# Taylor v. Comanche County Detention Center

> District Court, W.D. Oklahoma · November 25, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10388533

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** November 25, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10388533

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that evidence including “at least one prior attack at the jail” was sufficient to show the existence of a substantial risk of harm due to understaffing and insufficient monitoring of inmates
- finding that sheriff was on notice when he admitted that he had been aware of deficiencies in jail staffing and surveillance and had tried to correct them but had not been provided adequate funding to do so

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

JEFFREY ALLEN TAYLOR, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-18-55-G
)
COMANCHE COUNTY )
FACILITIES AUTHORITY et al., )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER
Plaintiff Jeffrey Allen Taylor brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
that, while he was a pretrial detainee at the Comanche County Detention Center (“CCDC”),
Defendants1 violated his constitutional rights by failing to protect him from being assaulted
by another inmate. This matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Suzanne
Mitchell in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
On March 9, 2020, Judge Mitchell issued a Report and Recommendation (“R. &
R.,” Doc. No. 65) in which she recommended that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 54) be granted.2 Plaintiff submitted an Objection (Doc. No. 76)3 to
the findings and conclusions of the R. & R., to which Defendants replied (Doc. No. 81).

1 The defendants are Comanche County Facilities Authority (“CCFA”) and William
Hobbs, both individually and in his official capacity as the Administrator of CCDC. See
Am. Compl. (Doc. No. 18) ¶ 1; Pl.’s Stip. (Doc. No. 19).
2 Plaintiff filed a Response to that Motion (Doc. No. 57), to which Defendants replied (Doc.
No. 60).
3 Although Plaintiff’s Objection fails to comply with the Local Civil Rules, the Court has
considered the document as though properly filed. See LCvR 5.2(a), 7.1(d), 7.1(e).
Pursuant to governing authority, the Court reviews de novo the portions of the R. & R. to
which specific objections have been made. See United States v. 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d
1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Having

conducted this de novo review, the Court finds as follows.
I. Background
As outlined in the R. & R., Plaintiff’s claims arise from an attack he suffered on
June 8, 2017, when Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee housed at CCDC. In the incident, an
inmate named Gregg Stanga attacked Plaintiff from behind while Plaintiff was picking up

food trays in Mr. Stanga’s jail pod in the course of Plaintiff’s jail-trustee duties. Mr. Stanga
stabbed Plaintiff in the neck with a metal shank, and the two struggled on the floor for
about 90 seconds. A CCDC officer who was present called for backup and ordered the
other inmates to lock down but did not physically intervene. Two other CCDC officers
eventually came to assist. Plaintiff sustained a broken leg, as well as a puncture wound in

his neck, and left the pod in a wheelchair.
In the R. & R., Judge Mitchell addressed relevant facts, Plaintiff’s allegations, and
the applicable standards of review. Judge Mitchell concluded that Defendant Hobbs was
entitled to summary judgment on the failure-to-protect claim raised against him in his
individual capacity as a supervisor at CCDC because Plaintiff had failed to show an

“affirmative link” between the attack and any action or inaction of Defendant Hobbs. See
R. & R. at 8-12; see also Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1248-49 (10th Cir. 2015). Judge
Mitchell also determined that Defendant Hobbs was entitled to qualified immunity on this
individual-capacity claim. See R. & R. at 12-13; Cox, 800 F.3d at 1246-47. As for the
claim against Defendant CCFA,4 Judge Mitchell found that Plaintiff had not shown “that
CCFA had any policy or custom that could provide a direct causal link [to] . . . Stanga’s
unexpected attack on Plaintiff.” R. & R. at 14. Accordingly, Judge Mitchell recommended

that summary judgment be granted to Defendants on all claims.
II. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is a means of testing in advance of trial whether the available
evidence would permit a reasonable jury to find in favor of the party asserting a claim. The
Court must grant summary judgment when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A party that moves for summary judgment has the burden of showing that the
undisputed material facts require judgment as a matter of law in its favor. Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). To defeat summary judgment, the nonmovant must
cite specific evidence sufficient to show that a genuine issue remains for trial. See Ezell v.

