# Donithan v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · November 3, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10383538

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** November 3, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Patricia Donithan,
Plaintiff, Case No. 2:21-cv-1136
vV. Judge Michael H. Watson
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation Magistrate Judge Vascura
& Correction,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“Defendant”) moves for

summary judgment on each of Patricia Donithan’s (“Plaintiff”) claims of retaliation
under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Mot., ECF Nos. 59, 61.’ For
the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion.
I. FACTS
Plaintiff worked for Defendant from 1996 until 2021. Donithan Dep. 18:3-
9: 41:13-15, ECF No. 55. During the pertinent timeframe, Plaintiff worked as a
Records Management Supervisor, Document Management File Retention.
Donithan Dep. 38:22—42:7, ECF No. 55. Plaintiff's direct supervisor was
Administrative Officer 2 (“Assistant Chief’), Carolyn Young (“Young”). /d. at

1 ECF No. 59 was not compliant with the Court’s local requirement that documents be
submitted in a text-searchable format, see Notice, ECF No. 60. Accordingly, a
compliant version was resubmitted in ECF No. 61. The Court cites to ECF No. 61
throughout this Opinion and Order.

43:3-7; Bower Dep. 17:10-12, ECF No. 52; Young Dep. 16:8-24, ECF No. 51.
Young's direct supervisor was the Chief of Sentence Computation and Records
Management, Liann Bower (“Bower”). Donithan Dep. at 43:13-16, ECF No. 555;
Bower Dep. 14:4—5, ECF No. 52.
Plaintiff took FMLA leave in 2016, 2017, and 2018 to care for her father.
Id. at 63:19-24. Plaintiff applied for, but was denied, various promotions from
2017 through 2021. /d. at 64:16-65:16. She believes each promotion denial
was retaliation for taking FMLA leave. See generally, id. Additional facts are
discussed below, as necessary.
ll. © STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard governing summary judgment is set forth in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(a), which provides: “The court shall grant summary judgment
if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
The Court must grant summary judgment if the opposing party “fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party’s case” and “on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Van Gorder v.
Grand Trunk W. R.R., Inc., 509 F.3d 265, 268 (6th Cir. 2007).
When reviewing a summary judgment motion, the Court must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, who must set forth
specific facts showing there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial, and the
Case No. 2:21-cv-1136 Page 2 of 22

Court must refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the
evidence. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 255 (1986).
The Court disregards “all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury
would not be required to believe.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). Summary judgment will “not lie if the dispute
about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see a/so Barrett v. Whirlpool
Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 511 (6th Cir. 2009).
The Court is not “obligated to wade through and search the entire record
for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party’s claim.”
InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court
may rely on the parties to call attention to the specific portions of the record that
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. LaSalle
Bank N.A., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1022 (S.D. Ohio 2009).
lil. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff alleges that FMLA retaliation is the reason she failed to obtain five
separate promotions: (1) a 2017 promotion to a Correction Record Sentence
Computation/Release Supervisor position; (2) a subsequent 2017 promotion to
Administrative Officer 2; (3)/(4) two 2018 promotions to Correction Record

Case No. 2:21-cv-1136 Page 3 of 22

Sentence Computation Release Auditor Supervisor; and (5) a 2021 promotion to
Release Supervisor. Resp., ECF No. 67.
A. Untimely Claims
The first two instances of alleged retaliation involve promotions that were
filled in 2017. See, e.g., Kimbro Decl. JJ 10, 12, ECF No. 61-2; Kimbro Decl.,
ECF No. 61-3 at PAGEID ## 1345, 1353.
Defendant argues that retaliation claims based on these instances are
barred by the statute of limitations.?, Mot. Summ. J. 14-15, ECF No. 61.
As the Court noted in a prior Opinion and Order in this case:
Generally, there is a two-year statute of limitations for all FMLA
claims. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1) (“Except as provided in paragraph (2),
an action may be brought under this section not later than 2 years
after the date of the last event constituting the alleged violation for
which the action is brought.”). The statute of limitations is extended
to three years for willful violations, however. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(2)
(“In the case of such action brought for a willful violation of section
2615 of this title, such action may be brought within 3 years of the
date of the last event constituting the alleged violation for which such
action is brought.”).
Op. and Order 4, ECF No. 35.
Plaintiffs original Complaint was filed on March 16, 2021, which falls
outside even the generous three-year statute of limitations. See Compl., ECF

