# Arndt v. Medicine Park City of

> District Court, W.D. Oklahoma · December 3, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10388053

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** December 3, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10388053

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that the state and its political subdivisions are “immune from tort liability to inmates . . . for the infinite numbers of 7 activities that are involved in prison operations”
- holding that a municipal police department is not an entity that could be sued because it lacks a legal identity apart from the municipality

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

CASSIE MARIE ARNDT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-18-206-D
)
CITY OF MEDICINE PARK, a political )
subdivision of the State of Oklahoma, )
et al., )
Defendants. )
ORDER
Defendants Comanche County Detention Center (the “CCDC”), William Hobbs, the
Board of County Commissioners of Comanche County (“Defendant Board”), and Kenny
Stradley (collectively the “Defendants”) bring before the Court a Renewed Motion to
Dismiss [Doc. No. 24] and brief in support. Plaintiff has filed a Response in opposition
[Doc. No. 30], to which Defendants have replied [Doc. No. 33]. This matter is fully briefed
and at issue.
BACKGROUND
A Medicine Park Police Officer effected a legal traffic stop on Plaintiff Cassie
Arndt, pulling her over for a speeding violation, on August 13, 2017. Complaint [Doc. No.
1], at 5. The officer processed Plaintiff’s information, and dispatch advised him of an
outstanding Stephens County arrest warrant for “Cassie Arndt.” Id. at 6. Relying on this
information and pursuant to that warrant, the officer arrested Plaintiff and transported her
to CCDC. Id. At CCDC, Plaintiff was processed and booked. Id. at 7. Ruth Art, a CCDC
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employee, showed Plaintiff a copy of the arrest warrant and allegedly realized Plaintiff was
not the same person named by the arrest warrant. Id. Art immediately informed her
lieutenant—herein referenced as John Doe 2. Id. John Doe 2 took no steps to investigate

Art’s conclusions and told Art to move forward with the booking process. Id. Another
lieutenant, John Doe 3, was also made aware of the discrepancy. Plaintiff was nonetheless
booked, forced to strip naked, and searched. Id. at 8. She was then confined in a cell for
approximately eighteen hours. Id. Eventually, Plaintiff was released, CCDC personnel
acknowledged there was no warrant out for her arrest, and Plaintiff was told her traffic

ticket would be dismissed. Id. At all relevant times, Defendant Hobbs served as Jail
Administrator and Defendant Stradley as Comanche County Sheriff.
The instant lawsuit was filed on March 7, 2018. Plaintiff alleges violations of her
constitutional rights under the federal and state constitutions, along with violations of state
law.

STANDARD OF DECISION
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain
enough facts that, when accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d
1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008). A claim has facial plausibility when the court can draw “the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. In § 1983 cases, it is particularly important “that the complaint make clear
exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair

2
notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her.” See Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1249–50
(emphasis in original); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1104 (10th Cir.
2009).

DISCUSSION
I. CCDC is not a legal entity subject to suit, and therefore all claims against
it are dismissed as a matter of law.
Defendants’ motion first asserts that, under Oklahoma law, CCDC is not a legal
entity subject to suit, and therefore, all claims asserted against it should be dismissed.

Plaintiff does not dispute the proposition.
A noncorporate entity’s capacity to be sued is determined by the law of the state in
which the district court is located. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b)(3). In Oklahoma, each organized
county can sue and be sued. OKLA. STAT. TIT. 19, § 1(1) (2018). The authority of each
county is exercised by its board of county commissioners, and a lawsuit brought against a

county must be filed against the relevant board of county commissioners. Id. §§ 3, 4.
Although the Oklahoma courts have apparently not addressed the issue of whether
a detention center has the capacity to be sued, other jurisdictions have concluded that
detention centers and county jails are not legal entities capable of suit. See Bolden v.
Gwinnett Cty. Det. Ctr. Medical Admin. Med. Doctors and Staff, 2009 WL 2496655 (N.D.

