# Stephens v. BMAG Management Company LLC

> District Court, W.D. Oklahoma · August 28, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10390393

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** August 28, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10390393

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the plaintiffs have appeared to abandon “those claims as evidenced by their failure to seriously address them in their briefs”
- holding that the district court did not err in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and recognizing that “[j]ury verdicts may not be based on speculation or inadmissible evidence or be contrary to uncontested admissible evidence”
- explaining that an employer’s explanation that an employee was terminated for her ethical violations of company policy satisfies the second step of McDonnell Douglas
- explaining it is the responding party’s burden to ensure that the factual dispute is shown with particularity, without relying on the trial court to conduct its own search of the record

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

SHIRLEY STEPHENS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-20-00306-JD
)
BMAG MANAGEMENT COMPANY, )
LLC, )
)
Defendant. )

ORDER

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) filed by
Defendant BMAG Management Company, LLC (“BMAG”) [Doc. No. 53].1 Plaintiff
Shirley Stephens (“Ms. Stephens”) filed a response in opposition [Doc. No. 63], and
BMAG filed a reply [Doc. No. 67]. The matter is fully briefed and at issue.
I. BACKGROUND
Ms. Stephens, “a female of African American descent” and former employee of
BMAG, filed this lawsuit in Oklahoma County District Court following the termination
of her employment as a controller for BMAG. [Doc. No. 1-1 at ¶ 8]. BMAG removed the
action to federal court based on federal question subject matter jurisdiction. Ms. Stephens
originally asserted claims for race and gender discrimination as a result of her termination
and retaliatory discharge under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, Title VII, and the Oklahoma
Anti-Discrimination Act. BMAG moved to dismiss Ms. Stephens’ claims under § 1983,

1 Also of record is Exhibit No. 4 to BMAG’s Motion [Doc. No. 54], which is filed
under seal. The Court uses ECF page numbering in this Order.
asserting it was a private employer and not acting under color of state law when it
terminated Ms. Stephens. Ms. Stephens did not object to dismissal of those claims, and
the Court dismissed Ms. Stephens’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Doc. No. 15].

BMAG now asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Stephens’
remaining claims. Although a failure to promote claim is not apparent on the face of the
governing petition [see Doc. No. 1-1], BMAG also seeks summary judgment on a failure
to promote claim.
Ms. Stephens’ termination followed her second round of employment with

BMAG, which is a motor vehicle dealer. Ms. Stephens asserts that she was terminated
because of her race and gender and in retaliation for reporting transactions by other
employees outside normal company standards. BMAG asserts that Ms. Stephens was
terminated after an internal investigation revealed she had violated company policy in
relation to her attempted purchase of three vehicles from BMAG.

II. STANDARD OF DECISION
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “An issue of fact is material ‘if under the substantive law it is
essential to the proper disposition of the claim.’” Savant Homes, Inc. v. Collins, 809 F.3d

1133, 1137 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Becker v. Bateman, 709 F.3d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir.
2013)). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if a rational trier of fact could find in
favor of the nonmoving party on the evidence presented. Fassbender v. Correct Care
Solutions, LLC, 890 F.3d 875, 882 (10th Cir. 2018). In applying this standard, the Court
“view[s] the evidence and draw[s] all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Farm
Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1148 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).

A. Ms. Stephens’ response brief does not comply with Local Civil Rule 56.1.
BMAG is correct that Ms. Stephens’ response brief does not comply with the
Local Civil Rules. In violation of Local Civil Rule 56.1, the response brief does not
respond “by correspondingly numbered paragraph, to the facts that [BMAG] contends
are not in dispute.” LCvR56.1(c) (emphasis in original). Compliance with this rule is

essential to the meaningful consideration of whether there are genuine issues of material
fact precluding summary judgment.
Under Local Civil Rule 56.1(e), “[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement of
material facts of the movant may be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary
judgment unless specifically controverted by the nonmovant using the procedures set

forth in this rule.” “As such, [Ms. Stephens’] failure to properly respond would permit the
Court to find [BMAG’s] statement of facts, as supported by the evidence, undisputed.”
See Lancaster v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., Case No. CIV-13-1348-R, 2016 WL 379785,
at *1 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 29, 2016); see also Glossip v. Chandler, Case No. CIV-14-0665-
F, 2021 WL 1240695, at *1–2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 2, 2021); Scalia v. Ghosn, 451 F. Supp.

3d 1215, 1220 (W.D. Okla. 2020).
The Tenth Circuit has upheld this approach, observing that it is not the district
court’s responsibility “to conduct a fishing expedition” to compensate for a deficient
response. See Coleman v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 287 F. App’x 631, 635
(10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (addressing a similar local rule); see also Cross v. The
Home Depot, 390 F.3d 1283, 1290 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining it is the responding
party’s burden to ensure that the factual dispute is shown with particularity, without

relying on the trial court to conduct its own search of the record).
Nevertheless, the Court has an independent duty to determine whether summary
judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(3), even if a party
fails to properly address another party’s assertion of facts as required by Rule 56(c). See
Reed v. Bennett, 312 F.3d 1190, 1194–95 (10th Cir. 2002); Murray v. City of Tahlequah,

Okla., 312 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2002). Thus, the Court has conducted its
independent review of the evidence of record under Rule 56(c) and reviewed Ms.
Stephens’ response brief to determine whether any part of the brief controverts, with
evidence, any of BMAG’s material facts.
B. Most of the information in Ms. Stephens’ declaration on which she relies to
try to create an issue of fact is inadmissible.