2 Defendant also argues that Plaintiff did not raise claims based on these instances in
her Second Amended Complaint, failed to move to amend her complaint after discovery
to add these claims, and should therefore be barred from asserting them. Mot. Summ.
J. 14-15, ECF No. 61 (“Because Donithan did not mention either 2017 position in her
Second Amended Complaint, this Court should not consider them.”). Because the
claims are untimely, the Court need not consider that alternative basis for dismissal.
Case No. 2:21-cv-1136 Page 4 of 22

No. 1. Plaintiff offers no response to Defendant's statute of limitations argument,
and the Court finds that any retaliation claim based on a failure to promote that
occurred in 2017 is time-barred. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITH
PREJUDICE Plaintiff's first two claims.
B. Timely Claims
The remainder of Plaintiff's claims are arguably timely and should therefore
be addressed on the merits.*
1. FMLA Retaliation
The FMLA states that it is “unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any
other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made
unlawful by this subchapter.” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.220(c) (stating the FMLA “prohibits an employer from discriminating or
retaliating against an employee . . . for having exercised or attempted to exercise
FMLA rights.”). Thus, the FMLA “encompasses a retaliation theory.” Johnson v.
Fifth Third Bank, 685 F. App’x 379, 384 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
When, as here, a plaintiff asserts a single-motive FMLA retaliation claim,’
the Court must determine whether that plaintiff relies on direct evidence or on

3 See Op. and Order 4~8, ECF No. 35 (discussing the timeliness of the 2018 claims and
declining to find at the motion to dismiss stage that the two-year limitations period
applied). Defendant did not address in its summary judgment motion whether the two-
or three-year limitations period applied to Plaintiffs claims based on the events in 2018,
and the Court therefore does not consider whether those claims are time-barred.
4 The Price Waterhouse and Desert Palace principles, as modified in White v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008) to create a summary judgment standard
in mixed-motive Title Vil cases, likely apply to a summary judgment analysis of mixed-
motive FMLA retaliation claims. However, because Plaintiff never identifies her claim as
Case No. 2:21-cv-1136 Page 5 of 22

circumstantial evidence. This is because one analysis applies for plaintiffs who
offer direct evidence of retaliation, while the familiar McDonnell Douglas/Burdine
tripartite burden-shifting test applies for those who rely on circumstantial
evidence. E.g., Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2012) (“There is no
doubt that this Court applies the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
to FMLA retaliation suits when the plaintiff produces indirect evidence of a causal
connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”
(citations omitted)); Johnson, 685 F. App’x at 384 (analyzing single-motive FMLA
retaliation claim based on circumstantial evidence under McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine).
2. Direct versus Circumstantial Evidence
The parties here dispute whether Plaintiff has offered direct evidence, and,
therefore, they dispute Plaintiffs burden of proof on summary judgment. Thus,
the first issue the Court must determine is whether Plaintiff has produced direct
evidence that she was denied the promotions in 2018 and 2021 because she
took FMLA leave.
Plaintiff offers two statements that she contends constitute direct evidence
that FMLA retaliation is the real reason for her failure to obtain the 2018 and

a mixed-motive claim, never invokes Price Waterhouse/Desert Palace (and, instead,
refers to the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework), and emphasizes the distinction
between direct and circumstantial evidence, the Court treats this case as asserting only
single-motive FMLA retaliation claims. Cf. Hashem-Younes v. Danou Enters. Inc., 311
F. App’x 777, 779 (6th Cir. 2009).
Case No. 2:21-cv-1136 Page 6 of 22

