# Coleman v. Hamilton County Board of County Commissioners

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · April 30, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10384554

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** April 30, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10384554

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “garden variety neglect” resulting in a failure to meet filing deadline cannot be excused by equitable tolling

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION - CINCINNATI
MISTY COLEMAN, : Case No. 1:22-cv-319
Plaintiff, 2 Judge Matthew W. McFarland

v
HAMILTON COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER AND OPINION

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Bethanie Drew, Fritz Elsasser,
Timothy Scholz, Colina Yates, Charmaine McGuffey, and the Hamilton County Board of
County Commissioner’s (“BOCC”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 41) and Defendants
NaphCare, Inc., Michael J. Pegram, Jr., Lauren A. Slack, Jenna N. Ward, and Donald L.
Haun’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 46). Both motions have been fully
briefed. (See Docs. 44, 45, 47, 49.) Thus, this matter is ripe for review.
For the reasons below, Defendants Drew, Elsasser, Scholz, Yates, McGuffey, and
the BOCC’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 41) and Defendants NaphCare, Inc., Pegram, Slack,
Ward, and Haun’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 46) are both GRANTED.
ALLEGED FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Hamilton County Justice Center in June 2020.
(Second Am. Compl., Doc. 28, § 19.) On June 18, 2020, Plaintiff was taken to the Justice

Center’s shower facility to bathe. (Id. at § 20.) As she exited the shower, Plaintiff fell and
fractured her ankle. (Id. at J 11, 21.)
Plaintiff commenced this action in state court on May 19, 2022, and it was removed

to this Court on June 6, 2022. (See Notice of Removal, Doc. 1.) Inan Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff brought negligence and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the Hamilton County
Sheriff's Office, McGuffey, Jim Neil, John/Jane Doe Jailers No. 1 and 2, John/Jane Doe
Nurses No. 1 and 2, and the BOCC. (Am Compl., Doc. 7.) On July 11, 2023, this Court
dismissed the claims against all of the named Defendants for failure to state a claim. (See
Order, Doc. 20.) The Court then provided Plaintiff sixty days to discover the identities of
Defendants John/Jane Doe Jailers No. 1 and 2 and John/Jane Doe Nurses No. 1 and 2.
(Id. at Pg. ID 154.)
On September 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint. (Second Am.
Compl., Doc. 28.) Plaintiff therein identifies Defendants Drew, Yates, Bolen, Scholz, and
Elsasser as employees of the Sheriff's Office who supervised Plaintiff or otherwise
controlled the Justice Center (“County Identified Defendants”). (See id. at [| 2-7, 20, 29-
31, 36.) Plaintiff identifies Defendants Pegram, Slack, Ward, and Haun as employees of
Defendant NaphCare, Inc., who provided medical care to Plaintiff and other inmates at
the Justice Center (“Medical Identified Defendants”). (Id. at {J 8-13, 31, 39.) Additionally,
in the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brings negligence and § 1983 claims against
both the County and Medical Identified Defendants (collectively, “Identified
Defendants”), McGuffey, and the BOCC. (See Second Am. Compl., Doc. 28, 9] 45-57, 62-
72.)

County Identified Defendants move to dismiss the claims against them, arguing
that they are time barred. (Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 41.) McGuffey and the BOCC also

move to dismiss or strike the claims against them, arguing that they are barred under the
doctrine of res judicata. (Id.) Medical Identified Defendants move for judgment on the
pleadings, also arguing that the claims against them are time barred. (Motion for
Judgment, Doc. 46.)
LAW
The standard of review for a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) motion for
judgment on the pleadings is the same as for a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim. Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court
construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts all allegations
as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Coley v. Lucas Cnty.,
799 F.3d 530, 537 (6th Cir. 2015). “[T]he plaintiff must plead ‘sufficient factual matter’ to
render the legal claim plausible, ie., more than merely possible.” Fritz, 592 F.3d at 722.
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). And, although the Court accepts well-
pleaded factual allegations as true, it need not accept “a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action” or “legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.” Bell
All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted).
ANALYSIS
Both the Medical and County Identified Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs’

