# Lane v. Marion County

> District Court, D. Oregon · September 17, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10392427

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. Oregon
- **Decided:** September 17, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10392427

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting “Communications protected by absolute privilege include those made in the course of, or sufficiently incidental to, judicial and quasi- judicial proceedings[.]”
- noting “only four” rejected applications following placement on a Brady list fell “far short of establishing a complete prohibition” on obtaining employment in law enforcement”
- noting Plaintiff bringing IIED claim must establish “that defendant’s actions constitute the sort of aggravated acts that violate social norms in the workplace beyond all civilized behavior.”
- holding “that the class-of-one theory of equal protection does not apply in the public employment context.”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

CODY LANE,

Plaintiff, Case No. 6:19-cv-287-MC

v. OPINION AND ORDER

MARION COUNTY, a political subdivision of
the state of Oregon, the MARION COUNTY
SHERIFF’S OFFICE, JASON MYERS,
individually and in his official capacity as
Marion County Sheriff, and CRAIG
CUNNINGHAM, individually,

Defendants.
_____________________________

MCSHANE, Judge:
Plaintiff Cody Lane brings this action stemming from an internal investigation by the
Marion County Sheriff’s Office following a citizen’s report that Plaintiff followed his girlfriend
home from a bar in a marked patrol car while on duty. Defendants move for summary judgment.
ECF No. 25. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff served as a patrol officer in the Marion County Sheriff’s Office for over ten
years. On the evening of November 24, 2017, Plaintiff worked the graveyard shift while his

1 The Court views the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.
1 – OPINION AND ORDER
girlfriend celebrated her birthday at the Red Apple bar. In the early hours of November 25, 2017,
Plaintiff’s girlfriend asked Plaintiff to follow her home as she had a malfunctioning headlight.
Plaintiff, already in the area, agreed to follow her home as they intended to spend Plaintiff’s
lunch break together. Several witnesses outside the bar observed Plaintiff’s patrol car follow the
girlfriend’s car out of the parking lot. One of the witnesses filed a report with the Sheriff’s

Office.
On November 30, 2017, Plaintiff received a Notice of Investigation. Defendant Craig
Cunningham, a Sergeant in the Sheriff’s Office, was the lead investigator in the internal
investigation of Plaintiff. Cunningham conducted 14 interviews, including of Plaintiff and his
girlfriend. On March 14, 2018, Plaintiff received a pre-termination letter. After a hearing,
Plaintiff was terminated effective April 9, 2018. Plaintiff’s Termination Letter noted Plaintiff
“purposefully meant to deceive or hide the fact that you were escorting your girlfriend home
from a bar.” Compl. ¶ 14 (emphasis omitted). Sheriff Meyers forwarded the allegation of
untruthfulness to the Marion County District Attorney’s Office, who placed Plaintiff on the

Brady list.
Through his union, Plaintiff filed a grievance and the parties went to arbitration on
September 5-7, 2018. Fourteen witnesses testified during the arbitration. On January 7, 2019, the
arbitrator ordered Plaintiff reinstated. Despite the arbitrator’s finding that Plaintiff was not
untruthful, the Marion County District Attorney refused to remove Plaintiff from the Brady list.
Plaintiff currently works not as a patrol officer, but in the Marion County Jail.
Plaintiff brings claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, alleging Defendants
violated his rights to due process and equal protection. Plaintiff argues:

2 – OPINION AND ORDER
Specifically, the Defendants violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment liberty interest
in pursuing his chosen profession, his property interest in his chosen employment,
and his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection.
Defendant’s conduct in basing their investigation on misrepresentations and
twisted witness statements, in testifying falsely at Plaintiff’s arbitration, and in
willfully failing to make Plaintiff whole, pursuant to Arbitrator Marr’s order
caused these violations.
Pl.’s Resp. 6; ECF No. 51.
Plaintiff also brings state law claims for wrongful discharge, defamation, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
STANDARDS
The court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is
“genuine” if a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Rivera v.
Phillip Morris, Inc., 395 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A fact is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the case. Id. The
court reviews evidence and draws inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 988 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hunt v.
Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)). When the moving party has met its burden, the non-
moving party must present “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(e)).
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff’s Procedural Due Process Claim
Plaintiff alleges that the investigation itself, his termination, and Defendants’ conduct
following the arbitration order violated his procedural due process rights. To prevail on these
3 – OPINION AND ORDER
claims, Boyd must establish: “(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2)
a deprivation of the interest by the government; (3) lack of process.” Portman v. County of Santa
Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993. “The fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal quotations omitted). Each setting invites its own assessment

