# Holland v. Allbaugh

> District Court, N.D. Oklahoma · August 18, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10386976

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** August 18, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10386976

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “cumulative-error in the federal habeas context applies only where there are two or more actual constitutional errors”
- noting that “cumulative-error in the federal habeas context applies only where there are two or more actual constitutional errors”
- discussing application of Rule 15 in habeas context

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

JESSE WILLIAM HOLLAND, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. 19-CV-0246-GKF-CDL
)
JIM FARRIS,1 )
)
Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner Jesse William Holland, an Oklahoma prisoner appearing through counsel,2
petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming the judgment entered
against him in the District Court of Tulsa County, Case No. CF-2016-5318, is subject to federal
collateral attack on several grounds. Holland also seeks leave to file a supplemental petition to
add a new claim. Respondent Jim Farris urges the Court to construe the motion for leave to
supplement as a motion to amend, to deny leave to amend because the new claim is untimely, and
to deny the amended petition because Holland has not demonstrated any basis to grant habeas
relief. For the following reasons, the Court treats the motion for leave to supplement as a motion
to amend, denies the motion to amend (Dkt. 18), and denies the amended petition (Dkt. 9).

1 According to a website maintained by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (ODOC)
(okoffender.doc.ok.gov), Holland is currently incarcerated at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary
(OSP), in McAlester, Oklahoma. The Court therefore substitutes the OSP’s warden, Jim Farris, in
place of the ODOC’s former director, Joe Allbaugh, as party respondent. See Rule 2(a), Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. The Clerk of Court shall note
this substitution on the record.
2 Holland initially appeared pro se, but counsel entered an appearance on June 12, 2022.
The Court nonetheless liberally construes the pleadings that Holland filed without the assistance
of counsel. Hall v Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
BACKGROUND
Following a traffic stop in September 2016, Officer Dean Montgomery found Holland in
possession of $1,190 in cash and a Ziploc bag containing at least 51 grams of methamphetamine.
Dkt. 16-2, Tr. Trial vol. 1, 154, 170-82, 207.3 In response to questions Officer Montgomery asked
as he was booking Holland into jail, Holland stated that he was unemployed. Id. at 188-91; Dkt.

16-6, Original Record (O.R.) 25. In June 2017, an Oklahoma jury convicted Holland of four
felonies—trafficking in illegal drugs (count one), acquiring proceeds from drug activity (count
two), possessing controlled drugs without a tax stamp (count three), and falsely personating
another to create liability (count four)—all after former conviction of two or more felonies, and of
one misdemeanor—obstructing an officer (count five). Dkt. 16-3, Tr. Trial vol. 2, 49-50. In
accordance with the jury’s recommendations, the trial court sentenced Holland to serve 51 years
(count one), 12 years (count two), four years (count three), and 10 years (count four) in ODOC
custody, and one year in the county jail (count five). Dkt. 16-5, Tr. Sentencing Hr’g 5. The trial
court ordered Holland to serve the four prison sentences consecutively and to serve the one-yar

jail sentence concurrently with the fourth prison sentence. Id.
Represented by counsel, Holland filed a direct appeal in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals (OCCA), raising seven claims. Dkt. 15-1, Holland v. State, No. F-2017-638 (Okla. Crim.
App. 2018) (unpublished) (OCCA Op.), 1-3. The OCCA rejected each claim on the merits and
affirmed Holland’s convictions and sentences but remanded the case to the Tulsa County District
Court with instructions to enter an order nunc pro tunc to correct several scrivener’s errors in the
original Judgments and Sentences. Id. at 28. The state district court filed an Amended Judgment
and Sentence on October 15, 2018, making corrections as directed by the OCCA, and filed a

3 For consistency, the Court’s citations refer to the CM/ECF header pagination.
Second Amended Judgment and Sentence on July 23, 2019, making additional corrections. Dkt.
15-7, Second Am. J and Sentence 1-6.4
Holland filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. 1), in April 2019, in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. The case was transferred to this Court
in May 2019. Dkts. 6, 7. With leave of Court, Holland filed an amended petition (Dkt. 9)5 and a

brief in support of the amended petition (Dkt. 10) 6 on June 3, 2019, raising the same seven claims
he presented to the OCCA through his direct appeal. Farris filed a response in opposition to the
amended petition (Dkt. 15), urging the Court to deny habeas relief.
In August 2020, Holland filed an application for postconviction relief in state district court,
claiming that the State of Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction over his criminal prosecution, in light of
McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), because he is Native American, he is a member of a
federally-recognized tribe, and he committed his crimes in Indian country (the “McGirt claim”).
Dkt. 20-1, Appl. 11. The state district court granted Holland’s application for postconviction relief.
Dkt. 20-3, Dist. Ct. Order (June 10, 2021) 1. The State timely appealed, and the OCCA reversed

the state district court’s order based on the OCCA’s prior decision, in State ex rel. Matloff v.

4 Farris provided a copy of only the second Amended Judgment and Sentence. The Court
therefore takes judicial notice of the Amended Judgment and Sentence filed in October 2018 which
is available to the public through the Oklahoma State Courts Network. See State v. Holland,
https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=tulsa&number=CF-2016-
5318&cmid=2989370, last visited August 15, 2022.
5 On the filing of the amended petition, the Court declared moot the original petition. Dkt.
11, at 1 n.1.
6 The brief in support of the amended petition consists, primarily, of copies of the briefs
Holland and the State filed in the OCCA on direct appeal. Dkt. 10, generally. The Court construes
Holland’s references to the “attached brief” as evidence that he intends to rely on the arguments
his appellate counsel presented to the OCCA to support the claims he raises in the amended
petition.
Wallace, 497 P.3d 686 (Okla. Crim. App. 2021), that McGirt does not apply retroactively to
convictions that were final before July 9, 2020, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Dkt. 20-4, OCCA Order 1-3. On remand, the state district court denied Holland’s application
reasoning that Wallace barred his request for postconviction relief. See Docket Sheet, State v.
Holland, https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=tulsa&number=CF-2016-

