# Moore v. Frazier

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · May 31, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10384716

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** May 31, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10384716

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- observing that a plaintiff “cannot rely solely on a single instance” to prove existence of unconstitutional custom
- concluding that summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence could not lead the trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

SANDRA M. MOORE,
administrator of the Estate of
James A. White,
:
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:21-cv-4134

Judge Sarah D. Morrison
v.
Magistrate Judge Kimberly A.

Jolson

SHERIFF TEDD E. FRAZIER, et :
al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
James White was arrested and detained at the Jackson County Correctional
Facility (the “Jail”) on charges relating to a probation violation and two
misdemeanor drug offenses. During his initial medical screening at the Jail, Mr.
White reported “stomach problems” with an ulcer and prior treatment for a hernia,
but he did not report or provide any medications and did not appear to be suffering
from a serious medical condition or illness.
A few days later, Mr. White complained of stomach pain. Corrections officers
placed him under medical observation, logging his activity overnight and contacting
the Jail’s nurse for guidance. Unfortunately, Mr. White’s condition continued to
decline, and corrections officers found him unresponsive in his cell the next
morning. He was transported to the hospital and pronounced dead shortly
thereafter. His autopsy report later revealed that he died of a severe abdominal
infection caused by ischemic colitis.
In the months following Mr. White’s death, Jail officials learned that he had

complained of stomach pain to family members prior to his arrest. He had been
eating only cereal and milk because his stomach could not tolerate anything else
and had an active prescription for stomach medication but had otherwise refused to
go to the doctor. His mother, Sandra Moore, described him as “stubborn” when it
came to seeking medical treatment.
Ms. Moore brought this action on behalf of her son’s estate against Jackson
County Sheriff Tedd Frazier, several corrections officers, and the Jail’s contractual

healthcare provider and two of its employees. She primarily claims that these
Defendants violated her son’s constitutional rights when they were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical condition. Sheriff Frazier and the corrections
officers (collectively, the “Jackson County Defendants”) now seek summary
judgment on all claims against them. (Mot., ECF No. 105.) The Motion is fully
briefed, and this matter is now ripe for consideration.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because the deliberate indifference inquiry is individualized, and because a
§ 1983 plaintiff must prove each individual defendant’s involvement in the alleged
violation, the Court focuses on the actions of each Jackson County Defendant in
reviewing the facts of this case. See Greene v. Crawford Cnty., Michigan, 22 F.4th
593, 607 (6th Cir. 2022); Pineda v. Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 977 F.3d 483, 491 (6th Cir.
2020).
A. Mr. White’s Arrest and Jail Intake

Mr. White was arrested on October 4, 2019. (ECF No. 105-2, PAGEID # 675,
678–81.) He was detained at the Jail, which was overseen by Sheriff Frazier and
the Jackson County Sheriff’s Office. (ECF No. 93 (“Sheriff Frazier Dep.”), 15:14–
16:25.) The Sheriff’s Office contracted with Premier Health Care Services1 to serve
as the Jail’s designated health authority responsible for administrating physical
and mental healthcare services to inmates. (ECF No. 105-1; ECF No. 105-10,

PAGEID # 757.) Premier Health was required to provide ten hours a week of in-
person medical assistance at the Jail and 24/7 on-call services. (ECF No. 105-1,
PAGEID # 663–64; ECF No. 97 (“Remines Dep.”), 17:13-17, 21:9-13.)
As part of the booking process, Mr. White completed intake forms and
received a medical screening. (ECF No. 105-2, PAGEID # 683, 690–93.) Relevant
here, he reported stomach problems (an ulcer) and that he had previously suffered
from a hernia below his stomach. (Id., PAGEID # 690.) He also reported that he

was not taking any medications at the time of his arrest.2 (Id., PAGEID # 693.)
Corrections Officer Chandler Jenkins signed Mr. White’s completed booking forms

1 Premier Health is now known as Jail Healthcare Services, Inc. (ECF No. 31,
PAGEID # 104.)

2 According to Ms. Moore, her son had been prescribed four medications in
October 2019, including omeprazole for “stomach problems.” (ECF No. 94 (“Moore
Dep.”), 32:16–34:12; ECF No. 111, PAGEID # 835.)
and indicated that Mr. White did not “appear to be in need of Emergency
Medical/Mental Treatment.” (Id., PAGEID # 683.)
B. Mr. White’s Condition and Medical Observation at the Jail

Mr. White was initially housed in the general population and placed in a cell
with James Simpson. (ECF No. 105-2, PAGEID # 686; ECF No. 103 (“Bowling
Dep.”), 30:9-15; ECF No. 102 (“Simpson Dep.”), 9:24–10:17.) Mr. Simpson testified
that while they were cellmates, Mr. White complained about worsening stomach
aches and cramps. (Simpson Dep., 14:6–16:12, 22:14–23:2, 25:9-19, 45:16–46:1.) Mr.
White “was always throwing up” and could not hold food down, vomiting between

four and five times a day. (Id., 15:3-12, 17:6-19.) Mr. Simpson also witnessed Mr.
White shaking in bed, having difficulty sleeping, and sweating profusely, among
other external signs of physical pain. (Id., 16:13-23, 18:20–19:14, 26:8-18.) Both Mr.
Simpson and Mr. White notified at least one corrections officer that there was
“something seriously wrong” with Mr. White and that he needed to go to the
hospital, but they were either ignored or told to “[s]it back in your bed and shut up.”
(Id., 16:4-12, 19:15-21, 25:23–26:5.) Mr. Simpson could not remember the name(s) of

the specific corrections officer(s) who disregarded their requests for help, nor could
he identify any of the Jackson County Defendants when their names were read to
him. (Id., 19:22–20:2 (“It was some of the young ones, some of the new ones that
came in, but I don’t know their names.”), 20:3–21:23 (“Like, I don’t remember none
of these.”), 40:6–41:4 (“Q. So am I hearing you right that these denials for help, this
was one male CO that you remember, don’t know his name? A. Don’t know his
name. Q. And it is none of the names that you’ve heard so far[?] A. No.”).)
On October 8, 2019, at approximately 8:45 PM, Mr. Simpson got the attention
of Corrections Officer Leah Bowling and waved her over to the cell. (ECF No. 113,

PAGEID # 908–09.) Officer Bowling walked in and saw Mr. White “on the bottom
bunk holding his stomach and moaning in pain.” (Id.) She did not believe Mr. White
was in immediate danger but radioed her supervisor, Corporal Peter Cain Wolford,
for assistance. (Id.; Bowling Dep., 33:8-18, 54:9-17.)
When he arrived, Corporal Wolford saw Mr. White “holding his belly” with
both hands “in pain.” (ECF No. 98 (“Wolford Dep.”), 21:2-23.) Mr. White told
Corporal Wolford and Officer Bowling that his stomach was hurting “real bad,” so

