# Emrit v. Combs

> District Court, W.D. Oklahoma · March 8, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10390735

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** March 8, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10390735

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that a pro se plaintiff “must allege facts in his complaint to show that the district court had jurisdiction, such as federal question or diversity jurisdiction”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

RONALD SATISH EMRIT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-24-217-D
)
SEAN “P. DIDDY” COMBS; )
BAD BOY ENTERTAINMENT; and )
ATLANTIC RECORDS, )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER
Plaintiff, appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action which allegedly
seeks relief for wrongs committed by multiple Defendants. Pursuant to the directives of 28
U.S.C. § 1915, the Court has reviewed the allegations of the complaint [Doc. No. 1]. Of
particular relevance is subpart (e)(2) of § 1915, which states:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been
paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—
***
(B) the action or appeal—
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). “District judges have ample authority to dismiss frivolous or
transparently defective suits spontaneously, and thus save everyone time and legal
expense.” Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003).
I. Plaintiff’s complaint is frivolous.
In reviewing the complaint, the Court is mindful that Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519 (1972) requires a liberal construction of pro se complaints. However, the Court is not
required to imagine or assume facts in order to allow a complaint to survive. See Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff bears “the burden of alleging
sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Id. “[C]onclusory
allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient.” Id.
The Court need not recite Plaintiff’s allegations at length; indeed, two examples

demonstrate their frivolous nature. First, Plaintiff brings a public nuisance claim based on
the purported fact that Defendant Sean “P. Diddy” Combs “could perhaps lose his contract
with Ciroc vodka.” Compl. at 6. Therefore, Plaintiff alleges, “Diddy’s billboards for Ciroc
on the streets [and] highways are an ‘eye sore’ given his newfound status as a sexual
predator who has committed the crimes of pimping and pandering, human trafficking, false

imprisonment, and white slavery . . . .” Id.
Oklahoma defines a public nuisance as a nuisance that “affects at the same time an
entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the
extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon the individuals may be unequal.” Okla.
Stat. tit. 50, § 2. “A private person may maintain an action for a public nuisance if it is

specially injurious to himself but not otherwise.” Id. § 10. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
has defined “special injury” as an injury “different in kind, not merely degree, from that
suffered by the general public from the act complained of.” McKay v. City of Enid, 109 P.
520, 522 (Okla. 1910); see also Schlirf v. Loosen, 232 P.2d 928, 930 (Okla. 1951) (defining
special injury as an injury “different in kind from that suffered by the public at large”). The
Court takes no position on the allegations related to Mr. Combs. But, whatever they may

be, Plaintiff comes nowhere close to establishing that the referenced billboards are
specially injurious—i.e., the billboards inflict on Plaintiff an injury different from that
suffered by the general public.
Next, Plaintiff brings a product liability claim based on the alleged “negligent
entrustment of allowing Sean ‘P. Diddy’ Combs to represent Ciroc vodka and Sean John at
department stores like Macy’s.” Id. at 7. Noticeably absent from the complaint, however,

are any allegations related to the actual elements of a product liability claim. Nothing in
the complaint could plausibly support Plaintiff’s product liability claim. See Braswell v.
Cincinnati Inc., 731 F.3d 1081, 1085 (10th Cir. 2013) (“The Oklahoma Supreme Court has
identified three elements to a products liability claim: the defect must have (1) caused the
injury in question, (2) existed at the time it left the manufacturer's control, and (3) made

the product unreasonably dangerous.”) (citing Kirkland v. Gen. Motors Corp., 521 P.2d
1353, 1363 (Okla. 1974)).
Simply put, Plaintiff’s complaint is frivolous. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
325 (1989) (“A complaint, containing as it does both factual allegations and legal
conclusions, is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”); see also

Robinson v. Love, 155 F.R.D. 535, 536 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (“While the Court cannot discount
with mathematical certainty the allegations in this case, the Court finds that, standing alone
and in the absence of further factual detail, plaintiff's claims are so fanciful as to render
each of his claims ‘clearly baseless.’”) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32
(1992)).1 Therefore, the Court is required to dismiss this case. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).