5318&cmid=2989370, last visited August 15, 2022. Holland timely appealed, and the OCCA
affirmed the denial of postconviction relief on April 5, 2022. See Docket Sheet, Holland v. State,
https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=appellate&number
=PC-2022-13&cmid=132115, last visited August 15, 2022.
Two months later, on June 12, 2022, Holland, through habeas counsel, filed a motion for
leave to file a supplemental petition to add the McGirt claim. Dkt. 18, Mot. to Am. 2-7. Farris
filed a response in opposition to the motion (Dkt. 20), and Holland filed a reply (Dkt. 21).
DISCUSSION
As previously stated, Holland’s amended petition reasserts the same seven claims he

presented to the OCCA through his direct appeal. Holland claims:
1) The prosecutor deprived him of a fair trial by (a) making statements about the prosecutor’s
military background during voir dire to “caus[e] the jury to sympathize and identify with
the prosecution,” (b) eliciting improper opinion testimony from Officer Montgomery
regarding whether Holland is a drug dealer, (c) disparaging the presumption of innocence
and attempting to shift the burden of proof to Holland, (d) making inflammatory remarks
during second stage closing arguments that resulted in excessive sentences, (e) making
unmistakable references to pardon and parole policies that resulted in excessive sentences,
and (f) misstating the law and ridiculing defense counsel;
2) The trial court plainly erred by allowing Officer Montgomery to testify about an
incriminating statement Holland made during a custodial interrogation—namely,
Holland’s statement to Montgomery during the booking process that he was unemployed—
because Montgomery did not first read Holland his rights, as required by Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);

3) Holland was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as interpreted in United States
v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), because trial counsel did not subject to the State’s case to
meaningful adversarial testing;
4) Holland was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as interpreted in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), because trial counsel performed deficiently and
prejudicially by (a) failing to raise an issue at trial about the discrepancies between the
weight of the methamphetamine noted on the arrest affidavit (65.51 grams) and property
receipt (65.6 grams “preweight” and 71.4 grams gross weight) and the weight of the
methamphetamine as identified at trial by the forensic chemist (51.00 grams), (b) failing to

object when the trial court allowed Officer Montgomery to testify about Holland’s
unwarned, incriminating statement regarding his lack of employment, and (c) failing to
object to the prosecutorial misconduct described in claim one;
5) The trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Holland’s sentences to be served
consecutively;
6) The trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose sentences as to counts two, three, and four
based on errors in the original Judgments and Sentences; and
7) The cumulative effect of trial errors deprived Holland of a fair trial.
Dkt. 9, Am. Pet. 6-19; Dkt. 10, Pet’r’s Br. 13-44.
Farris urges the Court to deny the amended petition. He contends that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
bars relief as to claims one through four and seven; that claim five is not a cognizable habeas claim
because it alleges only an error of state law; and that claim six is moot because the OCCA granted
relief on direct appeal when it directed the trial court to enter an order nunc pro tunc to correct
errors in the original Judgments and Sentences. Dkt. 15, Resp. 11-67.

Before evaluating the seven claims raised in the amended petition, the Court considers
Holland’s request to add a McGirt claim.
I. Motion for leave to supplement
Holland seeks leave to file a supplemental petition to add a McGirt claim.7 Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15 governs his request. See 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (providing habeas petitions “may
be amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions”);
see also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655-65 (2005) (discussing application of Rule 15 in habeas
context); Postelle v. Carpenter, 901 F.3d 1202, 1225 (10th Cir. 2018) (same). At this stage of the
proceeding, Holland may not amend the amended petition without leave of Court. Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a)(2). Under Rule 15(a)(2), a “court should freely give leave” to amend “when justice so
requires.” But a court may deny leave to amend if amendment would be futile. Stafford v. Saffle,
34 F.3d 1557, 1560 (10th Cir. 1994). Farris contends that amendment would be futile because the

7 Holland suggests he seeks leave to supplement the amended petition, not amend it. But
the purpose of a “supplemental pleading” is to “set[] out any transaction, occurrence, or event that
happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d); Carter v.
Bigelow, 787 F.3d 1269, 1278 (10th Cir. 2015). And supplemental pleadings “are distinct from
amendments to pleadings under Rule 15, which ‘relate to matters that occurred prior to the filing
of the original pleading.’” Carter, 787 F.3d at 1278. The McGirt claim alleges the trial court
lacked jurisdiction over Holland’s prosecution based on facts that existed at the time of that
prosecution. Consequently, the Court concludes Holland seeks leave to amend, not supplement,
the amended petition.
McGirt claim is untimely and does not relate back to any claims in the amended petition. Dkt. 20,
Resp. to Mot. 6-14. The Court agrees.
A. Timeliness
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), a state prisoner has one year from the latest of four dates to
file a federal habeas petition challenging the validity of his or her custody pursuant to a state-court

judgment. In most cases, the one-year limitation period begins to run on the date on which the
prisoner’s state-court judgment becomes final following the conclusion of direct review. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1)(A); Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 150 (2012); Felix, 545 U.S. at 655-65. The
one-year limitation period is tolled during the time that “a properly filed application for State
postconviction relief or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is
pending” in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). However, only applications filed within the
petitioner’s one-year limitation period “will toll the statute of limitations.” Clark v. Oklahoma,
468 F.3d 711, 714 (10th Cir. 2006).
Applying § 2244(d)(1)(A),8 Holland’s state-court judgment became final on December 26,

2018, 90 days after the OCCA issued its decision on direct appeal, when the time expired for
Holland to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Gonzalez, 565
U.S. at 150. His one-year limitation period commenced the next day, December 27, 2018, and
expired on December 27, 2019. Harris v Dinwiddie, 642 F.3d 902, 906 n.6 (10th Cir. 2011). Farris
concedes that Holland timely filed the amended petition, and that the claims therein are timely, but
argues that the McGirt claim is untimely. Dkt. 15, Resp. 2; Dkt. 20, Resp. to Mot. 7-12. See

