# Acosta v. Kchao

> District Court, W.D. Oklahoma · September 30, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10389179

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** September 30, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

MARTIN WALSH1, Secretary of Labor, )
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT )
OF LABOR, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-18-807-D
)
RANY KCHAO, individually, and )
KCHAO AND KCHAO HOSPITALITY, )
LLC, d/b/a WHISPERING PINES BED & )
BREAKFAST, a corporation, )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER
Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants,
Rany Kchao and Kchao and Kchao Hospitality, LLC [Doc. No. 51], and Plaintiff Martin
Walsh, Secretary of Labor [Doc. No. 52]. Both motions are fully briefed and at issue. See
Pl.’s Resp. Br. [Doc. No. 57]; Def.’s Reply Br. [Doc. No. 60]. See also Def.’s Resp. Br.
[Doc. No. 58]; Pl.’s Reply Br. [Doc. No. 59].
This case involves claims by the United States Department of Labor (DOL) under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19, that Defendants Kchao and
Kchao Hospitality, LLC, d/b/a Whispering Pines Bed & Breakfast (Whispering Pines) and
Rany Kchao violated the FLSA by failing to pay minimum wages to employees, failing to
pay overtime compensation, failing to maintain required records, and unlawfully retaliating

1 Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d), Secretary Martin Walsh is substituted as a party because he is
Eugene Scalia’s successor as the United States Secretary of Labor.
against former employees. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, an assessment of unpaid wages
and compensation owed to Defendants’ employees, and liquidated damages.

STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is
genuine if the facts and evidence are such that a reasonable juror could return a verdict for

either party. Id. All facts and reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant. Id.
A movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a dispute of
material fact warranting summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322–23 (1986). If the movant carries this burden, the nonmovant must then go beyond the

pleadings and “set forth specific facts” that would be admissible in evidence and that show
a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. “To
accomplish this, the facts must be identified by reference to affidavits, deposition
transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated therein.” Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144
F.3d 664, 671 (10th Cir. 1998); see FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

“Cross-motions for summary judgment are treated as two individual motions for
summary judgment and held to the same standard, with each motion viewed in the light
most favorable to its nonmoving party.” Banner Bank v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 916 F.3d
1323, 1326 (10th Cir. 2019). When the parties file cross motions for summary judgment,
the Court is entitled to assume “‘no evidence needs to be considered other than that filed
by the parties.’” Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138,

1148 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Whispering Pines is a bed and breakfast in Norman, Oklahoma. Rany Kchao is the
general manager and part-owner together with his wife, Thavory Kchao, of Whispering
Pines. The Kchaos’ residence is on the same property as the bed and breakfast, and multiple
Kchao family members both lived at the residence and worked at Whispering Pines. As
general manager, Mr. Kchao’s duties included establishing employment policies and
procedures, hiring and firing staff, setting employee rates of pay, handling employee time
records, and communicating with Whispering Pines’ accountants regarding payroll. Mr.
Kchao represented Whispering Pines during DOL's investigation and provided information

regarding pay practices and recordkeeping.
Beginning in March 2017, DOL investigated Whispering Pines’ compliance with
the FLSA's requirements regarding minimum wages, overtime compensation, and
recordkeeping. Cheryl Masters, an investigator from DOL's Wage and Hour Division,
visited Whispering Pines, made written requests for payroll and time records,

communicated with Mr. Kchao regarding requested documents, and interviewed
Whispering Pines managers and employees.
Defendants' employees handled goods that had been moved in interstate commerce,
including imported food, wine, and beer, Post-It notes from Kentucky, and artificial
sweetener from Virginia. Whispering Pines had an annual gross sales volume less than
$500,000 in 2014 but more than $500,000 in 2015, so Masters used the rolling quarters
methodology set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 779.266(b). Masters calculated the gross sales from

the four quarters immediately preceding the final quarter in 2015, and that total exceeded
$500,000. She thus determined that Defendants were covered by the FLSA beginning on
October 1, 2015. Defendants dispute Masters’ calculations and argue they were not covered
by the FLSA until July 1, 2016.
In her investigation, Masters learned that Defendants paid Kchao family members
that worked at Whispering Pines on a salary basis. Defendants kept no records of the hours

these relative employees worked. Masters learned Defendants also followed these practices
in regard to one non-relative employee, At Toem, who had recently immigrated to the
United States from Cambodia, the Kchaos’ native country. The Kchaos agreed to sponsor
Toem’s immigration visa, and Toem lived with the Kchaos. Toem also shared meals with
the Kchaos.

