# Oklahoma State of v. United States Department of Interior

> District Court, W.D. Oklahoma · November 9, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10389898

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** November 9, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10389898

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that SMCRA “encouraged the States, through an offer of exclusive regulatory jurisdiction, to enact their own laws incorporating these minimum standards, as well as any more stringent, but not inconsistent, standards that they might choose”
- declining to require additional procedures because “it would be a pointless formality in which the result was preordained”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-21-805-F
)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT )
OF THE INTERIOR, et al., )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER
Before the court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. no. 42)
filed on June 13, 2022, and Federal Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment (doc. no. 46) filed on July 28, 2022. Both motions are fully briefed and at
issue (doc. nos. 47, 48, 49).
I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, Oklahoma has regulated surface coal mining and reclamation
operations within its borders, including on land that was previously understood–for
more than a hundred years–to lie within the former boundaries of disestablished
Indian reservations. That understanding was upended when the Supreme Court ruled
that the Creek Reservation in eastern Oklahoma had never been disestablished.
McGirt v. Oklahoma, __, U.S. ___, 140 S.Ct. 2452 (2020). Applying the same
reasoning, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals subsequently recognized the
continued existence of the Choctaw Reservation and the Cherokee Reservation.
Hogner v. State, 500 P.3d 629 (Okla. Crim. App. 2021); Sizemore v. State, 485 P.3d
867 (Okla. Crim. App. 2021). The question presented in this case is whether
Oklahoma may continue to regulate surface coal mining and reclamation operations
within these reservations. The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and
Enforcement, a subdivision of the Department of Interior, answered that question in
the negative, concluding that the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
prohibited Oklahoma from regulating surface mining and reclamation operations on
Indian land. The consequences of this decision are significant – the land comprising
the Creek, Choctaw, and Cherokee Reservations makes up a huge swath of eastern
Oklahoma and includes all the surface coal mining and reclamation activities in the
state.
Dissatisfied with OSMRE’s decision, Oklahoma filed this action and a
companion case, seeking a declaratory judgment that Oklahoma has jurisdiction over
surface mining activities within the Reservations and contending that OSMRE
violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500, et seq., in various ways.
OSMRE answered and filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that
OSMRE is the sole regulatory authority on land comprising the reservations and that
Oklahoma’s state regulatory program is preempted by federal law as to these lands.
In the companion case, the court denied Oklahoma’s motion seeking to
preliminarily enjoin OSMRE from exercising regulatory authority over lands within
the Creek Reservation. See Order of December 22, 2021 (doc. no. 75), State of
Oklahoma, et al. v. Dept. of the Interior, et al., CIV-21-719-F (W.D. Okla.). The
court concluded that Oklahoma was not likely to succeed on the merits of its claims
because the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act precludes state regulation
of surface mining and reclamation operations on Indian lands. The parties1 have now