Ga. 2009) (“Jails . . . are not legal entities subject to suit under § 1983 at all.”); Rackley v.
Poinsett Cty. Det. Ctr., 2011 WL 1480316 (E.D. Ark. 2011) ( holding a “detention center
is not an entity subject to suit under § 1983”).

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The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has unequivocally stated that a county detention
facility “is not a person or legally created entity capable of being sued.” Aston v.
Cunningham, 2000 WL 796086 at *4 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000); see also Dutton v. City of

Midwest City, 630 F. App’x 742, 744 (10th Cir. 2015);Ketchum v. Albuquerque Police
Dep’t, 1992 WL 51481, at *2 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that a municipal police department
is not an entity that could be sued because it lacks a legal identity apart from the
municipality).1
Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims against the CCDC should be

dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. As dismissing the
claims against CCDC with leave to amend would be futile, given the CCDC is not a legal
entity capable of being sued, the dismissal as to this Defendant is with prejudice to refiling.
II. Plaintiff’s conceded and abandoned claims are dismissed as a matter of
law.

In her response against Defendants, Plaintiff concedes the negligent hiring, false
imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and punitive damages claims.
Response [Doc. No. 30], at 8. These claims are therefore dismissed as a matter of law.
III. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of individual liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.

To the extent the Complaint [Doc. No. 1] alleges § 1983 claims against Defendants
Hobbs and Stradley in their individual capacities, Defendants argue Plaintiff has failed to

1 Unpublished opinion cited pursuant to FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a) and 10TH CIR. R. 32.1.
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proffer any relevant facts. There is no indication on the face of the Complaint that Plaintiff
intended to state a claim of supervisory liability against these Defendants.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that “every person” acting “under the color of law”

to deprive someone of their “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws,” shall be liable to the person injured. To state a claim for individual liability
under the statute, Plaintiff must allege both that Defendants acted under color of state law,
and that they personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations. See Bruner v.
Baker, 506 F.3d 1021, 1026 (10th Cir. 2007); Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423 (10th

Cir. 1997). For liability to arise under § 1983, a defendant’s direct personal responsibility
for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right must be established—establishing
simply that the defendant is in a position of authority will not suffice. Novitsky v. City of
Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244, 1254 (10th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of any allegations of these Defendants’ personal

involvement. Instead, the Complaint alleges they are liable on a theory of respondeat
superior. In her response, Plaintiff does not dispute that she has failed to allege sufficient
facts, and—to a large extent—concedes this point. The one factual allegation involving
Defendants Hobbs and Stradley is wholly conclusory. Complaint at 1 (alleging only that
Defendants “deliberately failed to take remedial action in the face of actual and/or

constructive knowledge of constitutional violations and the false imprisonment of
[Plaintiff]”). Plaintiff, therefore, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

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IV. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of municipal liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
Where the Complaint [Doc. No. 1] alleges § 1983 claims of municipal liability

against Defendant Board, and Defendants Hobbs and Stradley in their official capacities,
Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to proffer any relevant facts.
“Municipalities and other local governmental bodies are persons within the
meaning of § 1983.” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
403 (1997). Under binding precedent, however, Defendants cannot be held liable for their

subordinate’s actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under a theory of respondeat superior.
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978). Instead, “it is
when execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the
government entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
A plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality must establish (1) the

existence of a municipal policy or custom; and, (2) a direct causal connection between the
policy or custom and the injury alleged. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385
(1989).
Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of any allegations of a custom or policy, for which
Defendants were responsible, and which caused the alleged constitutional violations. As

noted above, in her response, Plaintiff essentially concedes the point that she has failed to
allege sufficient facts to state a claim. The claims must therefore be dismissed as a matter
of law.

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V. Defendant Board and Defendants Hobbs and Stradley, in their official
and individual capacities, have complete tort immunity under
Oklahoma law.

The Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (“GTCA”) is the exclusive remedy
by which an injured plaintiff may recover against an Oklahoma governmental entity in tort.
Fuller v. Odom, 741 P.2d 449, 451 (Okla. 1987); see OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 152(14), 153.
Through the GTCA, the legislature adopted and reaffirmed sovereign immunity for the
State and its political subdivisions, subject to a limited waiver as specifically provided for

by the statute. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 152.1(B); see also Salazar v. City of Okla. City, 976
P.2d 1056, 1066 (Okla. 1999).
Under the GTCA, Defendant Board is a political subdivision. See OKLA. STAT. tit.
51, § 152(11)(c). Accordingly, Defendant Board may be liable for its torts or the torts of
its employees in situations where private persons or entities would also be liable under state

law. Salazar, 976 P.2d at 1066. This general waiver of liability, however, is itself subject
to certain limitations. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 155. The GTCA provides complete tort
immunity for losses resulting from the “(p)rovision, equipping, operation or maintenance
of any prison, jail or correctional facility…. ” “The exemption from tort liability as
provided in Section [155(25)] is all inclusive for tort claims.” Gibson v. Copeland, 13 P.3d

989, 992 (Okla. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Medina v. State, 871 P.2d 1379 (Okla. 1993)); see
also Horton v. State, 915 P.2d 352, 354 (Okla. 1996) (noting that the state and its political
subdivisions are “immune from tort liability to inmates . . . for the infinite numbers of

7
activities that are involved in prison operations”). The GTCA bars the present action
against Defendant Board. For the same reasons, Defendants Hobbs and Stradley—in their
official capacities—are likewise immune from suit in this case under Oklahoma law.

Estate of Weatherford ex rel. Thompson v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Muskogee Cty., No.
CIV-08-088-RAW, 2009 WL 331607, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 10, 2009), aff’d in part sub
nom., Weatherford ex rel. Thompson v. Taylor, 347 F. App’x 400 (10th Cir. 2009)
(“Plaintiff’s state claims against the Sheriff fail, however, for the same reason they fail
against the Board—they are barred by the []GTCA. An action against a state official in his

official capacity is not an action against the official, but rather an action against his
office.”).
Defendants Hobbs and Stradley, in their individual capacities, are not alleged to
have had any actual involvement in the subject incident. Complaint at 6. Plaintiff’s state-
law claims against them are premised on a theory of respondeat superior. “In no instance

in any such action shall an employee of the state or of a political subdivision of the state
acting within the scope of employment be named as defendant….” OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §
153(C); id. §163(C) (“In no instance shall an employee of the state or political subdivision
acting within the scope of his employment be named as defendant . . . .”).
“Scope of employment” means performance by an employee acting in good faith

within the duties of the employee’s office or employment. Id. § 152(12). Although
determining whether someone was acting within the scope of their employment is typically
a jury question, it is an issue for the Court in cases where only one reasonable conclusion

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can be drawn from the facts. Nail v. City of Henryetta, 911 P.2d 914, 918 (1996). Such is
the case here. As alleged, the facts lead only to the reasonable conclusion that Defendants
Hobbs and Stradley necessarily acted within the scope of employment. They are therefore
immune from suit on state claims in this case pursuant to Oklahoma law.
CONCLUSION
“A dismissal with prejudice 1s appropriate where a complaint fails to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6) and granting leave to amend would be futile.” Brereton v. Bountiful
City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006). Since it appears Plaintiff is unable to
assert a constitutional claim against Defendants under federal law, and the bar for doing so
is particularly high under binding precedent, further amendment would likely be futile.
Further, the state law claims are barred by the GTCA, and CCDC is not a legal entity
subject to being sued. The dismissal of all claims asserted against the moving Defendants
should be with prejudice to refiling for the reasons fully set forth herein.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss
[Doc. No. 24] is GRANTED. All claims against the moving Defendants are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE to refiling.
IS IT SO ORDERED this 3" day of December, 2019.

yO. QyPsE
ee
TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI
Chief United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10388053. Public record. Not legal advice.