8 In some circumstances, the limitation period begins later than the date the petitioner’s
state-court judgment became final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B), (C), (D). But Holland does not
suggest that any other provision of § 2244(d)(1) applies. Dkts. 18, 21. The Court thus confines
its analysis to § 2244(d)(1)(A).
Prendergast v. Clements, 699 F.3d 1182, 1186-88 (10th Cir. 2012) (endorsing claim-by-claim
approach to determine timeliness under § 2244(d)(1)). The record supports Farris’s view. Holland
first raised the McGirt claim in state court in 2020 and first raised it in this habeas proceeding in
June of 2022.
Holland nevertheless contends the McGirt claim cannot be untimely for two reasons. First,

he argues that because the convicting court lacked jurisdiction, his judgment is “void” and thus
“could not become final” for purposes of triggering § 2244(d)(1)(A)’s one-year limitation period.
Dkt. 18, Mot. to Am. 3-7; Dkt. 21, Reply Br. 3-6. This argument lacks merit. See, e.g., Lamarr
v. Nunn, No. 22-6063, 2022 WL 2678602, at * 2 (10th Cir. July 12, 2022) (unpublished)9 (rejecting
identical argument as “meritless” and stating, “This court has clearly explained that challenges to
the convicting court’s jurisdiction are considered due process challenges, subject to” the one-year
statute of limitations imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA)); Murrell v. Crow, 793 F. App’x 675, 678-79 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished) (rejecting
habeas petitioner’s argument “that because a litigant can generally challenge a court’s subject-

matter jurisdiction at any time, § 2244(d)(1) does not apply to his claim that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to accept his plea” and reasoning that “the jurisdictional nature of [the petitioner’s]
due-process claim” did not bar dismissal of that claim as untimely); Rowbotham v. Nunn, Case
No. 22-CV-0011-JFH-SH, 2022 WL 1523195, at *2 (N.D. Okla. May 13, 2022) (slip op.)
(“[T]here is no language in § 2244(d)(1)(A)—or any other provision of § 2244(d)(1)—to support
that the one-year statute of limitations does not apply to judgments that are allegedly ‘void’ for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”)

9 The Court cites this unpublished decision, and other unpublished decisions herein, as
persuasive authority. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Second, Holland asserts “[t]he AEDPA would in effect violate the Suspension Clause of
the U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2.” Dkt. 18, Mot. to Am. 3-4. The Suspension Clause provides that
“[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S. Const. art. 1 § 9, cl. 2. As Holland
notes, “at a minimum,” the Suspension Clause “protects the writ of habeas corpus as it existed

when the Constitution was adopted in 1789.” Dep’t of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 140
S. Ct. 1959, 1969 (2020) (citation omitted). Holland’s argument that applying the one-year
limitation period would violate the Suspension Clause lacks merit. See Long v. Miller, 541 F.
App’x 800, 802 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (“[T]he claim that AEDPA’s limitations period
violates the Suspension Clause has been squarely rejected by this court.”). In Long, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit explained,
We have held that although there may be circumstances when the limitations period
“raises serious constitutional questions and possibly renders the habeas remedy
inadequate and ineffective” in violation of the Suspension Clause, it can properly
be applied absent grounds for equitable tolling or a showing of actual innocence or
incompetence.
541 F. App’x at 802 (quoting Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998)). Critically, the
petitioner bears the burden to show that applying the statute of limitations would render the habeas
remedy inadequate and ineffective. Miller, 141 F.3d at 977. Holland’s bare assertion that the
AEDPA violates the Suspension Clause does not satisfy that burden. Moreover, Holland neither
seeks equitable tolling nor presents a credible claim that he is actually innocent.
In short, the McGirt claim is untimely under § 2244(d)(1)(A) and Holland does not
persuasively argue otherwise.
B. Relation back
When, as here, a habeas petitioner requests leave to add a new, untimely claim to a timely-
filed petition, the Court must consider whether Rule 15(c)’s relation-back provision supports the
requested amendment. See Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655-65 (2005) (discussing application of Rule 15
in habeas context). Generally, an amendment to a pleading can relate back to the original filing
date if “the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(c)(1)(B). But Rule 15(c)’s relation-back provision works differently in habeas proceedings.

Critically, “[a]n amended habeas petition . . . does not relate back (and, thereby escape AEDPA’s
one-year time limit) when it asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts that differ in both
time and type from those the original pleading set forth.” Felix, 545 U.S. at 650. It is not enough
to say that the newly-asserted claim arises from the petitioner’s trial and conviction. Id. at 662.
Rather, in the habeas context, “relation back depends on the existence of a common ‘core of
operative facts’ uniting the original and newly asserted claims.” Felix, 545 U.S. at 659.
Holland’s McGirt claim relies on facts that differ in time and type from the facts he alleges
to support the seven claims he raises in the amended petition. As a result, Holland cannot rely on
Rule 15(c)’s relation-back provision to support his request to add the untimely McGirt claim.

C. Conclusion
Because the McGirt claim is untimely and does not relate back to the claims in the amended
petition it would be futile to permit him leave to amend the amended petition to add that claim.
The Court therefore denies Holland’s motion for leave to file a supplemental petition, and will
adjudicate the amended petition only as to the seven timely claims asserted therein.
II. Amended petition
Because the OCCA adjudicated each claim Holland raises in the amended petition, this
Court cannot grant federal habeas relief as to any claim unless Holland first demonstrates that the
OCCA’s adjudication of the claim
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).10
In determining whether a petitioner has made any of these threshold showings, a federal
habeas court must rely on the same record that the state court considered to adjudicate the federal
claim. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). The federal habeas court also must presume
that the state court’s factual findings are correct unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption with
clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The Supreme Court has summarized
§ 2254(d)’s impact by explaining that “[w]hen a state court has applied clearly established federal
law to reasonably determined facts in the process of adjudicating a claim on the merits, a federal
habeas court may not disturb the state court’s decision unless its error lies ‘beyond any possibility
for fairminded disagreement.’” Shinn v. Kayer, 141 S. Ct. 517, 520 (2020) (quoting Harrington
v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)).
A. Prosecutorial misconduct (claim one)
Holland first claims that prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of a fair trial. Dkt. 9, Am.
Pet. 6-7. Under clearly established federal law, prosecutorial misconduct generally does not
warrant relief unless the prosecutor’s remarks or actions “so infected the trial with unfairness as to
make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181
(1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643-44 (1974)). To assess whether
prosecutorial misconduct deprived a defendant of due process, a reviewing court must consider

10 The “clearly established Federal law” referred to in § 2254(d)(1) consists of the Supreme
Court’s holdings in decisions issued on or before the date of the state court’s decision. Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003); House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1015-16 (10th Cir. 2008).
the prosecutor’s remarks or actions in light of the entire trial, not in isolation. Donnelly, 416 U.S.
at 645. As he did on direct appeal, Holland alleges the prosecutor committed misconduct by:
1) emphasizing his own military background during voir dire, thereby causing the jury to
sympathize and identify with the prosecution;
2) eliciting improper opinion testimony from Officer Montgomery as to whether Holland

was a drug dealer;
3) disparaging the presumption of innocence and attempting to shift the burden of proof
to Holland;
4) making inflammatory statements during closing argument of the punishment phase,
resulting in an excessive sentence;
5) referring to pardon and parole policies during closing argument of the punishment
phase, resulting in an excessive sentence; and
6) misstating the law and ridiculing defense counsel.
Dkt. 9, Am. Pet. 6-7; Dkt. 10, Pet’r’s Br. 13-24.