1 Plaintiffs include the State of Oklahoma, the Governor of Oklahoma in his official capacity, and
two state agencies responsible for administering Oklahoma’s SMCRA regulatory programs.
Defendants include the Department of the Interior, the Secretary of the Interior in her official
capacity, OSMRE, and the Director of OSMRE in her official capacity. For ease of reference, the
court refers to plaintiffs as Oklahoma and defendants as OSMRE.
returned to the court with cross-motions for summary judgment on all pending
claims. For the reasons explained below, the Court again concludes that Oklahoma
is not entitled to the relief it seeks.
But one thing must be clearly understood. The result the court reaches today
is compelled primarily by a straight-forward application of the federal surface
mining legislation to Indian lands–a situation contemplated by the express
provisions of that federal law. Because the result here is compelled by the express
requirements of federal legislation, this order should not be regarded as relevant to
other situations in the realm of civil law, not involving the express command of
federal surface mining legislation, in which other courts are required to determine
the extent of the fallout of the McGirt decision.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
Surface mining operations and reclamation activities are governed by the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201, et seq.,
also known as SMCRA. SMCRA “is a comprehensive statute designed to ‘establish
a nationwide program to protect society and the environment from the adverse
effects of surface coal mining operations.’” Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. &
Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 268 (1981) (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a)).
To that end, SMCRA directs the Secretary of the Interior, acting through OSMRE,
to establish minimum national performance standards for surface mining and
reclamation operations. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1211, 1251(b).
However, “because of the diversity in terrain, climate, biologic, chemical, and
other physical conditions in areas subject to mining operations,” SMCRA also
provides that the “primary governmental responsibility” for developing and
enforcing regulations “should rest with the States.” Id. at § 1201(f). Accordingly,
Title V of SMCRA provides a specific mechanism by which a State may take
responsibility for regulation of surface mining and reclamation operations. It works
as so: any state wishing to regulate surface mining operations may prepare a “State
program” that is submitted to OSMRE for approval. Id. at § 1235(a). The State
program must demonstrate that that State has laws which provide for the regulation
of surface mining and reclamation operations in accordance with SMCRA’s
requirements and that the State has the ability to enforce them. Id. If OSMRE
approves the state program, the State then exercises “exclusive jurisdiction” over
surface mining operations, although OSMRE retains enforcement oversight. Id. at
§§ 1235(a); 1254(b). A state with an approved program may also seek funding for
reclamation and restoration of land and water resources adversely affected by past
mining operations from a fund established by Title IV of SMCRA. Id. at § 1235(c).
In the absence of an approved state program, or in the event that a State is not
adequately enforcing its program, OSMRE implements a Federal program of
regulation for a state. Id. at § 1254(a). SMCRA thus “provides for either State
regulation of surface coal mining within its borders or federal regulation, but not
both. The Act expressly provides that one or the other is exclusive[.]” Bragg v. W.
Virginia Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275, 289 (4th Cir. 2001).
Although SMCRA permits States to assume exclusive regulatory jurisdiction
over surface mining and reclamation operations, it also carefully defines the
geographic scope of that jurisdiction. A “State program” means an approved
program under § 1253 “to regulate surface coal mining and reclamation operations,
on lands within such State.” 30 U.S.C. § 1291(25). “Lands within such State” is
further defined to mean “all lands within a State other than Federal lands and Indian
lands.” Id. at § 1291(11). Accordingly, pursuant to these definitions, a State’s
regulatory jurisdiction under SMCRA only extends to “non-Federal and non-Indian
land within the particular state.” Pennsylvania Fed'n of Sportsmen's Clubs, Inc. v.
Hess, 297 F.3d 310, 315-16 (3d Cir. 2002).
Regulation of surface mining on Indian lands is addressed in § 1300 of
SMCRA. This provision provides that “the Secretary shall incorporate the
requirements” of SMCRA “in all existing and new leases issued for coal on Indian
lands.” 30 U.S.C. § 1300(d). SMCRA’s implementing regulations also make clear
that OSMRE “shall[] [b]e the regulatory authority on Indian lands.” 30 C.F.R.
§ 750.6. “Indian lands” is defined to include “all lands, including mineral interests,
within the exterior boundaries of any Federal Indian reservation, notwithstanding
the issuance of any patent, and including rights-of-way, and all lands including
mineral interests held in trust for or supervised by an Indian tribe.” 30 U.S.C.
§ 1291(9).
Although SMCRA contemplates federal regulation on Indian lands, it also
allows an Indian tribe to prepare its own tribal program for the regulation of surface
mining and reclamation operations “on reservation land under the jurisdiction of the
Indian tribe.” 30 U.S.C. § 1300(d), (j). If an Indian tribe chooses to develop a
regulatory program, the procedures relating to submission of a state program after
implementation of a Federal program govern the process. Id. at § 1300(j)(1)(A).
SMCRA further provides that, for purposes of preparing a tribal regulatory program
under Title V, any reference to a State shall also be considered to be a reference to
an Indian tribe. Id. at § 1300(j)(1)(B). Similarly, Title IV authorizes Indian tribes to
seek funding for reclamation projects and provides that an Indian tribe shall be
considered to be a State for purposes of Title IV. Id. at § 1235(k).