2021 promotions. First, Plaintiff testified that in March of 2018, she and Young
discussed a new employee who would be joining Plaintiff's section. Donithan
Dep. 66:17-69:3; ECF No. 55. During that conversation, Young said something
along the lines of, “let’s look and see if she has an FMLA.” /d. at 69:4—-5. In

response, Plaintiff told Young that not all employees who have an FMLA
certification in place abuse it. /d. at 69:9-12. Young responded to Plaintiff's
statement with something like, “yes, but I’ve been burned too many times.” /d. at
69:12-13.
Second, Plaintiff provided an affidavit from a former co-worker, Julia
Kempher (“Kempher’), who overheard Bower and Young discussing Plaintiff.
According to Kempher's affidavit, Bower refused to permit Plaintiff to attend ’a
week or two of training” in 2015 because of Plaintiffs recent absences. Kempher
Aff. 1 6, ECF No. 67-4. When Young told Bower that the absences were FMLA-
related, Bower replied “No, | don’t care, she needs to be here if we're going to
reward her.” /d.
Plaintiff alleges that each statement is direct evidence of FMLA retaliation.
The Court disagrees.
“Direct evidence of discrimination ‘must establish not only that the plaintiff's
employer was predisposed to discriminate on the basis of [the FMLA], but also
that the employer acted on that predisposition.” Curry v. Brown, 607 F. App’x
519, 523 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696,
707 (6th Cir. 2008)). “[G]eneral, vague, or ambiguous comments do not
Case No. 2:21-cv-1136 Page 7 of 22

constitute direct evidence of discrimination because such remarks require a
factfinder to draw further inferences to support a finding of discriminatory
animus.” Daugherty, 544 F.3d at 708 (citations omitted).
Here, neither statement amounts to direct evidence because neither
explicitly shows an improper motive for the specific, at-issue promotion denials in
2018 or 2021. Instead, even though the statements demonstrate animus toward
employees who take FMLA leave, a factfinder would need to infer that the
decisions not to promote Plaintiff in 2018 and 2021 were tainted by such animus.
For example, Bower's statement occurred in 2015 and therefore plainly does not
indicate without further inference any reason for decisions made in 2078 or 2027.
And Young’s statement referred to a third party and therefore also cannot show
without further inference why actions were taken with respect to Plaintiff. Cf,
Foster v. Michigan, 573 F. App’x 377, 393 (6th Cir. 2014) (singular statement
made not specifically about the plaintiffs, not in connection with an adverse
employment action, and three years before any evaluation was not direct
evidence for purposes of a § 1983 intentional discrimination claim); Griffin v.
Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2012) (“The fact that the statements do not
specifically mention Daugherty means only that they are not direct evidence of
discrimination; they could still be circumstantial evidence of discrimination.”
(citation omitted)); Blair v. Henry Filters, Inc., 505 F.3d 517, 524-25 (6th Cir.
2007), overruled on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S.
167 (2009) (statement that plaintiff was “too old” to handle an account was direct
Case No. 2:21-cv-1136 Page 8 of 22

