# Willis v. Langford

> District Court, D. Oregon · February 24, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10394417

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** February 24, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10394417

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy to bring false charges barred by Heck
- holding wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy to bring false charges barred by Heck

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

STEVEN DAWAYNE WILLIS,
Case No. 3:22-cv-00122-JR
Plaintiff,
ORDER
v.

LIZA LANGFORD; PORTLAND POLICE
BUREAU; MULTNOMAH COUNTY;
and STATE OF OREGON,

Defendants.

RUSSO, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff, an adult in custody at the Multnomah County Inverness Jail, brings this civil
rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. Pursuant to an Order entered this date, the Court
granted plaintiffs Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. For the reasons set forth below,
plaintiff must file an Amended Complaint.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Langford, who represents plaintiff as his attorney in pending
criminal proceedings, violated plaintiff’s rights by failing to provide plaintiff with discovery and
failed to seek dismissal of charges against plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges Langford acted “in

1 - ORDER
collusion” with the state, the county, and the Portland Police Bureau. As a result, plaintiff alleges,
he remains in custody in violation of his constitutional rights and state law. By way of remedy,
plaintiff seeks money damages and expungement of his criminal records.
STANDARDS
A district court must dismiss an action initiated by a prisoner seeking redress from a
governmental entity or officer or employee, if the Court determines that the action (i) is frivolous
or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b).
When a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court must construe the pleadings liberally and afford

the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Moreover,
before dismissing a pro se civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim, the court supplies the
plaintiff with a statement of the complaint s deficiencies. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police
Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623-24 (9th Cir. 1988); Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir.
1987). A pro se litigant will be given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is clear that
the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623;
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000).
DISCUSSION
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1)
that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the

alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v.
Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A plaintiff must also allege that he suffered a specific injury as a
result of a particular defendant’s conduct and an affirmative link between the injury and the

2 - ORDER
violation of his rights. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976).
As an initial matter, plaintiff names as defendants the Portland Police Bureau and
Multnomah County, but does not allege facts that would establish municipal liability. See
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. A municipal entity is liable under § 1983 only if the plaintiff alleges
his constitutional injury was caused by employees acting pursuant to the municipality’s policy or
custom; a municipality may not be held vicariously liable under § 1983 simply based on the
allegedly unconstitutional acts of its employees. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Ed. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Board of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997).

Moreover, defendant State of Oregon is immune from suit, as the Eleventh Amendment bars suit
in federal court against either a state or an agency acting under its control absent a clear and
equivocal waiver. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curium).
As noted, in order to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant,
acting “under color of state law,” deprived him of a right secured by the U.S. Constitution or
federal law. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). A public defender
“performing a lawyer’s traditional functions” does not act under color of state law. Polk County
v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Plaintiff’s allegations against defendant Langford arise
directly from her traditional functions as counsel in his criminal proceeding and, as such, plaintiff
fails to state a claim against Langford upon which relief may be granted. Although an attorney

representing a criminal defendant does not act under color of federal law, a public defender
engaged in intentional misconduct as part of a conspiracy with federal actors to violate a plaintiff’s
rights can be liable under § 1983 for that conduct. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984)

3 - ORDER
(“an otherwise private person acts ‘under color of’ [federal] law when engaged in a conspiracy
with [federal] officials to deprive another of federal rights”). However, to state a conspiracy
claim, a plaintiff must show “an agreement or ‘meeting of the minds’ to violate constitutional
rights.’” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The Court “need
not, however, accept as true allegations that . . . are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of
fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th
Cir.) amended on other grounds, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff makes the conclusory statement that defendant Langford acted “in collusion” with
law enforcement agencies to violate his rights. Plaintiff has not made any factual allegations to

support an agreement or meeting of the minds. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“[t]hreadbare recitals of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice”). Accordingly, plaintiff does not allege a claim against Langford upon which relief may
be granted.
Finally, a claim for damages for an allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment, or for other
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid is not
cognizable under § 1983, “unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged,
invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477, 487 (1994); see also Guerrero v. City of Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 703 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding
wrongful arrest, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy to bring false charges barred by Heck).

The Heck rule also applies to Fourth Amendment claims based on allegations of unlawful search
and seizure of property. See Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 583-84 (9th Cir. 2007) (Heck

4 - ORDER
bars a plaintiff’s claims challenging the search and seizure of evidence upon which criminal
charges were based).
Heck applies to pretrial detainees and to claims arising out of pending charges. Alvarez-
Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 700–701 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Cabrera v. City of
Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1988) (Heck barred plaintiff’s false arrest and
imprisonment claims until conviction was invalidated); Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th
Cir. 1996) (Heck barred plaintiff’s claims that defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him and
brought unfounded charges against him). However, the Supreme Court has announced that the
Heck rule bars an action only if there is an existing conviction. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S.

384, 393 (2007).
In Wallace, the Supreme Court held that Heck does not encompass the principle that “an
action which would impugn an anticipated future conviction cannot be brought until that
conviction occurs and is set aside.” Id. Instead of requiring dismissal of civil claims filed in the
shadow of an impending criminal case under Heck, the Supreme Court noted that if a plaintiff files
a § 1983 false arrest claim before he is convicted, or “any other claim related to rulings that likely
will be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial, it is within the power of the district court,
and in accord with common practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood
of a criminal case is ended.” Id. at 393-94. If the plaintiff is then convicted, and the stayed civil
suit would impugn that conviction, Heck then requires dismissal. Id. Otherwise, the case may

proceed. Id.
Because it is not clear from the face of the Complaint whether plaintiff has been convicted
of a crime, and because plaintiff does not allege that any such conviction has been invalidated, to

5 - ORDER
the extent plaintiff alleges his current confinement results from his alleged unconstitutional
detention and the alleged illegal seizure of his property, plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to
dismissal.
To the extent plaintiff alleges claims for relief under state law, although the Court may
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, the Court may also decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if the court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). As discussed above, plaintiff’s Complaint fails to
state a plausible federal claim for relief. If plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint which
cures the deficiencies noted, plaintiff’s state law claims will be dismissed as well. See United

Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff must file an Amended Complaint,
curing the deficiencies noted above, within 30 days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is advised
that the amended complaint will operate as a complete substitute for the present complaint, not as
a supplement. Plaintiff is further advised that failure to file an Amended Complaint, or failure to
cure the deficiencies noted above, shall result in the dismissal of this proceeding.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 24th day of February 2022.

/s/ Jolie A. Russo
Jolie A. Russo
United States Magistrate Judge

6 - ORDER

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10394417. Public record. Not legal advice.