# Ibarra v. Lee

> District Court, N.D. Oklahoma · May 14, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10387481

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** May 14, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

United States District Court

for the Northern District of Oklahoma

Case No. 20-CV-598-JDR-SH
Rosalinda Ibarra, as the special administratrix of The Estate of
Jorge Martinez, deceased,
Plaintiff,
versus
Cheyenne Lee; The Board of County Commissioners of
Rogers County,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded this case following
Rosalinda Ibarra’s appeal of the Court’s order granting Defendants’ motions
for summary judgment. Dkt. 83. This Court previously entered summary
judgment in favor of the Defendants based on qualified immunity. Dkt. 72.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and directed the Court to reevaluate
the second prong of qualified immunity to determine whether Jorge Mar-
tinez’s constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the shoot-
ing. Dkt. 83 at 27-28. The Court must also evaluate Ms. Ibarra’s municipal
liability and state law claims. 1 Id. at 28. For the following reasons, Rogers
County Deputy Cheyenne Lee’s motion [Dkt. 50] is DENIED and The Board
of County Commissioners of Rogers County’s motion [Dkt. 51] is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

1 Ms. Ibarra abandoned her claim for municipal liability based on denial of medical
care and her substantive due process claim. The claims were initially dismissed by this
Court and were not argued in her appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Dkt. 83 at 3, n.1.
No. 20-cv-598

The uncontroverted record establishes that Mr. Martinez and Sarah
Chapa had two children together.2 On March 12, 2020, Ms. Chapa called the
County to request a welfare check on the children, who were in Mr. Mar-
tinez’s custody. Dkt. Nos. 50 at ¶ 1; 58 at ¶ 1. The welfare check was routed
to Deputy Lee, but he was unable to locate Mr. Martinez or the children. Dkt.
Nos. 50 at ¶ 2; 58 at ¶ 2.
On March 13, 2020, Ms. Chapa obtained a protective order against
Mr. Martinez on behalf of herself and the children. Dkt. 50-2. Rogers County
District Judge Pazzo instructed the County to serve Mr. Martinez with the
protective order. Dkt. Nos. 50 at ¶ 7; 58 at ¶ 4. Deputy Lee drove to Mr. Mar-
tinez’s home where he lived with his mother, Isidra Mitchell, and his sister,
Maria Martinez. Dkt. Nos. 50 at ¶ 10; 58 at ¶ 7. When Deputy Lee arrived,
Ms. Martinez answered the door because Mr. Martinez was sleeping. Dkt.
Nos. 50 at ¶ 13; 58 at ¶ 9. The parties disagree as to the events that took place
once Deputy Lee arrived at the home.
Ms. Martinez and Ms. Mitchell maintain that they did not invite Dep-
uty Lee into the home and that Deputy Lee initiated the altercation with Mr.
Martinez without stating a reason for the attempted arrest. Dkt. Nos. 58-2 at
¶¶ 8-9; 58-6 at ¶¶ 7-8. They also state that Mr. Martinez was unarmed and
did not fight back against Deputy Lee. Dkt. Nos. 58-2 at ¶ 15; 58-6 at ¶ 10. In
support of this claim, they point to Mr. Martinez’s autopsy report, which they
maintain failed to show the type of injuries that would be consistent with
striking or punching someone. Dkt. 58 at 25. Ms. Mitchell’s testimony states
that she saw Deputy Lee on top of Mr. Martinez at the time of the shooting.
Dkt 58-6 at ¶ 12. Ms. Ibarra’s medical expert also opined that the bullet that
killed Mr. Martinez had a “downward” trajectory.3 Dkt. 58-10 at ¶ 8.

2 The Court adopts the uncontroverted facts as stated by the Tenth Circuit. Dkt. 83
at 10.
3 Dr. Bennet Omalu’s testimony is subject to a pending motion to exclude. Dkt. 49.
The Court finds that, even without Dr. Omalu’s testimony, Ms. Ibarra has provided enough
No. 20-cv-598

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). A material fact is
one that “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” An-
derson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine
“if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Id. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, “the
judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth
of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id.
at 249. At this stage, the court must “view the evidence and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Schaffer v. Salt Lake City Corp., 814 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Twig v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 987, 997 (10th
Cir. 2011)).
I.
Deputy Lee maintains that even if facts are as Ms. Ibarra states, her
claims are barred by qualified immunity. Dkt. 50 at 18. Qualified immunity
protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To avoid summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds, the plaintiff must show that (1) a reasonable jury could find facts
supporting a violation of a constitutional right and (2) the right was clearly
established at the time of the violation. Wilkins v. City of Tulsa, 33 F.4th 1265,
1272 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)).
If the plaintiff fails to establish either prong, the defendant is granted qualified
immunity. See, e.g., Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014).