BMAG asserts that Ms. Stephens’ “conclusory, unsupported Declaration [Doc.
No. 63-1] does not create an issue of fact.” [Doc. No. 67 at 3]. A party opposing
summary judgment “need not produce evidence ‘in a form that would be admissible at
trial.’” Thomas v. Int’l Bus. Machs., 48 F.3d 478, 485 (10th Cir. 1995) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). “[H]owever, the
content or the substance of the evidence must be admissible.” Bryant v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 432 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2005).
The requirement that the substance of the evidence must be admissible is not only
explicit in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(4), but it is also implicit in the Court’s
role at the summary judgment stage. See Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc.,

452 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2006). Rule 56(c)(4) provides that an “affidavit or
declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set
out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is
competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). In determining
whether genuine issues of material fact make a jury trial necessary, a court may consider

only the evidence that would be available to the jury. Argo, 452 F.3d at 1199; see also
Truck Ins. Exch. v. MagneTek, Inc., 360 F.3d 1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that
the district court did not err in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment
and recognizing that “[j]ury verdicts may not be based on speculation or inadmissible
evidence or be contrary to uncontested admissible evidence”). Conclusory and self-

serving affidavits or declarations are not sufficient to survive summary judgment. See
Murray v. City of Sapulpa, 45 F.3d 1417, 1422 (10th Cir. 1995).
The Court agrees with BMAG that most of the information in Ms. Stephens’
declaration, on which she relies to try to create an issue of fact, is inadmissible and not
effective for summary judgment purposes. Additionally, Ms. Stephens, in her response

brief, states facts without any citation to supporting evidence or with citations that do not
support the factual statements. Further, much of Ms. Stephens’ declaration, as BMAG
points out, is “comprised of . . . generalized statements about unnamed people at
unidentified times purportedly violating unspecified policies, procedures, and laws.”
[Doc. No. 67 at 3–4]. See Matthiesen v. Banc One Mortg. Corp., 173 F.3d 1242, 1247
(10th Cir. 1999) (explaining that unsupported conclusory allegations are not sufficient to
defeat summary judgment).

III. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS2
Ms. Stephens first came to work for BMAG as a controller in August 2008. She
was hired by, and reported to, Shannon Hutton, director of accounting. Ms. Stephens and
Ms. Hutton knew each other from prior employment at a different dealership. Ms.
Stephens continued working at BMAG, and for Ms. Hutton, until her voluntary

resignation in June 2014. At the time of her voluntary resignation in 2014, Ms. Stephens
was the highest paid controller at BMAG. Ms. Stephens admits that Ms. Hutton asked her
to stay, but Ms. Stephens left in 2014 to pursue another job opportunity.
In 2016, Ms. Hutton reached out to Ms. Stephens to see if she would be interested
in returning to work at BMAG. During the negotiations, Ms. Hutton told Ms. Stephens, “I

would love you to join the team again.” [Doc. No. 53-7]. Ms. Hutton also told Ms.
Stephens that she really wanted to “make this work,” and that Ms. Stephens would “fill a
crucial part of what we need done.” [Doc. No. 53-8]. Additionally, Ms. Hutton stated she
would “go to bat on the salary.” Id.

2 This statement includes material facts presented by both parties that are
supported as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). If a party has asserted a fact, or
asserted that a fact is disputed, but has failed to provide necessary support, the assertion
is disregarded. All facts are stated in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, Ms.
Stephens.
Ms. Stephens was hired back by Ms. Hutton at a $140,000.00 annual salary on
May 6, 2016. Ms. Stephens was also eligible for, and received, a $20,000.00 bonus that
same year. Per Ms. Stephens’ offer letter, she was to receive a $30,800.00 bonus for

2017. Instead, she was paid more, and when Ms. Stephens asked Ms. Hutton about it, she
told her to keep it because she deserved it.
When Ms. Stephens was rehired in 2016, Ms. Stephens worked with three other
controllers at BMAG. All of them were Caucasian and all were paid less than Ms.
Stephens. Ms. Stephens continued to be the highest paid controller throughout the

remainder of her employment.
Ms. Stephens has more than 30 years of experience in the car industry. She
testified in her deposition that during her tenure as controller at BMAG, no one had more
experience with accounting departments for car dealerships than she did. Ms. Stephens
also indicated in her deposition testimony that she was responsible for training 24 to 40

people in the accounting department at BMAG because she was the most experienced
and knowledgeable. Ms. Stephens admits that three key areas of a controller’s
responsibility are profitability, internal controls, and asset management.
Ms. Stephens agreed that having signed contracts and keeping the car title in the
file until payment is received are safety measures that the accounting department is

responsible for handling.
In 2017, Ms. Stephens purchased a Land Rover from BMAG. She signed the
required documents and titled the vehicle in her name on February 24, 2017. She agreed
this was a “clean car deal,” and that she was not disciplined for this transaction. [Doc.
No. 53-1 at 22 (101:13–25)].
On August 20, 2018, an accounting clerk ran her routine monthly report for

accounts reaching a 60-day aging status. Ms. Stephens’ name was on the 60-day bad debt
report. The accounting clerk reported it to her immediate supervisor, Melody Wedman,
who then reported it to Ms. Hutton. Upon an initial review of the records, it appeared Ms.
Stephens had three car deals in her name for June, July, and August 2018—a 2007 Acura,
a 2011 BMW, and a 2015 Maserati. Seeing some concerns, Ms. Hutton reported it to

Barbara West, director of risk, who began an investigation. Fifteen employees were
interviewed, and a written report was completed by Ms. West.
A. The undisputed material facts show irregularities with the 2007 Acura
purchase.

On June 30, 2018, Ms. Stephens signed a Retail Purchase Agreement with BMAG
for a 2007 Acura. Only Ms. Stephens’ name was listed on the signed Agreement as a
purchaser of the vehicle. The car was to be paid for in cash by Ms. Stephens in the
amount of $5,028.00. Included in the file was a second Retail Purchase Agreement also
dated June 30, 2018, for the same 2007 Acura. This Agreement listed Ms. Stephens and
Erdoo Segher, a family friend, as purchasers. It was not signed.
Although BMAG asserts that no payment was ever made for the 2007 Acura, it
appears that BMAG deposited a check from Ms. Stephens on August 22, 2018—the same
day Ms. Stephens was terminated—for $5,028.00. The check was dated July 30, 2018.