Corporal Wolford escorted Mr. White to the booking area for medical observation.
(Id., 20:13–21:1, 23:5-15; ECF No. 113, PAGEID # 909.) On the way, Corporal
Wolford noticed that Mr. White appeared “discomforted” and “groaned a few times
as he was walking” at a slower-than-regular pace. (Wolford Dep., 22:3-18.) Corporal
Wolford placed Mr. White in Cell 130, which was located near the booking area and
was commonly used for medical observation. (Id., 20:13–21:1, 23:5-15.) Two other

inmates (Rick Jewell and Larry Young) were already in Cell 130 when Corporal
Wolford placed Mr. White there. (ECF No. 121 (“Jewell Aff.”), ¶ 4.)
Corporal Wolford told his supervisor, Sergeant Matthew “Duke” Rouse, about
Mr. White’s complaints. (Wolford Dep., 26:10-25.) In response to Sergeant Rouse’s
question of whether he had dealt with stomach issues in the past, Mr. White
referenced his history of ulcers but denied taking medication for ulcers at that time.
(ECF No. 105-22 (“Rouse Aff.”), ¶¶ 4–5.) Sergeant Rouse then texted Brittany
Remines, the on-duty Premier Health nurse, writing:
Rouse: … James white says stomach killing him where he’s had
ulcers. Nothing I can do right
Remines: Does he take meds?
Rouse: Not that I know of
Remines: Then he’s prob full of shit
Rouse: Ok. So don’t worry about it then. I’ve got him in 130 on 30
minute watch
Remines: Yea tell him I’ll see him tomorrow
Rouse: Ok thanks
Remines: Welcome

(Remines Dep., 37:2-15; ECF No. 105-4, PAGEID # 702.)
Nurse Remines followed up the text exchange with a phone call, during which
Sergeant Rouse confirmed that Mr. White had said in a “calm voice” that he was
having stomach pain. (Remines Dep., 41:2–42:18.) Nurse Remines told Sergeant
Rouse that she would check on Mr. White during her shift the next day (October 9)
and advised Sergeant Rouse to keep Mr. White on a 30-minute observation schedule
inside Cell 130 in the meantime and to alert her if his symptoms worsened. (Id.;
ECF No. 105-9, PAGEID # 745.)
The parties diverge on their accounts of Mr. White’s behavior in Cell 130. Mr.
Jewell testified that Mr. White “was in noticeable pain” and was “moaning and
groaning loudly, holding his abdomen with both arms.” (Jewell Aff., ¶ 6.) Mr. Jewell
further stated that:
During the entire time that [Mr. White] was in the cell with us, he
was in excruciating pain. The pain was so bad that he could not stay
in one location for long. He would sometimes sit on the bench or the
floor for a minute or two, rocking back and forth moaning loudly, and
then he would pace back and forth in the small cell, oftentimes
hunched forward clutching his stomach. I never saw him sleep. For
most of the time he was in the cell, he was wailing in pain, sometimes
even begging for God to intervene and save him. His wails became so
loud that I had to tear-off pieces of toilet paper and shove them into
my ear canals to get some sleep, but I could still hear him.

(Id., ¶¶ 7–8.) Mr. Jewell also testified that Mr. White continuously “ask[ed] the
corrections officers who walked by the cell door for immediate medical attention and
to transport him to the hospital,” but the officers “refused to transport him,
claiming that he was just faking his symptoms to get out of jail,” and instructed him
“to be quiet as he was disturbing other inmates.” (Id., ¶¶ 6, 8.)
Contrary to Mr. Jewell’s account, the Jackson County Defendants maintain
that Jail officials monitored Mr. White overnight and into the morning of October 9
without incident, logging their observations in an Observation Cell Record.3 (ECF
No. 105-2, PAGEID # 685.) Observing officers included Sergeant Rouse and
Corrections Officers Bowling, Jenkins, Brittany Angel, Cameron Davis, Brodie
Bailey, and Blaise Cook. (Id.; Angel Dep., 20:2–21:16; ECF No. 105-21 (“Sprague
Aff.), ¶ 7.) The Observation Cell Record reflects that at various times, the observing
officers saw Mr. White sitting up, standing, holding his stomach, talking or
moaning,4 sleeping, or resting. (ECF No. 105-2, PAGEID # 685.) The entries on the

3 The Jail’s policy with respect to inmate observation requires that officers
“look in and check on [the inmate]” and “make sure [they] see some kind of
movement,” though officers could choose to “go in and talk to [the inmate]” or “talk
through the door.” (ECF No. 96 (“Angel Dep.”), 13:23–14:18; see also ECF No. 95
(“Mapes Dep.”), 29:16–30:20 (“I would look in just to make sure everything appears
okay … If they’re awake and they look at me or something, I’ll ask them.”).)

4 Officer Angel testified that although she described Mr. White as “talking,”
the more accurate description was “moaning in pain.” (Angel Dep., 23:1-13.) The
evidence does not indicate whether other corrections officers who also used the word
Observation Cell Record show that Mr. White was observed every 15–30 minutes,
except there were no entries made between 6:08 AM and 7:35 AM. (Id.)
No officer entered Cell 130 or spoke with Mr. White overnight until around

6:33 AM on October 9, when Mr. White told Officer Jenkins that “an area above his
groin was hurting and his back was hurting.” (ECF No. 99 (“Jenkins Dep.”), 22:19–
23:12; ECF No. 105-12, PAGEID # 770; Jewell Aff., ¶ 9.) Mr. Young also told Officer
Jenkins that Mr. White was having trouble urinating. (Jenkins Dep., 26:15-22; ECF
No. 105-12, PAGEID # 770.) But Officer Jenkins did not see anything indicating
that Mr. White “was having a medical emergency right then and there,” and Mr.
White did not ask to be transported to the hospital at that time. (Jenkins Dep.,

24:16–25:5.) Nevertheless, Officer Jenkins called Nurse Remines and notified her of
Mr. White’s symptoms.5 (ECF No. 105-12, PAGEID # 770; ECF No. 105-11, PAGEID
# 767 (“I was then contacted at approx. 06:30 hours by the third shift supervisor
Chandler Jenkins (Unit 324), that James White was complaining of stomach pain as
well as flank pain. James White was not vomiting or showing signs of distress.”).) In
response, Nurse Remines (who suspected Mr. White was suffering from kidney

stones) instructed that Mr. White increase his fluid intake and advised Officer
Jenkins that she would check on Mr. White later that day and to notify her if Mr.

“talking” meant it to convey moaning.

5 Officer Jenkins testified that he told Nurse Remines about Mr. White’s
trouble urinating, but that symptom does not appear in Nurse Remines’s written
notes, and she testified that she does not recall whether Officer Jenkins did in fact
relay that symptom to her. (Jenkins Dep., 35:11–36:7; Remines Dep., 78:12–79:15.)
White’s condition worsened.6 (ECF No. 105-11, PAGEID # 767; Jenkins Dep., 37:15-
24; ECF No. 105-7, PAGEID # 715.) Officer Jenkins gave Mr. White some water but
did not ensure that he drank it. (ECF No. 105-12, PAGEID # 770; Jewell Aff., ¶ 9.)

