# Dates v. HBSC

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · February 29, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10384142

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** February 29, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10384142

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “standing is not dispensed in gross; rather, plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each claim that they press and for each form of relief that they seek”
- noting “[i]t is settled that the prohibition of § 2283 cannot be evaded by … prohibiting utilization of the results of a completed state proceeding”
- noting that “the importance of the federal policy to be protected by the injunction is not the focus of the inquiry” (citation omitted)
- noting the “protect or effectuate” exception applies to “prior federal court judgments”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

CARLEAN DATES, et al.,

Plaintiffs,
Case No. 1:24-cv-81
v.
JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE
HSBC, et al.,

Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Carlean Dates and Malik Ali (Dates’s husband) seek a temporary restraining
order (TRO) preventing them from being removed from “their” house located at 12062
Hazelhurst Drive, Cincinnati, Ohio, 45240 (the Hazelhurst property). The Court uses
quotations because, while it is admittedly the house in which they reside, it is not
their house. Rather, as a result of actions taken under a state court foreclosure order
and in particular a 2018 Sheriff’s sale pursuant to that order, the house now belongs
to HSBC, the assignee of the mortgage note on the property, who has told Dates to
leave. But, like a modern-day Bartleby, Dates (and her husband) would prefer not to.
To thwart HSBC’s efforts to foreclose and to obtain possession, she has filed
for bankruptcy—five times. Those filings ultimately resulted in an order from that
court imposing a two-year ban on her filing in bankruptcy due to her abuse of the
system. She also sued the bankruptcy judge and trustee from the most recent
bankruptcy action in both their individual and official capacities, in this Court,
essentially for little more than the fact they rejected her claims. That unsuccessful
suit recently resulted in this Court (via the undersigned) dismissing Dates’s
complaint as legally frivolous and warning her that similar conduct in the future
would subject her to sanctions. And earlier this month, the state court, which already
had held her in contempt for refusing to vacate the property on January 5, 2023 (and

perhaps emboldened by the bankruptcy court’s imposition of sanctions), amended its
contempt order to authorize the Sheriff to forcibly evict her, any other occupants, and
any personal property remaining on the premises on or after February 29, 2024.
Undeterred by an unbroken nearly ten-year string of adverse determinations
finding that Dates has no remaining property interest in the home, Plaintiffs
responded with the instant action. They now claim that, in seeking foreclosure and
eviction, HSBC has violated various federal laws, including the Dodd-Frank Wall

Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 12 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq.,
and the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961 et seq. (Compl., Doc. 3, #17–24). And given their impending eviction, they also
sought the TRO that is the subject of this Opinion and Order. (Mot. for TRO, Doc. 2).
(The Court notes that the TRO, to be effective, would need to be directed at either the
Ohio court system (which authorized the eviction) or the Sheriff (who will carry it out

under the state court order), neither of whom is a party to this action.)
As explained below, the Court concludes for a host of reasons—including, but
certainly not limited to, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the Anti-Injunction Act—
that Plaintiffs have little, if any, chance of success on the merits of their claims and
that, even if they did, a TRO directed at HSBC would provide them no relief.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
(Doc. 2).

BACKGROUND1
The case had humble beginnings in a simple foreclosure action that HSBC
initiated in 2012 in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas (Docket No. A
1200734). Case Summary – HSBC Bank USA NA as Trustee for the Certificate vs.
Carlean Dates, Hamilton Cnty. Clerk Cts., https://perma.cc/A9CF-JAGB [hereinafter
Foreclosure Action]. As the assignee of a mortgage note hypothecated by the
Hazelhurst property, HSBC sought to foreclose on the note when Dates defaulted,

(Doc. 3, #20–21). Dates v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (Dates XV), No. 1:19-cv-445, 2020
WL 7253301, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 10, 2020). This sparked a whirlwind of litigation,
including the opening of over a dozen federal dockets (listed in the footnote below)—
all of which have resulted in the courts either dismissing her actions or rejecting her
attempts to claim an ownership interest in the Hazelhurst property, largely because
these federal courts have found that the state court foreclosure proceeding

conclusively determined that HSBC was entitled to its mortgage note and (later) to
the title it obtained at the Sheriff’s sale.2