Toem started working at Whispering Pines in May 2015. From October 1, 20152 to
November 8, 2015, Defendants paid her a bi-weekly salary of $450, and from November
9, 2015 to June 10, 2016, her final thirty-one weeks working for Defendants, they paid her
a bi-weekly salary of $500. Defendants admit they did not make, keep, or maintain time
records for Toem, and although the Kchaos provided Toem lodging and food, the

Defendants kept no record of deductions from Toem’s wages for such expenses. Their
explanation for this is that they considered Toem family and treated her the same as the

2 This is the date range relevant here because DOL asserts that it can establish Defendants were
covered by the FLSA starting the final quarter of 2015.
Kchao family employees. Since there were no time records, Masters reconstructed Toem’s
average hours worked per week. Based on employee and management interviews, Masters

estimated that Toem worked an average of 92.5 hours per week. Defendants deny that
Toem worked more than 40 hours in any week she was employed.
Defendants paid all other non-family employees on an hourly basis, and they kept
time records for the work performed by these employees. But based on the employee and
manager interviews, Masters determined some time records were inaccurate, particularly
the time records for employee Desiree Matthews. Masters estimated that Matthews, a

former employee who worked at Whispering Pines for three months in 2016, worked more
hours than her timesheets indicated.3 Masters reconstructed Matthews’ workweeks and
estimated the number of hours she worked each week. Defendants deny that Matthews
worked more than 40 hours in any week she was employed.
Based on these reconstructed and estimated workweek hours, Masters calculated the

amount of backpay due to Toem and Matthews for FLSA minimum wage and overtime
compensation violations using the methods described in her affidavit. According to
Masters, Defendants owe Toem a total of $22,763.70 and Matthews a total of $1,770.38 in
back wages.
On May 24, 2016, the parties entered a tolling agreement that prevented the statute

of limitations from running on any FLSA claim that accrued after October 1, 2014 until
120 days after the agreement was terminated. Either party could terminate the agreement

3 Matthews was responsible for filling out her own timecards. Masters asserts that Defendants told
Matthews to clock out while she was still working. Defendants deny doing this.
at any time, and Plaintiff terminated it on April 19, 2018. Plaintiff filed his complaint in
this matter on August 21, 2018.

On October 30, 2018, Defendants and Thavory Kchao brought a defamation action
against Toem and another former employee, Beverly Marlow, in an Oklahoma state court.
They alleged that Toem and Marlow made false and misleading statements to federal
investigators that resulted in a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigation of the
Kchaos, including an investigation for human trafficking and forced adoption (regarding a
child born to Toem). The Defendants contended that the negative publicity resulting from

the investigation resulted in lost revenues and reputational damages. On November 19,
2020, the Oklahoma state court entered summary judgment in favor of Toem and Marlow
and dismissed Defendants’ claims against them. The court determined that the former
employees’ statements were subject to an absolute privilege provided by state law and that
they were thus immune from a defamation suit.