Ms. Stephens admits in her response brief that she took possession of the Acura on July
12, 2018, which predates the date written on the check and predates BMAG’s deposit of
the check. [Doc. No. 63 at 11].
From the Court’s independent review of the evidence, the Court was able to

discern that Ms. Stephens obtained a hold check form from BMAG that allowed her to
defer payment for the Acura until July 30, 2018, and that Ms. Hutton admittedly
approved an exception for Ms. Stephens to defer payment until after her paycheck
sometime in July 2018. Ms. Hutton testified in her deposition that after Ms. Stephens’
termination, Ms. Stephens told BMAG there was a check for the Acura in her cabinet

behind her desk, and Ms. Stephens told BMAG to cash it.
The title to the Acura was not in the file per normal process because Ms. Stephens
took it out of the accounting office and gave it to Ms. Segher. Ms. Segher, in turn, went
to a tag agency and titled the car in her name and Ms. Stephens’ name on August 6, 2018.
The Certificate of Title shows assignment of title to Ms. Stephens, as the purchaser, on

July 5, 2018. It shows a reassignment of title to Ms. Stephens and Ms. Segher on August
6, 2018.
The Oklahoma Tax Commission issued title to the 2007 Acura to Ms. Stephens
and Ms. Segher on August 18, 2018. Ms. Stephens admitted at her deposition that on that
date BMAG had no signed paperwork from Ms. Segher, and no money from either Ms.

Stephens or Ms. Segher for the 2007 Acura. Thus, it is undisputed that Ms. Stephens
represented to the State of Oklahoma that she owned the 2007 Acura despite not having
paid for it at that time. Further, Ms. Stephens admitted in her deposition that BMAG
would have no recourse against Ms. Segher, absent her signed signature on the Retail
Purchase Agreement, had BMAG not been able to obtain the money from Ms. Stephens
for the Acura.
B. The undisputed material facts show irregularities with Ms. Stephens’
attempted purchase of the 2011 BMW X6.

During the investigation, BMAG discovered that Ms. Stephens had also obtained
possession of a red 2011 BMW X6. The original Retail Purchase Agreement for the
BMW was dated July 31, 2018, but was not signed. The purchase price reflected on the
Agreement was $22,000.00 plus some additional fees and was to be fully financed
through Ally Financial. Ms. Stephens later signed a new Retail Purchase Agreement on
August 18, 2018, for the same BMW. Ms. Stephens admitted that she was going to give
the BMW to her son.

She also admitted that she could have purchased the BMW for $17,000.00, but she
worked out an agreement with Tim Ososanya, the finance director, and Gary Kruszynski,
the sales manager, to increase the purchase price to $22,000.00, so that she could get
$5,000.00 cash back.
BMAG has a cash back policy that prohibits cash back for customers unless it is

for tag, title, and license fees or for equity in a trade-in vehicle. Even if it meets one of
these two permissible reasons, the cash back cannot be issued to the customer until all
paperwork has been completed. Although Ms. Stephens was the most experienced
controller at BMAG and responsible for training the accounting department on policies
and procedures, she stated in her deposition that she was unaware of the cash-back

policy. Having now reviewed the policy, she admits that the $5,000.00 cash-back check
to her violated the policy since it was not for tag, title, and license fees and there was no
trade-in. The Court would note that Ms. Stephens’ claim that she was unaware of
BMAG’s cash-back policy is disputed by her own evidence. See [Doc. No. 63-22], which

is a July 5, 2017 email to Ms. Stephens and other controllers from Ms. Hutton reminding
them of the cash-back policy.
Ms. Stephens admits that she did not have Ms. Hutton’s permission to receive the
$5,000.00 cash back. Ms. Stephens acknowledged in her deposition that not all lenders
allow cash back to customers. She is unaware of whether Ally Financial allows it or not.

However, Ms. Stephens agreed that none of the lending documents would have given
Ally Financial notice that it was financing a $17,000.00 car with $5,000.00 cash back to
Ms. Stephens.
C. The undisputed material facts show irregularities with Ms. Stephens’
attempted purchase of the 2015 Maserati.

BMAG’s investigation also revealed that Ms. Stephens started another car deal on
the same date as the BMW—July 31, 2018—for a 2015 Maserati. The Retail Purchase
Agreement, which was not signed by Ms. Stephens, lists her as the purchaser and a
required down payment of $7,300.00. Ms. Stephens stated she took possession of the
Maserati on August 7, 2018.
On August 8, 2018, Ms. Stephens directed a subordinate to issue her a warranty
refund check for her Land Rover, which she traded in as part of the Maserati transaction.
Although Ms. Stephens disputes whether it was proper for the refund check to be issued

to her directly—rather than the lender on the Land Rover—Ms. Stephens admits, and
email correspondence corroborates, that she directed a subordinate employee to issue her
funds before giving BMAG any of her down payment and before the Maserati deal was
complete. Indeed, at the time Ms. Stephens directed her subordinate to issue her a check

directly, no down payment had been given to BMAG, and there was no signed contract in
the file.
During the investigation, another subordinate employee stated that Ms. Stephens
directed her to quickly issue a check to Tinker Federal Credit Union in the amount of
$66,000.00 for the trade-in on Ms. Stephens’ Land Rover. Ms. Stephens denies the

accuracy of this statement. In any event, a check was cut and sent to Tinker Federal
Credit Union on August 15, 2018, by BMAG despite no signed contract for the Maserati
or a down payment on same. The Court notes from its review of the unsigned Retail
Purchase Agreement for the Maserati, which included the Land Rover trade-in as part of
the same transaction, that Ms. Stephens still owed $66,000.00 on the Land Rover.

D. The undisputed material facts show that BMAG had zero funds for the three
vehicles on the date of Ms. Stephens’ termination and that two other
employees, a Caucasian male and African American male, were also
terminated because of their involvement with Ms. Stephens’ car deals.