1 Although the case comes before the Court on just the Complaint and the request for a TRO,
the Court “may take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts of record,” Granader v. Pub.
Bank, 417 F.2d 75, 82 (6th Cir. 1969), as well as take “judicial notice of the public records
pertaining to the [Hazelhurst] property,” Cotton v. City of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-cv-389, 2013
WL 1438030, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 9, 2013); accord Perkins v. Lakeview Loan Serv., LLC, No.
2:22-cv-10563, 2024 WL 100168, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 9, 2024). Indeed, Plaintiffs’ counsel
offered that same observation at the hearing on the TRO motion.
2 Dates v. Buchanan (Dates XVIII), No. 1:23-cv-449 (S.D. Ohio July 18, 2023) (Cole, J.); In re
Dates (Dates XVII), No. 1:23-bk-10007 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Jan. 5, 2023); Dates v. HSBC Bank
Dates began her federal court odyssey by filing her first bankruptcy action on
August 20, 2012, while the state court foreclosure proceeding was still pending. Dates
I (Case No. 1:12-bk-14507; Doc. 1). Although this resulted in the entry of an automatic

stay of the underlying foreclosure proceedings under 11 U.S.C. § 362, HSBC sought,
and the bankruptcy court granted, relief from that stay several months into the
proceeding. Dates XV, 2020 WL 7253301, at *1 (citing Mar. 19, 2013, Order Granting
Motion for Relief from Stay, Dates I (Case No. 1:12-bk-14507; Doc. 130)). HSBC then
successfully obtained a judgment of foreclosure in its favor in the state foreclosure
action on January 29, 2014. (Id.). In the Ohio state court system, Dates did not appeal
the foreclosure order outright; rather she sought to appeal her later denied motion

for a retrial of those state court foreclosure proceedings. But the appeals court
dismissed that appeal on September 25, 2014, for disregarding the Ohio Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Foreclosure Action, supra (Sept. 25, 2014, “Entry of Dismissal
(C 1400249)”). She never sought direct review in the Ohio Supreme Court.

USA, N.A. (Dates XVI), No. 1:19-cv-446 (S.D. Ohio June 11, 2019) (Cole, J.); Dates v. HSBC
Bank USA, N.A. (Dates XV), No. 1:19-cv-445 (S.D. Ohio June 11, 2019) (Cole, J.); Dates v.
HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (Dates XIV), No. 1:19-ap-1011 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 2019); In re
Dates (Dates XIII), No. 1:18-bk-14602 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2018); Dates v. HSBC Bank
USA, N.A. (Dates XII), No. 1:18-ap-1070 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2018); In re Dates (Dates
XI), No. 1:18-bk-13150 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2018); Dates v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.
(Dates X), No. 1:17-cv-842 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2017) (Barrett, J.); Dates v. HSBC Bank USA,
N.A. (Dates IX), No. 1:17-cv-634 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2017) (Barrett, J.); Dates v. HSBC Bank
USA, N.A. (Dates VIII), No. 1:17-cv-535 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 14, 2017) (Cole, J.); Dates v. HSBC
Bank USA, N.A. (Dates VII), No. 1:16-cv-1037 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 28, 2016) (Dlott, J.); Dates v.
HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (Dates VI), No. 1:16-ap-1052 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Sept. 12, 2016); In re
Dates (Dates V), No. 1:16-bk-12410 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio June 28, 2016); In re Dates (Dates IV),
No. 14-8034 (BAP 6th Cir. June 5, 2014); Dates v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (Dates III), No.
1:13-cv-376 (S.D. Ohio June 3, 2013) (Barrett, J.); Dates v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (Dates II),
No. 1:13-cv-291 (S.D. Ohio May 1, 2013) (Barrett, J.); In re Dates (Dates I), No. 1:12-bk-14507
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2012).
Undaunted by that state-court loss, Dates renewed her efforts in the
bankruptcy courts by serially filing bankruptcy actions there. Although the (new)
automatic bankruptcy stays associated with those filings temporarily stymied HSBC,

it eventually succeeded in enforcing the foreclosure judgment via sale of the
Hazelhurst property at auction. More specifically, in Dates’s third bankruptcy
proceeding, the bankruptcy court granted HSBC’s motion for relief from the stay, and
in doing so, it expressly noted that HSBC was “entitled to in rem relief due to [Dates’s]
serial filings.” Oct. 9, 2018, Order Granting Motion of HSBC for Relief from Stay with
Request for In Rem Relief at 2, Dates XI (Case No. 1:18-bk-13150; Doc. 26). Under
this in rem relief, the bankruptcy court held that beginning on October 9, 2018,