under a Mathews analysis and the only general statement that can be made is that persons
holding interests protected by the due process clause are entitled to “some kind of a hearing.”
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (citation omitted). “The tenured
public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of
the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story. To require more
than this prior to termination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government’s
interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee.” Id. at 546 (internal citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff received a Notice of Investigation less-than one week after the incident in
question. O’Kasey Decl. Ex. 5. The Notice informed Plaintiff of the citizen complaint regarding

possible violations of specific policies. The Notice provided:
During an incident on or about November 25, 2017, you are alleged to have
brought disrepute to the Marion County Sheriff’s Office. You are alleged to have
followed a female away from a bar in a marked County vehicle. The complainant
alleges hearing a conversation in which you stated, “Going to come follow you
home so that Stayton doesn’t get your ass.”
O’Kasey Decl. Ex. 5.
At the conclusion of the investigation, Plaintiff received a pre-termination notice which
set forth the charges and, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, set a time for the
Plaintiff to attend a hearing and respond to the charges. O’Kasey Decl. Ex. 6; ECF No. 26.
Plaintiff was provided a copy of the investigation and notified of his right to representation at the
4 – OPINION AND ORDER
due process hearing. After the hearing, Plaintiff received a written notice on April 9, 2018 that he
was being terminated because his behavior on the night in question:
brings into question your integrity and honesty. The investigation found that you
“purposefully” meant to deceive or hide the fact that you were “escorting” your
girlfriend home from a bar. You admitted that texting the message “Not a word to
them about what I am doing,” was intended to make sure that no one knew or
understood what you were doing because you didn’t want it to “look bad.” We
clarified during the Due Process hearing that you understood that to mean you
knew that you should not have been escorting her home from the location she was
at.
O’Kasey Decl. Ex. 7.
Pursuant to his rights under the collective bargaining agreement, Plaintiff arbitrated his
termination. Following that multi-day arbitration, the arbitrator ordered Plaintiff reinstated to his
former position, along with any back pay.
Plaintiff received an abundance of process. Plaintiff was interviewed during the internal
investigation, received notice of the charges, and presented evidence at the Due Process hearing.
Following his termination, Plaintiff successfully arbitrated his termination and was reinstated
with back pay. To the extent Plaintiff argues that the investigation simply ‘got it wrong,’ that
argument fails. “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee
against incorrect or ill-advised personnel decisions.” Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 350 (1976).
As Plaintiff received multiple opportunities to be heard, and ultimately succeeded in his
bargained-for arbitration hearing, his procedural due process claim fails. The Court arrives at this
conclusion even assuming, without deciding, that the internal investigation incorrectly concluded
that Plaintiff was untrustworthy.
/ / / /
/ / / /
5 – OPINION AND ORDER
II. Plaintiff’s Substantive Due Process Claim
Plaintiff argues Defendants’ determination that he was untrustworthy, and his subsequent
inclusion on the Brady list, violated his right to substantive due process; i.e., the right to work in
his chosen occupation. In the Ninth Circuit, substantive due process claims in the public
employment context are limited to “extreme cases, such as a government blacklist, which when

circulated or otherwise publicized to prospective employers effectively excludes the blacklisted
individual from his occupation, much as if the government had yanked the license of an
individual in an occupation that requires licensure.” Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 478
F.3d 985, 997-97 (9th Cir. 2007) (aff’d, 553 U.S. 591 (2008) (internal quotation omitted). In
other words, the Ninth Circuit tracks the conclusions of “the great majority” of other courts to
examine the issue, which have rejected a constitutional right to continued public employment in
a particular position. See, e.g, Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 142-43 (3rd Cir. 2000).
Stated differently, one does not have a constitutional right to a specific job or position, but only
to “a liberty interest in pursuing an occupation of one’s choice.” Engquist, 478 F.3d at 997.

