# Holmes v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · November 30, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10383682

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** November 30, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS

BRIAN ISIAH HOLMES, JR. : Case No. 2:23-cv-3147
:
Plaintiff, :
: District Judge Sarah D. Morrison
vs. :
Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.
:
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF :
REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION, :
et al., :
:
Defendants. :
:

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 6). Plaintiff, a
prisoner at the Chillicothe Correctional Institute (CCI), initially filed this pro se civil rights action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC)
for allegedly violating his constitutional rights. (Doc. 3).
On October 17, 2023, the undersigned filed an initial screening Report and
Recommendation that recommended dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. (Doc. 4). The undersigned found that the sole Defendant—
the ODRC—was not proper a party under § 1983. (Id., at PageID 92). However, the undersigned
recommended that Plaintiff be granted leave to file an amended complaint to rectify the identified
deficiency. (Id., at PageID 93). On November 3, 2023, the District Court adopted in full the
October 17, 2023 Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 7).
In the meantime, on November 2, 2023, Plaintiff filed an amended pleading. (Doc. 6).
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint supersedes Plaintiff’s earlier filed complaint and is the operative
complaint in this case. (See Doc. 7, at PageID 129). See also Scuba v. Wilkinson, No. 1:06-cv-
160, 2006 WL 2794939, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2006) (citing Parry v. Mohawk Motors of
Mich., Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 306 (6th Cir. 2000)); Calhoun v. Bergh, 769 F.3d 409, 410 (6th Cir.
2014) (“An amended complaint supersedes an earlier complaint for all purposes.”) (quotation and
citation omitted).

This matter is now before the undersigned for initial screening of Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to
recommend dismissal of the Amended Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A.
Initial Screening Standard

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner seeking “redress from a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity,” and is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is required to
conduct an initial screening of his complaint. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(a), 1915(e)(2).
The Court must dismiss the Complaint, or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b), 1915(e)(2).
To state a claim for relief, a complaint must set forth “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Court must
construe the complaint in the plaintiff’s favor, accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true,
and evaluate whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). However, a
complaint that consists of “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action” is insufficient. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

In the interest of justice, this Court is also required to construe a pro se complaint liberally
and to hold it “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f) [now (e)]). Even with such a liberal construction, a pro se complaint must still
adhere to the “basic pleading essentials.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
Specifically, a pro se “complaint ‘must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting
all the material elements’ to recover under some viable legal theory.” Barhite v. Caruso, 377 F.
App’x 508, 510 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 716 (6th Cir. 2005)).
Amended Complaint

Plaintiff brings this action against Annette Chambers-Smith, Director of the ODRC, and
two CCI employees, Lt. Ashley Marsh and A. Spaniol. Plaintiff’s allegations are set forth in two
counts:
In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that, on August 8, 2023, Defendants Marsh and Spaniol
improperly processed legal mail that he received from his defense attorney, in violation of the
First and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution and ODRC policy. (Doc. 6, at
PageID 100-01).
In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that ODRC’s legal-mail policies violate, and have led to
violations of, his rights under the First and Sixth Amendments. (Id., at PageID 100-02).
Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief. (Id. at PageID 104-05).
Analysis

At this stage of the proceedings, without the benefit of an answer or other briefing, the
undersigned concludes that Plaintiff may proceed at this juncture for further development with
Count Two’s claims against Defendant Chambers-Smith based on Plaintiff’s allegations of
unlawful ODRC policies.1 However, the remaining claims should be dismissed for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2).
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s claims against any defendant in an official capacity must be
dismissed to the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Absent an express waiver, a state
is immune from damage suits under the Eleventh Amendment. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v.
Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974). The
State of Ohio has not constitutionally nor statutorily waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in
the federal courts. See Johns v. Supreme Court of Ohio, 753 F.2d 524, 527 (6th Cir. 1985); State
of Ohio v. Madeline Marie Nursing Homes, 694 F.2d 449, 460-62 (6th Cir. 1982). The Eleventh