[t]he automatic stay shall not apply to the [Hazelhurst] property for a
period of two years as long as [HSBC], its successors and assigns hold
the note and mortgage … except that [Dates as] a debtor in a subsequent
case under th[e] [Bankruptcy Code] may move for relief from such order
based upon changed circumstances or for good cause shown, after notice
and a hearing.
Id. (emphasis added). In other words, the Hazelhurst property would not be subject
to the automatic stay in bankruptcy from October 9, 2018, until October 9, 2020, even
if it were claimed as property of a future bankruptcy estate, unless and until the
debtor sought an order from the bankruptcy court affirmatively staying in rem
actions over the Hazelhurst property.
True, Dates responded by launching a new bankruptcy proceeding on
December 21, 2018 (her fourth), hoping to take advantage of a new automatic stay.
Dates XIII (Case No. 1:18-bk-14602; Doc. 1). But HSBC, relying on the October 9,
2018, bankruptcy order providing no such automatic stay would occur, obtained an
Order for Sale from the state court. Foreclosure Action, supra (Dec. 27, 2018, “Order
for Sale Returned and Filed”). The Sheriff then sold the property at auction on
December 27, 2018. Id. (March 26, 2019, “Amended Judgment Entry Confirming

Sheriff’s Sale and Ordering Distribution”). The state court entered an order affirming
the sale and identifying HSBC as the buyer who was entitled to title on March 26,
2019. Id. Dates again appealed, but the appeals court sua sponte dismissed that
action for failure to prosecute. Id. (July 17, 2019, “Entry of Dismissal (C 190187)”).
And again, she declined to seek direct review from the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Meanwhile, the Hamilton County Recorder’s Office recorded HSBC’s deed to the
Hazelhurst property on April 15, 2019. Sheriff’s Deed, Hamilton Cnty. Recorder’s

Office (Apr. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/44UW-X9YH.
Despite no longer holding title to, or any other interest in, the property, Dates
refused to leave. The state court issued multiple Orders for Possession, which Dates
ignored. Finally, on December 20, 2022, HSBC moved in state court for an order
holding Dates in contempt on account of her refusal to vacate the property when an
HSBC representative and two police officers visited the property on December 16,

2022. Foreclosure Action, supra (Dec. 20, 2022, “Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt with
Contempt Hearing Scheduled by the Court for 1/5/23 @11:00”). After a hearing, on
January 5, 2023, the state trial court held Dates in contempt, ordered her to vacate
the premises, and authorized the Sheriff to use force in the event she did not comply.
Id. (Jan. 5, 2023, “Order Finding Defendant Carlean Dates Is in Contempt of Court”).
But, again seeking delay, Dates responded, not by appealing, but by re-traipsing her
well-trodden path to the bankruptcy court and filing a new action for bankruptcy
protection that same day. Dates XVII, 2024 WL 120028, at *1. As the two years had
elapsed on the October 2018 bankruptcy court order granting HSBC in rem relief

from the automatic stay regarding the Hazelhurst property, this new bankruptcy
filing once again resulted in an automatic stay. And based on that stay Dates
managed to remain for another year in a house she no longer owned. But that all
came to an end on January 5, 2024, when the bankruptcy court, citing the vexatious
and harassing litigation behavior that Dates had perpetrated over multiple years and
through multiple bankruptcies, dismissed the bankruptcy action as an abuse of the
judicial process and sanctioned Dates. This time it barred her from filing any further

bankruptcy actions for the next two years. Id.
Leaving out for the moment the five mandamus actions Dates filed in the Ohio
Supreme Court (which led that court also to declare her a vexatious litigator, State
ex rel. Dates v. Hamilton Cnty. Courthouse, No. 2022-1478, 203 N.E.3d 717 (Ohio Feb.
22, 2023) (table)) and the above-mentioned, recently dismissed suit in this Court in
which she sued the bankruptcy judge and trustee on frivolous claims, Dates XVIII,

No. 1:23-cv-449, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30485 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 22, 2024), that brings
us to the current suit. Given that no other bankruptcy stays are (or will be put) in
place, final action on HSBC’s attempt to take possession of the property it has owned
for nearly five years appears imminent. On February 15, 2024, the state court, after
being notified of the dismissal of Dates’s most recent bankruptcy action and the
corresponding sanctions, amended its January 5, 2023, contempt order and
reaffirmed its decision to hold Dates in contempt for continuing to squat on HSBC’s
property. Foreclosure Action, supra (Feb. 15, 2024, “Amended Order Finding
Defendant Carlean Dates Is in Contempt of Court”). It also ordered that Dates, any

occupants, and any personalty be removed from the Hazelhurst property by February
29, 2024, and authorized the Sheriff to use force to evict her and any others violating
the contempt order should the house still be occupied after that date. Id.
Dates remains unconvinced she must go. On February 22, 2024, Dates
(represented by counsel for the first time in this saga) and Ali sued HSBC in this
Court. They raise four claims:
(1) a claim that Defendants violated the purported bankruptcy stay (not
actually entered when she filed Dates XIII) when Defendants moved
forward with the December 27, 2018, Sheriff’s sale, (Doc. 3, #17–22);
(2) a claim that Defendants violated Dodd-Frank and its implementing
regulations by enforcing an invalid mortgage allegedly issued without
consideration of Dates’s ability to repay the corresponding loan (what
statutory provisions HSBC allegedly violated remain a mystery, as the
Complaint does not identify them with any meaningful specificity),3 (id.
at #22–23);
(3) a claim that Defendants violated civil RICO apparently based on the
mere fact that HSBC initiates foreclosures across the country, (id. at
#23); and
(4) a fraud claim based on Plaintiffs’ belief that the mortgage and
promissory note were invalid and because they are convinced Dates was
reconveyed the property in 2020, (id. at #23–24).