BNSF Ry. Co., 949 F.3d 1274, 1278 (10th Cir. 2020); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
Parties may establish the existence or nonexistence of a material disputed fact by:
• citing to “depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or

4 As referenced by Judge Mitchell, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Hobbs in his official
capacity as Administrator is duplicative of Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant CCFA. See
R. & R. at 2 n.2; Thompson v. Smith, No. CIV-08-255-FHS, 2009 WL 4912162, at *8 n.
11 (E.D. Okla. Dec. 11, 2009); see also Blueberry v. Comanche Cnty. Facilities Auth., 672
F. App’x 814, 816 (10th Cir. 2016) (describing the administrator as “the final policymaker
for the CCDC”). Accordingly, the Court refers to these collectively as a claim raised
against Defendant CCFA.
other materials” in the record; or
• demonstrating “that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible
evidence to support the fact.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). While the Court views the evidence and the inferences
drawn from the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, see Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Co. of Pittsburg, Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 431 F.3d 1241, 1255 (10th Cir. 2005), “[t]he
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant’s] position will be
insufficient; there must be evidence on which the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for
the [nonmovant].” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.

III. Section 1983 Claims and the Deliberate Indifference Standard
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured
by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Defendants challenge whether Plaintiff can show that, in acting

under color of law, Defendants “‘subject[ed]” Plaintiff, “or cause[d] [Plaintiff] to be
subjected,” “to a deprivation of his lawful rights.” Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1327
(10th Cir. 2010) (omission and internal quotation marks omitted).
Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the incident, “the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs.” Turner v. Okla. Cnty. Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs, 804 F. App’x 921, 925 (10th Cir. 2020) (citing Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960,
991 (10th Cir. 2019)). “In evaluating such Fourteenth Amendment claims, we apply an
analysis identical to that applied in Eighth Amendment cases.” Burke, 935 F.3d at 991
(internal quotation marks omitted).
“A prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to

an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994).
The “deliberate indifference standard has objective and subjective
components.” Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 2006).
“The objective component of deliberate indifference is met if the harm
suffered rises to a level sufficiently serious to be cognizable under the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause.” Burke, 935 F.3d at 992 (internal quotation
marks omitted). For the subjective component, the plaintiff must “show the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from harm, including
harm caused by other prisoners. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-
27, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). “To prevail on a failure to protect
claim, an inmate must show (1) that the conditions of his incarceration
present an objective substantial risk of serious harm and (2) prison officials
had subjective knowledge of the risk of harm, in other words, an official must
both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1214 (10th Cir. 2018) (brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct.
800, 202 L.Ed.2d 589 (2019).
Turner, 804 F. App’x at 925 (alterations omitted).
IV. Discussion
Plaintiff in his Objection largely repeats the arguments already raised and rejected
by Judge Mitchell in the R. & R. and does not challenge Judge Mitchell’s characterization
of the legal claims or the applicable standards of review. The Court herein addresses only
those objections that are “sufficiently specific” to preserve the relevant disputed issues for
de novo review. 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d at 1059; see also Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d
1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate
judge’s recommendation are deemed waived.”).
A. Plaintiff’s Individual-Capacity Claim Against Defendant Hobbs

Plaintiff argues that Defendant Hobbs should be held liable for Mr. Stanga’s attack
based upon Defendant Hobbs’ supervisory status at CCDC. Defendant Hobbs’ duties at
CCDC “include overseeing the hiring, training and management of Detention Officers and
maintaining the day-to-day operations of the CCDC.” Hobbs Decl. ¶ 4 (Doc. No. 54-3).
Defendant Hobbs cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat

superior. Rather, “[a] plaintiff arguing for the imposition of supervisory liability . . . must
show an ‘affirmative link’ between the supervisor and the constitutional violation. The
requisite showing of an ‘affirmative link’ . . . has come to have three related prongs: (1)
personal involvement, (2) sufficient causal connection, and (3) culpable state of mind.”
Cox, 800 F.3d at 1248 (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to
. . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through
the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”).
Plaintiff argues that this affirmative link between Defendant Hobbs and the attack
of June 8, 2017, can be established through two bases of liability. First, Plaintiff contends

that Defendant Hobbs should have been aware “of the increased risk of an incident”
between Plaintiff and Mr. Stanga as a result of events that had transpired between those
inmates, including a verbal exchange preceding the attack. Pl.’s Obj. at 13. Second,
Plaintiff contends that an affirmative link between Defendant Hobbs and the attack can be
shown from Defendant Hobbs’ “direct, actual ongoing knowledge of constitutional
deprivations” and ongoing facility and personnel deficiencies at CCDC. Id. at 10-12, 13-
20.