Applying the federal-due-process standard from Darden and Donnelly, the OCCA noted
that the prosecutor’s challenged comments must be viewed in light of the entire record and that
reversal is required only when “the cumulative effect” of the prosecutor’s misconduct deprived the
defendant of a fair trial. Dkt. 15-1, OCCA Op. 3. The OCCA considered whether the prosecutor’s
comments were improper and found that most were not, including the remark Holland identified
as impermissibly shifting the burden of proof to the defense. Id. at 3-9, 14-15. The OCCA found
that some comments, including those that Holland identified as disparaging the presumption of
innocence, were arguably improper but found that the trial court cured any error by sustaining
Holland’s contemporaneous objections as to those comments. Id. at 5-6, 14-15.
The OCCA agreed with Holland that the prosecutor made improper comments, in two
instances, during the punishment phase of Holland’s trial. First, the OCCA found that “the
prosecutor’s suggestion in the present case that the lives of 204 people would have been destroyed
if the officer had not caught [Holland] that day was inappropriate.” Dkt. 15-1, OCCA Op. 8-9.
Second, the OCCA found that the prosecutor made improper and misleading comments when he

“made unmistakable references to pardon and parole” in discussing Holland’s service of prior
sentences. Id. at 10-13. But the OCCA concluded that these improper comments did not affect
Holland’s substantial rights and thus did not require reversal. The OCCA reasoned that the
prosecutor’s inappropriate suggestion that hypothetical victims were spared when Holland was
arrested “did not affect the jury’s assessment of punishment” because “[t]he jury refused to follow
the prosecutor’s recommendation [to impose extremely lengthy sentences] and assessed
reasonable punishments for the charged offenses” and “[t]he evidence readily supported the jury’s
determination.” Id. at 9-10. Likewise, the OCCA reasoned that the prosecutor’s improper
comments regarding pardon and parole policies “did not render his sentencing trial fundamentally

unfair.” Id. at 14. Ultimately, the OCCA concluded, based on its review of the entire record, that
“the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s comments did not deprive [Holland] of a fair trial.” Id.
at 15.
In this proceeding, Holland reasserts the same arguments he presented to the OCCA to
support his view that all of the prosecutor’s comments were improper and prejudicial and thus
deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Dkt. 9, Am. Pet. 6-7; Dkt. 10, Pet’r’s Br.
13-24. For three reasons, the Court rejects this claim. First, because the OCCA applied the correct
law from Donnelly and DeChristoforo, and its application of that law to the facts of this case was
objectively reasonable, Holland has not shown that the OCCA’s decision either is contrary to, or
based on an unreasonable application of, controlling Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1); see House, 527 F.3d at 1018-19 (discussing § 2244(d)(1)). Second, Holland does
not identify any facts that the OCCA unreasonably determined in evaluating the prosecutorial-
misconduct claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); see House, 527 F.3d at 1019-20 (noting that
§ 2244(d)(2) focuses on “factual error”). Third, like the OCCA, this Court has reviewed the

prosecutor’s challenged remarks, in light of the entire trial record, and the Court concludes that
the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s improper remarks did not render the trial so unfair as to
violate Holland’s right to due process. For these reasons, the Court denies the amended petition
as to claim one.
B. Admission of Holland’s unwarned statement (claim two)
Next, Holland contends the trial court plainly erred by allowing Officer Montgomery to
testify at trial that, during the booking process, Holland stated that he was unemployed. Dkt. 9,
Am. Pet. 9; Dkt. 16-2, Tr. Trial vol. 1, 183, 191-92. As Holland alleges, Montgomery also testified
at trial (1) that Montgomery concluded, based on his observations during the traffic stop, that the

cash in Holland’s pockets constituted “drug proceeds,” and (2) that Holland’s statement that he
was unemployed “was significant” in supporting that conclusion. Dkt. 9, Am. Pet. 9; Dkt. 16-2,
Tr. Trial vol. 1, 182-83, 191-92. Holland claims permitting Montgomery to testify about Holland’s
statement that he was unemployed violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
because it is undisputed that Montgomery did not Mirandize Holland before asking about his
employment. Dkt. 10, Pet’r’s Br. 25-27; Dkt. 16-1, Tr. Preliminary Hr’g 39. Holland further
argues that the Fifth Amendment violation was not harmless because “Montgomery’s testimony
about [his] statement was integral” to Holland’s conviction, in count two, of acquiring proceeds
from drug activity. Id.
Under clearly established federal law, “suspects interrogated while in police custody must
be told that they have a right to remain silent, that anything they say may be used against them in
court, and that they are entitled to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed, at the
interrogation.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 107 (1995) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444).
These warnings “guard[] against the prosecutorial use of compelled statements as prohibited by

the Fifth Amendment.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304 (1985). The “[f]ailure to administer
Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion” and “unwarned statements that are
otherwise voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless be excluded
from evidence under Miranda.” Id. at 307. “[C]ustodial interrogation for purposes of Miranda
includes both express questioning and words or actions that . . . [are] reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response.” Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990).
However, in Muniz, “a plurality of the [Supreme] Court recognized the exception ‘which
exempts from Miranda’s coverage questions to secure the “biographical data necessary to
complete booking or pretrial services.”’” United States v. Parra, 2 F.3d 1058, 1067 (10th Cir.