3 Admittedly, Plaintiffs cite an entire collection of regulations in the Complaint. (Doc. 3 ¶ 42,
#21 (citing 12 C.F.R. Par 1026); Doc. 9, #52 (citing all of “Regulation Z”)). But citing an entire
part of the regulatory code is not going to cut it. By failing to “specify the provision or
provisions of the [regulations], if any, that [HSBC] allegedly violated, or any facts pertaining
to [such] a violation,” Plaintiffs have not come anywhere close to demystifying how HSBC
can be held liable for contravening Dodd-Frank. Rogers v. Horwitz, No. 1:20-cv-02568, 2023
WL 6383796, at *19 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2023).
Plaintiffs simultaneously moved for a TRO. (Doc. 2). The motion engaged in no
legal analysis and instead highlighted that eviction was “immanent [sic]” and that
Dates and her husband were entitled to temporary equitable relief based on the

allegations in the unverified Complaint. (Id. at #14). The motion suggested that the
TRO requested, which is to “stop [Plaintiffs’] immanent [sic] removal from the[]
[Hazelhurst] property,” should extend until “April 1, 2024,” which is 31 days from
now. (Id.). The Court held an informal telephone conference with the parties (at which
counsel for Plaintiffs and two attorneys for HSBC appeared) on February 26, 2024,
in which the Court authorized an expedited briefing schedule. (2/26/24 Min. Entry).
HSBC opposed the TRO by the Court’s February 28, 2024, 5:00 p.m. deadline, (Doc.

8), and Plaintiffs replied the same evening, (Doc. 9). The Court then heard argument
the next day (today), February 29, 2024, at 10:00 a.m. (2/29/24 Min. Entry).
The matter is ripe for the Court’s review.
LEGAL STANDARD
“A temporary restraining order is an extraordinary remedy that should only

be granted if the movant can clearly show the need for one.” Kendall Holdings, Ltd.
v. Eden Cryogenics LLC, 630 F. Supp. 2d 853, 860 (S.D. Ohio 2008). Ultimately, “the
purpose of a TRO under Rule 65 is to preserve the status quo so that a reasoned
resolution of a dispute may be had.” Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Tr. Co., 78 F.3d
219, 226 (6th Cir. 1996). Plaintiffs “bear[] the burden of establishing entitlement to
a temporary restraining order.” Mesa Indus., Inc. v. Charter Indus. Supply, Inc., No.
1:22-cv-160, 2022 WL 1044720, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 7, 2022). “To satisfy this burden,
[Plaintiffs] must establish [their] case by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. And that
in turn means that Plaintiffs “may not merely rely on unsupported allegations, but
rather must come forward with more than ‘scant evidence’ to substantiate their

allegations.” Patel v. AR Grp. Tenn., LLC, No. 3:20-cv-52, 2020 WL 5849346, at *4
(M.D. Tenn. Oct. 1, 2020) (collecting cases).
Whether a movant is entitled to this extraordinary relief is governed by the
same four factors that apply to preliminary injunctions. See Moore v. Kempthorne,
464 F. Supp. 2d 519, 525 (E.D. Va. 2006). Those factors are: (1) whether the movant
has a substantial likelihood or probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the
movant will suffer irreparable injury if the relief is not granted; (3) whether the

injunctive relief would unjustifiably harm a third party; and (4) whether the public
interest would be served by issuing the injunctive relief. Frisch’s Rest., Inc. v.
Shoney’s Inc., 759 F.2d 1261, 1263 (6th Cir. 1985). The failure to meet the likelihood
of success prong of the analysis is not dispositive. Id. at 1270. But if it is lacking,
preliminary equitable relief is permissible only if there are at least “serious questions
going to the merits and irreparable harm which decidedly outweighs any potential