Finally, SMCRA expressly prohibits inconsistent regulations, but not those
that are more stringent than its minimum standards. Section 1255 provides that “[n]o
State law or regulation…shall be superseded by any provision of this chapter or any
regulation issued pursuant thereto, except insofar as such State law or regulation is
inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter,” 30 U.S.C. § 1255(a), but state laws
that provide for “more stringent” regulation or for which SMCRA contains no
provision “shall not be construed to be inconsistent.” Id. at § 1255(b).
With that statutory framework in mind, the court now turns to the facts giving
rise to the present controversy.
B. The Present Controversy
On July 9, 2020, the Supreme Court issued its decision in McGirt, 140 S.Ct.
at 2452. McGirt held that the Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s Reservation in eastern
Oklahoma had not been disestablished and therefore met the definition of “Indian
country” under the Major Crimes Act. Id. at 2478. The Supreme Court
acknowledged that its decision could potentially impact state jurisdiction under a
variety of civil laws. Id. at 2482. This is such a case.
As contemplated by SMCRA, Oklahoma has administered both a state
program under Title V to regulate surface mining operations and a reclamation plan
under Title IV to oversee abandoned mine reclamation activities. Both programs
were approved by OSMRE in 1982. See 47 Fed. Reg. 14,152 (April 2, 1982); 30
C.F.R. § 936.20. The legislation creating Oklahoma’s state program is codified at
Okla. Admin. Code 460:20-1-1, et seq. Consistent with SMCRA, these state laws
recognize that Oklahoma’s regulatory program does not extend to Indian lands.
Okla. Admin. Code §§ 460:20-3-5; 460:20-3-6(a)
On April 2, 2021, nearly a year after the McGirt decision, OSMRE sent two
letters to the state agencies that administer Oklahoma’s SMCRA programs. See
Administrative Record (“AR”) 0638-42. The letters summarized McGirt’s holding
and explained that SMCRA precludes application of a state regulatory program on
Indian lands, which is defined to include land within the exterior boundaries of a
Federal Indian reservation. The letters then stated that Oklahoma could no longer
administer its state program on the Creek Reservation and that OSMRE was now the
regulatory authority on the land. The letters requested that the agencies assist in
transferring regulatory authority over the land during a 30-day transition period and
instructed Oklahoma to not take any action with irreversible consequences for
OSMRE’s ability to administer SMCRA within the boundaries of the Creek
Reservation.
Oklahoma’s response to this decision was swift and clear. The Oklahoma
Attorney General sent OSMRE a letter on April 16, 2021, arguing that SMCRA did
not entirely prohibit the enforcement of state law on reservation land and contending
that equitable defenses would bar the transfer of authority from the State to OSMRE.
See AR 0660-62. The Attorney General’s letter concluded by advising OSMRE that
he was instructing state agencies to not comply with OSMRE’s demands.
Undeterred, OSMRE proceeded to publish a “Notice of Decision” in the
Federal Register on May 18, 2021, purporting to inform the public of its decision
regarding the effect of McGirt and the transfer of regulatory authority over surface
mining and reclamation activities within the Creek Reservation. 86 Fed. Reg.
26941-01 (May 18, 2021). OSMRE subsequently denied or (to use OSMRE’s
preferred terms) “disapproved” or “suspended” two requests submitted by
Oklahoma for federal funding for its SMCRA programs.
From Oklahoma’s perspective, things only got worse from there. On
March 11, 2021, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, applying McGirt’s
reasoning, recognized the continued existence of the Cherokee Reservation in
eastern Oklahoma for purposes of the Major Crimes Act in Hogner, 500 P.3d at 629.
On April 1, 2021, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reached the same
conclusion in Sizemore, 485 P.3d at 867, regarding the Choctaw Reservation.
On June 17, 2021, OSMRE informed Oklahoma that, for the same reasons
articulated in its April 2, 2021 letters, it could no longer administer its SMCRA
programs on the Choctaw Reservation or the Cherokee Reservation and that
OSMRE was now the regulatory authority on these lands. A Notice of Decision
reflecting this action was published in the Federal Register on October 19, 2021. 86
Fed. Reg. 57,854 (Oct. 19, 2021). Because all of the surface mining and related
reclamation taking place in Oklahoma appears to occur on lands within the borders
of the Creek, Choctaw, or Cherokee Reservations, OSMRE’s decision regarding the
proper regulatory authority on these lands effectively revoked Oklahoma’s authority
to regulate surface mining within the state.
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, Oklahoma filed this action regarding the land
within the Choctaw Reservation and Cherokee Reservation and a companion lawsuit
regarding the land within the Creek Reservation. See State of Oklahoma, et al. v.
Dept. of the Interior, et al., CIV-21-719-F (W.D. Okla.).2 Both actions seek judicial
review of OSMRE’s actions under the Administrative Procedure Act and a
declaration regarding Oklahoma’s authority to continue enforcing its state regulatory
programs under SCMRA. After Oklahoma’s request for a preliminary injunction to
enjoin OSMRE’s exercise of regulatory authority over the Creek Reservation was
denied, Oklahoma shut down its Title V regulatory program. See Pl.s’ Br. ¶ 35.
Oklahoma also contends that it was forced to stop operating its Title IV reclamation
program without access to federal funding and that it is using state funds to pay
contractors to complete ongoing projects. Id. at ¶ 36. OSMRE contends, and
Oklahoma does not dispute, that the funding requests were eventually approved after
they were amended to reflect the change in regulatory authority. Def.s’ Br. ¶ 33.
OSMRE further asserts that it is currently acting as the sole regulatory authority on
the Reservations under SMCRA and that the parties are working to effectuate the
transfer of performance bonds and forfeited bond funds. Id. at ¶ 37.