C. Mr. White’s Medical Emergency and Death
Officer Angel observed Mr. White over the next few hours. (ECF No. 105-2,
PAGEID # 685.) During that time, she saw Mr. White sitting and resting in the
cell, but he would “jump up and stand in the doorway” upon seeing her in the
booking area, so “it didn’t seem like he was in much pain.” (Angel Dep., 15:14–
16:16.) When Officer Angel asked Mr. White where he was hurting, he “kind of

groaned and pointed” and “motioned to his stomach, but he would never tell
[Officer Angel] what was wrong.” (Id., 14:19–16:1, 34:4–37:2; ECF No. 105-3,
PAGEID # 701.) Officer Angel did not find Mr. White’s behavior unusual but
rather likened it to that of individuals going through drug or alcohol withdrawal.
(Angel Dep., 16:21–17:2.) She advised Mr. White that the nurse would be in to see
him later that day and reported the interaction to her supervisor, Sergeant Alden
Mapes. (ECF No. 105-3, PAGEID # 701.) Separately, Major Floyd Yates (a Jail

Administrator) noticed Mr. White that morning “standing up, lucid, walking

6 Nurse Remines testified that she verbally instructed Officer Rouse and
possibly Officer Jenkins to arrange for Mr. White’s transportation to the hospital if
his symptoms worsened or if the situation “became emergent,” though she did not
specify what she meant by “emergent.” (Remines Dep., 62:19–63:2, 70:20–72:13,
121:2–124:21.) The Jackson County Defendants deny that Nurse Remines gave any
orders “to send [Mr. White] out to the hospital.” (Mot., PAGEID # 650.) A narrative
written by Nurse Remines after her call with Officer Jenkins indicates that she did
not give any orders to send Mr. White to the hospital, and her treatment notes also
lack any reference to hospital transport. (ECF No. 105-7, PAGEID # 713, 715.)
around,” and not “display[ing] any signs of distress.” (ECF No. 105-19 (“Yates
Aff.”), ¶ 4.)
At approximately 10:50 AM on October 9, Mr. Jewell motioned Officer Angel

over to the cell. (Angel Dep., 24:8-14; ECF No. 115-4, PAGEID # 963.) Officer Angel
opened the cell door and saw Mr. White laying on the floor looking pale. (Angel
Dep., 24:15-17, 25:13-20.) She approached Mr. White, repeating his name and
tapping him on the shoulder, but when he did not respond and she could not
discern whether he was breathing, she began preliminary CPR procedures and
radioed for assistance. (Id., 25:3–26:10.)
Sergeant Mapes arrived at Cell 130 at approximately 10:52 AM and

observed Mr. White on the ground. (ECF No. 105-13, PAGEID # 772; Angel Dep.
38:3-21; Mapes Dep., 37:15-25.) Unable to find a pulse, Sergeant Mapes began
chest compressions and directed Officer Angel to call for help, which she did.
(Mapes Dep., 38:4-18; Angel Dep., 26:11-25.) Sergeant Mapes and other officers
performed CPR on Mr. White until the EMS squad arrived at approximately 10:56
AM. (ECF No. 105-9, PAGEID # 747.) Sheriff Tedd Frazier waited at the Jail

entrance for EMS, and Major Tabetha Sprague ordered Officer Angel to remove
Mr. Jewell from the cell and monitored the EMS arrival time. (ECF No. 105-13,
PAGEID # 774.)
The EMS squad transported Mr. White to Holzer Medical Center at 11:00
AM, where he was pronounced dead. (ECF No. 105-3, PAGEID # 701; ECF No.
105-6, PAGEID # 707; ECF No. 105-9, PAGEID # 747.) Mr. White’s autopsy report
revealed that he died of peritonitis due to an ischemic distal colon, and there was
approximately 1,200 mL of “brown liquid” in his abdominal cavity. (ECF No. 105-8,
PAGEID # 734.) There was also methamphetamine in his system. (Id., PAGEID

# 739.) Doctor Alice Frazier (Jackson County Coroner and Jail Medical Director)
learned of Mr. White’s death later that day and informed the Jail and Ms. Moore of
her son’s passing. (ECF No. 100 (“Alice Frazier Dep.”), 11:1-12, 36:10-13; Moore
Dep., 69:11-18; ECF No. 105-13, PAGEID # 775.)
The next day (October 10), Ms. Moore came to the Jail to collect Mr. White’s
belongings. (ECF No. 105-13, PAGEID # 775; Moore Dep., 71:4-17.) She signed for
and received Mr. White’s wallet, phone, and other items but did not receive any

medications. (ECF No. 105-13, PAGEID # 775; Moore Dep., 100:9-11; ECF No. 105-
2, PAGEID # 700.) Ms. Moore told Jail personnel that her son had complained of
stomach “troubles” before he was arrested. (ECF No. 105-13, PAGEID # 775.)
Later, on February 3, 2020, Ms. Moore met with Sheriff Frazier, Major Yates,
Major Sprague, and Chief Deputy Scott Conley and “admitted that prior to
incarceration, her son had complained of stomach pain and was only able to eat

cereal and drink milk.” (ECF No. 105-6, PAGEID # 707; Moore Dep., 75:17–80:4,
105:10-19.) She also told the officials that he disliked visiting doctors, noting in her
deposition that he could be “stubborn” with respect to seeking medical care. (ECF
No. 105-6, PAGEID # 707; Moore Dep., 68:2-4.)
D. Jail Policies and Subsequent Investigation
Following Mr. White’s death, Sheriff Frazier ordered an administrative
investigation into the cause of Mr. White’s medical emergency. (Sheriff Frazier
Dep., 34:8-15, 37:21–38:23.) Sheriff Frazier directed all officers who interacted with
Mr. White to draft narrative reports. (Id., 34:11-15.) Officers searched and

inventoried Cell 130 but found no evidence of contraband or other potentially
dangerous substances. (ECF No. 105-13, PAGEID # 774; ECF No. 105-6, PAGEID
# 705–06; Sprague Aff., ¶ 9.)
As part of this investigation, Sheriff Frazier also sought to establish the
extent to which Jail policies were followed. (Sheriff Frazier Dep., 34:8-15, 37:21–
38:23.) Pursuant to Jail policy at the time, “[n]o inmate shall be denied necessary
health care, as designated by the health authority [Premier Health],” and “[w]hen