harm to the defendant if a[] [TRO] is issued.” Id. (quoting Friendship Materials Inc.
v. Mich. Brick, Inc., 947 F.2d 100, 105 (6th Cir. 1982)).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
The issues with the motion and the complaint are numerous and, given the
time constraints imposed by the relief Plaintiffs seek, the Opinion and Order cannot
exhaustively address all of them. Instead, the Court endeavors to identify below the
most salient reasons Plaintiffs lack any meaningful likelihood of success on the claims
they raise and therefore do not merit temporary injunctive relief.
Before turning to the merits, though, the Court starts, as it must, with subject-

matter jurisdiction. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–95 (1998).
Multiple problems exist on that front, which the Court may address in the order it
pleases. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007).
The first, and biggest, problem is that the Court lacks Article III jurisdiction
to entertain the injunctive relief requested here because Plaintiffs lack standing to
pursue the equitable relief they demand. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413,
431 (2021) (explaining that “standing is not dispensed in gross; rather, plaintiffs must

demonstrate standing for each claim that they press and for each form of relief that
they seek”). As explained above, the order that requires Dates and any other
occupants of the Hazelhurst property to vacate is a Hamilton County Court of
Common Pleas contempt order directing the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Office to take
forcible action with respect to any squatters who remain at the Hazelhurst property
tomorrow. Foreclosure Action, supra (Feb. 15, 2024, “Amended Order Finding

Defendant Carlean Dates Is in Contempt of Court”). That means the impending harm
of which Plaintiffs complain (removal from the property) results from the state court’s
entry of the contempt order coupled with the Sheriff’s anticipated actions under it.
Neither of these are actions that HSBC has undertaken or will undertake. That is,
HSBC is not authorized to evict Plaintiffs, and the Sheriff is doing so at the state
court’s command, not HSBC’s, so enjoining HSBC accomplishes nothing. Rather,
providing Plaintiffs the relief they seek would require an order enjoining the Sheriff
from executing the state court contempt order. But neither the Sheriff’s Office, nor
any individual law enforcement officer likely to execute the contempt order, nor the

Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas is a party to this action.
That poses an insurmountable standing problem on redressability grounds. As
the Eleventh Circuit explained, “[i]f a plaintiff sues the wrong defendant, an order
enjoining the correct official who has not been joined as a defendant cannot suddenly
make the plaintiff’s injury redressable. [A] district court [i]s without jurisdiction to
enjoin the lone defendant in this action, much less the nonparty [Sheriff’s Office].”
Jacobson v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 974 F.3d 1236, 1255 (11th Cir. 2020); cf. Terves LLC

v. Yueyang Aerospace New Materials Co., No. 1:19-cv-1611, 2022 WL 2834743, at*3
(N.D. Ohio July 20, 2022) (“An injunction ordinarily cannot be imposed on a non-
party that has not had the opportunity to contest its liability.” (cleaned up)).
Accordingly, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain the equitable
relief Plaintiffs’ motion demands. TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 423. So the TRO motion
fails out of the gate.

But that is not the sole jurisdictional problem; the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
also comes into play. The doctrine “prevents the lower federal courts from exercising
jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers challenging state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” Abbot v.
Michigan, 474 F.3d 324, 328 (6th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). Plaintiffs’ theory, as raised
here in multiple counts of the Complaint (the bankruptcy stay count, the Dodd-Frank
count, and the fraud count), is that HSBC’s attempt to obtain possession of the
Hazelhurst property is improper because HSBC never validly obtained title during
the state court foreclosure proceedings. (See Doc. 3, #17–24). But granting relief to

Plaintiffs on such grounds would necessarily require the Court to hold “that the state
court was wrong, [which] is difficult to conceive [of] … as, in substance, anything
other than [a request for this Court to entertain] a prohibited appeal of the state-
court judgment.” Tropf v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 929, 937 (6th Cir. 2002)
(citation omitted). Hence, it is of no import that Plaintiffs do not expressly attempt to
appeal or to invoke the state court foreclosure judgment. (Reply, Doc. 9, #49–50).
Form does not matter, here—just substance. And in substance, Plaintiffs’ “federal

claims are [] predicated on their conviction that the state courts were wrong [about
HSBC’s entitlement to take possession of its home]—the very definition of [claims]
‘inextricably intertwined’” with the merits of the state court judgment. Tropf, 289
F.3d at 938. After all, that is the only means by which they can deign to ask this Court
to “enjoin[] [HSBC’s taking] … possession of [its] home under the federal statutes
cited.” (Doc. 9, #49).