BMAG’s investigation disclosed that Ms. Stephens directed subordinates to assist
her in violating company policy. Ms. Stephens was terminated on August 22, 2018.
When the termination was communicated to Ms. Stephens, she indicated for the first time
that there was a check for the Acura in her office. Ms. Stephens gave permission for
BMAG to cash the check. BMAG ordered Ms. Stephens to return the BMW and
Maserati, and BMAG returned the trade-in vehicle (the Land Rover) to Ms. Stephens.
After Ms. Stephens’ termination, another check in the amount of $7,300.00 for the
down payment on the Maserati was discovered in her office. It was post-dated August 30,
2018. As the car had already been returned, the check was never cashed. No one at

BMAG knew about the second check until after Ms. Stephens’ termination.
Mr. Ososanya and Mr. Kruszynski, both of whom were involved in Ms. Stephens’
deals on the BMW and Maserati, were also terminated from BMAG. Mr. Kruszynski is a
Caucasian male. Mr. Ososanya is an African American male.
Ms. Stephens admits that her paperwork was sloppy, that she made mistakes, and

that BMAG had zero funds for any of the three vehicles on the date of her termination.
E. The undisputed material facts show that none of Ms. Stephens’ identified
comparator employees is similarly situated, nor is there evidence of record
that BMAG’s employment decisions concerning these individuals was based
on their race or gender.

The only person who Ms. Stephens claims discriminated against her based on race
or gender is Ms. Hutton. However, Ms. Stephens admits that Ms. Hutton never made any
racial comments to her or about anyone else in her presence, nor did Ms. Hutton make
any negative comments to Ms. Stephens about her gender.
Ms. Stephens is unaware of any other employee who has ever titled a car in their
name without having paid for it. Moreover, Ms. Stephens is unaware of any other
employee who has taken possession of a car and given it to someone else before making
any of the required payment. Nor is Ms. Stephens aware of any other employee at BMAG
who has been listed on the bad debt report.
Ms. Stephens indicated in her deposition that she believed some employees
received cash back for reasons other than equity in a trade-in or tag, title, and license
fees. However, she conceded she did not know the reasons for the cash back for these car

deals, nor does she have any evidence that Ms. Hutton knew about or approved them. The
accounting clerk in charge of cash-back checks testified that the reason cash back is
limited to those two circumstances is because BMAG is not a lender or a bank, and it
does not “just lend out money to customers.” [Doc. No. 53-27 at 2 (20:13–22)].
Additionally, Ms. Hutton testified that the cash-back policy was narrowed down to those

two reasons because “cash back needs to be disclosed to any financing lender,” and that
some lenders allow cash back and some do not. [Doc. No. 63-25 at 1 (123:1–11)].
Although it is the responsibility of the accounting department to review any “cash back
related to a car deal,” Ms. Hutton admitted that “sometimes things slip through the
cracks.” See id. (123:12–23).

From the Court’s independent review of the evidence of record, it appears that
four other BMAG employees received cash back for car deals—Zac Sanders, Moses
Reyna, Kari Fieszel, and George Miller. [Doc. Nos. 63-29 & 63-30]. There is no evidence
of record that indicates for what reasons these four employees received cash back. Ms.
Stephens asserts, without citing to any evidence, that Sanders and Miller are Caucasian

males. Ms. Fieszel is female, and Mr. Reyna is a Hispanic male. See [Doc. No. 67-2]. Ms.
Hutton testified that Fieszel, Reyna, and Sanders were not accounting employees and did
not report to her, and that she had no knowledge of the three receiving cash back. See
[Doc. No. 67-1 at 4–5 (124:8–125:5)].
In Ms. Stephens’ declaration and her deposition testimony, she generally and
conclusory refers to other BMAG employees (predominately Caucasian males who are
general managers (“GM”)) who she asserts violated the same or similar policies and

processes that she violated, but who were not terminated by BMAG. See generally [Doc.
No. 53-2 at 14–45 (308–339) & Doc. No. 63-1]. She does not identify any of these
individuals by name in her declaration, but she was asked about specific individuals in
her deposition. The alleged violations range from one GM not signing his pay plan on
time to issues with deferred income, a failed audit, and removal of marketing items

without permission.
However, none of the alleged comparators, aside from Ms. Wedman, were
controllers or worked in accounting. Additionally, none were investigated for the same or
similar violations as Ms. Stephens, or as many violations as Ms. Stephens. Further, Ms.
Stephens admits that she has no evidence, other than her own subjective belief, that any

difference in discipline was based on race or gender.
1) Melody Wedman
Ms. Stephens asserts that she was treated differently than Ms. Wedman, a
Caucasian female controller, who purportedly took BMAG marketing items without
permission from a bucket by the door on her way out, and then returned them the next

day after being asked about taking them. Ms. Stephens does not know whether Ms.
Wedman received any discipline over this incident. Ms. Stephens admits that she has no
evidence, other than her own speculation, that Ms. Wedman was treated differently by
BMAG based on her race.
Additionally, Ms. Stephens asserts that Ms. Wedman had one location that failed a
sales tax audit, but she was not terminated as a result. However, Ms. Stephens admits that
she too has managed a location that failed a sales tax audit, although not to the same

extent, but she was not terminated or reprimanded either for that issue.
2) Casey Deskin and Angela Mirkhani
Two current BMAG employees, both Caucasian females, split up Ms. Stephens’
job duties after her termination in August 2018. Ms. Stephens admits that she has no
specific information, other than her mere speculation, that this move to have Ms. Deskin

and Ms. Mirkhani cover her former job duties was motivated or based on their race.
3) Jeremy Freeman
Ms. Stephens asserts that Mr. Freeman, a Caucasian male, and GM, delayed
signing his pay plan in violation of company policy, and that Ms. Hutton was the person
who told Ms. Stephens about Mr. Freeman’s alleged violation. However, Ms. Stephens