necessary medical, mental health or dental care is not available at the jail, inmates
are [to be] referred to an appropriate off-site health care setting.” (ECF No. 105-10,
PAGEID # 755–57.) Corrections officers were to “support[] the implementation of
clinical decisions that are made by authorized health care professionals.” (Id.,
PAGEID # 760.) Although the record does not include any Jail policies that outline
specific procedures for medical emergencies, Jail officials testified that they (or their

supervisors) were directed to contact the on-duty nurse in the event of any medical
concerns relating to inmates. (Sheriff Frazier Dep., 77:18-24; Angel Dep., 44:8–
45:18; Bowling Dep., 54:24–55:10.) For emergency situations, Jail officials were
instructed to contact Jackson County EMS for the inmate’s transport to Holzer
Medical Center without awaiting any communications with or direction from the on-
duty nurse. (Sheriff Frazier Dep., 101:16–102:1; Remines Dep., 123:8-16.)
The administrative investigation found that Jail officials acted properly and
did not violate any policies, in part because Sheriff Frazier determined that none of
the officers identified a medical emergency for Mr. White prior to finding him

unresponsive. (Sprague Aff., ¶ 5; Yates Aff., ¶¶ 5–6; Sheriff Frazier Dep., 135:19-
25.) The Jail subsequently submitted its investigation findings to the Jackson
County Prosecutor’s Office and the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction (“ODRC”). (Sheriff Frazier Dep., 34:11-15.) ODRC identified two
standards related to the provision of inmate medical care with which the Jail was
not in compliance; both the Jail and Premier Health instituted corrective plans of
action in response, including increasing the number of hours that nurses are

required to be physically present at the Jail, instituting training sessions on
medical emergencies, and instructing officers to send inmates to the hospital if
unable to reach Doctor Frazier or if otherwise in doubt, among others. (Sheriff
Frazier Dep., 117:12-20; Alice Frazier Dep., 47:1–49:6; Sprague Aff., ¶¶ 11–12.)
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ms. Moore commenced this action on August 10, 2021, against Sheriff
Frazier, Deputy Conley, Sergeant Mapes, Officer Angel, and several unidentified

“John Doe” Defendants. (ECF No. 1.) After learning the identities of the Doe
Defendants, Ms. Moore amended her Complaint to name 11 additional Jail
officials, Nurse Remines, Ms. Newport (Nurse Remines’s coworker), and Premier
Health. (Am. Compl., PAGEID # 70–72.)
The Jackson County Defendants now move for summary judgment on all
claims against them:
 An Eighth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all
Jackson County Defendants (excluding Sheriff Frazier) for failure to
provide medical care (Count I);
 A claim for failure to train or supervise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against Sheriff Frazier only (Count II);
 A wrongful death claim against all Jackson County Defendants (Count
IV); and
 A survival claim against all Jackson County Defendants (Count VI).

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14–33.)
At the outset, Ms. Moore has “conced[ed] that the evidence does not support
individual claims against Conley, Yates, Sprague, McGhee, Allen and Mapes.”7
(Resp., PAGEID # 1104.) Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in
these Defendants’ favor on all claims against them and evaluates the allegations
against the remaining Jail officials below. See, e.g., Young v. Olympus Am., Inc., No.
07-2547-STA, 2010 WL 1856539, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. May 6, 2010) (granting
summary judgment as to claims conceded by plaintiffs).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant has the burden of establishing there are no genuine
issues of material fact, which may be achieved by demonstrating the nonmoving

7 Ms. Moore includes Deputy Allen in this concession but later maintains that
Deputy Allen acted with deliberate indifference such that summary judgment
should be denied. (Compare Resp., PAGEID # 1104, with id., PAGEID # 1106.)
However, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Moore,
Deputy Allen had no interaction or involvement with Mr. White beyond serving as
the officer who inventoried the medical cell following his death. (Sprague Aff., ¶¶ 8–
9.) Summary judgment is therefore warranted.
party lacks evidence to support an essential element of its claim. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co.,
12 F.3d 1382, 1388–89 (6th Cir. 1993). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving

party to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56). When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398
U.S. 144, 157 (1970).
A genuine issue exists if the nonmoving party can present “significant
probative evidence” to show that “there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as

to the material facts.” Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., 8 F.3d 335, 339–40 (6th Cir.
1993). In other words, “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. See also Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (concluding that
summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence could not lead the trier of fact
to find for the nonmoving party).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Deliberate Indifference Claim Against Sergeant Rouse,
Corporal Wolford, and Officers Angel, Bowling, Jenkins, Cook,
Bailey, and Davis (Count I)

With respect to the remaining Jail officials (excluding Sheriff Frazier), Ms.
Moore contends that each was deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm to
her son while he was detained, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (Resp.,
PAGEID # 1093.) The Jackson County Defendants respond that Ms. Moore has not
met her burden to show deliberate indifference and cannot overcome their defense
of qualified immunity. Because Ms. Moore has failed to demonstrate that these

officials’ conduct rose to the level of deliberate indifference, she cannot prove a
constitutional violation.
Both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees have “a constitutional right
to be free from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs.” Howell v.
NaphCare, Inc., 67 F.4th 302, 310 (6th Cir. 2023). For prisoners, this right arises
under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments[.]”
Greene, 22 F.4th at 605 (citing U.S. Const. amend. VIII). For pretrial detainees, this

right is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Griffith
v. Franklin Cnty., Kentucky, 975 F.3d 554, 566 (6th Cir. 2020).
For many years, this was a distinction without a difference—courts in this
circuit analyzed both pretrial detainees’ and prisoners’ claims of deliberate
indifference “under the same rubric,” requiring plaintiffs to establish one objective
and one subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994);

Brawner v. Scott Cnty., 14 F.4th 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). To
satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff needed to show that the prisoner or
detainee had an “objectively” serious medical need. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; see also
Griffith, 975 F.3d at 567 (finding that objective component “require[d] a plaintiff to
prove that the alleged deprivation of medical care was serious enough to violate the
Constitution”). To meet the subjective component, the plaintiff had to demonstrate
that “an official kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety; the official must both [have been] aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exist[ed], and he must also [have]

draw[n] the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
However, in 2015, the Supreme Court considered a similar framework in the
context of excessive force claims in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015).
There, the Court concluded that a pretrial detainee need demonstrate “only that the
force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable,”
whereas prisoners must prove both subjective and objective unreasonableness. Id.
at 396–97, 400–02. The Kingsley opinion did not explicitly address whether an

objective-only standard applies to other pretrial-detainee claims, such as deliberate
indifference, but the Sixth Circuit subsequently determined that Kinglsey did
modify the subjective prong of the deliberate-indifference test for pretrial detainees.
Brawner, 14 F.4th at 596 (“Given Kingsley’s clear delineation between claims
brought by convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment and claims brought by
pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment, applying the same analysis to

these constitutionally distinct groups is no longer tenable.”). As a result, “[a]
pretrial detainee must prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—
something akin to reckless disregard.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted);
Helphenstine v. Lewis Cnty., Kentucky, 60 F.4th 305, 316 (6th Cir. 2023), cert.
denied, 144 S. Ct. 692 (2024) (“Simply put, Brawner held that Kingsley required us
to lower the subjective component from actual knowledge to recklessness.”). In other
words, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant “acted deliberately (not accidentally),
[and] also recklessly ‘in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either
known or so obvious that it should be known.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at

836).
Putting everything together, a plaintiff prevails on a deliberate indifference
claim if they show that (1) the pretrial detainee had an “objectively serious” medical
need; and (2) each defendant deliberately and also recklessly acted or failed to act
“where a reasonable official in their position would have recognized that [the
detainee’s] serious medical need posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm.”8 Howell,
67 F.4th at 312 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

a) Objectively Serious Medical Need
“A sufficiently serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Yarbrough v.
Henderson Cnty., Tennessee, No. 23-5117, 2024 WL 229665, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 22,
2024) (quoting Griffith, 975 F.3d at 567 (internal quotation marks omitted)).