Rooker-Feldman bars such an implicit appeal of the state court judgment. The
short of it is that the Court lacks the power to operate as an appellate court that
reviews state court judgments. So if Plaintiffs believe that the state court erred in
permitting HSBC to obtain title to the Hazelhurst property, they must pursue that
belief in the state court—not here. Id. at 937–38 (holding that a challenge to the
validity of a warranty deed alleged to be fraudulent was barred by Rooker-Feldman
given the deed’s validity was upheld in state court proceedings).
Beyond that, the Anti-Injunction Act also bars the requested TRO. Under the

Act, “[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings
in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or [to] effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283. On first blush, it may seem odd to describe a Sheriff’s acting pursuant to a
state court’s contempt order as a “proceedings in a State court.” But the Supreme
Court has interpreted the term quite broadly, such that even the Sheriff’s actions
here are covered by the Anti-Injunction Act:

That term is comprehensive. It includes all steps taken or which may be
taken in the state court or by its officers from the institution to the close
of the final process. It applies to appellate as well as to original
proceedings; and is independent of the doctrine of res judicata. It applies
alike to action by the court and by its ministerial officers; applies not
only to an execution issued on a judgment, but to any proceeding
supplemental or ancillary taken with a view to making the suit or
judgment effective. The prohibition is applicable whether such
supplementary or ancillary proceeding is taken in the court which
rendered the judgment or in some other.
Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403 (1935). Here, the Sheriff, armed with the contempt
order to evict Plaintiffs from their home, is effectuating the state court’s foreclosure
judgment. Cf. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287
(1970) (noting “[i]t is settled that the prohibition of § 2283 cannot be evaded
by … prohibiting utilization of the results of a completed state proceeding”). As that
ancillary “execution issued on a judgment … taken with a view to making
the … judgment effective” falls within the capacious definition of a ‘proceedings in a
State court’ set forth in Hill, the Anti-Injunction Act bars the TRO, unless one of the
three enumerated exceptions applies. 296 U.S. at 403.
None does. As HSBC rightly points out, (Opp’n, Doc. 8, #38–39), neither the

motion nor the Complaint identifies legal authority permitting this Court’s enjoining
state court proceedings—indeed, the motion (other than generally to refer back to the
Complaint) cites no legal authority at all, (see Doc. 2). True, Plaintiffs belatedly claim
that, because RICO claims may generally be remedied with injunctive relief, that
means Congress expressly authorized federal courts to issue injunctions against state
courts under that statute. (Doc. 9, #50–51). But two problems with that. First, the
argument is too late to the party and therefore need not be considered. SAT Tech.,

Inc. v. CECO Env’t Corp., No. 1:18-cv-907, 2023 WL 6119934, at *3 n.7 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 19, 2023). Second, the Sixth Circuit has previously suggested that this
argument does not work. It did so by noting in a civil RICO action challenging the
validity of certain conveyances of property that “there is no statute that particularly
authorizes the federal courts to issue injunctions in the circumstances of this case.”
Tropf, 289 F.3d at 942 n.21. If the civil RICO statute did not meet the Anti-Injunction

Act exception there, little reason exists to believe it would here. And this makes sense.
Plaintiffs merely point to the availability of injunctive relief generally under RICO.
But that does not answer the more specific and relevant question here, which is
whether the statute specifically authorizes injunctions that are directed against state
court proceedings. The latter need not and does not follow from the former. Vendo Co.
v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 636 (1977) (noting that “the importance of the
federal policy to be protected by the injunction is not the focus of the inquiry” (citation
omitted)). And as the standard for a statute to authorize such injunctions expressly
requires substantial evidence of congressional authorization by reference to the

statute’s text and historical enactment, id. at 631–34 (highlighting the unique
attributes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that make it a prime candidate for the “expressly
authorized” exception that is not evident from the lack of textual authorization and
historical support for the same authorization in the Clayton Act), the authority to
grant equitable relief alone cannot be the basis for the application of this exception.
Id. at 641 (concluding that a statute that “does not by its very essence contemplate or
envision any necessary interaction with state judicial proceedings, is clearly not [] an

Act” that fits within the “expressly authorized” exception to the Anti-Injunction Act).
Moving to the second exception, there is no prior federal court judgment to
protect or to effectuate. Huguley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 999 F.2d 142, 145 (6th Cir.
1999) (noting the “protect or effectuate” exception applies to “prior federal court
judgments”). To the contrary, the myriad federal cases identified above, see supra
note 2, all ended unfavorably to Dates. And finally, the Court need not issue an

injunction to aid this Court’s jurisdiction as this is an in personam action against
HSBC, not an in rem action regarding the Hazelhurst property. Hanover Am. Ins. Co.
v. Tattooed Millionaire Ent., LLC, 38 F.4th 501, 505–06 (6th Cir. 2022); cf. GP Vincent
II v. Est. of Edgar Beard, 68 F.4th 508, 519, 523 (9th Cir. 2023) (Bea, J., concurring
in the judgment) (explaining the in rem versus in personam distinction).
Moreover, even if the Court somehow could clear these threshold hurdles,
Plaintiffs fare no better on the merits of their specific claims. Perhaps most notably,
res judicata, now more commonly called claim preclusion, bars their claims. Claim