1993) (quoting Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601-02). The “underlying rationale” for this exception,
sometimes called the “booking exception,” “is that routine booking questions do not constitute
interrogation because they do not normally elicit incriminating responses.” Id. at 1068. However,
in recognizing the booking exception, the Muniz plurality also noted that “the police may not ask
questions, even during booking, that are designed to elicit incriminatory admissions.” Id. (quoting
Muniz, 496 U.S. at 602 n.14). “Thus, where questions regarding normally routine biographical
information are designed to elicit incriminating information, the questioning constitutes
interrogation subject to the strictures of Miranda.” Parra, 2 F.3d at 1068.
Applying plain-error review, based on Holland’s failure to object to the admission of
Officer Montgomery’s testimony about Holland’s unwarned statement, the OCCA found no Fifth
Amendment violation. The OCCA reasoned,
[Holland’s] statement concerning lack of employment during the booking process
was admissible. The officer’s inquiries were not intended to elicit an incriminating
response but were simply necessary to complete the booking process. Therefore,
they met the booking exception to Miranda and do not amount to custodial
interrogation. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 594, 601-02, 110 S. Ct. 2638,
2646, 2650-51, 110 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1990); Gilbert v. State, 1997 OK CR 71, ¶ 46,
951 P.2d 98, 112; Clayton v. State, 1992 OK CR 60, ¶ 29, 840 P.2d 18. 27. Thus,
we conclude that [Holland] has not shown that error, plain or otherwise, occurred.
Dkt. 15-1, OCCA Op. 16-17.
Holland argues, as he did on direct appeal, that his statement about being unemployed was
not admissible under the booking exception because, under the circumstances of this case, it was
clear that Officer Montgomery’s question about Holland’s employment, after finding a bag
containing 51 grams of methamphetamine and nearly $1200 in cash in Holland’s pockets—was
custodial interrogation designed to elicit an incriminating response. Dkt. 10, Pet’r’s Br. 26-27.
The Court liberally construes Holland’s argument as attempting to show, under
§ 2254(d)(1), that the OCCA unreasonably applied Muniz to the facts of his case. As just
discussed, it would be objectively unreasonable to apply the booking exception when “questions
regarding normally routine biographical information are designed to elicit incriminating
information.” Parra, 2 F.3d at 1068. And there is some support in the record for Holland’s view
that Montgomery’s question about his employment, even if ordinarily routine, might have been
improperly used as an investigatory tool in this case. For example, during Holland’s preliminary
hearing, the prosecutor asked Officer Montgomery, “So what are some of the things when you find
drugs and money that you look for, other things in order to determine whether that money is
associated with the distribution of drugs?” Dkt. 16-1, Tr. Preliminary Hr’g 26. Montgomery
responded: “The easiest one to look at is if the subject has a job, a legitimate means to come across
that earning. And if there is not a legitimate means, and they have narcotics, it’s oftentimes related
one to the other.” Dkt. 16-1, Tr. Preliminary Hr’g 26. Similarly, at trial, Officer Wesley Anderson,
the officer who initiated the traffic stop that resulted in Holland’s arrest, testified that “things” he
looks for “commonly associated with the illegal drugs found” that may indicate the drugs are

intended for distribution include “[l]arge amounts of money that is unexplainable, not having a
job, multiple cell phones, packaging materials, [and] scales.” Dkt. 16-2, Tr. Trial vol. 1, 120-24.
In addition, at the preliminary hearing, Montgomery testified that he found $1,190 in cash in
Holland’s pocket, and the following colloquy occurred:
Q. And based on everything that you observed or saw that day, did you draw
any type of conclusions as to what that money was associated with, or what
it was used for?
A. Yes.
Q. What was that for?
A. Drugs.
Q. All right. And how were you able to draw that conclusion?
A. Mr. Holland did not have a job, the female occupant of the car did not have
a job, either. A large amount of narcotics, along with the cash. And some
of the cash was consistent with street level narcotics sales.
Dkt. 16-1, Tr. Preliminary Hr’g 31. On cross-examination, Montgomery testified he did not give
Holland any Miranda warnings. Id. at 39. But when defense counsel asked, “How did you learn
that Mr. Holland was not employed? Did you ask him about his employment?,” Montgomery
replied, “I don’t think I did.” Id. at 39-40. And, as previously stated, Officer Montgomery testified
at trial that Holland’s lack of employment was “significant” in reinforcing Montgomery’s belief
that the nearly $1200 in cash Holland had in his pocket was “drug proceeds.” Id. at 183, 191-92.
Nevertheless, Officer Montgomery also clearly testified at trial that he asked about
Holland’s employment during the booking process at the jail. On direct examination at trial,
Montgomery described questions he asked Holland during the booking process when Montgomery
was completing an arrest and booking report, and the following colloquy took place between the
prosecutor and Montgomery:
Q. Okay. All right. Do you obtain – do you obtain an individual’s employment
records whenever you were there?
A. There is a line to be filled out.
Q. Now, on this particular night, when you arrested the defendant, did you ask
him if he was employed?
A. Yes.
Q. What did he say?
A. He said no work, or he said he doesn’t have a job. I indicated no work on
the line.
Q. He told you he didn’t have a job. Officer Montgomery, is that significant
to you in light of the fact that he almost had $1,200 in cash in his pocket?
A. Yes.
Q. And why is that significant?
A. It furthers that he had that much money on him with no job, $1,190 without
having a job. Drugs are extremely profitable.
Dkt. 16-2, Tr. Trial vol. 1, 190-92. Consistent with his testimony, the arrest and booking report
contains a blank for “employment” which Montgomery completed by indicting “no work.” Dkt.
16-6, O.R. 25. On this record, reasonable, fairminded jurists could find that the circumstances
surrounding when and how Officer Montgomery first elicited Holland’s statement about his
employment status are ambiguous. Thus, it is at least arguable that application of the booking
exception, under the particular facts of this case, was a closer call than the OCCA determined.
All that said, even if this Court assumes without deciding that the OCCA unreasonably
applied Muniz when it found that no Fifth Amendment error occurred, this would only remove
§ 2254(d)’s bar to habeas relief. And removing that bar does not entitle Holland to federal habeas
relief on this claim unless he can also persuade this Court that the constitutional “error had a
‘substantial or injurious effect or influence’ on the outcome of his trial.” Brown v. Davenport, 142
S. Ct. 1510, 1517, 1519 (April, 21, 2022) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637
(1993)); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007) (holding “that in § 2254 proceedings
a court must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under
the ‘substantial and injurious effect’ standard set forth in Brecht . . . whether or not the state
appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the “harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt” standard”). And, on the record presented, the Court finds that any Fifth
Amendment error arising from the admission of Montgomery’s testimony about Holland’s
unwarned statement was harmless under Brecht.