2 Because these two cases share the same factual background and raise identical legal issues, they
were consolidated for the purposes of summary judgment briefing (doc. no. 34).
C. Summary of the Claims
Oklahoma asserts six claims in its Amended Complaint (doc. no. 29): Count
one seeks a declaratory judgment that Oklahoma has jurisdiction over surface coal
mining and reclamation operations under Title IV and Title V of SMCRA within the
Creek Reservation; counts two through five contend that OSMRE’s actions violated
the APA because they were arbitrary and capricious and failed to comply with
procedural requirements; and count six asserts that OSMRE’s actions violated
Oklahoma’s right to fundamental fairness and due process.
OSMRE has asserted two counterclaims (doc. no. 30) in response. First, it
seeks a declaratory judgment that OSMRE is the sole regulatory authority within the
boundaries of the Creek, Cherokee, and Choctaw Reservations and that Oklahoma
does not have jurisdiction over surface mining or reclamation operations on these
lands. Second, it seeks a declaratory judgment that application of Oklahoma’s state
regulatory program under Title V and its reclamation program under Title IV to land
within the Reservations is preempted by SMCRA. Each party seeks to enjoin the
other from exercising regulatory authority over surface mining and reclamation
operations on the Reservations.
The parties agree that these claims raise questions of law that are appropriately
resolved at the summary judgment stage.
III. STANDARD OF DECISION
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). A dispute is genuine if the facts and evidence are such that a reasonable
juror could return a verdict for either party. Id. All facts and reasonable inferences
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id.
“Cross-motions for summary judgment are treated as two individual motions
for summary judgment and held to the same standard, with each motion viewed in
the light most favorable to its nonmoving party.” Banner Bank v. First Am. Title Ins.
Co., 916 F.3d 1323, 1326 (10th Cir. 2019). When the parties file cross motions for
summary judgment, the court is entitled to assume “‘no evidence needs to be
considered other than that filed by the parties.’” Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Farm
Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1148 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
As for challenges to agency action under the APA, the court “acts as an
appellate court” and “employs summary judgment to decid[e], as a matter of law,
whether the agency action is supported by the administrative record and otherwise
consistent with the APA standard of review.” New Mexico Health Connections v.
United States Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 946 F.3d 1138, 1161 (10th Cir. 2019)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Declaratory Judgment Claims
The parties raise opposing requests for a declaratory judgment as to
Oklahoma’s ability to regulate surface mining and reclamation operations within the
Reservations under SMCRA. To resolve these claims, the court will first address
whether SMCRA precludes and preempts Oklahoma’s regulatory authority over
surface mining and reclamation operations on the land. The court will then address
Oklahoma’s claim that equitable principles bar OSMRE from stripping Oklahoma
of its long-exercised regulatory authority.
1. State Regulatory Authority Under SMCRA
OSMRE argues that SMCRA precludes states from administering a state
program on Indian land and that, under the decisions in McGirt, Hogner, and
Sizemore, the lands involved here are Indian lands. Oklahoma does not seriously
dispute either of these contentions, and for good reason. SMCRA’s plain language
compels both conclusions.
First, the land at issue is Indian land under SMCRA’s definition of that term.
In McGirt, the Supreme Court held that the Creek Reservation qualified as “Indian
country” under the MCA, which is defined as “all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding
the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the
reservation.” McGirt, 140 S.Ct. at 2459 (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151(a)). SMCRA’s
definition of “Indian land” is similar – it includes “all lands…within the exterior
boundaries of any Federal Indian reservation, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent, and including rights-of-way.” 30 U.S.C. § 1291(9). Because the Creek,
Choctaw, and Cherokee Reservations were not disestablished and qualify as “Indian
reservation[s] under the jurisdiction of the United States,” each of them is also a
“Federal Indian reservation” under SMCRA.
Second, because the reservations are Indian land, SMCRA plainly precludes
a State from administering its state program on the land. As previously explained,
SMCRA establishes minimum national standards for the regulation of surface coal
mining and reclamation operations but allows States to assume responsibility for
enforcement of these standards through operation of approved state programs. 30
U.S.C. § 1253. But crucially, a state program is defined to exclude Indian land. Id.
at 1291. See Hess, 297 F.3d at 315-16 (explaining that SMCRA enables states to
assume exclusive jurisdiction “on non-Federal and non-Indian lands within the
particular state”); New Mexico ex rel. Energy & Mins. Dep't, Min. & Mins. Div. v.
U.S. Dep't of Interior, 820 F.2d 441, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (explaining that if a
particular reservation was not dissolved then the state “may not exercise authority
over these lands under the Surface Mining Act” and the lands would “be off limits”
to the state); State of Mont. v. Clark, 749 F.2d 740, 747-49 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(explaining that SMCRA “unambiguously denies the state the power to administer
funds on any Indian lands, on or off the reservation” because a state program is
defined to exclude Indian lands).
In addition to specifically excluding states from regulating surface mining on
Indian lands, SMCRA also designates the appropriate regulatory authority for these
areas. Section 1300 provides that the Secretary shall incorporate SMCRA’s
standards in all existing and new leases on Indian lands but also gives tribes the
option to administer their own tribal regulatory programs. 30 U.S.C. § 1300(d), (j).
To the extent these provisions leave any doubt as to regulatory authority on Indian
land, SMCRA’s implementing regulations clearly state that OSMRE “shall be the
regulatory authority on Indian land.” 30 C.F.R. § 750.6(a). Oklahoma does not
challenge the validity of this regulation.
SMCRA therefore unambiguously precludes application of Oklahoma’s state
program on the Reservations. Given this conclusion, OSMRE asserts that it is
entitled to a declaratory judgment that Oklahoma’s exercise of regulatory
jurisdiction over surface coal mining and reclamation operations within the
Reservations is preempted by SMCRA and that OSMRE is the sole regulatory
authority on these lands. In response, Oklahoma asserts that even if it cannot apply
its state program on Indian land, SMCRA does not entirely prohibit states from
regulating surface coal mining and reclamation operations outside of this program
and that Oklahoma therefore retains some regulatory authority over the
Reservations.3