admits that the fact that Mr. Freeman was allowed to delay signing his pay plan “had
nothing to do with his [race]” or gender, but because “[h]e was favored.” [Doc. No. 53-2
at 15 (309:2–24)].
Additionally, Ms. Stephens asserts that Mr. Freeman was allowed to “control his
gross profits each month” by breaking up the profits received from a car sale transaction

and deferring his income into the next month, in violation of company policy. [Doc. No.
53-2 at 19 (313:15–20)]. She agreed this was not the same violation of company policy
for which she was investigated. Id. at 20 (314:11–15).
Ms. Stephens indicated that she and Ms. Hutton talked about Mr. Freeman
deferring income, and that Ms. Hutton directed Ms. Stephens to talk to Mr. Freeman
about it. She advised that she confronted Mr. Freeman, but “he just kept doing it.” See id.

at 21 (315:1–7). Ms. Stephens, however, is unaware of whether Mr. Freeman was
disciplined for doing so. Id. (315:12–14).
Ms. Stephens also asserts that Mr. Freeman requested a title on a car, and he
purchased it earlier than he should have been allowed to because the car was on a stop
sale list. However, Ms. Stephens admits that Mr. Freeman obtained the title with the

permission of accounting management, and that he paid for the vehicle.
Ms. Stephens further contends that Caucasian male GMs at BMAG had a pattern
of deferring income and were sloppy about getting all the paperwork needed for car
deals, such as trade-in titles. She clarified this was not for their own car deals. She is
unaware of whether any of these individuals were disciplined over these issues, but she

contends that Ms. Hutton was aware. Ms. Stephens admits that she has no specific
information that these GMs were allowed to do so on account of their race or gender.
4) Brendon Landgren
Ms. Stephens asserts that Mr. Landgren also deferred income in violation of
company policy, and that he was demoted after an investigation. She admits that she has

no specific information that Mr. Landgren was allowed to defer income based on his race
or gender, and she agrees this was not the same policy for which she was investigated.
5) John Crosby and Yan Brown
Additionally, Ms. Stephens asserts that Mr. Crosby and Mr. Brown deferred
income. She is unaware of whether they were disciplined for doing so, and she has no

specific information that they were allowed to defer income based on their race or
gender. Ms. Stephens confirmed in her deposition that none of the above people, aside
from Ms. Wedman, worked in the accounting department. [Doc. No. 53-2 at 37 (331:22–
25)].
6) Jimmy Krase and Ricky Bradford

According to Ms. Stephens, Mr. Krase, a Caucasian male GM, reported four
vehicles as sold that were not sold to meet a sales objective in October 2017. She advised
that Ms. Hutton approved him doing so, although she does not know why. Ms. Stephens
asserts that Ricky Bradford, an African American male GM, did the same thing in 2016
and was terminated as a result. Ms. Stephens’ sole knowledge of Mr. Bradford’s actions

stems from information she received from Ms. Wedman.
7) Cory Rucker and Scott Tang
Ms. Stephens asserts that Cory Rucker, a Caucasian male GM at Porsche, and
Scott Tang, an Asian male finance director, exercised bad judgment, which resulted in a
BMAG vehicle being stolen. She contends that Mr. Tang was terminated as a result, but

Mr. Rucker was not. Ms. Stephens is unaware of whether Mr. Rucker was disciplined
over the issue. She also does not know who specifically made the decision to terminate
Mr. Tang, nor does she have any information that he was terminated based on his race or
gender.
F. The undisputed material facts indicate that Ms. Stephens has abandoned her
failure to promote claim.

Ms. Stephens asserts in her declaration and deposition testimony that Caucasian
employees received promotions and she did not. Specifically, Ms. Stephens stated in her
deposition that there was a position open for which she was qualified during her first term
of employment with BMAG in 2013. Although Ms. Stephens contends that she was more
qualified than the Caucasian female who received the promotion, she admits that she has
no specific information, other than her own speculation, that the employment decision
was based on race. Further, Ms. Stephens made no complaint, either internally or
externally, concerning the lack of promotion prior to filing this lawsuit in 2019.
Moreover, Ms. Stephens admits that the only possible position that came open and

to which she could have been promoted during her second term of employment with
BMAG was one in which she admits race and gender played no role in the decision. This
was the finance director position, and Ms. Mirkhani, a Caucasian female, was promoted
to that position. Ms. Stephens admits, however, that Ms. Mirkhani was qualified for the
position.

Finally, Ms. Stephens admits that Ms. Hutton was grooming her for a promotion in
mid-2018, and BMAG was even paying to send Ms. Stephens to leadership courses.
However, the position simply never materialized before Ms. Stephens’ termination in
August 2018.
G. The undisputed material facts do not establish a prima facie case of
retaliation because Ms. Stephens admittedly never reported her concerns of
discrimination to BMAG.

Ms. Stephens never made a complaint of race or gender discrimination during her
employment with BMAG. Instead, she claims to have had “general conversations” with
Ms. Hutton about male GMs “violat[ing] policies and not being held accountable” and
how people in “accounting . . . would be treated differently” than the GMs. [Doc. No. 53-
2 at 46 (341:4–23)]. Ms. Stephens testified she had these conversations with Ms. Hutton
“all the time,” but she did not recall the specific dates of those conversations or have any
notes or documents to show she complained about gender discrimination. See id. at 46–
48 (341:18–343:13).
Ms. Stephens admits that she never told anyone other than Ms. Hutton, and that
she never reported it to Human Resources or called the anonymous complaint hotline.
IV. ANALYSIS

A. BMAG is entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Stephens’ racially
discriminatory wrongful termination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title
VII, and under the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act.