evidence that age discrimination caused the plaintiff's removal from the account
but not that age discrimination caused the plaintiffs termination).
Because these statements require an additional inference, they are unlike
those the Sixth Circuit has labelled direct evidence. For example, in Daugherty,
a supervisor explicitly told Daugherty that he would lose his job if he used his
remaining FMLA leave. The plaintiff used the leave and was subsequently
terminated. The Circuit unsurprisingly found the supervisor's statement was
direct evidence because the threat “d[id] not indicate merely a general bias
against employees taking FMLA leave, but rather establishe[d] a clear
connection between Daugherty’s last FMLA leave and [the supervisor's] decision
to discharge Daugherty from his employment.” Daugherty, 544 F.3d at 708; cf.
Hunter v. Valley View Local Schs., 579 F.3d 688, 692-93 (6th Cir. 2009) (direct
evidence where the decisionmaker testified at deposition that the plaintiffs
absenteeism—due, in part, to FMLA leave—was one reason she placed the
plaintiff on involuntary leave).
As mentioned above, neither of these statements directly link animus
against FMLA users to Plaintiffs promotion denials. Thus, the Court concludes
that Plaintiff's timely claims should be analyzed under the McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine burden-shifting framework used for cases that rely on
circumstantial evidence. Cf. Tilley v. Kalamazoo Cty. Rd. Comm'n, 654 F. App’x
675, 683, 685 (6th Cir. 2016) (although termination letter could be read as
indicating that FMLA was a reason for the plaintiff's termination, it amounted to
Case No. 2:21-cv-1136 Page 9 of 22

circumstantial evidence because there was “no direct statement” that the FMLA
leave motivated termination); Curry, 607 F. App’x at 523 (statement that plaintiff
“needed to focus on her health problems, transfer to Burlington and it would be
less stressful” was not direct evidence that demotion and transfer were due to
FMLA leave); Rowan v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc., 360 F.3d 544, 548
(6th Cir. 2004) (general statements from management “about the need to lower
the average of their workforce” not direct evidence that plaintiffs were fired
because of age discrimination); Hein v. All Am. Plywood Co., Inc., 232 F.3d 482,
489 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Although the Big Boy sales updates, the references to
‘weight limits,’ and the ‘Burger Boy’ nicknames might raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to Ludwinski’s predisposition towards weight discrimination, Hein
presented no evidence to connect Ludwinski’s alleged prejudice against heavier
individuals with his decision to fire Hein.”).
3. McDonnell Douglas/Burdine
To make out a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation pursuant to McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine, Plaintiff must prove that: “(1) she availed herself of a protected
right under the FMLA .. . ; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and
(3) . .. there was a causal connection between the exercise of her rights under
the FMLA and the adverse employment action.” Edgar v. JAC Prods., Inc., 443
F.3d 501, 508 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
With respect to the third prong, “[aJn employer’s motive is an integral part
of the analysis ‘because retaliation claims impose liability on employers that act
Case No. 2:21-cv-1136 Page 10 of 22

against employees specifically because those employees invoked their FMLA
rights.” Daugherty, 544 F.3d 696, 707 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Edgar, 443 F.3d
at 508). Evidence that “supports an inference’ that the adverse action was taken
because a plaintiff exercised FMLA rights is sufficient to establish a causal
connection for purposes of a prima facie case. Johnson, 685 F. App’x at 384-85
(internal quotations and citation omitted). Thus, “[e]stablishing a prima facie
case” of FMLA retaliation under McDonnell Douglas/Burdine “is easily met.”
Johnson, 685 F. App’x at 384—85 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
defendant to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.
Edgar, 443 F.3d at 508 (citation omitted). If the defendant offers such a reason,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish a genuine dispute of material
fact that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was pretext and that FMLA
retaliation was the real reason a defendant took the adverse action. Johnson,
685 F. App’x 385-86.
A plaintiff can demonstrate pretext by raising a genuine dispute of material
fact that either: (1) “the proffered reason{] had no basis in fact, (2) . . . the
proffered reason[] did not actually motivate the employer's action, or (3)... it

was insufficient to motivate the employer’s action.” /d. at 386 (cleaned up). “To
succeed, [the plaintiff] must put forth evidence which demonstrates that the
employer did not honestly believe in the proffered non-discriminatory reason for