DISCUSSION
A. FLSA Liability
Defendants are both employers. The FLSA imposes duties on employers with
respect to compensation of employees engaged in commerce or employed by an enterprise
engaged in commerce. In relevant part, an “employer” as defined by FLSA “includes any
person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an
employee.” See 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). As the entity that employed Toem and Matthews,

Whispering Pines plainly was their employer. The undisputed facts also establish that Mr.
Kchao acted in the interest of an employer in relation to Whispering Pines' employees. See,
e.g., Chao v. Hotel Oasis, Inc., 493 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2007) (“corporate officer
principally in charge of directing employment practices, such as hiring and firing

employees, requiring employees to attend meetings unpaid, and setting employees' wages
and schedules” and “thus instrumental in ‘causing’ the corporation to violate the FLSA”
was personally liable for violations). The Court finds that Defendants were both
“employers” of Whispering Pines' employees, and thus, both Defendants are potentially
liable for FLSA violations that occurred in the operation of Whispering Pines.
As a threshold element to its claims, Plaintiff must establish that the Defendants

were covered by the FLSA as an enterprise engaged in commerce. An
“enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce” means an
enterprise that:
(i) has employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce, or that has employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on
goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by
any person; and

(ii) is an enterprise whose annual gross volume of sales made or business
done is not less than $500,000 (exclusive of excise taxes at the retail level
that are separately stated).

29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(i) and (ii).
Defendants contend that they do not qualify under these provisions because,
according to them, Whispering Pines did not have an annual gross income of $500,000
until July 1, 2016, after Toem’s employment ended.4 They argue that taxes should not have

4 Even if this is accurate, Defendants would qualify as an enterprise engaged in commerce at least
one month before Matthews’ employment ended.
been included in the calculations and that since § 203(m)(2)(B) prohibits employers from
keeping tips received by employees, tips should not have been included in the calculation

either. But Department of Labor regulations provide that gross annual volume should be
calculated based on the price a customer actually paid for the relevant good or service,
which would include tips paid to employees. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 779.258, 779.259(a). The
tips were thus appropriately included in the calculations.
Therefore, Plaintiff has established that, at least as of January 1, 2016, Defendants
were an enterprise engaged in commerce under the FLSA. Even if the calculations

excluded taxes paid by Whispering Pines, they would still show a total volume of sales
exceeding $500,000 for 2015. See [Doc. No. 58-9 at p. 12]. Enterprise coverage would thus
be established as of January 1, 2016. By showing tips were properly included in the
calculations, Plaintiff has successfully established enterprise coverage at least five months
before Toem’s employment ended and seven months before Matthews’ employment

ended.
Plaintiff, nevertheless, asserts it can establish enterprise coverage as of October 1,
2015. Plaintiff appears to concede that the inclusion of taxes in the calculation is necessary
to reach the threshold income amount for Defendants to have been covered as of October
1, 2015. But neither Plaintiff nor Defendants have met their burdens on summary judgment

to succeed on the issue of whether the taxes paid by Whispering Pines should have been
included in the gross income calculations. “[E]xcise taxes which (a) are levied at the retail
level and (b) are separately stated and identified in the charge to the customer at the time
of sale need not be included in the calculation of the gross or dollar volume of sales.” 29
C.F.R. § 779.261. Defendants have not provided evidence beyond their own internal Profit
and Loss Sheets that shows Whispering Pines paid taxes to any taxing authority, nor have

they provided evidence showing such taxes were separately stated as required in 29 C.F.R.
§ 779.264. The evidence they do provide is insufficient to show the calculations were
erroneous as a matter of law. But it is sufficient, however, to show a genuine dispute of
material fact to prevent Plaintiff from succeeding on summary judgment regarding this
issue. Proof of enterprise coverage—including Defendants’ annual gross income—is an
element of Plaintiff’s cause of action that must be proved to the finder of fact.

B. Timeliness of Plaintiff’s Claims
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s FLSA claims are time-barred under the statute of
limitations because Plaintiff filed his claims beyond the time allowed under the tolling
agreement entered by the parties. Under 29 U.S.C. § 255(a), a FLSA claim accrues when

the employer fails to pay the required compensation. See 29 C.F.R. § 790.21(b). Toem
worked for Defendants from May 2015 through June 2016, and Matthews worked for
Defendants from May 2016 through July 2016. The applicable statute of limitations
depends on whether Defendants’ FLSA violations were willful. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). If so,
a three-year limitation applies, but if not, a two-year limitation applies. Id. The Court need
not resolve the issue of willfulness to determine whether Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred

because Plaintiff complied with a valid tolling agreement and brought its cause of action
within either limitation period.
On May 24, 2016, the parties entered a tolling agreement. For purposes of
computing the time limit in § 255(a), the agreement excluded the period from October 1,
2014 through 120 days5 following the sending of a notice to terminate the tolling
agreement. Either party could terminate the agreement at any time, and Plaintiff terminated

it on April 19, 2018. The limitations period for Plaintiff’s claims thus did not start running
until August 18, 2018, 120 days after Plaintiff’s notice to terminate the tolling agreement.
Defendants argue the tolling agreement required Plaintiff to bring his cause of action
before the expiration of the 120-day period. To support this reading, Defendants point to
the notice of termination and assert that Plaintiff stated he was required to file his complaint
within 120 days of the notice. [Doc. No. 51 at pp. 9–10]. Nothing in the notice supports

that contention; Plaintiff stated he would file his complaint after the notice of termination
period. [Doc. No. 51-13]. By the plain language of the tolling agreement, the tolled
period—October 1, 2014 to August 17, 2018—is not included in computing the time
limited by the statute of limitations. Therefore, the limitations period in § 255 did not begin
to run until August 18, 2018. Plaintiff filed this suit three days later, on August 21, 2018,

which was clearly within both limitations periods provided in § 255(a).
Defendants argue that this reading of the tolling agreement is unreasonable as it
would give Plaintiff unlimited time to investigate Defendants and file FLSA claims. [Doc.
No. 51 at p. 11–12]. But the tolling agreement afforded both parties the right to terminate
it by providing a notice of termination. Defendants could have terminated the agreement at

any time, and the statute of limitations would have started running on Plaintiff’s claims.

5 The tolling agreement included inconsistent time periods for the tolling of the statute of
limitations after the agreement was terminated. One provision stated 90 days, but a different
provision stated 120 days. The parties’ agreed to follow the 120-day period.
This is not an indefinite tolling agreement because Defendants had the power to end it. As
such, the Court finds Plaintiff’s FLSA claims are timely.

C. Admissibility of Masters’ Wage Calculations
Defendants argue Masters' wage calculations must be stricken because, in making
them, she relied on anonymous employee statements, which Defendants contend are
hearsay, and not her personal knowledge. But these statements are not hearsay pursuant to
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) because Plaintiff offers them against Defendants and they were

made by Defendants' own employees on matters like wages and working hours, which are
within the scope of the employee-employer relationship while it existed. An affidavit used
in support of, or opposition to, a summary judgment motion must conform to the
requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). Facts set forth in an affidavit may be considered so
long as they may ultimately be presented at trial in an admissible form. Statements of

employees that meet the requirements of FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) could be admitted at
trial. These anonymous employee statements accordingly constitute evidence in a form that
would be admissible at trial as they are not hearsay. See Scalia v. Ghosn, 451 F. Supp. 3d
1215, 1220–21 (W.D. Okla. 2020).
Defendants further challenge Plaintiff’s invocation of the informer's privilege,

which protects the identities of the anonymous employees. The employees interviewed by
Masters and referenced in her affidavit are anonymous because Plaintiff has asserted his
informer's privilege, which allows him “to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons
who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that
law” to further and protect “the public interest in effective law enforcement.” Roviaro v.
United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957). This privilege “protect[s] employees who cooperate
with the Department of Labor in investigations about FLSA violations.” Brock v.