Ms. Stephens asserts claims of race discrimination based on her alleged wrongful
termination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e–2, and the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 1101 et seq.
(“OADA”). Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual
“because of such individual’s race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). The OADA makes it “a
discriminatory practice for an employer . . . to discharge, or otherwise to discriminate
against an individual . . . because of race.” Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 1302(A)(1). “[A]bsent
direct evidence of discrimination, claims under all three laws are subject to the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.”3 Raymond v. Select Specialty Hosp. –
Tulsa/Midtown, LLC, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1211 (N.D. Okla. 2019). Here, Ms. Stephens

relies on circumstantial evidence to show BMAG’s discriminatory intent; thus, the Court
employs the three-step burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) to determine whether Ms. Stephens’ race discrimination
claims under Title VII and the OADA survive summary judgment.
First, Ms. Stephens has the burden of presenting a prima facie case of race

discrimination. See Throupe v. University of Denver, 988 F.3d 1243, 1251 (10th Cir.
2021). If Ms. Stephens establishes her prima facie case, the burden of production then
shifts to BMAG to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. See
id.; see also Bennett v. Windstream Commc’ns, Inc., 792 F.3d 1261, 1266 (10th Cir.
2015). If BMAG does so, the burden of production shifts again to Ms. Stephens to show

that BMAG’s articulated reasons are pretextual. See Bennett, 792 F.3d at 1266.

3 The parties do not analyze the racial discrimination claims under each separate
Act, and it is not necessary to do so because in “‘racial discrimination suits, the elements
of a plaintiff’s case are the same . . . whether that case is brought under §§ 1981 or 1983
or Title VII.’” Baca v. Sklar, 398 F.3d 1210, 1218 n.3 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Drake v.
City of Ft. Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1162 (10th Cir. 1991)); see Kendrick v. Penske
Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1225 n.4 (10th Cir. 2000) (providing that racial-
discrimination claims under § 1981 and Title VII have the same prima facie elements as
provided by McDonnell Douglas) (citations omitted); see also Mann v. XPO Logistics
Freight, Inc., 819 F. App’x 585, 594 n.15 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (“[T]he
[Supreme] Court did not displace McDonnell Douglas’s application to § 1981 claims.”)
(citing Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1019
(2020)). Here, Ms. Stephens’ § 1981 racial discrimination claim fails for the same
reasons her Title VII claim fails. Thus, BMAG is entitled to summary judgment on Ms.
Stephens’ § 1981 claim for the same reasons.
1) Step One—BMAG concedes that Ms. Stephens can establish a prima facie case
of race discrimination.

To set forth a prima facie case of discrimination for wrongful termination, Ms.
Stephens generally must establish that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she
was qualified for her position; (3) she was discharged; and (4) her position was not
eliminated after her discharge. See Adamson v. Multi Cmty. Diversified Servs., Inc., 514
F.3d 1136, 1150 (10th Cir. 2008). The critical inquiry “is whether the plaintiff has
demonstrated that the adverse employment action occurred ‘under circumstances which
give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.’” See id. at 1151 (quoting Texas
Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). BMAG agrees for purposes
of the Motion that Ms. Stephens can establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.

[Doc. No. 53 at 23]. It asserts, however, that Ms. Stephens’ wrongful termination claim
fails as a matter of law under Step Three of the burden-shifting analysis.
2) Step Two—BMAG has presented a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
Ms. Stephens’ termination.

BMAG contends, and the evidence reflects, that the proffered reasons for Ms.
Stephens’ termination are her improper car deals in violation of company policy. An
employer’s burden of articulating a justifiable, non-discriminatory reason for its
employment action is “exceedingly light.” Montes v. Vail Clinic, Inc., 497 F.3d 1160,
1173 (10th Cir. 2007). The employer’s burden is one of production only.
Other courts have accepted that a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
termination could be a violation of company policy. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Epworth Villa,
537 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 2008) (concluding that an employee’s violation of the
company’s policies and procedures regarding confidentiality by providing unredacted
medical records to a third party was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her
termination); Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 483 F.3d 1106, 1120 (10th Cir. 2007)

(concluding that the defendant had produced a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
termination where the bank’s policy made it clear that termination could result from a
branch manager refunding overdraft fees on branch employees’ accounts without
approval); Swackhammer v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 493 F.3d 1160, 1166 (10th Cir.
2007) (explaining that an employer’s explanation that an employee was terminated for

her ethical violations of company policy satisfies the second step of McDonnell
Douglas); Raymond, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1213 (finding that the defendants had met their
“exceedingly light” burden to proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason where the
defendants asserted the plaintiff was terminated in accordance with the employee
handbook).

The Court concludes that the evidence cited by BMAG is more than sufficient to
satisfy its burden of articulating a justifiable, non-discriminatory reason for Ms.
Stephens’ termination. The undisputed material facts show numerous irregularities with
Ms. Stephens’ purchase of the 2007 Acura and her attempted purchases of the 2011
BMW and 2015 Maserati. Additionally, the undisputed material facts show that Ms.

Stephens violated several of BMAG’s policies, including, but not limited to, violating the
cash-back policy; taking possession of vehicles before paying for them; removing a car
title from the file in the accounting office; not signing Retail Purchase Agreements; and
directing a subordinate to issue a warranty check for a trade-in vehicle before a down
payment was made on the new vehicle. Ms. Stephens also falsely represented to the State
of Oklahoma that she owned a vehicle that was not hers at the time.
3) Step Three—BMAG’s decision to terminate Ms. Stephens’ employment was not
pretextual.