Case No. 2:21-cv-1136 Page 11 of 22

its adverse employment action.” /d. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
a. Analysis
For each of the three remaining promotions, Defendant admits that Plaintiff
availed herself of a protected right (using FMLA leave to care for her father) and
suffered adverse employment actions (failing to obtain the 2018 and 2021
promotions). But, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie

case as to any of the three remaining promotions because there is no genuine
issue of material fact as to whether there was a causal connection between her

use of FMLA leave and her failure to obtain a promotion. Mot. Summ. J., ECF
No. 15-17. Moreover, Defendant argues that, if Plaintiff can establish a prima
facie case, it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for each promotion
denial, which Plaintiff is unable to rebut. /d. at 17-20.
The Court begins by determining whether Plaintiff offered evidence
sufficient for a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation as to each remaining
promotion.
As circumstantial evidence of causation, Plaintiff offers Young’s 2018
statement asking whether a different employee has ever taken FMLA leave,
Bower's 2015 refusal to permit Plaintiff to participate in weeks-long training
because of then-recent absences from the office, an affidavit from another
employee, Michelle Kountz (“Kountz’), who alleges that Young and Bower
interfered with Kountz’s attempts to take FMLA leave, and an unsupported
Case No. 2:21-cv-1136 Page 12 of 22

allegation that Bower, based on anti-FMLA animus, purposefully violated the
terms of a 2017 mediation out of a desire to make Plaintiff a less-credentialed
candidate for future promotions. See generally, Resp., ECF No. 67.
To determine whether this circumstantial evidence supports an inference
of causation, it is important to set forth Defendant's general procedure for filling
vacancies and to consider the undisputed evidence regarding how each at-issue

vacancy was filled in this case.
There is no dispute as to the general procedure for filling vacancies at
Defendant. The first relevant step was for Human Resources to post the

vacancy. Bower Dep. 42:5-6, ECF No. 52.° Once the application period closed,
Human Resources forwarded all applications (with required documents) to
Bower, and she or Young would screen each application and determine whether
the applicant met required minimum qualifications. /d. at 42:6—14. If an applicant
did not meet the minimum qualifications, they did not receive an interview. /d. at
44:4-8.
A Subject Matter Expert (“SME”) then reviewed for various criteria all
applications submitted by applicants who met minimum qualifications, and the
SME scored each application based on those criteria. Id. at 43:24-44:25. The
SME’s scores were used to determine which applicants received an interview,
and Human Resources scheduled those interviews. /d. at 42:14—-20; 44:22-25.

5 Bower's testimony as to this process is consistent with Defendant's policies during the
pertinent timeframes. See ECF No. 61-2 at PAGEID ## 1287-1300.
Case No. 2:21-cv-1136 Page 13 of 22

Those applicants selected for an interview then interviewed before a panel
of three. See jd. at 42:20-21. Bower would sometimes serve on an interview
panel; “it kind of depended on who was available and what position it was. So it

was different for . . . each position and what area it was in.” /d. at 42:20-25.
Young also served on some interview panels. Young Dep. 23:24—24:8, 26:1—5,
ECF No. 51.
Upon completion of the interviews, the panel would discuss the
interviewees amongst themselves and submit a recommendation to Bower as to
whom to hire. Bower Dep. 43:1-8, ECF No. 52. Bower was required to approve
the recommendation, and her approval ultimately determined “whether or not the

person [recommended by the panel] receive[d] the opportunity,” because she
had the power to “change the recommendation.” /d. at 43:19-23, 57: 6-13. But
Bower did not “really review anything” before signing off on a recommendation
and “never went against a panel’s recommendation” during her entire tenure as
Chief. /d. at 57:6-—13. Once Bower signed off on a panel’s recommendation, the
form was transferred to Human Resources because the Chief of Human
Resources “has the final signature on the positions.” /d. at 43:3-18; 50:15—
51:24.
1. 2018 Promotions
For both 2018 promotions, the SME was Donelle Cummins (“Cummins”).
Kimbro Decl. Jf] 14, 16, ECF No. 61-2 at PAGEID ## 1284-85; Rec. for
Personnel Selection, ECF No. 61-3 at PAGEID # 1361; Rec. for Personnel
Case No. 2:21-cv-1136 Page 14 of 22