1. Substantial Risk to Plaintiff from Mr. Stanga
As to the first argument, Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant Hobbs knew of and
disregarded a “substantial risk of harm” related to or created by Mr. Stanga, as required to
establish Defendant Hobbs’ “culpable state of mind” and “establish a violation under the
subjective element of deliberate indifference.” Turner, 804 F. App’x at 926; Cox, 800 F.3d

at 1248 (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant Hobbs had not received any
complaint from Plaintiff, there had been no report to Defendant Hobbs of Mr. Stanga
“attack[ing] any other CCDC inmate or staff,” and Defendant Hobbs was not personally
involved in the June 2017 incident. Hobbs Decl. ¶¶ 9-10. Further, Plaintiff and Mr. Stanga
had lived in the same housing unit for a time and had not had any problems with each other

prior to June 8, 2017. Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 4 (Doc. No. 55-2); id. Ex. 5 (Doc. No. 55-3); Pl.’s
Dep. 160:11-13 (Doc. No. 54-2); see also id. at 160:14-15 (Plaintiff testifying that he was
“[v]ery” surprised when Mr. Stanga attacked him). Accordingly, “a reasonable jury could
not find that [Defendant Hobbs] was aware of facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed” to Plaintiff from Mr. Stanga “and that

[Defendant Hobbs] actually drew the inference.” Turner, 804 F. App’x at 926 (“[O]fficials
must possess enough details about a threat to enable them to conclude that it presents a
strong likelihood of injury, not a mere possibility.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
2. Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiff’s attempt to impose supervisory liability upon Defendant Hobbs in his
individual capacity based upon conditions of confinement at CCDC also fails. As noted in

the R. & R., Plaintiff attempts to prove this affirmative link by pointing to “allegedly
overcrowded conditions,” “the alleged presence of weapons in the facility,” “the alleged
lack of enough detention officers,” “the detention officers’ lack of better offensive
weapons,” “alleged insufficient training for detention officers,” and “the alleged existence
of a policy or custom to allow inmates to disobey rules.” R. & R. at 9 (citing Am. Compl.

¶ 13; Pl.’s Resp. at 22-23).
Judge Mitchell thoroughly addressed this argument, explaining how Plaintiff’s
contentions and evidence regarding the conditions at the jail and the detention officers’
training failed to show that “Defendant Hobbs was subjectively, deliberately indifferent.”
R. & R. at 10-12; see also Cox, 800 F.3d at 1248; Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185,

1195-96, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010) (“A plaintiff may . . . succeed in a § 1983 suit against a
defendant-supervisor by demonstrating . . . the defendant . . . acted with the state of mind
required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation.”). Plaintiff’s Objection does
not evince error in this finding, as it fails to point to any evidence proving that Defendant
Hobbs himself “drew the inference” that a substantial risk of serious harm from an inmate

attack existed by virtue of the conditions at CCDC at the time of the attack or “disregarded”
that excessive risk despite this awareness. Turner, 804 F. App’x at 926; see Tafoya v.
Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 916 (10th Cir. 2008) (“An official’s failure to alleviate a significant
risk of which he was unaware, no matter . . . how gross his negligence in failing to perceive
it, is not an infliction of punishment and therefore not a constitutional violation.”). The
fact that several other jail employees later testified, with little to no detail or documentary
support, as to overcrowding issues and previous inmate altercations does not show that

these conditions presented, in June 2017, such an “obvious” risk of “almost inevitabl[e]”
relevant constitutional harm that Defendant Hobbs’ personal knowledge can be inferred.
Tafoya, 516 F.3d at 916-17; Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d
760, 769 (10th Cir. 2013); see Pl.’s Obj. at 3; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (noting that such an
inference could be supported by “evidence showing that a substantial risk of inmate risks

was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented or expressly noted by prison officials in the
past” and “circumstances suggest[ing] that the defendant-official . . . ‘must have known’
about it” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756,
762 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that sheriff was on notice when he admitted that he had been
aware of deficiencies in jail staffing and surveillance and had tried to correct them but had

not been provided adequate funding to do so), abrogated on other grounds as recognized
in Brown v. Flowers, 974 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2020).
Having considered the parties’ arguments and the record evidence, the Court agrees
that because Plaintiff cannot show a genuine issue as to whether Defendant Hobbs acted
with a culpable state of mind, Plaintiff cannot show the requisite affirmative link to impose

