# Rodriguez v. Wagoner County Board of County Commissioners

> District Court, E.D. Oklahoma · March 3, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10385411

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Oklahoma
- **Decided:** March 3, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10385411

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

ELIZABETH MARIE RODRIGUEZ, )
)
)
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-20-037-RAW
)
BOARD OF COUNTY )
COMMISSIONERS OF THE )
COUNTY OF WAGONER, et al., )
)
)
)
)
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Before the court is the motion of defendants Board of County Commissioners of the
County of Wagoner and Chris Elliott, in his official capacity, for summary judgment. This
lawsuit commenced in the District Court for Wagoner County. The case was removed to this
court by defendants. Plaintiff brings claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 for the alleged
deprivation of the civil rights of a pretrial detainee. Specifically, the First Amended
Complaint alleged (1) excessive force [as to all defendants], (2) medical indifference [as to
defendants Sampson and Sheriff Elliott], (3) failure to intervene [as to all defendants] and
(4) an official liability claim [as to Wagoner County].
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Rule 56(a) F.R.Cv.P. A dispute is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party; a fact is material when it might affect the
outcome of the suit under governing law. See Foster v. Mountain Coal Co., 830 F.3d 1178,
1187 (10th Cir.2016). The court must view all evidence and draw reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Spring Creek Expl. & Prod.
Co. v. Hess Bakken Inv., II, LLC, 887 F.3d 1003, 1026 (10th Cir.2018). The court’s duty is

not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial. See Ohlsen v. United States, 998 F.3d 1143, 1153 (10th
Cir.2021).
Official capacity claims are considered to be claims for municipal liability and are

thus one and the same as suing the county, and the court therefore applies municipal liability
law to all §1983 claims asserted against the county and Sheriff Elliott sued in his official
capacity. See Seals v. Jones, 2014 WL 3818280, *12 (N.D.Okla.2014).
A municipality is not liable solely because its employees cause injury. Jackson v. City
and County of Denver, 2022 WL 120986, *3 (10th Cir.2022). Instead, to establish municipal

liability, a plaintiff must show both the existence of a municipal policy or custom and also
a direct causal link between the policy or custom and the injury alleged. Id.
A municipal policy or custom may take many forms: a formal regulation or policy; a
widespread, permanent, and well-settled custom; a decision by an employee with final

2
policymaking authority; a final policymaker’s ratification of both an employee’s
unconstitutional actions and the basis for them; or the deliberately indifferent failure to

appropriately hire, train, supervise, or discipline employees. Id.
In determining whether an official has final policymaking authority, the court looks
to state and local law. Id. at *4. The court looks only at where statutory policymaking
authority lies, rather than where de facto authority may reside. Id. Three factors help the
court decide whether an individual is legally a final policymaker for a municipality: (1)

whether the official is meaningfully constrained by policies not of that official’s own making;
(2) whether the official’s decisions are final, i.e., are they subject to any meaningful review;
and (3) whether the policy decision purportedly make by the official is within the realm of
the official’s grant of authority. Id.

The factual basis for the court’s decision is as follows.1 Plaintiff was a pretrial
detainee in the Wagoner County Jail from March 27, 2017 until convicted on October 22,
2018. She was then transferred on October 24, 2018. Plaintiff had episodes in jail in which
she attempted to kill herself or otherwise raised concerns for self-harm. She was also

involved in numerous altercations with other inmates or with jailers. Plaintiff admits that,
as of June 4, 2018, she had a long history of not following orders from the jail staff. On the
1Plaintiff asserts: “Many of the SMF of movants are not
material and as such no response to them is needed.” (#76 at
n.1). The court disagrees. See Turner v. Klika, 2011 WL
4528423, *3 (W.D.Okla.2011); Herrion v. Children’s Hosp. Nat’l
Med. Ctr., 786 F.Supp.2d 359, 362 (D.D.C.2011)(“irrelevant and
immaterial” challenges are “patently insufficient to controvert
the truth of the matters identified”).
3
morning of June 4, 2018, plaintiff was involved in a fight with another female inmate in the
jail.