Gingerbread House, Inc., 907 F.2d 115, 117 (10th Cir. 1989). “The privilege is qualified.
The interest of the government in protecting its sources must be weighed against the
defendants' need for the information.” Usery v. Ritter, 547 F.2d 528, 531 (10th Cir. 1977).
Thus, “[w]here the disclosure of an informer's identity . . . is essential to a fair
determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.” Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60–61.
Prior to their response to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, Defendants did

not challenge Plaintiff’s assertion of the privilege, and they never moved the Court to
compel disclosure of Masters’ interview records. Based on the summary judgment motions
and the arguments therein, the Court is unable to weigh the parties’ respective interests and
determine whether disclosure is warranted. Typically, such balancing requires an in camera
review. See United States v. Moralez, 908 F.2d 565, 569 (10th Cir. 1990). The Court thus

cannot rule on whether the informer privilege is improperly asserted on the current record.
D. FLSA Violation
Both Plaintiff and Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s FLSA
minimum wage and overtime violation claims regarding Toem, but only Plaintiff moves

for summary judgment for the FLSA claims regarding Matthews.
1. Wage Deductions
Defendants assert that Plaintiff cannot succeed on his FLSA claims regarding Toem
because the wages it paid her—including room, board, and other facilities provided to
her—were sufficient under the FLSA. Plaintiff asserts that since Defendants did not follow
the FLSA’s requirements for claiming credits for room, board, and other facilities, they are
not entitled to credit these items toward Toem’s wages now. Defendants kept no

contemporaneous record of any addition to or deduction from Toem’s wages for lodging
and meal expenses. Instead, they attempted to provide, well after Toem’s employment
ended, an estimate of the total food and housing expenses they incurred because they were
housing and feeding Toem. FLSA implementing regulations provide that
an employer who makes deductions from the wages of employees for board,
lodging, or other facilities . . . furnished to them by the employer or by an
affiliated person, or who furnishes such board, lodging, or other facilities to
employees as an addition to wages, shall maintain and preserve records
substantiating the cost of furnishing each class of facility . . . .

29 C.F.R. § 516.27(a) (internal quotations omitted). Further. If those deductions “result in
the employee receiving less in cash than the applicable minimum hourly wage,” the
employer must maintain records showing those deductions “on a workweek basis.” Id.
(b)(1). The undisputed evidence shows that Defendants provided no records showing
deductions to Toem’s wages for lodging and meal expenses. As such, they may not claim
those credits now. See Donovan v. I & J, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 93, 109 (D.N.M. 1983) (“An
employer seeking a § 203(m) wage deduction has the obligation, under the regulations, to
keep records concerning the costs.”).
2. Minimum Wage and Overtime Violations
Plaintiff asserts that the uncontroverted evidence establishes that, as a matter of law,
Defendants violated the minimum wage and overtime requirements of the FLSA. Under
the FLSA, employers must pay non-exempt employees at least $7.25 per hour. 29 U.S.C.
§ 206. The FLSA further requires employers to pay a rate not less than one and one-half
times the regular rate for an employee’s workweek hours in excess of forty. § 207. Section
213 lists exemptions to those requirements, but they do not apply in this case.6

Defendants argue that they did not violate these provisions in regard to Toem
because they reached an agreement with her under 29 C.F.R. § 785.23 that should be
recognized and accepted by the Court. Section 785.23 allows employers to enter an
agreement with an employee regarding how to determine the number of hours the employee
works; it is applicable when the employee resides on the employer’s premises, making it
“difficult to determine the exact hours worked.” Id. Only “reasonable agreement[s]” that

“take[] into consideration all of the pertinent facts” are authorized in § 785.23. These
agreements are not an exemption from the overtime requirements of the FLSA; instead,
they should provide a method for counting the number of hours the employee works. See
Braziel v. Tobosa Developmental Servs., 166 F.3d 1061, 1063 (10th Cir. 1999); see also
Brigham v. Eugene Water & Elec. Bd., 357 F.3d 931, 942 (9th Cir. 2004).