liability upon Defendant Hobbs in his individual capacity based upon the alleged facility
conditions and staffing issues.
3. Qualified Immunity
Defendant Hobbs argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s
individual-capacity claim. “Qualified immunity protects officials from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Thomas v. Kaven,
765 F.3d 1183, 1194 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[W]hen a defendant asserts a qualified-immunity defense at summary
judgment, we require the plaintiff “to shoulder” a heavy two-part burden to
survive the defendant’s assertion. Cox, 800 F.3d at 1245. First, the plaintiff
must demonstrate on the facts alleged . . . that the defendant violated his [or
her] constitutional or statutory rights. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged unlawful
activity.
Perry v. Durborow, 892 F.3d 1116, 1120-21 (10th Cir. 2018) (omission and second
alteration in original) (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff’s Objection does not offer a reasoned challenge to Judge Mitchell’s finding
that Defendant Hobbs is entitled to qualified immunity, arguing only that Defendant Hobbs
was “ultimately responsible for the operation of the jail” and that Defendant Hobbs is “not
entitled to qualified immunity if [he] knew [he] [was] violating a person’s constitutional
rights.” Pl.’s Obj. at 20-21 (citing Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489 (10th Cir.
1990)). Even assuming the right was clearly established, however, as outlined above
Plaintiff cannot show on the record before the Court that Defendant Hobbs is liable in his
capacity as a supervisor for the alleged constitutional violation. Accordingly, Plaintiff has
failed to shoulder his summary-judgment burden, and Defendant Hobbs is entitled to
qualified immunity in his individual capacity. See Perry, 892 F.3d at 1120-21.
B. Plaintiff’s Municipal-Liability Claim Against Defendant CCFA
Plaintiff relies upon the same allegations of deficient conditions—“overcrowding,
insufficient and inadequate supervision of inmates, inadequate training, inadequate

treatment of detainees and risk of attack by inmates,” and “failure to secure inmates”—as
a basis for liability against CCFA.5 Am. Compl. ¶ 18; see Pl.’s Resp. at 29-34.
CCFA is a public trust that owns and operates CCDC. R. & R. at 2; see Am. Compl.
¶ 7; Order of Aug. 31, 2018 (Doc. No. 16) at 2-3. Such a governmental entity can be held
liable under § 1983 under a theory of municipal liability, but the plaintiff “must show that

‘the municipality itself caused the constitutional violation at issue.’” Blueberry, 672 F.
App’x at 816 (alteration omitted) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385
(1989)). The Tenth Circuit has “identified three elements to such a claim: ‘(1) official
policy or custom, (2) causation, and (3) state of mind.’” Id. (quoting Schneider, 717 F.3d
at 769).

In the R. & R., Judge Mitchell rejected Plaintiff’s municipal-liability claim based
upon a lack of evidence on the policy-or-custom element and did not address causation or
state of mind. See R. & R. at 14 (finding that “Plaintiff has provided no evidence that

5 Contrary to Defendants’ suggestion, there is no per se rule “requir[ing] individual officer
liability before a municipality can . . . be held liable for damages under Monell.” Thomas
v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 305 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Cordova v. City
of Albuquerque, No. Civ. 11-806-GBW/ACT, 2013 WL 12040727, at *4 (D.N.M. Feb. 22,
2013). Indeed, “municipal liability can exist if a jury finds that a constitutional injury is
due to a municipal policy, custom, or practice, but also finds that no officer is individually
liable for the violation.” Barnett v. MacArthur, 956 F.3d 1291, 1301 (11th Cir. 2020),
petition for cert. filed, No. 20-595 (U.S. Nov. 5, 2020); accord Garcia v. Salt Lake Cnty.,
768 F.2d 303, 310 (10th Cir. 1985).
CCFA had any policy or custom that could provide a direct causal link” between the
CCFA’s action or inaction “and Stanga’s unexpected attack on Plaintiff”). Having
considered Plaintiff’s objections de novo, see Pl.’s Obj. at 21-28, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has cited evidence sufficient to show a genuine fact issue as to each of the three
elements, such that summary judgment is not warranted on the municipal-liability claim.
1. Policy or Custom
As outlined by the Tenth Circuit, “[a]n official policy or custom may take many
forms, including ‘a formally promulgated policy, a well-settled custom or practice, a final

decision by a municipal policymaker, or deliberately indifferent training or supervision.’”
Blueberry, 672 F. App’x at 816-17 (quoting Schneider, 717 F.3d at 770).
Plaintiff contends that CCDC was overcrowded and understaffed at the time of
Plaintiff’s assault, that there were blind spots in the facility’s camera monitoring system,
and that inmates routinely ignored rules and commands without meaningful consequences.