External signs of internal distress can indicate to a layperson that a detainee has a

8 In 2022, a panel of the Sixth Circuit interpreted Brawner as adding a third
prong: that “the prison official knew that his failure to respond would pose a serious
risk to the pretrial detainee and ignored that risk.” Trozzi v. Lake County, 29 F.4th
745, 757–58 (6th Cir. 2022). The parties urge the Court to apply this three-part test.
(Mot., PAGEID # 647; Resp., PAGEID # 1094.) But later panels have rejected
Trozzi, finding that its “framing of the elements is irreconcilable with Brawner.”
See, e.g., Grote v. Kenton Cnty., Kentucky, 85 F.4th 397, 405 (6th Cir. 2023); Howell,
67 F.4th at 311 n.3; Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 316–17.
serious medical need. See, e.g., Preyor v. City of Ferndale, 248 F. App’x 636, 642 (6th
Cir. 2007) (finding sufficiently serious medical condition where detainee was seen
lying on the cell floor and suffered from “severe” stomach pain, vomiting, and

diarrhea causing dehydration); Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899
(6th Cir. 2004) (vomiting is “a clear manifestation of internal physical disorder”).
Placing a pretrial detainee in an observation cell due to his medical condition also
“tends to show a sufficiently serious medical need.” Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 318.
Courts have “routinely held that a condition resulting in death is ‘sufficiently
serious’ to meet the objective component.” Burwell v. City of Lansing, 7 F.4th 456,
463 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing Winkler v. Madison Cty., 893 F.3d 877, 890 (6th Cir.

2018)); see also Howell, 67 F.4th at 311–12; Rouster v. Cty. of Saginaw, 749 F.3d
437, 446 (6th Cir. 2014); Speers v. Cty. of Berrien, 196 F. App’x 390, 394 (6th Cir.
2006); Larrick v. Tuscarawas Cnty., No. 5:21-CV-00959, 2023 WL 6311396, at *21
(N.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2023).
As discussed, the parties dispute the extent of Mr. White’s external
symptoms. But the Court need not resolve this disagreement because the evidence

is undisputable that he was in medical distress. Mr. White told Corporal Wolford,
Officer Jenkins, Officer Bowling, and Sergeant Rouse about his stomach pain and
indicated the same to Officer Angel when he pointed to his stomach in front of her.
(ECF No. 113, PAGEID # 908–09; Wolford Dep., 20:13–21:1; Jenkins Dep., 22:19–
23:12; Rouse Aff., ¶¶ 4–5; Angel Dep., 14:19–16:1.) Corporal Wolford decided to
place Mr. White on medical observation, and he admitted that he could tell from Mr.
White’s appearance and gait that he was in pain while escorting him to the medical
cell. (Wolford Dep., 21:2–22:14, 23:5-15.) Although the Jackson County Defendants
were not aware of the cause of the medical distress, they knew that Mr. White

required extra observation and that he was exhibiting pain that worsened and
spread over time.
Moreover, both Ms. Moore’s medical expert and Doctor Frazier testified that
if left untreated, peritonitis is fatal. (Alice Frazier Dep., 35:24–36:2; ECF No. 119
(“Hookman Dep.”), 41:14–42:13); see Speers, 196 F. App’x at 394 (“Expert testimony
showed that delirium tremens, if untreated, is often fatal—which assuredly makes
it a ‘serious’ medical condition.”). That proposition proved true in Mr. White’s case,

a fact that numerous courts in this circuit have found indicative of “an objectively
serious need for medical treatment” in it of itself. Rouster, 749 F.3d at 446 (finding
that detainee’s perforated duodenum—which leaked toxic materials into his
abdominal cavity, caused internal bleeding, and led to his death within days of
being detained—was “[c]learly” sufficiently serious to meet the objective prong); see
also Burwell, 7 F.4th at 463 (citing cases).

Mr. White had an objectively serious medical need.
b) Subjective Disregard of Serious Medical Need
To prove that the Jail officials deliberately and recklessly acted or failed to
act where a reasonable official in their position would have recognized that Mr.
White’s serious medical need posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm, Ms. Moore
must prove “more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin
to reckless disregard.” Howell, 67 F.4th at 312 (citing Brawner, 14 F.4th at 598).
She must make this showing as to each individual official, because § 1983 “imposes
liability only on a defendant who was personally involved in the unconstitutional

action that caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Pineda, 977 F.3d at 491; see also Stuckey v.
Wilson, No. 1:08-cv-00184, 2008 WL 11351365, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 4, 2008)
(Beckwith, J.) (“Recovery under Section 1983 is predicated on a plaintiff’s ability to
identify the officer who allegedly violated the constitutional right.”). As such, “[i]n
the face of [a] motion for summary judgment, a § 1983 plaintiff must produce
evidence supporting each individual defendant’s personal involvement in the
alleged violation to bring that defendant to trial.” Pineda, 977 F.3d at 491; see also

Greene, 22 F.4th at 607 (quoting Speers, 196 F. App’x at 394) (“At the second prong,
because we cannot ‘impute knowledge from one defendant to another[,]’ we must
‘evaluate each defendant individually[.]’”); Grote, 85 F.4th at 408 (emphasis in
original) (“Again, the deliberate indifference inquiry is individualized; differently
situated individual officers may be deliberately indifferent based on what they see,
what they should have known, or their actions in response to a detainee’s needs.”).