3 OSMRE asserts that Oklahoma waived this argument by not asserting it in the Amended
Complaint and that it raises a hypothetical legal question that is not ripe for adjudication because
Oklahoma has not identified any state law that it seeks to enforce outside of those contained in its
State program. The court disagrees – the argument responds to OSMRE’s assertion that it should
be declared the sole regulator on the Reservations and is fairly encompassed by the claims asserted
in the pleadings. Further, “[f]ederal regulatory action that preempts state law creates a sufficient
The Supreme Court recently reiterated that although a State generally has
jurisdiction over all its territory, its jurisdiction in Indian country may be preempted
“by federal law under ordinary principles of federal preemption.” Oklahoma v.
Castro-Huerta, ___ U.S. ___, 142 S.Ct. 2486, 2494 (2022). The preemptive effect
of a federal law “may be either expressed or implied, and ‘is compelled whether
Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly
contained in its structure and purpose.’” Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n,
505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (citation omitted). There are “at least two types of implied
pre-emption: field pre-emption, where the scheme of federal regulation is so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it, and conflict pre-emption, where compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility or where state law stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress[.]” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Ultimately, the
“task in any pre-emption case is to determine whether state regulation is consistent
with the structure and purpose of the statute as a whole.” Id. at 98.
Here, SMCRA’s text and structure indicate Congress’ intent to preempt state
regulation of surface coal mining and reclamation activities that occurs outside of an
approved state program. SMCRA defines surface coal mining and reclamation
operations expansively, 30 U.S.C. § 1291(27) and (28), and includes provisions
governing all activities conducted in connection with these operations. See, e.g., 30
U.S.C. §§ 1256, 1258, 1262, 1265. SMCRA is therefore accurately described as “a
comprehensive statute that regulates all surface coal mining operations.” United
States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 300 (2009) (emphasis added). Its primary

injury-in-fact” with respect to a State’s ability to pursue declaratory and injunctive relief. Wyoming
ex rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2008).
purpose is to “establish a nationwide program to protect society and the environment
from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations.” 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a).
With respect to State involvement in surface mining regulation, SMCRA is designed
to “assist the States in developing and implementing a program to achieve the
purposes of this chapter.” Id. at § 1202(g) (emphasis added). To that end, SMCRA
allows States to assume a regulatory role, but only via approved state programs.4
SMCRA provides that a State “which wishes to assume exclusive
jurisdiction” over surface coal mining and reclamation operations “shall” submit a
state program to the Secretary for approval. 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a). This is the only
mechanism by which a State may assume regulatory jurisdiction; the procedures are
mandatory. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 99 (1992) (holding that the “unavoidable
implication” of a provision in the OSH Act stating that a State “shall” submit a plan
if it wishes to “assume responsibility” over occupation safety health standards “is
that a State may not enforce its own occupational safety and health standards without
obtaining the Secretary’s approval”). Absent an approved state program, the federal
government exercises “exclusive jurisdiction.” 30 U.S.C. § 1254(a). A state
therefore does not retain any regulatory authority over surface mining and
reclamation operations unless it has an approved state program.
Further, state regulation on Indian land outside of an approved state program
would undermine the authority granted to OSMRE and Indian tribes. SMCRA
permits an Indian tribe to administer its own regulatory program but otherwise