Plaintiff submits a report by John Boren, who is identified as an expert in “police and
corrections practices.” See Boren R. (Doc. No. 57-6) at 6. Mr. Boren states that CCDC is
designed to house 283 inmates but that a February 2017 inspection performed by the
Oklahoma Department of Health recorded an inmate population of 322. See id. at 15;
accord Orr Dep. 22:4-23 (Doc. No. 57-4). Detention Officers Isaiah Orr and Matthew

Crow likewise testified that overcrowding had been observed at CCDC in the months and
weeks leading up to Plaintiff’s assault. See Orr Dep. 22:4-23, 47:9-21; Crow Dep. 66:17-
67:6 (Doc. No. 57-3).
There is also evidence indicating that CCDC—and, more specifically, Pod 254, in
which Mr. Stanga attacked Plaintiff—was overcrowded on the day of the attack. For
instance, the pertinent video footage shows a sleeping bunk in the “general area” of Pod

254, which, Mr. Boren explains, is an “unmistakable indicator of over population.” Boren
R. at 15; see Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 10 (Surveillance Video (Doc. No. 56) (conventionally filed)
(reflecting a futon-type sleeping bunk and bedding situated on the floor of the small
common area, with inmates seated at the tables and also on the steps of the staircase)).
Another indicator of overpopulation, according to Mr. Boren, was Mr. Stanga’s ability to

smuggle a piece of metal into his cell and use it to fashion a weapon without detection. See
Boren R. at 12. This, he explains, is because overpopulation diminishes the “[q]uality and
regular scheduling of cell/facility searches and personal searches,” which are the “main
tactic[s]” used to control the influx and possession of contraband. Id. (emphasis omitted);
see also Crow Dep. 57:10-58:15 (testifying that no metal is allowed to inmates at CCDC

and admitting that the metal shank used to attack Plaintiff should have been detected and
confiscated through regular pat-downs and searches).
Plaintiff also presents evidence through Mr. Boren that CCDC staffing levels were
insufficient to maintain a reasonably safe environment for inmates. Mr. Boren states that
“[n]ormal staffing for a shift would be approximately (10) ten [detention] officers,” Boren

R. at 11, but on the morning of Plaintiff’s assault, there were only six detention officers on
duty, see id. Of these officers, one (Officer Krewko) was a “new hire” with less than two
days’ work experience, two were on “fixed duty/post” (meaning they “could not leave their
assigned post”), and one was serving as shift commander. Id. Thus, there were only two
detention officers on duty (Officers Ollison and Browders) with both roving capacity and
meaningful “inmate detention/supervision experience.” Id.; see also Crow Dep. 18:15-22
(discounting Officer Krewko’s ability to aid in preventing or stopping the assault based on

his lack of experience). One of those officers (Officer Ollison) was present at the onset of
the assault, but he was neither equipped with nor qualified to use OC spray (i.e., “pepper
spray”) or a taser gun. Boren R. at 11; see also Orr Dep. 55:22-56:12; R. & R. at 11.
Based on the foregoing, a jury could reasonably conclude that at the time of the
attack, CCDC was overpopulated and understaffed—not only with respect to the raw

number of officers on duty, but also with respect to the number of on-duty officers equipped
with and qualified to use nonlethal weapons—and that these conditions exposed inmates
to a greater risk of serious harm to inmate safety. See Savage v. Fallin, 663 F. App’x 588,
593 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[S]taffing that is insufficient to provide adequate security to inmates
and staff may . . . contribute to [an Eighth Amendment] violation.”); cf. Thompson v.

Lengerich, 798 F. App’x 204, 211 (10th Cir. 2019) (reversing dismissal of Eighth
Amendment claim based on allegations of overcrowding and understaffing where prisoner
alleged that “staff responses to inmate fights ha[d] been delayed, leaving inmates injured”).
With respect to inmate surveillance, Lieutenant Crow testified that there were “lot[s]
of blind spots” in CCDC’s video-camera monitoring system (i.e., areas that are not visible

to the facility’s master control) and that the existence and location of such blind spots were
common knowledge among CCDC staff and likely known to inmates as well. Crow Dep.
59:10-60:5. Officer Browders testified that one such blind spot was in the entryway of Pod
254. See Browders Dep. 40:22-25; see also Surveillance Video (indicating that Mr. Stanga
was hiding within this blind spot and waiting to jump on Plaintiff before their fight moved
into the center of the common area). A jury could reasonably conclude that the limited
nature of CCDC’s surveillance system, together with officials’ tolerance of camera blind

spots, increased the potential for and severity of inmate-on-inmate violence, thereby
exposing inmates to a substantial risk of serious harm. Cf. Blueberry, 672 F. App’x at 818
(affirming grant of summary judgment to CCFA where inmates made no showing that
CCFA was aware of the CCDC blind spots before the incidents alleged and CCFA installed
additional security cameras after the incidents were reported); Henderson v. Glanz, No. 12-