claims against them are time barred, so the Court will first address these arguments
together. (See Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 41, Pg. ID 296-99; Motion for Judgment, Doc. 46,
Pg. ID 366-372.) Then, the Court will consider the claims against McGuffey and the
BOCC. (Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 41, Pg. ID 299-300.)
I. Claims against Identified Defendants
As noted above, Plaintiff brings negligence and § 1983 claims against each
Identified Defendant. (Am. Compl., Doc. 7, 37-47.) In response, the Identified
Defendants argue that these claims are time barred. (See Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 41, Pg.
ID 296-99; Motion for Judgment, Doc. 46, Pg. ID 366-372.)
The statute of limitations period for § 1983 and negligence claims is two years. See
Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.10; Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 1989) (en
banc). The statute of limitations for these claims begin to run when the plaintiff knows or
has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of her action. Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d
262, 273 (6th Cir. 1984). Identified Defendants allegedly injured Plaintiff on June 18, 2020.
(Second Am. Compl., Doc. 28, { 20.) Plaintiff brought her § 1983 and negligence claims
against Identified Defendants on September 15, 2023. (See id.) Thus, on their face,
Plaintiffs claims against Identified Defendants are time barred under the two-year
statute of limitations.
Plaintiff brings various arguments to show that the claims are nevertheless timely.
Plaintiff first argues that her claims against Identified Defendants relate back to the
original complaint. (Response to Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 44, Pg. ID 322-24; Response to
Motion on Judgment, Doc. 47, Pg. ID 376-79.) Next, Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to

equitable tolling. (Response to Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 44, Pg. ID 324-26; Response to
Motion for Judgment, Doc. 47, Pg. ID 382-84.) Finally, Plaintiff argues that her claims
against Medical Identified Defendants are timely under the discovery rule. (Response to
Motion for Judgment, Doc. 47, Pg. ID 380.) The Court will consider each in turn.

a. Relation Back Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15
Plaintiff first argues that her claims against Identified Defendants relate back to
her original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. (Response to Motion to
Dismiss, Doc. 44, Pg. ID 322-24; Response to Motion for Judgment, Doc. 47, Pg. ID 376-
79.) Under Rule 15, an amendment that changes a named defendant can relate back if the
newly named defendant (1) “received such notice of the action that [he] will not be
prejudiced in defending on the merits;” and (2) “knew or should have known that the
action would have been brought against [him], but for a mistake concerning the proper
party’s identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C).
Plaintiff maintains that she met these requirements because Identified Defendants
knew about the original complaint when it was filed and should have known that
Plaintiff intended to sue them when she named the John Doe Defendants in the
Complaint. (Response to Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 44, Pg. ID 322-24; Response to Motion
for Judgment, Doc. 47, Pg. ID 376-79.) While these assertions may be true, Plaintiff fails

to meet another prerequisite of Rule 15(c)—that she made a “mistake concerning the

proper party’s identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).
Plaintiff cannot meet the requirements of Rule 15 because she failed to establish
that her lack of knowledge of the John Doe Defendants’ identities was due to a mistake.

See Smith v. City of Akron, 476 F. App’x 67, 69 (6th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff “did not make a
mistake about the identity of the parties [she] intended to sue;” instead, she simply “did

not know who they were and . . . did not find out within the . . . limitations period.” Id.
“TA]bsence of knowledge is not a mistake as required by Rule 15.” Brown v. Cuyahoga
Cnty., Ohio, 517 F. App’x 431, 433-34 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Ham v. Sterling Emerg. Servs.
of the Midwest, Inc., 575 F. App’x 610, 616-17 (6th Cir. 2014) (The plaintiff’s inability to
timely learn the identity or address of the John Doe defendant was “not a mistake.”).
Thus, as Plaintiff did not make a mistake about the John Doe Defendants’ identities, her
claims against Identified Defendants cannot relate back to her original complaint under
Rule 15.
b. Equitable Tolling
Next, Plaintiff argues that the Court should equitably toll the statute of limitations
period. (Response to Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 44, Pg. ID 324-26; Response to Motion for
Judgment, Doc. 47, Pg. ID 382-84.) “The federal courts sparingly bestow equitable
tolling.” Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 560 (6th
Cir. 2000). “Typically, equitable tolling applies only when a litigant’s failure to meet a
legally-mandated deadline unavoidably arose from circumstances beyond that litigant’s
control.” Id. Thus, “[a]bsent compelling equitable considerations, a court should not
extend limitations by even a single day.” Id. at 561. In determining whether equitable
tolling is available, courts may consider: 1) lack of actual notice of the filing requirement,
2) lack of constructive notice of the filing requirement; 3) diligence in pursuing one’s
rights; 4) absence of prejudice to the defendant; and 5) the plaintiff’s reasonableness in

remaining ignorant of the particular legal requirement. Truitt v. Cty. of Wayne, 148 F.3d
644, 648 (6th Cir. 1998). As the party seeking equitable tolling, Plaintiff bears the burden
of proving that she is entitled to it. Jurado v. Burt, 337 F.3d 638, 642 (6th Cir. 2003).
Equitable tolling is unwarranted here. Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to
equitable tolling because she could not engage in discovery to determine the John Doe
Defendants’ identities at the pleading stage. (Response to Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 44, Pg.
ID 325-26; Response to Motion for Judgment, Doc. 47, Pg. ID 383-84.) But, Plaintiff could
have moved for early discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d)(1) to do just
that. See Laya Yelana Simpson & Sinn Da Truth LLC v. Doe, No. 21-CV-10877, 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 256988, at *3 (E.D. Mich. May 7, 2021) (“Courts have held repeatedly that a party
shows good cause, sufficient to obtain discovery before a Rule 26(f) conference, when the
discovery requested is necessary to determine an opposing party's identity.”).
Moreover, Plaintiff does not identify any factors beyond her control that prevented
her from discovering the identities of the John Doe Defendants. Plaintiff also does not
claim that she was ignorant of the relevant statute of limitations period. These
considerations, coupled with the lack of diligence by Plaintiff, demonstrate that equitable
tolling is not warranted. See Johnson v. U.S. Postal Serv., 64 F.3d 233, 238 (6th Cir. 1995)
(explaining that “garden variety neglect” resulting in a failure to meet filing deadline