As Plaintiff is currently employed by the Marion County Sheriff’s Office, he has not been
blacklisted from an occupation in law enforcement. Plaintiff has no liberty interest in his right to
a specific position, such as his former position as a patrol officer. Instead, Plaintiff has the right
to engage in his chosen occupation of law enforcement. As he is currently employed in that
occupation, Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim fails.
Plaintiff’s argument that his unsuccessful applications for employment with other law
enforcement agencies demonstrates he is blacklisted is meritless. Plaintiff produced evidence of
unsuccessful applications with the Portland and Bend police departments after his placement on
the Brady list. The Portland department declined to hire Plaintiff not because of his placement on
6 – OPINION AND ORDER
the Brady list but because Plaintiff admitted to violations involving the use of the law
enforcement database for personal reasons. Weiner Decl. Ex. 5, 36. The Bend department
declined to hire Plaintiff but did not provide a reason for rejecting Plaintiff’s application. Weiner
Decl. Ex. 6, 46. The record thus consists of one unsuccessful application that, when viewed in
the light most favorable to Plaintiff, is due to Plaintiff’s inclusion on the Brady list.

Providing evidence of one unsuccessful application with another law enforcement agency
falls far short of establishing one is blacklisted from a career in law enforcement. See Tillotson v.
Dumanis, 567 F. App’x 482, 483 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting “only four” rejected applications
following placement on a Brady list fell “far short of establishing a complete prohibition” on
obtaining employment in law enforcement”) (internal brackets omitted). As the record does not
support a conclusion that Plaintiff is blacklisted from engaging in his chose profession of law
enforcement—and in fact demonstrates the opposite—his substantive due process claim fails.
III. Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Claim
Plaintiff argues Defendants violated his right to equal protection because while he was