preclusion holds that a “final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the
parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in
that action.” Fed. Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981). As noted above,
the state court entered a judgment in the foreclosure action in 2014 finding that
HSBC held a valid mortgage and an order in 2019 affirming the property’s sale to
HSBC as the current titleholder. Plaintiffs’ claims attempting to (re)litigate the
validity of the mortgage, (e.g., Doc. 9, #53–54), could have easily been raised in that

proceeding—yet, Dates instead has attempted to do so several times over in this
Court and the bankruptcy court to no avail. As the undersigned noted in an appeal
from one of the previous bankruptcy filings,
[t]he validity of the underlying lien at issue here (which resulted from a
mortgage) was determined by an Ohio state court. … [T]hat earlier
foreclosure judgment precludes Dates’ later efforts to relitigate that
same issue in her bankruptcy proceedings. The … resolution of that
issue in connection with her fourth bankruptcy action appears to this
Court to be just as correct as when the bankruptcy court reached that
same result, on that same issue, in her second bankruptcy action.
Dates XV, 2020 WL 7253301, at *7. And the passage of another three years does not
(and cannot) change that result. So there is no basis for Dates now to re-raise claims
that she could have made in resisting the state court judgment in the first instance.
Nor is there any basis for her to re-raise claims that she could have asserted in
previous federal actions.4
Given the many problems the Court already has identified, the Court declines

to tread much further. That said, the Court would be remiss if it did not note the
clearly evident problems with the conclusory allegations in the Dodd-Frank and
RICO counts of the Complaint. (Doc. 3, #22–23). These claims appear to consist only
of “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted); see also supra note 3. Whether or
not as such they could survive a motion to dismiss is a question for another day. But
for present purposes, suffice to say that they do not provide the Court a strong basis—

4 Just as Plaintiffs’ challenge to who properly holds title to the Hazelhurst property is barred
by the state court foreclosure judgment under the doctrine of res judicata, so too are some of
Dates’s other claims connected to the property by the judgments entered in the several cases
from her extensive federal court litigation history.
As the bankruptcy court (correctly) held in Dates’s most recent bankruptcy proceeding, HSBC
still holds title even though it executed an April 17, 2020, Release of Mortgage. Dates XVII,
2024 WL 120028, at *7. “The Release of Mortgage released and reconveyed HSBC’s mortgage
interest ‘to the persons legally entitled thereto.’ At the time of the release, that ‘person’ was
HSBC, holding legal title to the Hazelhurst Property pursuant to the Sheriff's Deed” recorded
a year before. Id. (cleaned up). Dates cannot be heard to suggest she obtained title on account
of HSBC’s release of the mortgage to itself in order to create a clean title to the Hazelhurst
property subject to no encumbrances. The Hazelhurst property is HSBC’s, as it has been for
nearly five years.
Similarly, despite Plaintiffs’ continued insistence to the contrary, (Doc. 9, #51–52), no
violation of the bankruptcy court stay could have occurred when HSBC initiated a Sheriff’s
sale of the Hazelhurst property in late 2018. The bankruptcy court rejected this spurious
argument that Plaintiffs now rehash and offered the following observation: no automatic stay
barred the sale as “HSBC had previously obtained in rem relief from the automatic stay
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(4) in Case Number 18-13150 by order entered on October 9,
2018 and the relief granted was valid for a period of two years [Case Number 18-13150,
Docket Number 26].” Dates XVII, 2024 WL 120028, at *7 n.7.
Simply, the repackaged Complaint counsel filed here fares no better than any of the other
dozen-and-half uncounseled suits raising largely the same specious challenges.
and certainly not a clear and convincing basis—to conclude that Plaintiffs are likely
to prevail on their action.
And beyond that there is the question of evidence generally. As noted above, a

plaintiff seeking a TRO must provide an evidentiary basis supporting that request.
See Patel, 2020 WL 5849346, at *4. Often, that comes in the form of a verified
complaint, which amounts to an affidavit, as the plaintiff signs it under penalty of
perjury. But the Complaint here is not verified, and thus is not evidence, as Plaintiffs’
counsel conceded during argument. Nor have Plaintiffs attached any evidence to their
motion, as counsel also conceded. That in turn means, as counsel also acknowledged,
that the only evidentiary record before the Court is the previous litigation history, of