On this point, both Mr. Simpson and Mr. Jewell9 testified about the actions

9 The Jackson County Defendants ask the Court to deem Mr. Jewell’s
affidavit as a sham affidavit, arguing that it contradicts the narrative he provided
as part of the Jail’s investigation into Mr. White’s death. (Reply, PAGEID # 1118.)
“A party may not create a factual issue by filing an affidavit, after a motion for
summary judgment has been made, which contradicts [his] earlier deposition
testimony.” Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 460 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation
omitted). However, as the Jackson County Defendants acknowledge, Mr. Jewell’s
prior narrative was not rendered under oath. See, e.g., Lanier v. Bryant, 332 F.3d
999, 1004 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying sham affidavit rule only to sworn testimony).
(or inaction) of unnamed or unidentified “corrections officers.” (See, e.g., Jewell Aff.,
¶ 6 (“The corrections officers refused to transport him … I continued to hear him
ask the corrections officers who walked by the cell for immediate medical

attention[.]”), ¶ 8 (“At times, some of the corrections officers would stop by the cell
door and instruct him to be quiet[.]”), ¶ 11 (describing “the complete and utter
disregard for human life displayed by the corrections officers”); Simpson Dep.
19:22–20:2, 20:3–21:23, 40:6–41:4.) However, these types of generalized allegations
do not create triable issues as to the conduct of any individual Jackson County
Defendant.
The Sixth Circuit addressed this issue in Jones v. Muskegon Cnty., 625 F.3d

935 (6th Cir. 2010). In that case, the father of a detainee who died of colorectal
cancer claimed that 21 corrections officers were deliberately indifferent to his son’s
serious medical needs in violation of his constitutional rights. Id. at 942. He
supported his claim with affidavits that referred to “guards” generally but did not
specify wrongdoing attributable to any particular defendant (i.e., which officers
were making comments, which officers ignored requests for medical care, which

officers were around the detainee during the relevant period, etc.). Id. Because the

Moreover, “an affidavit submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
should be stricken only if it ‘directly contradicts’ prior sworn testimony and no
‘persuasive justification’ is provided for the contradiction.” In re Nat’l Century Fin.
Enterprises, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 2d 828, 879 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (Graham, J.) (quoting
Aerel, S.R.L. v. PCC Airfoils, L.L.C., 448 F.3d 899, 908 (6th Cir. 2006)). Here, Mr.
Jewell’s affidavit does not contradict his earlier narrative but rather “fills a gap left
open” by the narrative. (Compare Jewell Aff., generally, with ECF No. 105-14,
PAGEID # 777.)
affidavits did not “implicate any specific officer,” the court found that they were
insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact in the context of a
deliberate indifference claim against the corrections officers. Id. at 943; see also,

e.g., Murphy v. Grenier, 406 F. Appx 972, 974 (6th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added)
(affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant where plaintiff’s “opposing
affidavit merely stated that someone had opened his mail”). Like the plaintiff in
Jones, Ms. Moore’s reliance on Mr. Simpson’s and Mr. Jewell’s assertions regarding
the conduct of unnamed “corrections officers” does not preclude a grant of summary
judgment in favor of the Jackson County Defendants.
With this in mind, the Court reviews the evidence regarding what each

named Jail official (Bowling, Wolford, Rouse, Jenkins, Angel, Cook, Bailey, and
Davis) saw and did in chronological order.
Officer Bowling. Officer Bowling was the first named corrections officer to
respond to Mr. White’s complaints of stomach pain. (Resp., PAGEID # 1088.) Officer
Bowling saw Mr. White holding his stomach and moaning, and she heard him tell
Corporal Wolford that he was having “really bad stomach pains.” (ECF No. 105-11,

PAGEID # 765.) She also assisted with Mr. White’s overnight medical observation,
making one entry in the Observation Cell Record that Mr. White was “standing” on
October 8 at 10:30 PM. (ECF No. 105-2, PAGEID # 685.) There is no evidence that
Officer Bowling was aware of Mr. White’s medical history or that he had prior
stomach “troubles” and unreported medication. She knew only that he complained
of stomach pain.10 (ECF No. 113, PAGEID # 909.) When confronted with Mr.
White’s complaints of stomach pain, she contacted her supervisor (Corporal
Wolford) per Jail policy. Officer Bowling performed her duties, and there is no

evidence that she deliberately and recklessly disregarded Mr. White’s medical
needs.
Corporal Wolford. After Mr. White told him and Officer Bowling about his
“really bad stomach pains,” Corporal Wolford placed Mr. White in Cell 130 for
medical observation. (Wolford Dep., 22:3–23:15.) When moving Mr. White, Corporal
Wolford saw that he was in pain. (Id.) Corporal Wolford reported Mr. White’s
situation to his supervisor, Sergeant Rouse. (Id., 26:10-25.) Like Officer Bowling,

Corporal Wolford was unaware of Mr. White’s medical history and other later-
discovered facts. Although he witnessed Mr. White in pain while walking, Mr.
White was able to walk unassisted. (Id.) By placing Mr. White in Cell 130 for
observation and reporting the situation to his supervisor, Corporal Wolford was not
recklessly disregarding Mr. White’s medical needs.
Sergeant Rouse. After Corporal Wolford brought Mr. White’s stomach pains

to his attention, Sergeant Rouse spoke to Mr. White, and Mr. White told Sergeant
Rouse that his stomach hurt and that he had a history of ulcers. (Rouse Aff., ¶¶ 4–
5.) Sergeant Rouse then contacted Nurse Remines. (Remines Dep., 37:2-15.) Nurse

10 Doctor Perry Hookman, Ms. Moore’s medical expert, did not render an
opinion as to the actions or inactions of any of the Jackson County Defendants
because he did not “think they [had] any medical experience to—to make or break
any diagnosis or know anything about medicine. All they’re hearing is somebody
has stomach pain.” (Hookman Dep., 81:12-23.)
Remines told Sergeant Rouse that she would check on Mr. White the next day
(October 9) and advised Sergeant Rouse to monitor Mr. White’s condition and alert
her if his symptoms worsened. (Id.; ECF No. 105-9, PAGEID # 744–45.) Sergeant

Rouse then conducted observatory checks of Mr. White from 8:45 to 10:11 PM on
October 8 and saw him holding his stomach, sitting, walking, and jumping up
without difficulty. (ECF No. 105-2, PAGEID # 685; Rouse Aff., ¶ 8.)
Consistent with Jail policy, Sergeant Rouse reached out to Nurse Remines for
additional instructions upon hearing of Mr. White’s stomach issues. (Remines Dep.,
37:2-15; ECF No. 105-1, PAGEID # 668; ECF No. 105-4, PAGEID # 702.) There is
no evidence that Sergeant Rouse did not accurately convey what he knew of Mr.

White’s condition to Nurse Remines. Even assuming that Nurse Remines
affirmatively told Sergeant Rouse to send Mr. White to the hospital if his symptoms
worsened, there is no evidence that Mr. White’s condition worsened while Sergeant
Rouse was on duty or that Sergeant Rouse was aware of any worsening symptoms.
Generally, non-medically trained officers do not act with deliberate
indifference to a detainee’s medical needs when they reasonably defer to a medical

professional’s diagnosis or treatment. McGaw v. Sevier County, 715 F. App’x 495,
498 (6th Cir. 2017). A mistaken, albeit reasonable, belief that such deference to a
provider is warranted will not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. Id. Such
deference is only unreasonable “in circumstances when the officer is aware of
additional information concerning an incarcerated person’s condition, or if the
medical professional rendered their opinion prior to changed circumstances.” Grote,
85 F.4th at 412. Ms. Moore has not shown that Sergeant Rouse’s reliance on Nurse
Remines or his following of her instructions was unreasonable under the
circumstances.