4 The state laws comprising Oklahoma’s regulatory program recognize this point. See Okla.
Admin. Code §§ 460:20-1-4 (providing that the Oklahoma Department of Mines “is responsible
for the regulation of surface coal mining and reclamation operations under an approved State
program”); 460:20-3-4 (providing that the Oklahoma Department of Mines shall assume primary
responsibility for the regulation of surface mining and reclamation operations “upon submission
to and approval by the Secretary of a State program”); 460:20-3-6(a) (providing that “[a]ny person
who conducts surface coal mining and reclamation operations on non-Indian or non-Federal
lands…shall have a permit issued pursuant to the applicable State or Federal program”).
designates OSMRE as the regulatory authority on Indian lands. State regulation of
surface coal mining and reclamation operations on Indian land would conflict with
the authority granted and allocated by Congress and is therefore preempted by
SMCRA.
Finally, SMCRA contemplates an “either-or arrangement” where there is
either state regulation or federal regulation, but not both. Hess, 297 F.3d at 318.
Jurisdiction is therefore “never shared” and cannot be exercised concurrently. Id.;
see also Bragg, 248 F.3d at 289 (“In sum, because the regulation is mutually
exclusive, either federal law or State law regulates coal mining activity in a State,
but not both simultaneously.”). Because SMCRA provides for federal regulation on
Indian land in the absence of a tribal regulatory program, the enforcement of state
laws – whether as part of a state program or not – would violate the exclusive
jurisdiction envisioned by SMCRA.
In an attempt to navigate around the preemptive effect of SMCRA’s
provisions, Oklahoma argues that § 1255 preserves its authority to implement “other
state laws” outside of its state program so long as they are more stringent than
SMCRA’s minimum standards. But § 1255 says nothing about “other” state laws.
What it does say is that “any” state laws providing for more stringent regulations are
not inconsistent with SMCRA and therefore not superseded. 30 U.S.C. § 1255.
However, because SMCRA only permits a state to regulate surface mining via an
approved state program, the state laws § 1255 addresses are those that comprise the
state program. See Pennsylvania Coal Ass'n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 238 (3d Cir.
1995) (interpreting § 1255 and explaining that federal regulations “serve only as the
base rather than the ceiling for the state program”); Bragg, 248 F.3d at 288
(explaining that SMCRA “encouraged the States, through an offer of exclusive
regulatory jurisdiction, to enact their own laws incorporating these minimum
standards, as well as any more stringent, but not inconsistent, standards that they
might choose”). Section 1255 merely reflects that States may incorporate more
extensive and more stringent regulations into their state programs. It does not,
however, change the jurisdictional limits of a state program or authorize states to
regulate surface mining via a set of state laws that operate independent of SMCRA.
In any event, § 1255 provides that inconsistent state laws are superseded by
SMCRA. Applying state surface mining and reclamation laws to Indian land – even
those that are more stringent than SMCRA’s minimum standards – would be
inconsistent with the exclusive authority granted to OSMRE and Indian tribes on
Indian land.
In sum, SMCRA carefully allocates regulatory authority over all surface coal
mining and reclamation operations depending on the type of land at issue and leaves
no room for state regulation outside of this scheme. Application of Oklahoma’s state
surface coal mining and reclamation laws to the land comprising the Creek,
Cherokee, or Choctaw Reservations is inconsistent with this scheme and is therefore
preempted by SMCRA
2. Equitable Principles
Despite the plain meaning of SMCRA, Oklahoma argues that fundamental
principles of equity foreclose OSMRE’s ability to strip Oklahoma of regulatory
jurisdiction over surface mining and reclamation operations within the reservations.
Broadly speaking, Oklahoma’s equitable arguments are understandable. After all,
for well over a century, millions of Oklahomans (including tribal leaders and their
constituents) lived their lives and conducted their public and private business with
the understanding that the State of Oklahoma, acting through its elected leaders and
the agencies they created, had plenary regulatory authority within the boundaries of
the state. But the issue now is whether the court is at liberty to ignore SMCRA’s
unambiguous command and, as a matter of equity, authorize an ongoing violation of
federal law. The court appreciates Oklahoma’s concerns regarding the displacement
of state and local authority over a huge portion of its territory following McGirt, but
a “district court cannot…override Congress’ policy choice, articulated in a statute,
as to what behavior should be prohibited.” United States v. Oakland Cannabis
Buyers' Co-op., 532 U.S. 483, 497 (2001). Rather, when “the statute’s language is
plain,” as it is here, “the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its
terms.” United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As explained above, SMCRA’s plain
language precludes implementation of a state regulatory program on Indian land,
which includes the reservations of the Creek Nation, Choctaw Nation, and Cherokee
Nation. OSMRE seeks to enforce these provisions. Although, for decades,
Oklahoma regulated mining and reclamation operations on these lands because the
parties quite understandably believed that the State had the authority to do just that,
the court is now obligated to enforce the statute’s plain terms.
The Supreme Court’s decision in City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian
Nation of New York, 544 U.S. 197 (2005) does not compel a different result. In
Sherill, the Oneida Indian Nation sought to revive its ancient sovereignty over
parcels located on its historic reservation. Id. at 202. The reservation land had been
purchased by New York in the late 1700s and early 1800s in violation of the
Nonintercourse Act, which bars sales of tribal land without the acquiescence of the
Federal Government. Id. at 204-05. In the late 1990s, the Tribe purchased parcels of
the historic reservation land on the open market. Id. at 211. The Tribe then resisted
payment of municipal property taxes on the ground that “acquisition of fee title to
discrete parcels of historic reservation land revived the Oneidas’ ancient sovereignty
piecemeal over each parcel.” Id. at 202.
The Supreme Court rejected this theory and held that the “disruptive remedy”
sought by the Tribe was barred by equitable principles. Id. at 217. Specifically, the
Court held that “the Oneidas’ long delay in seeking equitable relief against New
York or its local units, and developments in the city of Sherrill spanning several
generations, evoke the doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility, and
render inequitable the piecemeal shift in governance this suit seeks unilaterally to
initiate.” Id. at 221. The Second Circuit has twice applied Sherrill’s equitable
principles to bar similar ancient Indian land claims seeking possession, ejectment,
or damages as a means to remedy the centuries-old transfer of reservation land that
occurred in violation of the Nonintercourse Act. See Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y.
v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 275 (2d Cir. 2005); Oneida Indian Nation of New York v.
Cnty. of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114, 121 (2d Cir. 2010).
Oklahoma contends that, given its long-exercised regulatory authority over
surface mining on the reservations, these same equitable principles should preclude
OSMRE from stripping Oklahoma of its regulatory control over the lands involved
here. The court is not the least bit critical of the State for advancing this argument,
given that the ancient land transfers underlying the claims in Sherrill, Cayuga, and
Oneida violated the Nonintercourse Act and equity still worked to bar those claims.
But the relief sought in those cases was different than the relief requested here.
Sherrill and its progeny concerned attempts to rekindle tribal sovereignty or obtain
relief based on a tribe’s right to possess the land. This case does not involve those
types of disruptive remedies but is instead about the interpretation and application
of a federal statute.
The Second Circuit’s decision in Cayuga Nation v. Tanner, 6 F.4th 361 (2d
Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 775 (2022), is instructive in this regard. There, the
Cayuga Nation purchased a tract within the boundaries of its historic reservation. Id.
at 369. The land had originally been sold in violation of the Nonintercourse Act and
had been subject to local regulation for generations, but the reservation had never
been disestablished. Id. at 365. After the Cayuga Nation opened a gaming
establishment on the property, the Village of Union Springs attempted to enforce an
ordinance requiring a license for the operation of gaming facilities. Id. at 371-72.
The Cayuga Nation filed suit to preclude enforcement of the ordinance, arguing that
it was preempted by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Id. at 372. In evaluating
whether this claim was barred by claim preclusion due to a previous lawsuit
involving the parcel, the Second Circuit noted that the Cayuga Nation was not
seeking to assert broad immunity from local regulation – an assertion that would
have been undermined by Sherrill – but was instead seeking a declaration “that the
specific sliver of local law that the Village was attempting to enforce is preempted
by a specific federal statute.” Id. at 376. That issue, the Second Circuit explained,
“turns on a straightforward question of statutory interpretation” regarding whether
the land involved “sits on Indian lands within the meaning of the IGRA.” Id. at 377-
78. Because the land qualified as Indian lands under the IGRA’s definition, and the
IGRA preempts local laws regulating gaming on Indian lands, the Second Circuit
held that the municipal ordinance was preempted. Id. at 380. Thus, although
acknowledging that Sherill could undermine a tribe’s belated assertion of “broad
immunity from local regulation,” id. at 376, the Second Circuit did not apply
Sherrill’s equitable defenses to the Cayuga Nation’s federal preemption claim. Id. at
380. Rather, the Second Circuit simply applied the “plain language of the IGRA.”
Id. at 378.
Similarly, here, the parties’ claims concern whether a “specific sliver” of state
regulatory authority is preempted by a federal statute, a question that is answered by
SMCRA’s plain language.5 This case does not, as was the case in Sherrill, implicate
broad claims of tribal immunity from local regulation or an Indian tribe’s possessory