Here, Defendants assert such an agreement existed: “Toem would work in exchange
for her salary.” [Doc. No. 58 at 32]. It is Defendants’ burden to prove this agreement was
reasonable under § 785.23. Clearly Toem agreed to work in return for her salary, but
Defendants offer no evidence that would suggest this agreement took into consideration all
pertinent facts, such as a method for how to calculate how many hours Toem actually

6 Although Defendants believed Toem was exempt from the FLSA because they provided her food
and housing and treated her as family, there is no exception to the FLSA’s minimum wage and
overtime requirements for family members. Plaintiff points out that, as a policy matter, the Wage
and Hour Division at the DOL does not supervise payment of back wages to an employer’s family
members unless the family member has stated a desire for payment of back wages due.
worked or her overtime compensation. The Court finds Defendants’ asserted agreement
legally and factually deficient, and it will not be considered in resolution of either party’s

motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff bears the burden to prove the amounts of unpaid back pay and overtime
compensation due to employees during the relevant time period. Where an employer fails
to keep adequate or accurate records of employees' work hours, however, Plaintiff can
satisfy this burden by proving that employees “performed work for which [they were]
improperly compensated” and by “produc[ing] sufficient evidence to show the amount and

extent of that work as a matter of just and reasonable inference.” Anderson v. Mt. Clemens
Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946); see Baker v. Barnard Constr. Co., 146 F.3d 1214,
1220 (10th Cir. 1998); Donovan v. Simmons Petroleum Corp., 725 F.2d 83, 85-86 (10th
Cir. 1983). Once the plaintiff satisfies that burden, “[t]he burden then shifts to the employer
to come forward with evidence of the precise amount of work performed or with evidence

to negative the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the employee's evidence.”
Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 687-88.
For the minimum wage and overtime claims as to Toem, Plaintiff has satisfied the
first prong of the analysis under Mt. Clemens by showing Toem performed work for which
she was not properly compensated and producing evidence of the approximate amount due

for uncompensated work by Toem as a matter of reasonable inference. Defendants are thus
not entitled to summary judgment on these claims.
But Defendants meet their burden by producing evidence to negate the
reasonableness of that inference. Defendants contest Masters’ reconstruction of the weekly
average of hours Toem worked. They point to two depositions of Toem, one from a
separate lawsuit7 and another from this suit. Toem testified that she usually finished work

on Sundays around 3:00 p.m. because the restaurant was closed, but Masters’ calculation
estimates that Toem worked until 11:00 p.m. on those days. Further, Toem gave unclear
testimony on when she typically finished working on other days. She stated she usually
went home around 9:00 p.m., but she also explained that, depending on how busy the day
was, she would complete her work at 8:00 p.m., 9:00 p.m., or even midnight. Masters
estimated that, on average, Toem worked until 11:00 p.m. every day except Mondays.

Though the Defendants provide no evidence of the precise amount of work performed by
Toem, they do identify inconsistencies between Toem’s testimony and Masters’
calculations. They, therefore, raise genuine disputes of material fact that preclude summary
judgment on the issue of backpay owed to Toem.
The minimum wage and overtime claims as to Matthews require the resolution of

factual disputes, precluding summary judgment. First, Defendants deny Matthews’
timecards are inaccurate. Second, Masters asserts that on some days Defendants told
Matthews not to clock in or told her to clock out before she was finished working. But
Defendants deny directing Matthews to clock out before she was finished working. The

7 Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is based on that suit, which was brought by the defendants in this case
against Toem and Marlow in an Oklahoma state court. Plaintiff points out that Defendants never
produced a copy of the transcript from Toem’s deposition in that state court action. Plaintiff does
not explicitly ask the Court to disregard the testimony from that deposition, and the Court will
consider the deposition in ruling on the instant motions. The Court notes that most of the transcript
is available in the parties’ summary judgment motion exhibits filed in state court months before
summary judgment motions were filed in this case.
conflicting testimony presents questions for the trier of fact. The Court is thus unable to
decide that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff showed Matthews performed work for which she

was not properly compensated.
Since Plaintiff has not proved that Defendants violated the FLSA, the Court must,
necessarily, deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liquidated
damages.