Officer Jenkins. When Mr. White arrived at the Jail on October 4, Officer
Jenkins assisted with the booking process and was aware of his disclosure of
stomach problems. (ECF No. 105-2, PAGEID # 683, 690–93; ECF No. 105-10,
PAGEID # 762–63.) Officer Jenkins’s next interaction with Mr. White was when he
observed Mr. White from approximately 2:38 to 5:00 AM on October 9, noting that
Mr. White was sitting or resting during each check. (ECF No. 105-2, PAGEID
# 685.) When Officer Jenkins learned of Mr. White’s spreading pain and trouble

urinating, he called Nurse Remines for further instructions. (ECF No. 105-11,
PAGEID # 767; Jenkins Dep., 37:15-24; ECF No. 105-7, PAGEID # 715.) He
followed those instructions by giving Mr. White a cup of water, but he did not make
sure Mr. White drank the water. (ECF No. 105-12, PAGEID # 770; Jewell Aff., ¶ 9.)
Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Ms. Moore, the Court will
assume that Nurse Remines instructed Officer Jenkins to arrange for Mr. White’s

transport to the hospital if his symptoms worsened. (Remines Dep., 62:19-23, 70:20-
24, 121:2-6; ECF No. 105-7, PAGEID # 713.) The Court will also assume that Officer
Jenkins did not tell Nurse Remines about Mr. White’s trouble urinating. Even with
these assumptions, Ms. Moore has not shown deliberate indifference on the part of
Officer Jenkins—instead, he monitored Mr. White for several hours, affirmatively
called Nurse Remines after hearing Mr. White’s complaints about new and
worsening pain, and followed her instructions by giving Mr. White water. (ECF No.
105-12, PAGEID # 770; ECF No. 105-11, PAGEID # 767.) There is no evidence that
Officer Jenkins was aware that Mr. White’s symptoms worsened after he spoke with

Nurse Remines. Although Officer Jenkins knew about Mr. White’s history of ulcers,
he did not know the full extent of Mr. White’s stomach problems because Mr. White
did not disclose them. It was thus reasonable for Officer Jenkins to follow Nurse
Remines’s instruction. See McGaw, 715 F. App’x at 498–99 (“Where, as here, an
officer responds to a substantial risk of serious harm by asking for and following the
advice of a professional [that] the officer believes to be capable of assessing and
addressing that risk, then the officer commits no act of deliberate indifference in

adhering to that advice.”).11
Officer Angel. When Officer Angel completed observatory checks on Mr.
White the morning of October 9, she found him sitting in the cell, but he would
“jump up and stand in the doorway” upon seeing her in the booking area, which
she understood to mean he was not “in much pain.” (ECF No. 105-2, PAGEID

11 Ms. Moore argues that Officer Jenkins, along with the other Jackson
County Defendants, did not “administer” any “actual treatment” to Mr. White in
this case because “[m]erely looking in the cell to see if he is alive and handing him a
cup of water is not treatment.” (Resp., PAGEID # 1103.) But, as explained, the
officers in this case attended to Mr. White, placed him under medical observation,
consulted with the nurse multiple times about his condition, and followed her
medical guidance. “Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the
dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant
to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in
state tort law.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976); see
Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Westlake with
approval).
# 685; Angel Dep., 15:14–16:16.) When she asked about his condition, Mr. White
pointed to his stomach but did not verbally tell Officer Angel that anything was
wrong. (Id., 14:19–16:1, 34:4–37:2; ECF No. 105-3, PAGEID # 701.) She later found

Mr. White unresponsive, at which time she began CPR procedures and called for
assistance. (Angel Dep., 25:3–26:10.)
Officer Angel did not know Mr. White’s medical history—she knew only
that Jail officials were following Nurse Remines’s instructions and that a nurse
would be in to see Mr. White later that day. (ECF No. 105-3, PAGEID # 701.) She
did not find Mr. White’s behavior unusual but likened it to that of individuals
going through drug or alcohol withdrawal, which she saw often in the Jail. (Angel

Dep., 16:21–17:2.) Her mistaken belief does not amount to deliberate indifference
unless it was “clearly inconsistent” with the detainee’s symptoms, and there is no
evidence of that. Britt v. Hamilton Cnty., No. 21-3424, 2022 WL 405847, at *3 (6th
Cir. Feb. 10, 2022). She reported her interaction with Mr. White to her supervisor
and immediately acted upon finding him unresponsive in his cell. There is no
evidence that Officer Angel deliberately or recklessly disregarded Mr. White’s

medical needs.
Officers Cook, Bailey, and Davis. These three officers observed Mr. White
overnight. (ECF No. 105-2, PAGEID # 685.) The Observation Cell Record shows
three entries by Officer Cook (5:20–6:08 AM), two entries by Officer Bailey (2:15 AM
and 4:05 AM), and eight entries by Officer Davis (11:15 PM–1:53 AM). (Id.) There is
no evidence that any of them knew Mr. White’s medical history or why he was being
medically observed. None of these officers saw any physical activity by Mr. White
that would indicate a medical issue—for the most part, they saw him resting or
sleeping. See Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 321 (internal quotations and citation

omitted) (finding that defendants did not observe “vomiting, diarrhea, shaking,
sweating, or any other manifestation of illness. Neither had any reason to
appreciate the seriousness of [the detainee’s] condition”). Even though none of these
officers entered the cell or spoke with Mr. White, they followed Jail policy, and Ms.
Moore has not shown that these officers disregarded Mr. White’s medical condition.
* * *
Based on the foregoing, there is no evidence that these remaining Jackson

County Defendants deliberately or recklessly disregarded a known or obvious risk
to Mr. White’s health, and they are entitled to summary judgment on Count I.
B. Failure to Train or Supervise Claim Against Sheriff Frazier
(Count II)

Ms. Moore sued Sheriff Frazier in his official capacity as the Jackson County
Sheriff. (Resp., PAGEID # 1104.) This amounts to a suit against Jackson County
itself. Leach v. Shelby County, 891 F.2d 1241, 1245–46 (6th Cir. 1989). Ms. Moore
bases her § 1983 claim against Jackson County on allegations that Mr. White’s
death was caused by Jail policy or custom.12 (Resp., PAGEID # 1104–05.)