CV-68-JED-FHM, 2012 WL 5931546, at *1-2, *3-4 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 27, 2012) (denying
dismissal of a failure-to-protect claim where plaintiff alleged that prison officials had failed
to ensure that “known ‘blind spots’” “were adequately supervised and secured”).
Plaintiff has also submitted testimony supporting his assertion that Defendants
fostered a “culture of allowing inmates to . . . ignore small rule[s] or commands.” Pl.’s

Resp. at 7. Officer Browders testified that inmates were not punished for ignoring rules or
commands from detention officers and that officers often get “cussed out” by inmates when
they attempt to enforce rules. Browders Dep. 79:3-10, 91:10-17. Officer Crow similarly
testified that inmate disobedience is a daily occurrence at CCDC and that the inmates’
defiance is largely “tolerated” by CCDC staff and administration. Crow Dep. 43:8-44:4.

Relatedly, there is testimony in the record to the effect that physical fights between inmates
occurred with some degree of regularity at CCDC. Browders Dep. 48:15-49:23, 50:2-10;
Crow Dep. 53:16-54:4; see also Boren R. at 18 (stating that inmate violence is a “recurring
event” at CCDC). A jury could reasonably infer that such insubordination and violence is
attributable, at least in part, to the deficiencies summarized above, and that Plaintiff faced
a substantial risk of serious harm in a jail environment where inmates are permitted to flout
basic rules and commands. See Lopez, 172 F.3d at 761 (holding that evidence including

“at least one prior attack at the jail” was sufficient to show the existence of a substantial
risk of harm due to understaffing and insufficient monitoring of inmates).
2. Causation
To prove causation, Plaintiff must establish that the challenged policy or practice is
“closely related to the violation of the plaintiff's federally protected right.” Schneider, 717

F.3d at 770 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The causation element is applied with
especial rigor when the municipal policy or practice is itself not unconstitutional, for
example, when the municipal liability claim is based upon inadequate training, supervision,
and deficiencies in hiring.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
While a close question, the record when construed in Plaintiff’s favor reflects a

genuine dispute as to whether the conditions and customs cited above, and Defendant
CCFA’s failure to correct those deficiencies, were the moving force behind the alleged
violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Officer Browders testified that she witnessed a verbal altercation between Plaintiff
and Mr. Stanga on the morning of June 8, 2017, prior to the incident, but did not have an

opportunity to report it because she was summoned to another floor. Browders Dep. 27:19-
28:5. There is also testimony indicating that the attack could have been prevented by
locking down Pod 254 prior to a trustee distributing and collecting meal trays but that a
lockdown would have been impracticable due to the disproportionate inmate-to-officer
ratio. See Orr Dep. 30:17-31:10, 57:6-9; Browders Dep. 48:1-5, 78:24-79:15. The
evidence further reasonably supports a finding that understaffing, overpopulation, and/or
blind spots in the facility’s camera monitoring system furnished the occasion for Mr.

Stanga to smuggle another inmate’s knee brace into Pod 254 and use it to create an
improvised weapon. See Crow Dep. 59:10-60:5; Browders Dep. 40:22-25; Boren R. at 12.
From this testimony, a jury could reasonably infer that additional staffing at CCDC would
have enabled Officer Browders to report the altercation to her superior, allowing measures
to be taken to prevent further interaction between Plaintiff and Mr. Stanga, and that more

officers, fewer inmates, and better monitoring would have hindered Mr. Stanga’s ability to
plan and carry out the attack.
Mr. Boren opines that the attack could have been prevented if Officer Ollison had
been equipped with OC spray because “the mere presence of an officer equipped and
trained to deploy and properly use [OC] spray” is enough to deter inmates from engaging