3. Recordkeeping Requirements
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated the FLSA’s recordkeeping requirements
as a matter of law. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) sets forth the FLSA recordkeeping requirements. It
requires employers to keep and preserve records pertaining to its employees' “wages, hours,
and other conditions and practices of employment[.]” See 29 U.S.C. § 211(c). Pursuant to
29 U.S.C. § 217, the Secretary of Labor has authority to commence injunction proceedings

against an employer suspected of violating any of the requirements referenced in Section
215. This includes recordkeeping violations under Section 211(c). See 29 U.S.C. §
215(a)(5).
Defendants admit they did not keep individualized time records for Toem. [Doc.
No. 58 at p. 4]. They also kept no record of deductions from Toem’s wages for meals and
lodging. These omissions are sufficient to establish that Defendants violated the

recordkeeping requirements of the FLSA as a matter of law.
E. Retaliation
Under the familiar burden-shifting analysis applicable to retaliation claims under 29
U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by showing:
(1) he or she engaged in activity protected by the FLSA; (2) he or she suffered
adverse action by the employer subsequent to or contemporaneous with such
employee activity; and (3) a causal connection existed between the
employee's activity and the employer's adverse action.

Conner v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1394 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Pacheco
v. Whiting Farms, Inc., 365 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2004). If a prima facie case is
established, “the burden of production shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate non-
retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Pacheco, 365 F.3d at 1206. Once
the employer produces evidence that would dispel the inference of retaliation, “the burden
shifts back to the employee to show genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether
the employer's proffered reason is unworthy of credence.” Id. at 1207.
The undisputed facts establish that Toem and Marlow engaged in activity protected
by the FLSA when they gave statements to federal investigators to assist in DOL and FBI
investigations. Plaintiff can establish the remaining prima facie elements by showing
Defendants’ defamation suit (1) lacked a reasonable basis in fact or in law and (2) was filed

for a retaliatory motive. Martin v. Gingerbread House, Inc., 977 F.2d 1405, 1406-07 (10th
Cir. 1992).
Defendants filed a defamation action in state court, alleging that Toem and Marlow
made false statements that caused a law enforcement search of their business, negative
press coverage, and a loss of revenue. Plaintiff asserts that the defamation suit was baseless
because Toem’s and Marlow’s statements were subject to an absolute privilege and
because the claims may have been time-barred. The state court granted Toem’s and

Marlow’s summary judgment motion and dismissed the case based on the state privilege;
the court did not discuss the statute of limitations issue.
The parties argued the absolute privilege issue twice to the state court—first upon a
motion to dismiss and, second, on summary judgment. Toem and Marlow continually
asserted that Defendants could not maintain a defamation suit because their statements
were made preliminary to or during judicial proceedings and were thus privileged under

Kierschstein v. Haynes, 788 P.2d 941 (Okla. 1990). The court nevertheless denied Toem’s
and Marlow’s motion to dismiss. But on summary judgment, the court held that the
privilege covered Toem’s and Marlow’s statements. [Doc. No. 52-25 at p. 1]. It dismissed
Defendants’ claims against Toem and Marlow and certified the case for appeal. The case
remains pending before the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals.

Having examined Defendants’ state action, the Court has determined that the
defamation claims against Toem and Marlow, while unable to survive summary judgment,
were not so unsupported that the Court can label them baseless. Although the state court
ultimately dismissed the claims by applying the Kierschstein privilege, Defendants
legitimately attempted to establish their claims for relief, which were not based on an

“indisputably meritless legal theory.” Jones v. Addictive Behav. Change Health Grp., LLC,
364 F. Supp. 3d 1257, 1269 (D. Kan. 2019). Plaintiff therefore cannot establish the
remaining prima facie elements of the FLSA retaliation claim. Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on the retaliation claim.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court finds that genuine disputes of material facts preclude
summary judgment, in favor of either party, on Plaintiff's FLSA minimum wage and
overtime violation claims. The Court further finds that Plaintiff is entitled to summary
judgment on his FLSA recordkeeping requirements violation claim. Finally, the Court
finds Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's FLSA retaliation claim.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [Doc. No. 51] is GRANTED IN PART, as set forth herein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
[Doc. No. 52] is GRANTED IN PART, as set forth herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 30" day of September, 2021.

\
yO Oy
TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI
Chief United States District Judge

20

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10389179. Public record. Not legal advice.