Selection, ECF No. 61-4 at PAGEID # 1371. It is uncontested that, based on
Cummins’ scoring of the applications, Plaintiff received an interview for each
2018 position. Donithan Dep. 125:2—127:23, ECF No. 55.
The interview panel for both positions consisted of Cummins, Mary Oakley
(“Oakley”), and Bryan Byorth (“Byorth”). Kimbro Decl. J 14, 16, ECF No. 61-2 at
PAGEID ## 1284-85; Rec. for Personnel Selection, ECF No. 61-3 at PAGEID
# 1361; Rec. for Personnel Selection, ECF No. 61-4 at PAGEID # 1371. The
parties did not submit declarations or deposition transcripts from Oakley or
Byorth, but Cummins stated under oath that, after the interviews were conducted,
the panelists discussed “the candidates’ qualifications for the positions and not
the candidates’ FMLA status.” Cummins Decl. 7 10, ECF No. 61-1. Indeed,
Cummins averred that she was not even aware of Plaintiffs FMLA status at the
time of the interviews and recommendations and that Plaintiff's FMLA status did
not influence her recommendations for either of the 2018 promotions. /d. at Tf 9,
11. The panelists ultimately recommended Lucrecia Hager (“Hager”) and
Christopher Dunn (“Dunn”) for the two 2018 promotions. Rec.for Personnel
Selection, ECF No. 61-3 at PAGEID # 1361; Rec. for Personnel Selection, ECF
No. 61-4 at PAGEID # 1371.
Bower approved the panelists’ recommendations for the two 2018
promotions. /d. Again, although Bower had the authority to change the panel's
recommendations, she has “never” done so. Bower Dep. 57:3-13, ECF No. 52.

Case No. 2:21-cv-1136 Page 15 of 22

Plaintiff offers no evidence to contradict Cummins’ testimony that Cummins

was not aware of Plaintiffs FMLA status, that the panel did not discuss the same
when reaching their consensus candidates, and that Plaintiffs FMLA status did
not impact Cummins’ 2018 promotion decisions. Similarly, Plaintiff offers no
evidence that either Oakley or Byorth knew about, let alone considered, Plaintiff's
FMLA status when determining who to recommend for the 2018 promotions.
Rather, Plaintiffs causation theory is that Bower made the “final selection] for
the promotions at issue,” Resp. 5, ECF No. 67, and that Bower was biased
against Plaintiff.
But even assuming for the sake of argument that Bower harbored animus
against Plaintiff for using FMLA leave, Plaintiffs causation argument lacks merit.
Her argument is essentially that the panel recommended Hager and Dunn for
these positions, that the panel’s recommendations were not the result of FMLA
retaliation, but that FMLA retaliation is the reason Bower refused to change the
recommendations and exercise her authority to instead appoint Plaintiff to one of
the open positions. This is too attenuated an argument to satisfy even the low
barrier at summary judgment with respect to raising a genuine dispute of material
fact on causation. It simply does not raise an inference that FMLA retaliation is
the reason Plaintiff lost the two 2018 promotions, because no one with even
arguable animus “made” the decisions in the real sense of the word. The
“untainted” panel made the hiring decisions. Bower did not “dec[ide] on whom to
select for promotions” as Plaintiff maintains, Resp. 9, ECF No. 67; Bower simply
Case No. 2:21-cv-1136 Page 16 of 22