The burden thus shifts to Ms. Stephens to show that the proffered reason is a mere
pretext for discrimination; to avoid summary judgment at this stage, Ms. Stephens must
present sufficient evidence to create a genuine factual dispute regarding pretext. See
Montes, 497 F.3d at 1173. To do so, Ms. Stephens must present evidence showing that
BMAG’s reasons for termination are “‘so incoherent, weak, inconsistent, or contradictory
that a rational factfinder could conclude the reasons were unworthy of belief.’” Young v.
Dillon Cos., 468 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d

1064, 1076 (10th Cir. 2004)).
A pretext challenge requires the Court “to look at the facts as they appear to the
person making the decision to terminate [the] plaintiff.” Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1231.
Moreover, the Court does not decide “whether the employer’s reasons were wise, fair or
correct; the relevant inquiry is whether the employer honestly believed its reasons and

acted in good faith upon them.” Riggs v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 1108, 1118–19
(10th Cir. 2007) (citing Timmerman, 483 F.3d at 1120). Pretext is commonly shown
through evidence in one of three ways: (1) an employer’s stated reason for the
termination was false; (2) the employer acted contrary to a written company policy; or (3)
the employer treated the plaintiff differently than other similarly situated employees who

violated work rules of comparable seriousness. See Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1230.
Ms. Stephens has not presented any evidence that would permit a reasonable fact
finder to infer that BMAG’s stated reasons for her termination were false. BMAG’s
stated reasons have been consistent from the beginning. Additionally, Ms. Stephens was

hired and fired by the same person, Ms. Hutton, within a relatively short period of time,
which serves as “a strong inference that the employer’s stated reason for acting against
the employee is not pretextual.” Antonio v. Sygma Network, Inc., 458 F.3d 1177, 1183
(10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (explaining that “same
actor” evidence gives rise to an inference “that no discriminatory animus motivated the

employer’s actions”).
Ms. Stephens’ comparator evidence also is unavailing and does not establish
pretext. To begin with, Mr. Ososanya and Mr. Kruszynski, both of whom were involved
in Ms. Stephens’ deals on the BMW and Maserati, were terminated from BMAG. Mr.
Kruszynski is a Caucasian male, and Mr. Ososanya is an African American male.

Moreover, Ms. Stephens has presented no evidence of any employee violating the same
policies that she did, or policies of comparable seriousness, who were treated differently
by BMAG. For example, Ms. Stephens has not presented any evidence of an employee
who was knowingly allowed by Ms. Hutton, or anyone else for that matter, to take a car
title out of accounting before the deal was finalized and title a car in their name without

payment. Nor has Ms. Stephens presented evidence of any employee who was knowingly
allowed by Ms. Hutton to inflate the purchase price of a vehicle to obtain cash back. Ms.
Stephens has presented no evidence of any employee who was allowed by Ms. Hutton to
misuse their position of authority within the company to direct subordinates to violate
company policy. Finally, Ms. Stephens presented no evidence of any other employee who
had three cars in their possession without paying BMAG.
The closest Ms. Stephens comes to identifying similarly situated employees who

violated work rules of comparable seriousness is Jeremy Freeman and the four employees
who received cash back on their vehicle purchases—Zac Sanders, Moses Reyna, Kari
Fieszel, and George Miller. “Individuals are considered ‘similarly situated’ when they
deal with the same supervisor, are subjected to the same standards governing
performance evaluation and discipline, and have engaged in conduct of ‘comparable

seriousness.’” E.E.O.C. v. PVNF, L.L.C., 487 F.3d 790, 801 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting
McGowan v. City of Eufala, 472 F.3d 736, 745 (10th Cir. 2006)).
There is no evidence satisfying these similarly situated standards or otherwise
sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find in favor of Ms. Stephens. For instance, there is
no evidence of record that indicates for what reasons these four employees received cash

back or that Ms. Hutton knew about the cash back or approved of the cash back. An
employer cannot be held accountable for failing to treat situations similarly when it is
unaware of them. See, e.g., Doke v. PPG Indus., Inc., 118 F. App’x 366, 370 (10th Cir.
2004) (unpublished) (explaining that where the plaintiff had failed to show that
management had any evidence, other than his own unsubstantiated allegations, that other

employees had violated company policy, they were not similarly situated employees for
purposes of inferring pretext). There also is nothing in the record that would allow a
reasonable jury to find this conduct of comparable seriousness to Ms. Stephens’ conduct.
Ms. Stephens asserts that Mr. Freeman requested a title on a car, and that he then
purchased the car earlier than he should have been allowed to because it was on a stop
sale list. Ms. Stephens, however, presents no evidence from which this Court, or a jury,

could infer some wrongdoing with respect to this transaction. Indeed, Ms. Stephens
admits that Mr. Freeman obtained the title with the permission of accounting
management, and that he actually paid for the vehicle. No reasonable jury could find that
this conduct was of comparable seriousness to Ms. Stephens’ admission that she took a
title from the accounting office and gave it to a third person to title it in both their names,

thereby falsely representing to the State of Oklahoma that they owned a vehicle that had
not been paid for at the time.
Finally, there are other undisputed material facts that show Ms. Hutton harbored
no discriminatory animus toward Ms. Stephens based on her race or gender. For one, Ms.
Stephens was paid more than any other controller at BMAG during both of her periods of

employment. Ms. Hutton also awarded Ms. Stephens substantial, and larger, bonuses than
other controllers. Ms. Hutton once paid Ms. Stephens a greater bonus than expected, and
she told Ms. Stephens she deserved it. Further, Ms. Hutton placed Ms. Stephens in charge
of training and, according to Ms. Stephens, was grooming Ms. Stephens for a promotion
in mid-2018.

In summary, there is no evidence of record that BMAG’s decision to terminate
Ms. Stephens’ employment was a mere pretext for discrimination or sufficient evidence
to create a genuine factual dispute regarding pretext. Accordingly, BMAG is entitled to
summary judgment on Ms. Stephens’ racially discriminatory wrongful termination claims
under Title VII and under the OADA.
B. Ms. Stephens has abandoned her failure to promote claim; thus, BMAG is
entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Although a failure to promote claim is not apparent on the face of the governing
petition [see Doc. No. 1-1], BMAG also seeks summary judgment on such claim. Ms.
Stephens makes conclusory allegations in her declaration and deposition testimony that
Caucasian employees received promotions and she did not. However, she provides no
evidence or discussion regarding this claim in her response brief. Thus, Ms. Stephens has
abandoned her failure to promote claim. See, e.g., Maestas v. Segura, 416 F.3d 1182,
1190 n.9 (10th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the plaintiffs have appeared to abandon “those

claims as evidenced by their failure to seriously address them in their briefs”); Hinsdale
v. City of Liberal, Kan., 19 F. App’x 749, 768–69 (10th Cir. 2001) (unpublished)
(affirming the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment for the defendants on
the plaintiff’s equal protection claim where the plaintiff failed to address the claim in his
response to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment).