As a result, plaintiff was visited in her cell by Judy Elliott, Sheriff Elliott and other
jail staff. She was told she would be placed on “lockdown.” Plaintiff told jail staff she
refused the order. After she had returned from the medical staff for an unrelated condition,
defendants Riggs (Undersheriff) and Sampson (present movant) came to her cell and again
told her she would be placed on lockdown. Plaintiff stated she would kill herself if she had

to lockdown. Plaintiff asserts she then got into an altercation with Riggs and Sampson. She
asserts Sampson touched her back and Riggs put her into a bear hug from behind. She
asserts Riggs struck her in the face and applied pressure to her nose with the palm of his
hand. (#75-1 at page 7 of 43 in CM/ECF pagination, ll.16-20).

As depicted in the jail video (#63-9), plaintiff was later confronted in the open pod
by Sheriff Elliott, Judy Elliott, and Sampson. Sampson walked behind where plaintiff was
seated and patted her with one hand on her back or side area, which was intended as “a
prompt to get up.” (#63-8 ¶8). Plaintiff told Sampson not to touch her, Upon plaintiff’s

refusal to stand, Sampson grabbed plaintiff to physically direct her to her cell. At this time,
movant was standing several feet away.
Plaintiff resisted, and Sheriff Elliott grabbed her by the hair bun on top of her head.
Sheriff Elliott pulled plaintiff’s hair and (in conjunction with Sampson) directed her to her
cell. Patrick then noticed for the first time that plaintiff was being held by the hair. Patrick

4
was too far away to intervene. Patrick was ordered to get plaintiff’s clothes off. Patrick did
so using “trauma scissors” with smooth edges. As plaintiff was physically resisting, Patrick

pushed plaintiff’s feet against plaintiff’s buttocks to protect Patrick from any kicking or
gyrations by plaintiff. (#65-14 at ¶24). Plaintiff was placed in a “turtle suit,” an anti-suicide
smock.
The only physical condition plaintiff claims to have resulted from the Sampson
incident was soreness in her neck, which lasted approximately one week. (#75-1 at page 35

of 43, ll.17-23). She assumes the cause was Sheriff Elliott grabbing her hair. (#75-1 at page
36 of 43, ll.1-2). Plaintiff has never had any medical diagnosis or assessment regarding any
conduct on the part of Sampson. (#75-1 at page 35 of 43, ll.10-13). She does not believe
anything Patrick did contributed to her neck soreness. (#65-5 at page 23 of 47, ll.11-14).

Plaintiff turned in a medical request on June 4, 2018 regarding ear pain. She was
treated that day and treated again for each of the next few days. The record does not reflect
any role or knowledge on Sampson’s part. (#63-8, ¶¶20-27). Plaintiff claims no lasting
effects or permanent impairment from her ear condition.

Plaintiff has not disputed movants’ statement of undisputed facts regarding policies
of the jail involving situations of this type. See #59 at page3 of 28, ¶¶35-38. Plaintiff has
disputed ¶34, but not (in the court’s view effectively).
The court incorporates by reference the companion orders ruling on other defendants’
motions for summary judgment in their individual capacity. The court ruled that the plaintiff

5
had failed to establish a constitutional violation, either in reference to the first prong of
qualified immunity analysis or otherwise. On that basis, the present motion should also be

granted. A municipality may not be held liable where there was no underlying constitutional
violation by any of its officers. Donahue v. Wihongi, 948 F.3d 1177, 1199 (10th Cir.2020).
More specifically as to the present motion, plaintiff has pointed out that the sheriff is
responsible for the jail under Oklahoma law. See 19 O.S. §§513 & 547(A). As an earlier
order (by Judge Heaton) in the case at bar noted: “Under Oklahoma law, the county sheriff

is ordinarily the final policymaker as to the county jail.” Rodriguez v. Bd. of Co. Comm’rs,
2020 WL 1979329, *2 (E.D.Okla.2020).
Assuming arguendo a constitutional violation, however, plaintiff has not established
a causal link between any county policy (as defined above) and the violation. Plaintiff argues

that Judy Elliott, a 911 coordinator, had no authority to give orders in the jail and any of her
directives were therefore arbitrary and unlawful. The court agrees with movants’ assertion:
“that Sheriff Elliott may have delegated some authority to Judy to discipline inmates does not
constitute a policy or custom, nor did it make Judy Elliott a final policy-maker” (#85 at 5).2

2Judy Elliott was an employee of the Board. (#91-1 at page
10 of 69 ll.6-7).
6
It is the order of the court that the motion for summary judgment of defendants Board
of County Commissioners and Chris Elliott, in his official capacity (#59) is hereby granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 3rd day of MARCH, 2022.

7

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10385411. Public record. Not legal advice.