cannot be excused by equitable tolling).
c. Discovery Rule
Finally, Plaintiff argues that her claims against Medical Identified Defendants are

not time barred because the “discovery rule” has not been met. (Response to Motion for

Judgment, Doc. 47, Pg. ID 379-82.) Ohio’s discovery rule provides that a cause of action
does not accrue until a plaintiff either knows or reasonably should have known that (1)
he or she was injured and (2) that his or her injury was proximately caused by the
defendant’s conduct. □□ Stricker v. Jim Walter Corp., 447 N.E.2d 727, 732 (Ohio 1983). “The
discovery rule seeks to redress the unconscionable result reached by a strict application
of the limitations period to injured parties whose right to recovery can be barred by the

statute of limitation before the party is even aware of an injury’s existence.” Flynn v. Bd.
of Trs., No. C-060178, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 6546, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2006).
Ohio’s discovery rule requirements have been met here. Plaintiff admits that she

was “plainly aware that she had been injured,” but did not know that NaphCare
employees —rather than Justice Center employees — provided her medical treatment that
caused her injury. (Response to Motion for Judgment, Doc. 47, Pg. ID 381.) But, that is
enough to meet the discovery rule’s requirements. Plaintiff alleges that she was injured
by individuals working at the Justice Center’s medical center. (See id; see also Second Am.
Compl., Doc. 28.) That she did not know where the medical personnel worked does not

negate the fact that she knew who the alleged perpetrators of her injury were. Cf. Snyder-
Hill v. Ohio State Univ., 48 F.4th 686, 707 (6th Cir. 2022) (Discovery rule had not been met
because the plaintiffs did not know that the defendant injured them.). Thus, the discovery
rule requirements have been met such that Plaintiff's cause of action began to accrue on
June 18, 2020.
* * *

Plaintiff's claims against Identified Defendants are time barred under the two-year

statute of limitations for negligence and § 1983 claims. Plaintiff has failed to present any
argument to overcome this finding. Thus, Plaintiff's claims against Identified Defendants
must be dismissed.
Il. Claims against Defendants McGuffey and the BOCC
The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s negligence and § 1983 claims against McGuffey
and the BOCC. (See Second Am. Compl., Doc. 28, |] 62-72.) McGuffey and the BOCC

move to dismiss or strike these claims based on the doctrine of res judicata. (Motion to
Dismiss, Doc. 41, Pg. ID 299-300.) Plaintiff does not oppose the dismissal of these claims,
instead arguing that she merely re-pled these claims to preserve them for appeal.
(Response to Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 44, Pg. ID 326-27.)
“Under the doctrine of res judicata, ‘a final judgment on the merits bars further
claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.’” U.S. ex rel. Sheldon

v. Kettering Health Network, 816 F.3d 399, 414 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Montana v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979)). Res judicata precludes a claim raised in a subsequent
proceeding where there is: “(1) a final decision on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (2) a subsequent action between the parties or their privies; (3) an issue in
the subsequent action which was litigated or which should have been litigated in the
prior action; and (4) an identity of the causes of action.” Winget v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A., 537 F.3d 565, 577-78 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
The claims against McGuffey and the BOCC are barred under the doctrine of res
judicata. This Court dismissed Plaintiff's negligence and § 1983 claims against McGutfey
and the BOCC for failure to state a claim. (See Dismissal Order, Doc. 20.) Plaintiff's present

negligence and § 1983 claims against McGuffey and the BOCC are based on the same set
of facts as the previous claims. (See Am. Compl., Doc. 7; Second Am. Compl., Doc. 28.)
Thus, Plaintiff's negligence and § 1983 claims against McGuffey and the BOCC are barred
by res judicata and subject to dismissal.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, Defendants Drew, Elsasser, Scholz, Yates, McGuffey, and the
BOCC’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 41) and Defendants NaphCare, Inc., Pegram, Slack,
Ward, and Haun’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 46) are both GRANTED.
This case is TERMINATED from the Court's docket.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
Haake Weta). 2
By:
JUDGE MATTHEW W. McFARLAND

10

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10384554. Public record. Not legal advice.