5 It is worth emphasizing again that this case involves the regulation of surface mining and
reclamation activities under SMCRA; it does not make any determination with respect to
Oklahoma’s ability to enforce other state laws or regulations on the land at issue.
rights over land that long ago passed into private ownership. Sherrill is therefore
inapplicable.
Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the more compelling Supreme Court authority
on the facts of this case is not Sherrill, but McGirt. The “key question” in McGirt
was whether the land involved qualified as “Indian country” as that term is defined
under the Major Crimes Act (“MCA”). McGirt, 140 S.Ct. at 2459. Because the land
qualified as Indian country, the Supreme Court held that “the MCA applies to
Oklahoma according to its usual terms.” Id. at 2478. Although this conclusion
resulted in an avulsive shift in criminal jurisdiction from Oklahoma to the federal
government that conflicted with decades of prior practice, the Supreme Court was
nevertheless unwilling to ignore the “statutory promise” contained in the MCA. And
although McGirt acknowledged that certain legal doctrines like laches may be
deployed to protect those who have reasonably labored under a mistaken
understanding of the law, it did not deploy such doctrines to preclude the future
enforcement of the MCA. Id. at 2481. Likewise, in the case at bar, the key question
is whether the lands in question here qualify as Indian land under SMCRA. They do
qualify as Indian land, with the result that state-level regulation of surface mining
and reclamation activities within the three reservations is prohibited.
Ultimately, whatever role Sherrill or other equitable defenses may have in
blocking long-dormant assertions of sovereignty, or in narrowing the remedies
available for unlawful land sales, they do not override the clear command of a federal
statute. On the contrary, “[o]nce Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has
decided the order of priorities in a given area, it is for the Executive to administer
the laws and for the courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought.” Tennessee
Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978). Because SMCRA’s plain language
precludes state regulation on Indian land, and because the lands at issue are Indian
land as defined by SCMRA, the court concludes, unavoidably, that it must enforce
the unambiguous provisions of SMCRA, with the result that Oklahoma may not
continue to exercise regulatory jurisdiction over surface mining and reclamation
activities on the lands at issue. The fact that Oklahoma has regulated surface mining
on these lands for several decades does not lead to a different result.
Moreover, taking Sherrill’s equitable principles on their own terms, “laches
or neglect of duty on the part of officers of the government is no defense to a suit by
it to enforce a public right or protect a public interest.” Utah Power & Light Co. v.
United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917); United States v. Distefano, 279 F.3d 1241,
1245, n. 2 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Such a defense would fail, however, because laches
may not be asserted against the United States in an action brought to enforce a public
right or a public interest.”); Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah v. Myton, 835 F.3d 1255,
1263 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[L]aches is a line of defense that usually may not be asserted
against the United States.”). Here, OSMRE is not seeking to vindicate the interests
of a private party but is acting in its sovereign capacity to ensure compliance with a
federal statute and to enforce its own regulatory authority. Laches or other delay-
based defenses cannot be applied to the federal government when it acts in that
capacity. United States v. Angell, 292 F.3d 333, 338 (2d Cir. 2002) (rejecting laches
defense where federal government sought to enforce the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq.).
Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, Oklahoma is not entitled to the
declaratory judgment it seeks in count one of its Amended Complaint. OSMRE is
entitled to a declaratory judgment that SMCRA preempts application of Oklahoma’s
regulatory programs on land within the boundaries of the Creek Reservation,
Cherokee Reservation, and Choctaw Reservation and that OSMRE is the sole
regulatory authority on these lands in the absence of an approved tribal regulatory
program.
B. APA Claims
Oklahoma’s remaining claims assert that OSMRE’s actions violated the
Administrative Procedure Act in two ways: first, the actions were arbitrary,
capricious, and not in accordance with law; and second, the actions were not
promulgated using the proper procedures. See 5 U.S.C. § 706. However, before
turning to the merits of these issues, the court will address OSMRE’s contention that
the court lacks jurisdiction to review these claims because OSMRE did not perform
a final agency action and the suit has been brought in the wrong venue.
1. Jurisdictional Challenges
a. Final Agency Action
“The APA authorizes judicial review only of final agency actions.” Kobach v.
U.S. Election Assistance Comm'n, 772 F.3d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir. 2014). OSMRE
contends that its decision to assume regulatory authority over the reservations was
nondiscretionary and therefore not an agency action at all. OSMRE’s argument goes
like this: McGirt, Hogner, and Sizemore “rendered the decisions that made OSMRE
the authority within the reservations,” OSMRE therefore had no discretion other than
to instruct Oklahoma to cease operating its state program, and nondiscretionary
actions such as this are not agency actions.
But OSMRE’s initial premise is flawed. McGirt, Hogner, and Sizemore did
not render any decision with respect to Oklahoma’s regulatory authority under
SMCRA. These cases address whether particular reservations qualify as “Indian
country” for purposes of the Major Crimes Act. Of course, the conclusions these cases
reached regarding the existence of the reservations had significant implications
under SMCRA. But it was OSMRE’s application of the holdings in McGirt, Hogner,
and Sizemore to SMCRA, not the cases themselves, that ultimately caused the shift
of authority that Oklahoma now challenges.
SMCRA’s decision – which is reflected in letters to Oklahoma’s state
agencies, Notices of Decision published in the Federal Register, and the refusal to
fund certain grant requests – initiated a major change in the status quo and involved
at least some interpretation and application of SCMRA’s provisions. It therefore
qualifies as an agency action under the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (defining
“agency action” to include the “whole or part of an agency rule, order, license,
sanction, relief, or the equivalent thereof”); 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (defining “rule” as a
statement “designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy”). That
OSMRE believed its decision was the only option available to it under the governing
law does not render its decision unreviewable or somehow not an agency action. See
Sac & Fox Nation of Missouri v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1250, 1261 (10th Cir. 2001)
(reviewing agency decision that the agency described as nondiscretionary under the
governing statutes).
Further, because OSMRE engaged in agency action as defined in the APA,
“[t]he APA establishes a basic presumption of judicial review.” Dep't of Homeland
Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California, ___ U.S. ___, 140 S.Ct. 1891, 1905 (2020)
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). This presumption can
generally only “be rebutted by a showing that the relevant statute ‘preclude[s]’
review, or that the ‘agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” Id.
(alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). Neither of these exceptions apply
here.
OSMRE additionally argues that, assuming it performed an agency action, its
decisions with respect to Oklahoma’s funding requests were not final agency actions.
An agency action is final if it marks “the consummation of the agency’s
decisionmaking process” and “either determine[s] rights or obligations or
occasion[s] legal consequences.” Kobach, 772 F.3d at 1189 (quotation marks
omitted). OSMRE’s decision to disapprove Oklahoma’s requests for grant funding
meets these requirements because OSMRE definitively determined that it will not
provide funding for state projects occurring on Indian land. OSMRE’s conclusion
on this point was final. Although OSMRE subsequently approved an amended
funding request that reflected the change in jurisdictional authority, OSMRE did not
alter its position regarding its inability to approve funding for state projects on Indian
land.
b. SMCRA’s Venue Provision
So OSMRE engaged in some sort of final agency action, but what type? The
answer is significant because SMCRA includes a provision that limits where certain
actions may be brought. Section 1276(a)(1) of SMCRA provides:
Any action of the Secretary to approve or disapprove a State program
or to prepare or promulgate a Federal program pursuant to this chapter
shall be subject to judicial review by the United States District Court
for the District which includes the capital of the State whose program
is at issue. Any action by the Secretary promulgating national rules or
regulations including standards pursuant to sections 1251, 1265, 1266,
and 1273 of this title shall be subject to judicial review in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit. Any other
action constituting rulemaking by the Secretary shall be subject to
judicial review only by the United States District Court for the District
in which the surface coal mining operation is located.