II. Even assuming Plaintiff’s complaint is not frivolous, Plaintiff alleges no facts
showing that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction.
Even assuming Plaintiff’s complaint is not otherwise frivolous, the Court is mindful
of its “independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even
in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514
(2006); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks

1 To this end, the Court takes judicial notice of orders from numerous other federal district courts,
which detail Plaintiff’s history of bringing frivolous claims similar to those set forth in the
complaint. For example, the Southern District of California recently documented Plaintiff’s history
of filing frivolous cases:

A search of the Pacer electronic database as of the date of this Order reveals over
two hundred civil cases and appeals in the federal court system filed under the
name Ronald Satish Emrit. Mr. Emrit has been sanctioned by the Western District
of Texas, which determined that he “abuses the in forma pauperis process and clogs
the federal district courts with meritless litigation.” See Emrit v. Nat'l Academy of
Recording Arts & Sciences, No. 1:14-cv-00392-SS, 2015 WL 518774, at *4 (W.D.
Tex. Feb. 5, 2015) (listing cases). The Northern District of Texas has twice rejected
Mr. Emrit's attempts to obtain IFP status to bring his frivolous lawsuits and required
him to pay the required filing fee to proceed. See Emrit & Leal-Martinez v. Binder
& Binder, No. 3:14-CV-3844-D, ECF No. 20 (N.D. Tex. June 8, 2015), rep. and
rec. adopted, ECF No. 22 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 2015); Emrit v. Wells Fargo Bank
Inc., No. 4:18-cv-00091-O, ECF No. 5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2018). Further,
Mr. Emrit has been barred from filing suits without leave of court in at least three
federal district courts. See Emrit v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (CMS),
No.: 2:14-cv-1761-GMN-PAL, 2016 WL 164992 (D. Nev. Jan. 14, 2016); Emrit v.
Nat'l Academy of Recording Arts & Sciences, 2015 WL 518774, at *4 (W.D. Tex.
Feb. 5, 2015); Emrit v. Time Warner, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00314-LAP, ECF No. 13
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2014).

Merit v. Zuckerberg San Francisco Gen. Hosp., No. 18-cv-0316-BAS-JMA, 2018 WL 11472391,
at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2018). It also appears that Plaintiff recently filed a case in the Western
District of Virginia involving the very same frivolous claims alleged here. See Emrit v. Combs, et
al., No. 3:24-CV-00005, 2024 WL 945316 (W.D. Va. Mar. 5, 2024) (dismissing case for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction).
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). “Because the jurisdiction
of federal courts is limited, there is a presumption against our jurisdiction, and the party

invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proof.” Marcus v. Kan. Dept. of Revenue,
170 F.3d 1305, 1309 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Regardless
of his pro se status, Plaintiff is required to allege facts in his complaint sufficient to show
the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction. See Harris v. Tulsa 66ers, 551 F. App’x 451, 451
(10th Cir. 2014) (noting that a pro se plaintiff “must allege facts in his complaint to show
that the district court had jurisdiction, such as federal question or diversity jurisdiction”).

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege facts establishing that the Court has subject-matter
jurisdiction. Although the complaint includes a “jurisdiction and venue” section, see
Compl. at 3, all of the alleged facts appear aimed at establishing diversity jurisdiction in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Of course, Plaintiff filed this case in the Western
District of Oklahoma, rendering inapplicable any discussion of the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania as it relates to diversity jurisdiction. Further, Plaintiff’s complaint sets forth
three causes of action: (1) public nuisance; (2) tortious interference with business relations;
and (3) product liability. See id. at 6-7. Each of these causes of action arise under state law,
thus foreclosing the possibility that the Court has federal-question jurisdiction.2 In short,

2 The complaint’s “jurisdiction and venue” section states that the Court has subject-matter
jurisdiction in this case because Plaintiff asserts claims arising under “Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1974, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Equal Protection Clause, Due Process
Clause, Fourth Amendment, and Privileges and Immunities Clause.” Compl. at 4. The Court
assumes that this allegation—like Plaintiff’s allegations related to the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania—is the product of Plaintiff copy-and-pasting from a different complaint.
nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint comes close to showing that the Court has subject-matter
jurisdiction in this case.
CONCLUSION
Because Plaintiff’s complaint is frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and
because Plaintiff fails to allege facts establishing that the Court has subject-matter
jurisdiction, Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. A separate judgment
shall be entered accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 8" day of March, 2024.

AL, 0. Oxf
TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI
Chief United States District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10390735. Public record. Not legal advice.