evidence to raise a genuine issue as to whether Mr. Martinez was on the ground when Dep-
uty Lee shot him.
No. 20-cv-598

Ms. Ibarra asserts that Deputy Lee violated Mr. Martinez’s Fourth
Amendment rights by seizing him without probable cause and using excessive
force by shooting him. Dkt. 58 at19-28. The Tenth Circuit, upon review of
the record, concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact for a jury
to resolve concerning whether Deputy Lee had probable cause to arrest Mr.
Martinez and whether he used excessive force in shooting Mr. Martinez. Dkt.
83 at 19, 22. Accordingly, the only issue for this Court to determine regarding
qualified immunity is whether Mr. Martinez’s right to be free from Deputy
Lee’s alleged use of excessive force and attempted arrest without probable
cause was clearly established at the time of the altercation.
A right is clearly established where “there is a Supreme Court or
Tenth Circuit decision on point, or that the ʻclearly established weight of au-
thority from other courts [has] found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.’”
Patel v. Hall, 849 F.3d 970, 980 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Klen v. City of Love-
land, 661 F.3d 498, 511 (10th Cir. 2011)). This prong does not “ʻrequire a case
directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12
(2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). The heart of the
issue is whether the official was “on notice that the conduct in question could
violate the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965,
979 (10th Cir. 2001).
The Court finds that Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), put Dep-
uty Lee on notice that his use of excessive force was unconstitutional. Garner
formally recognized what most would consider common sense—that “[a] po-
lice officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him
dead.” 471 U.S. at 11; see also King v. Glanz, No. 12-CV-137-JED-TLW, 2014
WL 2805313, at *8 (N.D. Okla. June 20, 2014) (holding that in 2010 “the law
was clearly established that a law enforcement officer may not use deadly
force to seize an unarmed person who is not posing any threat to the officer
or others”). If true, the facts presented by Ms. Ibarra establish that Deputy
No. 20-cv-598

Lee shot an unarmed individual who was not resisting arrest, despite being
on notice that such conduct was unconstitutional. Thus, Deputy Lee is not
entitled to qualified immunity from Ms. Ibarra’s excessive force claim.
Turning to the unlawful arrest claim, the Tenth Circuit held that a rea-
sonable jury presented with Ms. Ibarra’s evidence could find that Deputy Lee
did not have probable cause to arrest Mr. Martinez. Dkt. 83 at 19-22. “It has
long been established that an arrest…without probable cause that a crime has
been committed violates the Fourth Amendment.” Shroff v. Spellman, 604
F.3d 1179, 1188 (10th Cir. 2010) (citing Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108,
1117 (10th Cir. 2007)). The Court finds that the constitutional right to be free
from an arrest without probable cause was clearly established at the time of
the shooting. See, e.g., Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1117 (“The law was and is unam-
biguous: a government official must have probable cause to arrest an individ-
ual.”) (collecting cases). Accordingly, Deputy Lee was on notice that attempt-
ing to arrest Mr. Martinez without probable cause was unconstitutional. Dep-
uty Lee is not entitled to qualified immunity and his motion for summary
judgment on the excessive force and unlawful arrest claims is DENIED.
II.
Because a reasonable jury could find that Deputy Lee’s actions were
unconstitutional, the Court must analyze Ms. Ibarra’s municipal liability
claims against the County. Dkt. 83 at 28. A municipality cannot “be held lia-
ble under § 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Bd. of the Cty.
Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Instead, to
establish municipal liability a plaintiff must show not only that the municipal
employee committed a constitutional violation but also that a municipal pol-
icy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivations.
Myers v. Okla. Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 151 F.3d 1313, 1316 (10th Cir. 1998)
(citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). A municipal
policy or custom can include:
No. 20-cv-598