Alternatively, Ms. Stephens admits that the only possible position that came open
and to which she could have been promoted during her second term of employment was
one in which she admits race and gender played no role in the decision. This was the
finance director position, and Ms. Mirkhani, a Caucasian female, was promoted to that
position. Ms. Stephens admits, however, that Ms. Mirkhani was qualified for the position.
Ms. Stephens also admits that Ms. Hutton was grooming her for a promotion in
mid-2018, and BMAG was paying to send Ms. Stephens to leadership classes. However,
the position never materialized before Ms. Stephens was terminated in August 2018. As

such, Ms. Stephens presents no evidence that BMAG did not promote her on account of
her race or gender, and BMAG is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
C. BMAG is entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Stephens’ wrongful
termination claims based on gender discrimination under Title VII and under
the OADA.

Because she relies on circumstantial evidence, Ms. Stephens’ gender
discrimination claims under Title VII and the OADA, like her race discrimination claims,
follow the three-step McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis. Title VII prohibits an
employer from discriminating against any individual “because of such individual’s . . .
sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). The OADA makes it “a discriminatory practice for an
employer . . . to discharge, or otherwise to discriminate against an individual . . . because
of . . . sex.” Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 1302(A)(1). BMAG does not dispute Ms. Stephens’
prima facie case of gender discrimination for purposes of the Motion. Moreover, as
addressed above, the Court finds that BMAG has satisfied its “exceedingly light” burden
of proffering a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Ms. Stephens’ termination, i.e.,
the improper car deals and violations of company policy.

Ms. Stephens offers the same evidence in support of her claims of pretext on
gender discrimination as she does with respect to race discrimination. Simply put, she
offers no evidence of similarly situated male employees who violated work rules of
comparable seriousness, nor does she show that similarly situated co-workers outside her
protected class were treated differently. Thus, BMAG is entitled to summary judgment on
Ms. Stephens’ gender discrimination claims under Title VII and the OADA.
D. BMAG is entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Stephens’ retaliatory
discharge claims under Title VII and the OADA.

Because Ms. Stephens lacks direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation, the
Court evaluates her retaliatory discharge claims under McDonnell Douglas. See Rutledge
v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Johnson Cnty., Kan., No. 22-3081, 2023 WL 4618335, at *5
(10th Cir. July 19, 2023) (unpublished); Fischer v. Forestwood Co., Inc., 525 F.3d 972,
979 (10th Cir. 2008). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Ms. Stephens must
show (1) she engaged in protected opposition to discrimination; (2) BMAG took an
adverse employment action against her; and (3) a causal connection exists between the

protected activity and the adverse action. See Fischer, 525 F.3d at 979. BMAG asserts
that Ms. Stephens cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation because she did not
engage in protected opposition.
Admittedly, Ms. Stephens never complained about race discrimination during her
employment, nor did she directly complain about gender discrimination. Instead, she had

“general conversations” with Ms. Hutton about male GMs “violat[ing] policies and not
being held accountable” and how accounting people were “treated differently” than the
GMs. [Doc. No. 53-2 at 46 (341:11–23)]. Although Ms. Stephens testified that she had
these conversations with Ms. Hutton “all the time,” she was unable to recall the specific
dates, nor could she produce any notes or documents to show she complained about

gender discrimination. See id. at 47–48 (342:23–343:13). Further, Ms. Stephens admits
that she never filed an actual complaint or went to Human Resources or even called the
anonymous complaint hotline.
Ms. Stephens does not address her retaliation claim in her response brief other

than to admit that she “did not report her concerns about discrimination and policy
violations among employees.” [Doc. No. 63 at 24]. “An employer’s action against an
employee cannot be because of that employee’s protected opposition unless the employer
knows the employee has engaged in protected opposition.” Petersen v. Utah Dep’t of
Corr., 301 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2002) (emphasis omitted). That is, it is “crucial”

that Ms. Stephens’ employer “knew that she was engaging in protected opposition.” See
id. Other than general conversations with Ms. Hutton about male GMs violating policies,
there is no evidence of record that BMAG ever knew that Ms. Stephens had complained.
Even if Ms. Stephens’ general conversations with Ms. Hutton could be protected
opposition, there is no evidence of a causal connection between the protected activity and

Ms. Stephens’ termination. At the time of her termination, Ms. Stephens was the highest
paid controller, and Ms. Hutton, according to Ms. Stephens, had been grooming her for a
promotion since mid-2018. Accordingly, BMAG is entitled to summary judgment on Ms.
Stephens’ retaliatory discharge claims.
V. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court concludes that BMAG is entitled to summary
judgment on Ms. Stephens’ Title VII and OADA race and gender discrimination and
retaliatory discharge claims. BMAG is also entitled to summary judgment on Ms.
Stephens’ race discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for the same reasons her race
discrimination claim fails under Title VI. Additionally, BMAG 1s entitled to summary
judgment on Ms. Stephens’ failure to promote claim. Consequently, the Court GRANTS
BMAG’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 53], and this Order disposes of the
remaining claims in this action. A separate judgment will follow.*
IT IS SO ORDERED this 28th day of August 2023.

Wada elm
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

* Tn light of this Order, the Court terminates BMAG’s Motion to Strike Witnesses
from Plaintiff's Witness List [Doc. No. 50] without a ruling.
32

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10390393. Public record. Not legal advice.