In addition to Montgomery’s testimony that Holland stated he was not employed, the jury
heard evidence that Holland had nearly $1200 in cash and at least 51 grams of methamphetamine
in his pockets, had four cell phones with him in the car, had no identification documents, and gave
officers a false name during the traffic stop. Dkt. 16-2, Tr. Trial vol. 1, 127-36, 178-81, 207.
Officers Anderson and Montgomery testified, based on their training and experience, that the
amount of methamphetamine in the bag and the multiple cell phones were indicative of drug
dealing. Id. at 137-38, 165-69. And, while Holland’s theory of defense appeared to be that he
possessed the methamphetamine for personal use, see Dkt. 10, Pet’r’s Br. 30, Montgomery
testified that the “typical dosage unit” for personal use of methamphetamine “is about a quarter of

a gram,” and that Holland’s bag contained over 200 doses. Dkt. 16-2, Tr. Trial vol. 1, 161. Based
on his training and experience, Montgomery testified that people who possess drugs for personal
use generally have instruments that they would use to ingest the drugs, e.g., lighters and glass
pipes. Id. at 164. Montgomery also testified he did not find any instruments on Montgomery’s
person or in the car that could have been used to ingest methamphetamine. Id. at 182-83. In light
of the entire trial record, and regardless of how significant Montgomery found Holland’s
employment status, the jury had strong circumstantial evidence—beyond the unwarned statement
that Holland was unemployed—to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Holland acquired the
$1,190 as proceeds of drug activity.
In sum, even if the Court assumes without deciding (1) that the OCCA’s decision on the
Fifth Amendment claim involved an unreasonable application of Muniz and (2) that a Fifth
Amendment error occurred at trial, the Court concludes that error had no substantial and injurious
effect on the outcome of Holland’s trial. The Court thus denies the amended petition as to claim
two.

C. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel under Cronic (claim three)
Next, Holland claims he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as
interpreted in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), because trial counsel failed to subject
the State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing. Dkt. 9, Am. Pet. 10. As he did on direct appeal,
Holland argues that his attorney filed no pretrial motions, waived opening statements at both stages
of his bifurcated trial, “interposed few objections and conducted only token cross examination of
three of the State’s four witnesses,” thereby leaving the State’s case “completely unchallenged.”
Dkt. 10, Pet’r’s Br. 30 (citing Dkt. 16-2, Tr. Trial vol. 1, 214, 139-42, 152-53, 192-97; Dkt. 16-3,
Tr. Trial vol. 2, 242-45, 267). As further support for this claim Holland asked the OCCA, and now

asks this Court, to consider an affidavit he attached his request either to supplement the appellate
record or to have an evidentiary hearing regarding his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims
(claims three and four). Dkt. 10, Pet’r’s Br. 30-31. That affidavit, signed by an attorney who was
present in the Tulsa County courthouse on the last day of Holland’s trial, avers that the affiant saw
Holland’s attorney “in the hallway celebrating with the prosecutors” after the trial, that Holland’s
attorney “appeared pleased with the results of the case . . . and made disparaging comments about
Mr. Holland and his family,” and that Holland’s attorney “told the prosecutors that Mr. Holland
was an idiot for going to trial and deserved to die in prison.” Dkt. 10, Pet’r’s Br. 30-31; Dkt. 15-
4, Beach Aff. 6-7.11
Under clearly established federal law, the right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment is the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 654;
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970). In 1984, the Supreme Court issued two

decisions that supply guiding legal principles for most ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.
The Supreme Court later summarized these cases:
In Strickland, which was decided the same day as Cronic, we announced a two-part
test for evaluating claims that a defendant’s counsel performed so incompetently in
his or her representation of a defendant that the defendant’s sentence or conviction
should be reversed. We reasoned that there would be a sufficient indication that
counsel’s assistance was defective enough to undermine confidence in a
proceeding’s result if the defendant proved two things: first, that counsel’s
“representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” 466 U.S., at
688, 104 S. Ct. 2052; and second, that “there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different,” id., at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Without proof of both deficient performance
and prejudice to the defense, we concluded, it could not be said that the sentence or
conviction “resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that rendered the
result of the proceeding unreliable,” id., at 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, and the sentence
or conviction should stand.
In Cronic, we considered whether the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing a
defendant’s conviction under the Sixth Amendment without inquiring into
counsel’s actual performance or requiring the defendant to show the effect it had
on the trial. 466 U.S., at 650, 658, 104 S. Ct. 2039. We determined that the court
had erred and remanded to allow the claim to be considered under Strickland’s test.
466 U.S., at 666–667, and n. 41, 104 S. Ct. 2039. In the course of deciding this
question, we identified three situations implicating the right to counsel that
involved circumstances “so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating
their effect in a particular case is unjustified.” Id., at 658-659, 104 S. Ct. 2039.
First and “[m]ost obvious” was the “complete denial of counsel.” Id., at 659, 104
S. Ct. 2039. A trial would be presumptively unfair, we said, where the accused is
denied the presence of counsel at “a critical stage,” id., at 659, 662, 104 S. Ct. 2039,
a phrase we used in Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54, 82 S. Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d