Amendment bar extends to actions where the state is not a named party, but where the action is
essentially one for the recovery of money from the state. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663; Ford Motor
Company v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). A suit against defendants in their official
capacities would, in reality, be a way of pleading the action against the entity of which defendants
are agents. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Thus, actions against state
officials in their official capacities are included in this bar. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). See also Colvin v. Caruso,

1However, the Court advises Plaintiff that this is only a preliminary determination. The Court has not made
a determination as to the merits of the claims or potential defenses thereto, nor is Defendant precluded from filing a
motion to dismiss, motion for more definite statement, or other appropriate motion under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See, e.g., Wiley v. Austin, No. 8:20CV220, 2020 WL 6204382, at *3 (D. Neb. Oct. 22, 2020).
605 F.3d 282, 289 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Cady v. Arenac Co., 574 F.3d 334, 344 (6th Cir. 2009))
(“[A]n official-capacity suit against a state official is deemed to be a suit against the state and is
thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment, absent a waiver.” (citation and ellipsis omitted)).
Therefore, the individual Defendants are immune from suit in their official capacities to the extent
that Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.

Next, a § 1983 claim cannot be based on a violation of ODRC policy. See Williams v.
Burgess, No. 5:21-cv-99, 2021 WL 5816830, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 7, 2021) (citing Laney v.
Farley, 501 F.3d 577, 580 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007)) (“The purpose of § 1983 is to remedy violations of
federal law, not state law.”); Lewellen v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 34 F.3d 345, 347 (6th Cir.
1994) (“Unless a deprivation of some federal constitutional or statutory right has occurred, § 1983
provides no redress even if the plaintiff’s common law rights have been violated and even if the
remedies available under state law are inadequate”). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants violated ODRC policy, such a claim should be dismissed. See Brown v. Mahlman,
No. 1:22-cv-239, 2022 WL 17817615, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 19, 2022) (dismissing alleged

violations of ODRC policy because they “fall outside the scope of § 1983”).
Finally, Count One should be dismissed in its entirety. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
Marsh and Spaniol improperly opened his legal mail on a single occasion in August 2023. These
allegations are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. An isolated incident
of inadvertent mail interference does not state a claim that rises to the level of constitutional
magnitude. See Okoro v. Scibana, 63 F. App’x. 182, 184 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Such a random and
isolated incident [of alleged interference with the plaintiff’s mail] is insufficient to establish a
constitutional violation.”); Johnson v. Wilkinson, No. 98-3866, 2000 WL 1175519, *2 (6th Cir.
Aug. 11, 2000) (“This random and isolated interference with [the plaintiff’s] mail did not violate
his constitutional rights.”). See also Whiting v. Washington Twp., No. 3:19CV1707, 2020 WL
1481449, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 23, 2020) (citing Okoro and other cases). Accordingly, Count
One is subject to dismissal.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. Count Two’s claims against Defendant Chambers-Smith under the
First and Sixth Amendments may proceed to further development at
this time based on Plaintiff’s allegations of unlawful ODRC
policies.

2. Plaintiff, however, has not yet provided to the Court the required
service documents for Defendant Chambers-Smith. Plaintiff is
ORDERED to provide a completed summons and U.S. Marshal
form for Defendant Chambers-Smith so that service of process can
be accomplished. The documents must be submitted within thirty
(30) days of the date of this Order. The CLERK OF COURT is
DIRECTED to send a summons form and a U.S. Marshal form to
Plaintiff for this purpose.

3. Plaintiff is ORDERED to keep this Court informed of his current
addresses, and promptly file a Notice of New Address if he is
released or transferred.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. The Court DISMISS the following remaining claims with
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted:
A. All claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their
official capacities;
B. Any § 1983 claim based on violations of ODRC policy; and
C. Count One of the Amended Complaint in its entirety.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b), 1915(e)(2).

2. The Court CERTIFY pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that, for
the reasons discussed above, an appeal of any Order adopting this
Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good faith. See
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS:
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections
to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served
with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely motion by either
side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of the R&R objected to,

and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party shall
respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy
of those objections. Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit
rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947
(6th Cir. 1981).

November 30, 2023 s/Peter B. Silvain, Jr.
PETER B. SILVAIN, JR.
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10383682. Public record. Not legal advice.