(1) a formal regulation or policy statement;
(2) an informal custom amounting to a widespread practice
that, although not authorized by written law or express munic-
ipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a
custom or usage with the force of law;
(3) the decisions of employees with final policymaking author-
ity;
(4) the ratification by such final policymakers of the decisions—
and the basis for them—of subordinates to whom authority was
delegated subject to these policymakers’ review and approval;
or
(5) the failure to adequately train or supervise employees, so
long as that failure results from “deliberate indifference” to the
injuries that may be caused.
Bryson v. City of Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bram-
mer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 602 F.3d 1175, 1189-90 (10th Cir.
2010)).
Ms. Ibarra has presented enough evidence upon which a reasonable
jury could find that Deputy Lee violated Mr. Martinez’s constitutional rights.
Dkt. 83 at 28. She alleges several different theories as to why that violation
was caused by the County’s policies or customs: that the County failed to
properly train Deputy Lee; it had a custom of allowing officers to use exces-
sive force; and it had a history of ratifying officers’ use of excessive force. Dkt.
2 at ¶¶ 59-82.
A.
The Court first addresses Ms. Ibarra’s inadequate training claim.
There are two areas in which Ms. Ibarra alleges that the County failed to
properly train Deputy Lee. First, she asserts that the County failed to train
No. 20-cv-598

Deputy Lee to serve protective orders with a second officer present. Dkt. 2 at
¶ 61. Second, Ms. Ibarra claims that the County failed to provide Deputy Lee
with the annual training on use of lethal force and that Deputy Lee’s lack of
training was directly connected to the shooting death of Mr. Martinez. Dkt.
57 at 14-15.
The Court recognizes that “[a] municipality’s culpability for a depri-
vation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.”
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citing Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. 808, 822-23 (1985)). This is because “the inadequacy of police train-
ing may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train
amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the po-
lice come into contact.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388
(1989). Generally, a failure to train claim requires a showing that there is “a
pattern of unconstitutional behavior” and the municipality “consciously or
deliberately [chose] to disregard the risk of harm.” Barney v. Pusipher, 143 F.3d
1299, 1307-08 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omit-
ted).
Ms. Ibarra argues that she has shown the necessary pattern of similar
constitutional violations to establish sufficient notice which would amount to
deliberate indifference by the County in allowing only one officer to serve a
protective order. Dkt. 2 at ¶ 29. She points to an instance in June of 2018
when Rogers County Sheriff Scott Walton “slammed” an arrestee’s head into
a wall. Dkt. 57 at 11-12. The second incident she cites was in March of 2019
when Deputy Lee arrested an individual after a car chase and allegedly beat
him with a flashlight. Id. at 10. The third event was in April of 2019 when a
deputy was shot by another deputy while pursuing an arrest. Id. at 11. And
finally, she points to the August 2020 shooting death of Paul Bryan following
a car chase. Id. at 10.
But the Court is not persuaded that these prior incidents are suffi-
ciently similar to make the required deliberate indifference showing. None of
No. 20-cv-598

the events cited involve service of a protective order as to put the County on
notice that it should require two officers to be present. The facts do not sug-
gest that the County was deliberately indifferent to a potential harm in allow-
ing one officer to serve a protective order. Further, there is no indication that
a second officer would have resulted in a different outcome for Mr. Martinez.
As to the failure to provide use of force training, Ms. Ibarra has pointed
to several instances where officers used force. But Ms. Ibarra makes no claim
as to whether the officers involved in these altercations lacked the annual
training. She would need to show a pattern of excessive force as to put the
County on notice that their training in use of force was deficient or that other
officers in these situations were lacking the required training. Also, the one
other instance where lethal force was used, Mr. Bryan’s death, occurred
nearly five months after Mr. Martinez’s death. Considering the timeline, Mr.
Bryan’s death could not have put the County on notice of any deficiencies in
its training at the time of Mr. Martinez’s death. Waller v. City & Cty. of Den-
ver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1286 (10th Cir. 2019) (“Incidents that occurred subse-
quent to the incident at issue in this case cannot have provided Denver with
notice of a deficiency in its training program before that incident….”)
When, as here, there is no pattern of sufficiently similar unconstitu-
tional behavior, a failure to train claim may be premised on a single incident
based on a showing of: (1) the existence of a municipal policy or custom in-
volving deficient training; (2) an injury caused by the policy that is obvious
and closely related; and (3) that the municipality adopted the policy or cus-
tom with deliberate indifference to the potential injury. Lance v. Morris, 985
F.3d 787, 800 (10th Cir. 2021) (citing Waller, 932 F.3d at 1283-34). The Court
must apply this analysis here to evaluate whether Mr. Martinez’s death was
obvious and closely related to the alleged policies and whether the County
demonstrated deliberate indifference.
As to the first element, Ms. Ibarra alleges that the County’s policy of
serving a protective order with one officer is unconstitutional. The second
No. 20-cv-598