12 Although her Complaint asserts that Sheriff Frazier (and thus Jackson
County) acted with deliberate indifference by “fail[ing] to adequately train and
supervise” Jail officials with respect to identifying, preventing, and responding to
inmates’ medical conditions and emergencies (Am. Compl., ¶ 19), Ms. Moore seems
to have abandoned her failure to train claim in favor of supervisory liability for Jail
officials’ following of improper “customs” and failure to follow Jail policies. (Resp.,
Counties may not be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of
their employees or agents.13 Monell v. New York City Dep’t. of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A local government may be held directly liable under § 1983

only where “an officially executed policy, or the toleration of a custom ... leads to,
causes, or results in the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right.” Doe v.
Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 507 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–
91); Wiggins v. DuPont, No. 1:17-cv-1107, 2018 WL 2372416, at *3 (N.D. Ohio May
24, 2018) (“To prevail in a § 1983 suit against a municipality, a plaintiff must show
that the alleged federal right violation occurred because of a municipal policy or
custom.”). A county’s failure to adequately supervise employees may be considered a

custom or policy when such failure amounts to deliberate indifference. Wiggins,
2018 WL 2372416, at *5; see also Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407
(1997) (“A showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice.”).
Here, Ms. Moore attacks various Jail “customs,” including those allegedly
leading officers to “shift the ultimate responsibility on to someone else”; provide
minimal if any information from their observations to “either the jail nurse or the

jail doctor”; avoid taking “any vital signs of inmates unless specifically directed to

PAGEID # 1104–05.)

13 The Jackson County Defendants argue that the County cannot be held
liable because there has been no showing of individual constitutional violations on
the part of Jail officials. (Mot., PAGEID # 658.) Although the Sixth Circuit has
suggested such a general rule, it “also has advised that these statements should not
be read so broadly.” Craddock v. Cnty. of Macomb, No. 21-CV-12827, 2024 WL
775172, at *7–8 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2024), reconsideration denied, No. 21-CV-
12827, 2024 WL 2607302 (E.D. Mich. May 24, 2024) (discussion); see also Winkler,
893 F.3d at 900. Accordingly, the Court will proceed with its analysis.
do so”; and “rely on a licensed practical nurse to make all medical decisions,
although she was only present at the Jail three days a week.” (Resp., PAGEID
# 1104–05.) She then lists three official Jail policies that she asserts were not

followed, including those requiring that both a medical doctor and a registered
nurse provide healthcare services to inmates, that inmates be given “sick call
request forms” when having a medical issue, and that in emergency situations,
EMS must transport inmates to the hospital. (Id., PAGEID # 1105.)
“Municipal liability attaches only where the policy or practice in question is
attributable to the municipality.” D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 378, 387 (6th Cir.
2014) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The thrust of Ms. Moore’s

argument is not that Jail officials were following improper policies but rather that
they were not following proper policies and instead acting on informal “customs.”
Putting aside the conclusory nature of these allegations, nothing indicates that the
conduct “was acquiesced to or informed by” County actors. D’Ambrosio, 747 F.3d at
387; Winkler, 893 F.3d at 902. Even construing Ms. Moore’s argument to be that
Jackson County had a custom of “inaction” in the face of unconstitutional conduct

by Jail officials, the argument still fails—there is no record of the Jail “providing
constitutionally inadequate medical care to inmates in the past,” and Ms. Moore has
not alleged the “clear and persistent” office-wide pattern of unconstitutional conduct
necessary to support this claim. Winkler, 893 F.3d at 902; see also Thomas v. City of
Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 2005) (observing that a plaintiff “cannot
rely solely on a single instance” to prove existence of unconstitutional custom).
Thus, Ms. Moore has not presented facts from which a jury could find that
Jackson County had a policy or custom that caused a violation of Mr. White’s
constitutional right to adequate medical care. Jackson County is entitled to

summary judgment on her failure to train or supervise claim.
C. State-Law Tort Claims Against Jackson County Defendants
(Counts IV and VI)

Finally, Ms. Moore brings wrongful death and survival claims against the
Jackson County Defendants. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30–33.) But, like her federal claims,
her state-law claims cannot succeed.
1. Wrongful Death Claim
Ohio Rev. Code § 2125.01 establishes a claim for wrongful death, stating that
“[w]hen the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default which
would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages if
death had not ensued, the person who would have been liable if death had not
ensued … shall be liable to an action for damages.” Id. In evaluating such a claim,
the trier of fact may award damages for “the injury and loss resulting to the
beneficiaries … by reason of the wrongful death.” Peters v. Columbus Steel Castings
Co., 873 N.E.2d 1258, 1261 (Ohio 2007) (quoting Ohio Rev. Code § 2125.02(A)(2)).
Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(6) provides that the Jackson County

Defendants, as employees of a political subdivision, are immune from wrongful
death liability unless their acts were (a) “manifestly outside the scope of the
employee’s employment or official responsibilities”; or (b) “were with malicious
purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner[.]” Id. Because the Jackson
County Defendants’ actions were within the scope of their employment with the
Jail, the second exception is the only possibility. Ms. Moore argues that the Jackson
County Defendants acted in a reckless manner. (Resp., PAGEID # 1106.)

Reckless conduct under Ohio law is “characterized by the conscious disregard
of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is unreasonable
under the circumstances and is substantially greater than negligent conduct.”
Anderson v. City of Massillon, 983 N.E.2d 266, 273 (Ohio 2012). Considering this
standard, Ms. Moore’s wrongful death claim against the Jackson County
Defendants fails for the same reasons that her deliberate indifference claim fails.
See, e.g., Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 497 (6th Cir. 2002) (granting

immunity under Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(6)(b) based on earlier finding that
officers had not acted with deliberate indifference).
2. Survival Claim
A survival claim allows the decedent’s estate to recover for any injuries
suffered by the decedent before his death. Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.21; see also Peters,
873 N.E.2d at 1261 (emphasis in original) (“Thus, when an individual is killed by

the wrongful act of another, the personal representative of the decedent’s estate
may bring a survival action for the decedent’s own injuries leading to his or her
death as well as a wrongful-death action for the injuries suffered by the beneficiaries
of the decedent as a result of the death.”). However, “[s]urvivorship is a claim that is
derivative of the principal claims in a complaint,” such that it remains only “so long
as any of the underlying principal [sic] claims in the complaint remain.” Stratford v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 2:07-cv-639, 2008 WL 2491965, at *9 (S.D. Ohio
June 17, 2008) (Graham, J.) (citation omitted). Because the Court is granting
summary judgment to the Jackson County Defendants on all other claims, Ms.

Moore’s survivorship claim fails as well.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the facts of this case are tragic. A man lost his life
while in Jackson County’s custody and, had his condition been diagnosed in time, he
may have survived. However, Ms. Moore has not shown that the actions of the
Jackson County Defendants rose to the level of a constitutional or state-law
violation. For the reasons set forth above, the Jackson County Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 105) is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Sarah D. Morrison
SARAH D. MORRISON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10384716. Public record. Not legal advice.