11 The OCCA denied Holland’s request to add the affidavit to the appellate record, but the
OCCA considered the substance of the affidavit when it denied his request for an evidentiary
hearing. Dkt. 15-1, OCCA Op. 23-24. The affidavit is thus part of the record properly before this
Court.
114 (1961), and White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60, 83 S. Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d
193 (1963) (per curiam), to denote a step of a criminal proceeding, such as
arraignment, that held significant consequences for the accused. Second, we
posited that a similar presumption was warranted if “counsel entirely fails to subject
the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” Cronic, supra, at 659,
104 S. Ct. 2039. Finally, we said that in cases like Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932), where counsel is called upon to render assistance
under circumstances where competent counsel very likely could not, the defendant
need not show that the proceedings were affected. Cronic, supra, at 659-662, 104
S. Ct. 2039.
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695-96 (2002) (footnote omitted). Like Holland, the habeas petitioner
in Cone raised a claim that he believed fit within the second situation described in Cronic. Cone,
535 U.S. at 696. Specifically, the petitioner in Cone argued that his attorney “failed to ‘mount
some case for life’ after the prosecution introduced evidence in the sentencing hearing and gave a
closing statement.” Id. at 697. The Cone Court disagreed, explaining that “[w]hen [the Supreme
Court] spoke in Cronic of the possibility of presuming prejudice based on an attorney’s failure to
test the prosecutor’s case, [it] indicated that the attorney’s failure must be complete.” Cone, 535
U.S. at 697. The Cone Court thus clarified that Cronic’s presumption of prejudice, as to the second
situation the Cronic Court described, applies only when defense counsel completely fails to
challenge the prosecution’s case, whereas Strickland’s showing of prejudice applies in all cases
when defense counsel fails to challenge the prosecution’s case “at specific points.” Cone, 535
U.S. at 697.
The OCCA rejected Holland’s Cronic claim because it found that “this is not a case where
counsel entirely failed to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” Dkt.
15-1, OCCA Op. 19. The OCCA reasoned:
Defense counsel ably conducted voir dire, connecting with the potential jurors
while searching for individuals favorable to [Holland’s] case. She engaged in a
poignant cross-examination of the State’s witnesses and developed evidence to
support [Holland’s] defense. Counsel also secured a stipulation preventing the
prosecution from introducing evidence that [Holland] had outstanding warrants at
the time of the traffic stop. She raised meritorious objections, with several side bars
to advance [Holland’s] cause, and secured favorable rulings on [Holland’s] behalf.
Counsel entered a demur to the evidence and gave a competent closing argument
at the end of the first stage of the trial. Before the second stage of the trial, defense
counsel argued that some of [Holland’s] prior felony convictions were
transactional. She entered a demur and gave a competent closing argument at the
end of the second stage of the trial. Based upon the record, we find that counsel
subjected the prosecution’s case to adversarial testing.
Dkt. 15-1, OCCA Op. 19.
The OCCA then looked beyond the trial record and considered the affidavit Holland
submitted regarding trial counsel’s post-trial behavior. Dkt. 15-1, OCCA Op. 24. The OCCA
concluded that “[t]he comments within the affidavit . . . fail to overcome the trial record and
establish that counsel failed to oppose the prosecution’s case throughout the proceeding.” Id.
Having independently reviewed the trial record, the Court finds the OCCA’s decision to
reject Holland’s Cronic claim is neither contrary to Cronic and Cone nor based on an unreasonable
application of Cronic and Cone. As the OCCA reasoned, the trial transcripts do not show a
“complete” failure to challenge the State’s case. And, while the comments in the affidavit, if true,
demonstrate, at the very least, a serious lapse in judgment and a complete lack of professionalism,
the Court cannot say that it was objectively unreasonable for the OCCA to determine that the
substance of the affidavit did not “overcome” evidence in the trial record that defense counsel did
not utterly fail to subject the prosecution’s case to adversarial testing. The Court therefore agrees
with Farris that § 2254(d) bars relief and denies the petition as to claim three.
D. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel under Strickland (claim four)
Alternatively, Holland claims he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
as interpreted in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), because trial counsel (1) did not
object to the prosecutorial misconduct, as described in claim one; (2) did not object to the
admission of Holland’s unwarned statement about his employment status, as discussed in claim
two; and (3) did not raise any issues before or during trial regarding discrepancies in the weight of
the methamphetamine identified in the arrest affidavit, the property receipt, and the testimony of
the forensic analyst or to challenge the chain of custody for the methamphetamine. Dkt. 9, Am.
Pet. 12; Dkt. 10, Pet’r’s Br. 33-38.
As previously stated, Strickland provides the clearly established federal law and requires a
defendant to show (1) that counsel performed deficiently and (2) that, but for counsel’s deficient

performance, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been
different. 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694. On direct review in state court, “the standard for judging
counsel’s representation is a most deferential one.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. On habeas review,
“[e]stablishing that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is
all the more difficult.” Id. On habeas review, “the question is not whether counsel’s actions were
reasonable,” instead, “the question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel
satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id.
Applying Strickland, the OCCA rejected the Strickland claim. Relying on its prior
determinations that the prosecutor did not commit reversible misconduct and that the trial court

did not commit reversible error by admitting Holland’s unwarned, incriminating statement about
his employment, the OCCA found that trial counsel did not perform deficiently or prejudicially by
failing to object to the prosecutorial misconduct or the admission of Holland’s statement. Dkt. 15-
1, OCCA Op. 20-21. As to trial counsel’s failure to object to discrepancies in the weight of the
methamphetamine and failure to challenge the chain of custody, the OCCA stated,
Reviewing the record in the present case, we find that [Holland] has not shown that
counsel rendered ineffective assistance under Strickland. The officer’s testimony
at trial established that the methamphetamine was in substantially the same
condition as when the crime was committed, thus, the substance was admissible at
trial. Although it is clear from the record that there was a variance in the measures
of the substance between the field and laboratory, the quantity of the substance was
well above the minimum amount to qualify as trafficking under either
measurement. In light of the other evidence at trial, we find that [Holland] has not
shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been
different had counsel raised the challenge that [Holland] now raises on appeal.
Dkt. 15-1, OCCA Op. 22-23.
Because it is clear that the OCCA applied Strickland, Holland cannot show that the
OCCA’s decision is contrary to clearly established federal law. House, 527 F.3d at 1018-19. Thus,
the Court construes his argument to assert that the OCCA either unreasonably applied the law or
unreasonably determined the facts relevant to the Strickland analysis. But if this is his argument
the Court rejects it. As previously discussed, it was objectively reasonable for the OCCA to
determine that the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct did not deprive Holland of a fair trial. Even if
trial counsel reasonably should have objected to those remarks the OCCA found improper,
counsel’s failure did not prejudice Holland. And, while it might have been objectively

unreasonable for the OCCA to reject Holland’s Fifth Amendment claim, and thus objectively
unreasonable for the OCCA to find that counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to object to
Officer Montgomery’s testimony about the unwarned statement, the admission of that statement
was harmless. And there is no basis in the record to say that, but for, trial counsel’s failure to
object to the admission of that statement, the outcome of the trial would have been different.
Finally, it was not objectively unreasonable for the OCCA to determine that Holland could not
establish prejudice based on counsel’s failure to challenge discrepancies in the weight of the
methamphetamine or to challenge the chain of custody. On the record presented, it appears that
officers may have recovered more methamphetamine from Holland’s pocket than the forensic

chemist testified to at trial. As the OCCA reasoned, the 51.00 grams of methamphetamine the
forensic chemist described was more than twice the minimum quantity necessary to establish drug
trafficking under Oklahoma law. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 415(C)(4)(a). There is a reasonable
argument counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard by not calling attention to the
possibility that Holland actually may have possessed closer to three times the minimum quantity
of methamphetamine necessary to convict him of drug trafficking and by not suggesting that either
the law enforcement officers or the forensic chemist tampered with the drugs or otherwise failed
to comply with chain-of-custody procedures. Moreover, even if it could be reasonable to conclude
that counsel performed deficiently as to the drug quantity and chain of custody issues, it was not

objectively unreasonable for the OCCA to find no resulting prejudice.
The Court therefore denies the amended petition as to claim four.
E. Consecutive sentences (claim five)
In his fifth claim, Holland asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him
to consecutively serve his four prison sentences. Dkt. 9, Am. Pet. 15; Dkt. 10, Pet’r’s Br. 39.
Holland argued on direct appeal, and reasserts here, that, under state law, “[m]odification from
consecutive to concurrent is warranted where the crimes occurred near the same time and place,
where not all offenses were serious, and where the jury suggests a preference of concurrent
service.” Dkt. 10, Pet’r’s Br. 39. Applying state law, the OCCA rejected this claim. Dkt. 15-1,