in violent conduct. See Boren R. at 13 (emphasis omitted). Were a jury to credit Mr.
Boren’s opinion on this matter, it might reasonably conclude that the assault was “closely
related” to Defendant CCFA’s failure to equip its officers with OC spray or similar
nonlethal weapons. Schneider, 717 F.3d at 770. Officer Browders further testified that,
had Officer Ollison been equipped with (and trained to use) OC spray, he would have been

justified under the circumstances to deploy it in an effort to subdue Mr. Stanga and prevent
further harm to Plaintiff. Browders Dep. 45:23-46:17. Officer Browders also testified that
the presence of just one additional officer would have enabled her, along with Officers
Ollison and Krewko, to safely intervene in the assault. Id. at 63:12-24; cf. Lopez, 172 F.3d
at 761 (pointing to jailer’s testimony “that the jail was woefully understaffed” as support
for the plaintiff’s failure-to-protect claim premised upon inadequate conditions); Savage,
663 F. App’x at 592-93 (reversing dismissal of prisoner’s claim of “an unreasonable risk

of physical assault” where he alleged that “prison officials have made statements
acknowledging a link between staffing shortages and a high risk of prison violence”).
It is undisputed that, while the assault was in progress, some inmates in Pod 254
refused to comply with Officer Ollison’s order to lock down and return to their cells. See
Defs.’ Mot. at 11, 31; Pl.’s Resp. at 9; Surveillance Video (reflecting multiple inmates

milling about in the common area during and after the fight); see also Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 8
(Incident Report (Doc. No. 55-4) at 2). As noted above, Officer Browders and Officer
Crow testified regarding officers’ allowing of inmate disobedience and violation of facility
rules. See Browders Dep. 79:3-10, 91:10-17; Crow Dep. 43:8-44:4. Such testimony is
consistent with Plaintiff’s theory that such noncompliance is attributable to Defendant

CCFA’s “policy or custom of . . . allow[ing] inmates to get by with not following small
rules.” Pl.’s Resp. at 16; see also id. at 7.
Plaintiff therefore has identified sufficient evidence to create a material fact issue as
to whether conditions permitted by Defendant CCFA to exist at CCDC “set in motion a
series of events” that caused his constitutional injury. Schneider, 717 F.3d at 768 (internal

quotation marks omitted); see Winton v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Tulsa Cnty., 88 F. Supp. 2d
1247, 1268 (N.D. Okla. 2000) (“A jury could find that overcrowding, under-staffing, lack
of adequate inmate supervision, lack of inmate segregation and classification, lack of
inmate exercise time, dormitory-style housing, all of which existed over a long period of
time, were all de facto policies of inaction by the County which created and or contributed
to the conditions which created a serious risk of harm in the Jail.”).
3. State of Mind

With respect to state of mind, “to show that a facially lawful municipal action has
led an employee to violate a plaintiff’s rights, the plaintiff must show that the action was
taken with deliberate indifference as to its known or obvious consequences.” Blueberry,
672 F. App’x at 817 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Turner, 804 F. App’x at
925.

The deliberate indifference standard may be satisfied when the municipality
has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act is substantially
certain to result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously or
deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm. In most instances, notice
can be established by proving the existence of a pattern of tortious conduct.
In a narrow range of circumstances, however, deliberate indifference may be
found absent a pattern of unconstitutional behavior if a violation of federal
rights is a highly predictable or plainly obvious consequence of a
municipality’s action or inaction.
Schneider, 717 F.3d at 771 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
The record before the Court allows a reasonable inference that the alleged
conditions and attendant risks to inmate safety were known to CCDC staff and
administrators. See, e.g., Orr Dep. 22:4-23, 27:10-29:5, 48:9-25; Crow Dep. 48:4-7, 53:16-
54:4, 59:10-60:5, 66:17-67:6; Browders Dep. 40:22-25, 48:15-49:23, 50:2-10, 63:12-24,
78:9-17; Boren R. at 18. Based on this evidence, there is a genuine dispute as to whether
CCFA, as the entity responsible for operating the jail, knew about the complained-of
conditions (i.e., overcrowding, understaffing, insufficient camera monitoring, and
institutional tolerance of inmate disobedience), knew such conditions posed a substantial
risk of serious harm to inmates, and nonetheless neglected to take any ameliorative action.
Cf. Burke, 935 F.3d at 1000 (evidence showing defendant knew about, yet failed to correct,
deficiencies in medical care provided to inmates “would permit a reasonable jury to find

he was deliberately indifferent to the risk that poor care would result in [the plaintiff’s]
constitutional injury”).
Defendants, for their part, do not directly dispute the cited instances where CCDC
exceeded its inmate capacity or the CCDC officers’ testimony regarding the allegedly
deficient jail conditions, emphasizing instead that Plaintiff does not cite a specific incident