failed to override those untainted decisions. This conclusion on causation is
especially strong here, where Bower testified that she has never overridden a
panel’s recommendation.
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff invokes temporal proximity to satisfy her
prima facie burden, she fares no better. First, Plaintiff fails to cite any evidence
concerning the specifics of when she took FMLA leave in relation to when the
2018 hiring decisions were made. She merely cites generally to the then-existing
FMLA certifications (one of which post-dates the 2018 hiring decisions). Resp.
10, ECF No. 67 (“Exhibit F are copies of some of the FMLA certifications for her
father.”) (emphasis in original); Certifications, ECF No. 67-6. Thus, the Court
cannot discern how much time passed between the taking of any given leave and
the promotion decisions. Second, regardless of the amount of time between the
two (or even considering her leave to be continuous due to the existence of an
ongoing certification), Plaintiff faces the same hurdle as above. There is simply
no indication anywhere in the-record that anyone on the panel knew about
Plaintiffs FMLA status. Logically, absent evidence of knowledge, temporal
proximity cannot support an inference of causation.
At bottom, Plaintiff has offered zero evidence that a single person involved
in the 2018 recommendation decisions even knew about Plaintiffs FMLA status,
let alone that her FMLA status was the true reason a panelist chose not to
recommend Plaintiff. Bower's inaction—her failure to override those
recommendations and promote Plaintiff instead—is insufficient to support an
Case No. 2:21-cv-1136 Page 17 of 22

inference that Plaintiff lost the promotions because of her FMLA status; she lost
the promotions because the unbiased panel recommended another candidate.
Plaintiff has thus failed to clear the admittedly non-onerous bar to establishing a
prima facie case of retaliation vis-a-vis the 2018 promotion denials, and
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on those claims.
2. 2021 Promotion
For the 2021 promotion, Bower was the SME. Rec. for Personnel
Selection, ECF No. 61-4 at PAGEID # 1379. It is again undisputed that Plaintiff
received an interview for this promotion, Donithan Dep. 141:14-143:1, ECF No.
55, but the panel ultimately recommended Charity Kisor instead. Rec. for
Personnel Selection, ECF No. 61-4 at PAGEID # 1379.
The interview panelists for the 2021 promotion were Carmen Kimbro
(“Kimbro”), Cummins, and John Dong (“Dong”). Again, Cummins averred that
she was unaware of Plaintiffs FMLA status, that the panelists did not discuss
Plaintiffs FMLA status, that Plaintiff's status did not influence Cummins’ decision
with respect to the 2021 promotion. Cummins Decl. J] 9-11, ECF No. 61-1.
Kimbro also submitted a declaration and declared that she has “never been
made aware of the interviewees’ FMLA status” before an interview, “would not
know if and when an applicant has FMLA leave,” did not discuss any candidate’s
FMLA status in connection with the 2021 promotion recommendation decisions,
was not influenced by Plaintiff's FMLA status when determining who to
recommend for the 2021 promotion, and believed Plaintiff failed to “articulate,
Case No. 2:21-cv-1136 Page 18 of 22

during the interview, that she had the necessary experience for the position.”
Kimbro Decl. □□ 22-27, ECF No. 61-2. Dong also submitted a declaration, in
which he likewise averred that he was not aware of the FMLA status of any
candidate, that the panelists did not discuss any candidate’s FMLA status, that
Plaintiffs FMLA status did not influence his decision, and that he recommended
Kisor “because Kisor had recent experience and knowledge working with
offender releases, which [Plaintiff] did not have.” Dong Decl. ff] 3-8, ECF No.
59-6. Moreover, there is zero evidence that anything Bower did as SME affected
the panel’s selection of a candidate for recommendation.®
Plaintiff again fails to rebut this evidence with any evidence that Kimbro,
Cummins, or Dong knew of Plaintiffs FMLA status when they decided to
recommend Kisor over Plaintiff (and the other five interviewees) for the 2021
promotion. As Plaintiff cannot even show the panelists knew of her FMLA status,
she has necessarily produced no evidence that the panel’s recommendation was
based on FMLA retaliation.
Instead, as above, Plaintiffs causation theory rests on the fact that Bower
approved the recommendation rather than of exercising her authority to reject the
panel’s recommendation and instead appoint Plaintiff. Although Plaintiff's
argument ultimately fails for the same reasons addressed above, the Court