investigated for dishonesty, Defendants undertook no similar investigation when alerted to
complaints that Cunningham, who conducted Plaintiff’s internal investigation, was dishonest in
the course of Plaintiff’s investigation. This “class-of-one” theory, however, is not cognizable in
the public employment context. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 598 (holding “that the class-of-one theory
of equal protection does not apply in the public employment context.”). The “government has
significantly greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees than it does when it brings its
sovereign power to bear on citizens at large.” Id. at 599. The Supreme Court concluded:
Thus, the class-of-one theory of equal protection—which presupposes that like
individuals should be treated alike, and that to treat them differently is to classify
them in a way that must survive at least rationality review—is simply a poor fit in
7 – OPINION AND ORDER
the public employment context. To treat employees differently is not to classify
them in a way that raises equal protection concerns. Rather, it is simply to
exercise the broad discretion that typically characterizes the employer-employee
relationship. A challenge that one has been treated individually in this context,
instead of like everyone else, is a challenge to the underlying nature of the
government action.
Id. at 605.
As Plaintiff acknowledges he is not a part of any protected class, his equal protection
claim based on the allegation that he was treated differently than another Sheriff’s Office
employee necessarily fails.
IV. Plaintiff’s Continued Placement on the Brady List
Whether as part of any or all of the above federal claims, Plaintiff argues his continued
placement on the Brady list is an ongoing violation of his constitutional rights. The Court
disagrees.
The Marion County District Attorney, and not any Defendant in this action, made an
independent decision to place Plaintiff on the Brady list. The District Attorney testified:
And frankly, in many respects, the employment determination has absolutely zero
to do with our Brady determination. . . . [O]ur Brady decision is separate and
distinct from any employment consideration . . . . Based on all the information we
had with regard to Mr. Lane at this juncture, we believed him to be dishonest. We
frankly believed that he violated criminal law. We just could not prove it to the
standard necessary in a court of law, and therefore we did not need further
information. We did not need that to be ferreted out further. We were confident in
our decision as of August 29th of 2018.
Weiner Decl. Ex. 1, 2-3.
The District Attorney noted that although Defendants informed her of the arbitration
order, it did not alter the decision to place Plaintiff on the Brady list:
My recollection is that they complied with the order—as I reviewed it, which is
they had—they were required to ask us to either review the decision or even
change the decision. They were very careful about complying with the order. That
is my recollection.
8 – OPINION AND ORDER
And at the time, again, we were—we were provided with their copy of it. So we
did look at it and review it. And we were afforded an opportunity to read it there.
We didn’t take a copy. I don’t have it. But—but my recollection is they were—
they were complying with what they had been ordered or required to do. And we
responded to them specifically, “Thank you for notifying us of this, but it does not
change our Brady determination.”
Weiner Decl. Ex. 1, 5-6.
The District Attorney provided clarification on her thought process in regard to Plaintiff’s
placement on the Brady list:
So there’s multiple levels of conduct with Mr. Lane, but first of all, the conduct,
it—the actual conduct while on duty in a police car as observed by members of
the public, of him escorting his girlfriend home, because even by his own
admission that was inappropriate and official misconduct level conduct.
His own admission was such that her headlights were out or would intermittently
go out, and so he needed to follow her home. That, in and of itself, to me, is
fraught with untruthfulness. I don’t know why you would need to follow someone
home if their headlights are out. Seems like you would want to be in front of them
to help them see their way through the darkness. And yet that, in and of itself, is
an admission of official misconduct and really an abuse of his role as a police
officer to be escorting his girlfriend home.
Then, secondarily to that, it is our belief, and it was the finding of the Sheriff’s
office and—and my determination, as well as Mr. Beglau’s that Mr. Lane lied
about that behavior in subsequent interviews, which were Garrity-compelled and
therefore not something we could use in a criminal prosecution, but nonetheless,
that he was dishonest in those—in those circumstances as well.
Weiner Decl. Ex. 1, 11-12.
The District Attorney “fundamentally disagreed with” the arbitrator’s decision. Weiner
Decl. Ex. 1, 14. Ultimately, the District Attorney stated she “made an independent, separate
interpretation and assessment of this case in this investigation. What a third party thinks about is
not relevant to my decision-making.” Weiner Decl. Ex. 1, 15.
9 – OPINION AND ORDER
As the District Attorney made an independent analysis of Plaintiff’s conduct, Plaintiff’s
continued placement on the Brady list cannot establish any violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights by any of the Defendants named in this action.
V. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims
Plaintiff brings state law claims for wrongful discharge, defamation, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress against the county.2
In Oregon, a Plaintiff bringing a wrongful discharge claim states a claim “(1) when the
discharge is for exercising a job-related right that reflects an important public policy; or (2) when
the discharge is for fulfilling some important public duty.” Babick v. Oregon Arena Corp., 333
Or. 401, 407 (2002) (internal citations omitted). Although Plaintiff argues that his termination
was wrongful because he was never made “whole,” he makes no argument or allegation that his
termination was related in any way to the fulfillment of any public duty or policy. Therefore,
even accepting that Plaintiff was never made whole, his wrongful discharge claim fails.
Plaintiff’s defamation claim fares no better. It is undisputed that any statements made by

Cunningham (in the report) or Meyers (in sending the report to the District Attorney) occurred in
the course of their official duties. Therefore, their statements are entitled to absolute immunity.
Chamberlain v. City of Portland, 184 Or. App. 487, 386-87 (2002).
While this is admittedly a narrow privilege, it applies under the narrow facts at issue.
Oregon Courts have extended absolute immunity to police officers conducting an internal
investigation and report. Johnson v. Brown, 193 Or. App. 375, 385 (2004) (discussing
Chamberlain and noting officer was entitled to absolute immunity as to a defamation claim when