OCCA Op. 25.
The Court agrees with Farris that this claim does not present a cognizable habeas claim. A
federal district court has authority to grant relief to a prisoner in custody under a state-court
judgment only if the prisoner demonstrates “he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The plain language of § 2254(a)
provides that habeas relief is available only to remedy violations of federal law, not state law.
Wilson v. Cocoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010). Holland cites no clearly established federal law
governing a state court’s discretionary decision to impose consecutive rather than concurrent
sentences. Dkt. 9, Am. Pet. 15; Dkt. 10, Pet’r’s Br. 39. This is not surprising as a state trial court’s
sentencing decisions generally involve matters of state law. See Dennis v. Poppel, 222 F.3d 1245,
1258 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that federal habeas courts “afford wide discretion to the state trial
court’s sentencing decision, and challenges to that decision are not generally constitutionally
cognizable, unless it is shown the sentence imposed is outside the statutory limits or unauthorized
by law”). Holland does not argue that his sentences are outside the statutory limits for his crimes

or are otherwise unauthorized by state law. And, as Farris contends, each of Holland’s sentences
are within the applicable statutory range of punishment. His 51-year prison sentence for trafficking
methamphetamine is within the permitted range of 12 years to life imprisonment when that crime
is committed by a person who has two or more prior felony convictions. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-
401 (2012), Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-415 (2015); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 51.1(C) (2011). His 12-year
prison sentence for acquiring proceeds from drug activity is within the statutory range of six years
to life imprisonment when that crime is committed by a person who has two or more prior felony
convictions. Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-503.1 (2011); Okla. Stat tit. 21, § 51.1(C) (2011).
Based on the foregoing, Holland’s fifth claim does not present a cognizable habeas claim.

The Court thus denies the amended petition as to claim five.
F. Scrivener’s errors (claim six)
In claim six, Holland alleges the trial court “lacked jurisdiction to impose the count 2-4
sentences based on the convictions reflected [in the] Judgment and Sentence documents.” Dkt. 9,
Am. Pet. 17. More specifically, he argued on direct appeal and reasserts here, that the original
Judgments and Sentences referred to incorrect statutory provisions and failed to refer to the statutes
related to sentencing, but he acknowledged that the jury “was correctly instructed on the subject
offenses and found him guilty after two or more previous convictions.” Dkt. 10, Pet’r’s Br. 40-
42. The relief he sought from the OCCA was to either modify his sentences or direct the trial court
to correct errors in the Judgments and Sentences through an order nunc pro tunc. Id. at 42.
As Farris contends, Holland’s complaints about scrivener’s errors are not cognizable on
habeas review. Wilson, 562 U.S. at 5. And, even if this claim were cognizable, the OCCA granted
the latter form of relief, and the trial court corrected the errors complained of, making this claim

moot. Dkt. 15-1, OCCA Op. 25-27; Dkt. 15-7, Second Am. J and Sentence 1-6. For these reasons,
the Court denies the amended petition as to claim six.
G. Cumulative error (claim seven)
In his seventh and final claim, Holland alleges the cumulative effect of the errors he alleged
in claims one through six deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Dkt. 9, Am. Pet.
19; Dkt. 10, Pet’r’s Br. 43. Holland raised this claim on direct appeal, and the OCCA rejected it.
The OCCA stated, “When there have been numerous irregularities during the course of a trial that
tend to prejudice the rights of the defendant, reversal will be required if the cumulative effect of
all the errors is to deny the defendant a fair trial.” Dkt. 15-1, OCCA Op. 27. The OCCA noted

that the only errors it found in Holland’s trial were those stemming from the prosecutor’s
comments the OCCA found were improper but not prejudicial. Id. The OCCA reasoned,
“Considering these errors together, we, again, conclude that [Holland] was not deprived of a fair
trial.” Id. at 27-28.
The OCCA’s statement of the law is consistent with the law of this circuit. “Under
cumulative error review, a court ‘merely aggregates all the errors that individually have been found
to be harmless, and therefore not reversible, and it analyzes whether their cumulative effect on the
outcome of the trial is such that collectively they can no longer be determined to be harmless.’”
Jackson v. Warrior, 805 F.3d 940, 955 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Hamilton v. Mullin, 436 F.3d
1181, 1196 (10th Cir.2006)); see also Thacker v. Workman, 678 F.3d 820, 849 (10th Cir. 2012)
(noting that “cumulative-error in the federal habeas context applies only where there are two or
more actual constitutional errors”).
Like the OCCA, the Court will aggregate the non-prejudicial errors stemming from the
prosecutor’s improper comments, discussed in claim one, and, in addition, this Court will consider

the arguable Fifth Amendment violation discussed in claim two that this Court found harmless
under Brecht. In light of the record as a whole, the Court finds that the cumulative effect of these
individually harmless errors did not deprive Holland of a fair trial. The Court thus denies the
amended petition as to claim seven.
CONCLUSION
Because the Court concludes that it would be futile to amend the amended petition to add
the McGirt claim, the Court denies Holland’s motion for leave to file a supplemental petition,
construed as a motion to amend. Further, because the Court concludes that Holland has not
established that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States, the Court denies Holland’s amended petition for writ of habeas corpus. Finally, because
the Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not debate this Court’s assessment of Holland’s
claims, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 484 (2000); Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. The Clerk of Court shall note the substitution of Rick Whitten in place of Joe Allbaugh as
party respondent.
2. The motion for leave to file a supplemental petition (Dkt. 18) is construed as a motion to
amend and is denied.
3. The amended petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. 9) is denied.
4. A certificate of appealability is denied.
5. A separate judgment shall be entered in this matter.

DATED this 18th day of August 2022.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10386976. Public record. Not legal advice.