6 Instead, the evidence to which the Court was pointed suggests the opposite. See
Bower Dep.: 44:22—25, ECF No. 52 (Q: “Are the subject matter expert scores taken into
account when selecting a candidate?” A: “No. No. It’s just used for interview purposes
to determine who will receive interviews.”).
Case No. 2:21-cv-1136 Page 19 of 22

discusses Plaintiffs evidence a bit more here, where Bower was involved in the
selection process as SME.
At this stage, Bower’s 2015 statement is circumstantial evidence that
Bower harbored an anti-FMLA animus’ despite her testimony that she did not
consider Plaintiffs FMLA status in connection with any at-issue promotion. See
Bower Dep. 67:1—5, ECF No. 52. Similarly, another employee averred that
Bower prevented her from exercising her FMLA rights. Kountz Aff., ECF No. 67-
14.
This circumstantial evidence of Bower’s anti-FMLA bias is ultimately a red
herring, however. As noted, Bower had two roles in the 2021 promotion
decision. First, as SME, she screened the applicants to determine who should
receive an interview—and Plaintiff received an interview. Next, she essentially
rubberstamped the panel’s recommendation. Thus, just as with the 2018
promotions, even considering that Bower was the SME in 2021, she cannot
reasonably be considered a “decisionmaker’ for purposes of that promotion. The
circumstantial evidence of Bower's anti-FMLA animus is therefore again

7 Plaintiff also references a 2017 mediation between Plaintiff and Bower and argues that
Bower violated the terms of that mediation. Resp. 16, ECF No. 67. She contends that
“Bower refused to participate in [Plaintiff's] efforts to enhance her chances of a
promotion to the Offender Release Section of the Bureau of Records Management” by
“intentionally . . . not follow[ing] through on the terms of the mediation because to do so
would have put her in a stronger position to obtain promotions.” /d. at 17. Plaintiff,
however, cites zero evidence that Bower violated the terms of the 2017 mediation—let
alone that she did so out of an anti-FMLA animus in order to ensure that Plaintiff would
be in a weak position vis-a-vis future promotions. As such, this instance is not
considered as circumstantial evidence to support Plaintiffs theory that Bower's years-
later decision not to override the panel’s recommendation was FMLA retaliation.
Case No. 2:21-cv-1136 Page 20 of 22

insufficient to support an inference that FMLA retaliation is the reason Kisor
received the 2021 promotion instead of Plaintiff.
Additionally, Plaintiff cannot rely on temporal proximity for the same
reasons as addressed above. If the real decisionmakers were unaware of
Plaintiffs FMLA usage, the timing between her protected activity and the adverse
action cannot indicate the two are correlated.
For these reasons, Plaintiff has also failed to establish a prima facie case
with respect to the 2021 promotion, and Defendant is entitled to summary
judgment on that claim as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
Two of Plaintiffs claims are time-barred. As to the remaining claims,
Plaintiff has failed to offer evidence that would support an inference that Plaintiff's
FMLA usage is the reason she was denied the promotions. At bottom, the
evidence shows that the people who decided to promote a different candidate
over Plaintiff were not even aware of Plaintiffs FMLA status or usage. The only
evidence of anti-FMLA animus relates to Young and Bower. But Young was not
involved in any of the timely decisions. And, to the extent Young’s bias infected
Bower, Bower likewise was not a decisionmaker in the practical sense of the
word. Plaintiff's argument that Bower’s animus made her fail to override the
panels’ decisions is insufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact on
causation in these single-motive FMLA retaliation claims. As such, Defendant is
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs claims. Defendant’s motion, ECF No.
Case No. 2:21-cv-1136 Page 21 of 22

59, is GRANTED. The Clerk shall enter judgment for Defendant and terminate
this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED. | | ch Nan
MICHAEL H. WATSON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10383538. Public record. Not legal advice.