2 Plaintiff agrees that under the Oregon Tort Claim Act, he may not bring the state claims against the individually-
named defendants. Resp. 32-33.
10 – OPINION AND ORDER
officer “was required, as part of her job duties, to prepare a written report describing the
plaintiff’s conduct on an assignment that the two officers had jointly undertaken.”). Additionally,
any statements made to the District Attorney are entitled to absolute immunity due to the quasi-
judicial nature of such statements. Id. at 381 (noting “Communications protected by absolute
privilege include those made in the course of, or sufficiently incidental to, judicial and quasi-

judicial proceedings[.]”).
Finally, a Plaintiff bringing an IIED claim must establish, amongst other things, that the
“defendants’ conduct constitutes extraordinary conduct which a reasonable jury could find
beyond the farthest reaches of socially tolerable behavior.” Kraemer v. Harding, 159 Or. App.
90, 110 (1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Plaintiff argues:
Defendants persist in their belief Plaintiff was untruthful and discount the fact-
finding hearing at arbitration as just the opinion of the arbitrator. District Attorney
Clarkson also persists in her belief Plaintiff was untruthful which is prima facie
evidence Defendants acted with insufficient diligence in correcting her. A logical
inference a jury could make is that Defendants never intended to correct the
record, even knowing exactly how damaging the label of untruthfulness is to a
law enforcement officer.
Resp. 38.
As demonstrated above, Defendants provided the District Attorney with the arbitrator’s
decision. The District Attorney made an independent decision to keep Plaintiff on the Brady list.
As noted, the District Attorney believed Plaintiff’s explanation of tailing, as opposed to leading,
his girlfriend home due to a broken headlamp, indicated Plaintiff was being untruthful. That the
District Attorney was not swayed by the arbitrator’s findings does not somehow mean the
Defendants’ own actions were beyond the reaches of acceptable behavior. And though Plaintiff
believes Cunningham’s internal investigation was not as fair or thorough as Plaintiff would have
liked, the actions do not rise to the level necessary to support a claim of intentional infliction of
11 – OPINION AND ORDER
emotional distress. See McManus v. Auchincloss, 271 Or. App. 765, 782 (2015) (noting Plaintiff
bringing IIED claim must establish “that defendant’s actions constitute the sort of aggravated
acts that violate social norms in the workplace beyond all civilized behavior.”).
VI. Plaintiff’s Request for Leave to Amend
Plaintiff acknowledges he fails to adequately state a claim under the First Amendment or

under his “class of one” equal protection claim. Realizing this, Plaintiff seeks leave to file an
amended complaint. The time to file an amended complaint, however, passed nearly one year
ago. ECF No. 2. Discovery closed months ago. The parties deposed the witnesses long ago.
Leave to amend in these circumstances is disfavored. “Simply put, summary judgment is not a
procedural second chance to flesh out inadequate pleadings. Wasco Prods. Inc. v. Southwall
Techs, Inc., 435 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Fleming v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 922
F.2d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 1990). Allowing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint would be unduly
prejudicial to the Defendants. A response to summary judgment is not the appropriate time to
alert the Court and the Defendants that Plaintiff wishes to proceed on a theory that Defendants
retaliated against Plaintiff for engaging in the grievance process.3 Were it not for a global

pandemic, this case would have been tried already. Simply put, it is far too late for Plaintiff to
file an amended complaint based on new theories.
/ / / /
/ / / /
/ / / /
/ / / /

3 Additionally, leave to amend would likely be futile, as filing a grievance and proceeding to arbitration is not a
matter of public concern entitled to First Amendment protections. Heidt v. City of McMinnville, No. 3:15-CV-00989-
SI, 2017 WL 2432150, at *5-6 (D. Or. June 5, 2017).
12 – OPINION AND ORDER
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 25, is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 17th day of September, 2020.

_____/s/ Micahel J. McShane____
Michael McShane
United States District Judge

13 – OPINION AND ORDER

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10392427. Public record. Not legal advice.