element requires Ms. Ibarra to show that the alleged inadequate training was
a direct causal link to Mr. Martinez’s death. “[I]n order for liability to attach
in a failure to train case, the identified deficiency in a city’s training program
must be closely related to the ultimate injury, so that it actually caused the
constitutional violation.” Brown v. Gray, 227 F.3d 1278, 1290 (10th Cir. 2000)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). When analyzing the train-
ing, there is a noted difference between officers who “were trained to do pre-
cisely the wrong thing” and officers who were “not given enough training to
know the correct response to a dangerous situation.” Allen v. Muskogee, Okla.,
119 F.3d 837, 844 (10th Cir. 1997). The former demonstrates a causal link be-
tween the training and injury, but the latter does not. Id. And the latter is
precisely what we have here.
Deputy Lee received training on how to serve protective orders and
was following that training when he attempted to serve Mr. Martinez. Dkt.
Nos. 51 at ¶ 12; Dkt. 57 at ¶ 12. Thus, this is not a situation where Deputy Lee
was improperly trained on how to serve a protective order, but instead, Ms.
Ibarra argues, he should have had additional training on how to handle an in-
dividual that was potentially armed or on drugs. Dkt. 57 at ¶ 12. There is no
indication that Deputy Lee was trained “to do precisely the wrong thing.”
Allen, 119 F.3d at 844. And again, there is no indication that the presence of a
second officer in this situation would have prevented Mr. Martinez’s death.
As for Ms. Ibarra’s claim that Deputy Lee was inadequately trained
regarding the use of lethal force, it is uncontested that Deputy Lee received
“the minimum requirements for employment as a law enforcement officer in
Oklahoma.” Dkt. 57 at ¶ 1. The record is devoid of any indication that the
County incorrectly trained Deputy Lee in use of force or that it was on notice
that Deputy Lee’s alleged lack of training would result in constitutional vio-
lations. There is also no indication that additional training would have pre-
vented Mr. Martinez’s death. Connick, 563 U.S. at 68 (To establish municipal
liability, a party cannot merely show “that additional training would have
No. 20-cv-598

been helpful in making difficult decisions.”). Accordingly, the County’s mo-
tion for summary judgment as to Ms. Ibarra’s inadequate training claim is
GRANTED.
B.
Second, Ms. Ibarra alleges that the County “established customs,
practices and patterns authorizing and even encouraging use of excessive
force during encounters with citizens….” Dkt. 2 at ¶ 69. Specifically, she ar-
gues that the County authorized use of excessive force by failing to require its
officers to carry non-lethal tools—namely batons, pepper spray, and tasers.
Dkt. 57 at 20-21. But federal courts have routinely rejected “the less-lethal
weapons theory of municipal liability.” Davis v. City of Tulsa, Okla., 380 F.
Supp. 3d 1163, 1175 (N.D. Okla. 2019) (collecting cases). This is because a
police officer’s actions are evaluated for reasonableness rather than whether
he used the least intrusive means. Id. at 1176. And in this case, there is no
indication that the County’s failure to require its officers to carry batons, pep-
per spray, or tasers was deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of
others. Ms. Ibarra has failed to provide any evidence that the County was on
notice or that Mr. Martinez would not have been shot if Deputy Lee were
required to carry a taser, baton, or pepper spray. The County’s motion for
summary judgment regarding Ms. Ibarra’s established customs claim is
GRANTED.
C.
And finally, Ms. Ibarra alleges that the County has a history of ratifying
officers’ use of excessive force and ratified Deputy Lee’s actions in this case.
Dkt. 2 at 21. Ms. Ibarra claims that the County approved of Deputy Lee’s
actions as they relate to Mr. Martinez’s death by failing to discipline, repri-
mand, retrain, or suspend him. Id. Under a ratification theory, “a municipal-
ity will not be found liable…unless a final decisionmaker ratifies an em-
ployee’s specific unconstitutional actions, as well as the basis for these
No. 20-cv-598