which the Court can take judicial notice. But for all the reasons discussed above, the
litigation history does not support (to put it mildly) Plaintiffs’ request for a TRO. So
even putting aside all of the legal problems noted above, Plaintiffs have abjectly failed
to carry the evidentiary burden required to support their requested relief.
In sum, on a host of fronts, both substantive and procedural, the Court sees an
array of deficiencies with the claims, the Complaint, and the TRO motion. The

jurisdictional, pleading, res judicata, and merits problems (merits that have been
litigated and relitigated in several forums), all point in one direction: Plaintiffs have
not established any meaningful likelihood of success on their claims. And because the
Complaint raises no serious questions going to the merits of the claims, the Court
need not address any of the other preliminary injunction factors, as the apparently
spurious nature of Plaintiffs’ claims in and of itself dooms any request for relief.
Frisch’s, 759 F.2d at 1270.
But the Court closes with a further observation on the balance of harms. Here

it is granting the TRO that would cause harm, not denying it. HSBC has owned the
Hazelhurst property for five years but has been denied possession for that entire time.
The protection of property rights, like HSBC’s, is an essential component of our
constitutional legal structure. See U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV. Any further delay
occasioned by this Court would simply add to HSBC’s costs and the harm it has
suffered to date.
And even that does not tell the whole story of the harm at issue here. Mortgage

lenders provide money to support home purchases at favorable interest rates
precisely because the lenders have a way to minimize their losses in the event of
default. In the parlance of the banking industry, mortgage loans are said to be
“secured,” which simply means that the lender has access to a straightforward
mechanism for repossessing the collateral (the home) in a relatively fast and efficient
manner if the borrower stops paying. Because the availability of such relief reduces

the risk accompanying such loans, that reduced risk is passed on to borrowers in the
form of lower rates generally. But if parties like the Plaintiffs here are successful in
turning the foreclosure process into a multi-year, multi-jurisdictional slog, then the
value to the lender of the repossession right goes down, and the risk goes up. In turn,
that means that interest rates for mortgage loans will rise across the board, as such
loans will be less “secure.” And that means home purchasers will pay more for their
mortgages.
Plaintiffs’ only response on the harm front is to assert that: “Defendant is an

international bank. How serious an injury could the ordering of a temporary stay be”?
(Doc. 9, #53). At one level, Plaintiffs may be correct that HSBC, with its resources,
could “afford” to let Dates remain in the house in some sense of that term. But
remember that the “temporary stay” sought here is merely the latest installment in
a series of events that have resulted in a roughly five-year delay in Plaintiffs’ leaving
the house after the sale was complete. And nothing before the Court suggests any
reason that Plaintiffs should be subject to special property rules. So the question is

not whether HSBC could absorb such a loss as to Dates, but rather whether it could
absorb that type of loss as to all mortgage borrowers across the board. But that just
leads directly to the point immediately above—when risks change, so do interest
rates, and that outcome harms homeowners generally.
Does that mean that borrowers have no rights when lenders seek eviction? Of
course not. Borrowers have due process rights to present any defenses they have to

foreclosure or eviction in the foreclosure action itself, or even perhaps to file for
bankruptcy protection, if they qualify, to stop those proceedings in their tracks. But
here Dates has received due process, indeed oodles of process, with multiple suits in
multiple courts, all largely re-plowing the same ground. It is just that she lost.
And that brings the Court to its final observation about harm, which is the
harm that repetitive filings cause to the judicial system itself. A fundamental tenet
of the judicial process is that parties present all their arguments relating to a given
matter to the first forum that has jurisdiction over a matter. And if a party disagrees
with the resolution in that forum, the proper avenue for registering that
disagreement is by way of an appeal. Parties have every right to disagree with a
court’s conclusion if they wish. Indeed, roughly fifty percent of the parties in any
action tend to disagree with the court’s resolution. And courts are by no means
infallible. But parties cannot rely on their disagreement with a court’s decision as a
basis for simply ignoring court orders. Nor, except in very limited circumstances not
present here, can they just proceed to file a new case in a new court system in hopes
of obtaining a different answer than the one they already received.

CONCLUSION
Over the past ten years, much ink has been spilled, and many trees felled, on
a straightforward foreclosure proceeding and the long string of objections to that
proceeding that Dates has repeatedly raised in multiple forums to no avail. That
Dates now has counsel pressing those claims—or seeking to add new ones in support
of Dates’ previous efforts to prevent the state-court ordered eviction—does not change
the outcome. Because the lack of any prospect for success on the merits of Plaintiffs’
claims dooms the request for a TRO, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 2).
SO ORDERED.
\
February 29, 2024
DATE DOUGLAS R. COLE \
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
22

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10384142. Public record. Not legal advice.