“similar to the attack on Plaintiff.” Defs.’ R. & R. Reply at 14, 18-19. Defendant Hobbs’
signed declaration is silent as to Plaintiff’s conditions-of-confinement allegations, instead
focusing upon the training protocols and written policies that apply to the facility, as well
as the training of the specific officers present at the incident. See Hobbs Decl. ¶¶ 5-8, 12.
But a governmental entity can be held liable for its actions and inaction (e.g., “permitting

conditions” that precipitate an inmate attack or failing “to adequately train and supervise
the detention officers on duty”) even if the entity’s official policy “is not unlawful on its
face.” Winton, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 1263; accord Schneider, 717 F.3d at 770. Nor do
Defendants contend that Defendant CCFA “tried to correct the deficiencies but was
hindered” by circumstances beyond its control, such as a lack of funding. Lopez, 172 F.3d

at 762 n.4 (noting that a sheriff could have possibly defeated individual liability for
unconstitutional jail conditions if he had shown “that monetary restraints . . . frustrated his
good faith efforts to correct the improper conditions”).
Considered in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence in the record is
sufficient to create a material fact issue as to whether Defendant CCFA was deliberately
indifferent to an excessive risk to inmate safety and to the obvious consequences of its
conduct in operating CCDC in this regard.

4. Conclusion
In sum, a jury could conclude from the evidence before the Court that Defendant
CCFA was or should have been aware of a significant risk of harm to inmate safety at
CCDC, that Defendant CCFA “failed to take reasonable steps to abate the risk,” and that
Defendant CCFA’s “policy of no or ineffective action was the moving force behind the

conditions which created the risk of harm in the first place.” Winton, 88 F. Supp. 2d at
1268-69; see also Lopez, 172 F.3d at 763-64. Defendant CCFA is therefore not entitled to
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s municipal-liability failure-to-protect claim.
C. Punitive Damages
Finally, Defendants seek summary judgment with respect to any claim by Plaintiff

to recover punitive damages against Defendant CCFA and Defendant Hobbs in his official
capacity. See Defs.’ Mot. at 37; Am. Compl. ¶ 15. The Court agrees that Plaintiff may not
recover punitive damages against these Defendants and grants summary judgment in that
regard. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (“[A]
municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).6

6 The Court notes that in a 2003 decision the Tenth Circuit found that the district court had
erred “in preventing the jury from considering the imposition of punitive damages” against
a government employee sued in her official capacity. Youren v. Tintic Sch. Dist., 343 F.3d
1296, 1309 (10th Cir. 2003). This aspect of Youren has not been overturned but has
repeatedly “been called into question by lower courts,” Estep v. City of Del City ex rel. Del
City Police Dep’t, No. CIV-17-625-M, 2018 WL 1598674, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 30,
CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined herein, the Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 65) is
ADOPTED IN PART and DECLINED IN PART. Specifically:
(1) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 54) is GRANTED with
respect to Plaintiff Jeffrey Allen Taylor’s failure-to-protect claim raised against
Defendant William Hobbs in his individual capacity and with respect to Plaintiff's
claim for punitive damages; and
(2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as to the failure-to-protect
claim raised against Defendant Comanche County Facilities Authority.
This matter is re-referred to Magistrate Judge Suzanne Mitchell for completion of
the remaining pretrial deadlines.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 25th day of November, 2020.

CHARLES B. GOODWIN
United States District Judge

2018), and by the Tenth Circuit itself. See Cross Continent Dev., LLC v. Town of Akron,
548 F. App’x 524, 531 (10th Cir. 2013) (characterizing Youren as “an anomalous outlier”
and reasoning that if “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be
treated as a suit against the entity, and a municipality is immune from punitive damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, then individuals sued in their official capacity should be immune
from punitive damages as well” (internal quotation marks omitted)). This Court and others
have dismissed redundant official-capacity claims on § 1983 suits despite Youren’s
anomalous holding. See, e.g., Morris v. Humphrey, No. CIV-14-497-W, 2014 WL
3451033, at *1 n.3 (W.D. Okla. July 11, 2014); Cooper v. Cagle, No. CIV-06-881-C, 2007
WL 2840385, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 27, 2007).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10388533. Public record. Not legal advice.