actions.” Bryson, 627 F.3d at 790. It is well established that a municipal liabil-
ity claim relies on the County’s notice that the acts were unconstitutional.
Thus, approval after the fact cannot support a ratification theory.4
Ms. Ibarra also relies on the same examples of excessive force dis-
cussed previously to support her ratification claim. But as the Court found,
none of these occurrences are sufficiently similar to the deadly shooting at
issue here. Further, there is no indication that the County had “a policy [re-
garding use of excessive force] that was the moving force behind” Mr. Mar-
tinez’s death. Davis, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 1174. The County’s motion for sum-
mary judgment as to the ratification claim is GRANTED.
III.
Moving to the claims brought under Oklahoma law, Ms. Ibarra alleges
claims for false arrest [Dkt. 2 at ¶¶ 83-87], battery [Id. at ¶¶ 88-93], and neg-
ligence [Id. at ¶¶ 94-99], all of which Deputy Lee claims are barred by the
Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act. Dkt. 50 at 33 (quoting Morales v.
City of Okla. City, 230 P.3d 869 (2010); Okla. Stat. tit. §§ 153(A), (C)). The
Act “provides for exclusive liability of a political subdivision for the torts of
its officers or employees acting within the scope of their office or employ-
ment.” Hodge v. Keene, No. CIV-10-1283-D, 2013 WL 372460, at *8 (W.D.
Okla. Jan. 30, 2013) (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 153). If the employee was act-
ing within the scope of employment, the action for his or her conduct must
be brought against the state or political subdivision. Okla. Stat. tit. 51, §
153(C). The question at issue here is whether Deputy Lee was in fact acting

4 See, e.g., Lynch v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Muskogee Cty., Okla., 786 F. App’x 774,
787 (10th Cir. 2019) (“Failing to adequately investigate or punish does not count as ratifi-
cation.”); see also Davis, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 1174 (“The City’s post-shooting review could
not have been the direct cause of…the shooting that occurred before the review.”); see also
Cordova v. Aragon, 569 F.3d 1183, 1194 (10th Cir. 2009) (“As for any failure to discipline
Officer Aragon, basic principles of linear time prevent us from seeing how conduct that
occurs after the alleged violation could have somehow caused that violation.”).
No. 20-cv-598

within the scope of his employment, which would require Ms. Ibarra to bring
her state law claims against the County rather than Deputy Lee individually.
Although Ms. Ibarra appears to agree that Deputy Lee was acting
within the scope of his employment [Dkt. 2 at 23-24], the Act allows plaintiffs
to argue alternatively that the employee’s actions fall outside the scope of em-
ployment. Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 153(C). The Act defines scope of employment
as “performance by an employee acting in good faith within the duties of the
employee’s office or employment….” Id. at § 152(12). Thus, “[a]n act of the
employee is not in the scope of employment if the employee acted maliciously
or in bad faith.” Pellegrino v. State ex rel. Cameron Univ., 63 P.3d 535, 537
(Okla. 2003).
Ms. Ibarra has alternatively claimed that Deputy Lee was acting mali-
ciously when he attempted to arrest Mr. Martinez without probable cause and
used excessive force. Dkt. 2 at 24-26. She has presented evidence that Deputy
Lee entered the home without telling anyone why he was there, initiated the
altercation with Mr. Martinez, attempted to arrest Mr. Martinez without
probable cause, and shot Mr. Martinez while he was unarmed and posed no
physical threat. If the facts are as Ms. Ibarra alleges, a reasonable jury could
conclude that Deputy Lee’s action were not in good faith, falling outside the
scope of his employment. See, e.g., Lynch, 786 F. App’x at 788-89 (reversing
district court’s grant of immunity because “[i]t would be…reasonable to con-
clude that the officers did not act in good faith in the force they used”). Ac-
cordingly, Deputy Lee’s motion for summary judgment regarding Ms. Ib-
arra’s state law claims is DENIED.
As for the County, its only argument raised in its motion regarding the
state law claims is that Deputy Lee’s actions were reasonable. Dkt. 51 at 23.
But Ms. Ibarra has established that a reasonable jury could determine other-
wise. Dkt. 83 at 27. And unlike Deputy Lee, the County wholly fails to make
an argument that the state law claims are barred by the Act. Dkt. Nos. 51 at
23-24; 62 at 10. It likewise fails to point to any facts that show Ms. Ibarra failed
No. 20-cv-598

to comply with the Act’s requirements. /d. The County’s motion for sum-
mary judgment regarding the state law claims is DENIED.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Deputy Lee’s motion for
summary judgment [Dkt. 50] is DENIED. The County’s motion for sum-
mary judgment [Dkt. 51] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART: it is granted as to Ms. Ibarra’s municipal liability claims; it is denied
as to Ms. Ibarra’s state law claims.
DATED this 14th day of May 2024.
“ 7 | /\
a NX
An Reon —
JOHN D. RUSSELL
United States District Judge

13

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10387481. Public record. Not legal advice.