order .

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10394729. Public record. Not legal advice.