30 U.S.C.A. § 1276(a)(1).
Oklahoma contends that OSMRE’s actions amount to a disapproval of its state
program. Therefore, under the first prong of § 1276(a)(1), jurisdiction to review the
actions complained of here is appropriate in this court. OSMRE disagrees. It
contends that SMCRA and its implementing regulations make clear that the
disapproval of a state program references a specific action that occurs in response to
the submission of a state program or an amendment to a state program. But, OSMRE
notes, neither a state program nor a program amendment were submitted and rejected
in this case. Moreover, OSMRE argues, submission of a program amendment was
unnecessary because Oklahoma’s state program already excludes Indian land from
its regulatory jurisdiction. OSMRE therefore contends that its action (if an agency
action at all) is some other species of rulemaking, with the consequence that judicial
review is only appropriate in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, the location where
all the surface mining is located.
However, as even OSMRE concedes, SMCRA does not indicate precisely
how to proceed when a State’s regulatory authority over certain areas is
compromised by changes in the law. Def.’s Br. at 43. Here, OSMRE took actions
with respect to Oklahoma’s state program that effectively terminated Oklahoma’s
regulatory jurisdiction over all surface coal mining and reclamation operations
within its borders. The court concludes quite readily that this scenario most closely
resembles the disapproval of a state program. Although Oklahoma’s state program
has not been formally disapproved, the reality is that Oklahoma is no longer
administering a state program because of OSMRE’s decision. OSMRE’s action is
therefore equivalent to the disapproval of a state program and jurisdiction to review
the action is appropriate in the court.
2. Unlawful Agency Action
Oklahoma asserts that OSMRE violated the APA by acting in a manner that
was arbitrary and capricious and that failed to comply with required procedures. See
5 U.S.C. § 706. More particularly, Oklahoma contends that OSMRE failed to
adequately explain its decision, failed to consider important reliance interests before
transferring regulatory authority, and failed to engage in notice and comment
procedures. OSMRE defends its actions as procedurally and substantively sound,
but also asserts that even if it erred, such error was harmless because the conclusion
it ultimately reached was the only permissible interpretation of SMCRA.
In reviewing whether an agency action was arbitrary and capricious or made
without observance of required procedures, the APA instructs courts to take “due
account…of the rule of prejudicial error.” 5 U.S.C. § 706. Under this standard, an
APA violation does not require reversal “unless a plaintiff demonstrates prejudice
resulting from the error.” Prairie Band Pottawatomie Nation v. Fed. Highway
Admin., 684 F.3d 1002, 1008 (10th Cir. 2012). The rationale behind this rule is
obvious: “If the agency’s mistake did not affect the outcome, if it did not prejudice
the petitioner, it would be senseless to vacate and remand for reconsideration.” PDK
Lab'ys Inc. v. U.S. D.E.A., 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Thus, the harmless
error rule is appropriately applied where the agency reached the correct conclusion
and further consideration of the issues would not change the result. See Lake
Carriers' Ass'n v. E.P.A., 652 F.3d 1, 10-11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding that “providing
notice and an opportunity for comment…would have served no purpose” and that
“further consideration or response” to arguments the agency allegedly ignored “was
unnecessary” because the agency correctly determined that it lacked the authority to
amend the action in the way petitioners’ desired); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v.
Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 659 (2007) (holding that erroneous statement in
Federal Register notice did not require remand to agency because it “had no effect
on the underlying agency action being challenged”); Sheppard v. Sullivan, 906 F.2d
756, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that petitioner “could not have been harmed” by
the failure to provide notice and comment prior to an agency action because the
agency’s approach was “the only reasonable one” and the agency would likely have
been reversed had it reached the opposite conclusion); Hisp. Info. &
Telecommunications Network, Inc. v. F.C.C., 865 F.2d 1289, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(declining to require additional procedures because “it would be a pointless
formality in which the result was preordained”).
Assuming that OSMRE violated the APA either by failing to follow the proper
procedures or by failing to consider certain aspects of the issue, those errors would
not require remand to the agency because the errors would be harmless. Once the
Supreme Court and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the
Reservations had not been disestablished, SMCRA’s unambiguous language
required OSMRE to assume regulatory authority with respect to operations within
the Reservations and to notify Oklahoma that it could no longer administer its state
program. SMCRA permits no other interpretation. Although this is not the result
Oklahoma would prefer, no amount of administrative process will change the fact
that SMCRA precludes state regulation on Indian land.
Further, the transfer of authority required by SMCRA has already taken place
– Oklahoma represents that it has shut down its regulatory and reclamation programs
and OSMRE asserts that it has assumed jurisdiction over the reservations. This is the
only outcome permitted by SMCRA; remanding this action to the agency to consider
reliance interests, more fully explain its reasoning, or engage in notice and comment
would therefore be a “pointless formality.” Hisp. Info. & Telecommunications
Network, Inc., 865 F.2d at 1294. Because Oklahoma has failed to establish that it
can exercise sole or concurrent jurisdiction on the reservations, “the additional
agency procedures [it] demand[s] would not have afforded [it] the relief [it] seeks.”
Lake Carriers' Ass'n, 652 F.3d at 12. Under those circumstances, to remand to the
agency “would be an exercise in futility—one not in accord with ‘the rule of
prejudicial error.” All Indian Pueblo Council v. United States, 975 F.2d 1437, 1443
(10th Cir. 1992) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706).
In sum, the court may exercise jurisdiction over Oklahoma’s APA claims.
However, because any of the alleged APA deficiencies asserted by Oklahoma would
be harmless (in other words, ultimately of no consequence) under the circumstances
presented here, OSMRE is entitled to summary judgment on these claims. Last,
Oklahoma has not cited any law or made any separate argument in support of its
claim that OSMRE’s actions violated its right to fundamental fairness and due
process. Accordingly, the court finds that OSMRE is also entitled to summary
judgment on this claim.
V. CONCLUSION
Oklahoma seeks to continue regulating surface coal mining and reclamation
operations on land within the exterior boundaries of the Creek Reservation, Choctaw
Reservation and Cherokee Reservation, as it has done for several decades. However,
State regulation of these activities on Indian land is now precluded by SMCRA.
Accordingly, Oklahoma’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. no. 42) is DENIED
and Federal Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. no. 46) is
GRANTED. A separate judgment will be entered.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 9" day of November, 2022.

STEPHEN P. FRIOT
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

21-0805p011.docx

° The court notes the counterclaim plaintiffs’ prayer for injunctive relief, doc. no. 30, pp. 59, et seq.
The injunctive relief sought by counterclaim plaintiffs tracks the declaratory relief they seek. The
court is satisfied that plaintiffs will comply with the determinations the court makes in this order
and, consequently, that injunctive relief is not required. In the unlikely event that enforcement of
the court’s determinations is required, counterclaim plaintiffs may seek supplemental relief as
permitted by the Declaratory Judgment Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2202.

28

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10389898. Public record. Not legal advice.