# Gillispie v. Miami Township

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · July 31, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10382801

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** July 31, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10382801

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the district court did not err where it found Red Cliff and Bad River bands had a “legally protected interest in the suit”
- finding that an interest must be more than a financial interest

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

ROGER DEAN GILLISPIE, :
:
Plaintiff, : Case No. 3:13-cv-416
:
v. :
: Judge Thomas M. Rose
THE CITY OF MIAMI TOWNSHIP, et al., :
:
Defendants. :
______________________________________________________________________________

ENTRY AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO BE JOINED AS
A NECESSARY PARTY OR INTERVENE IN THE TOWNSHIP’S ACTION
AGAINST MOORE WITHIN THIS ACTION (DOC. NO. 480)
______________________________________________________________________________

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to be Joined as a Necessary Party or
Intervene in the Township’s Action Against Moore within this Action (“Motion”) (Doc. No. 480),
filed by Plaintiff Roger Dean Gillispie (“Gillispie”). Gillispie moves this Court to either: join him
as a necessary party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 or, in the alternative, to allow him to intervene under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 in Intervenor-Plaintiff Miami Township Board of Trustees’ (“Township”)
declaratory judgment action against Intervenor-Defendant Matthew Scott Moore (“Moore”). The
declaratory judgment action involves whether the Township has a duty to defend or indemnify
Moore pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07 for claims made against him by Gillispie in the
underlying action. (Doc. No. 480 at PageID 15578-79; Doc. No. 397.) The Township argues that
Gillispie does not have a “substantial legal interest in th[e] declaratory action.” (Doc. No. 483 at
PageID 15689.)
For the reasons explained below, the Court DENIES the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court assumes that the parties are familiar with the factual background of this case and
will not delve into its extensive history. The Court will briefly address the procedural posture of
this case as it is relevant to this Motion.
On September 23, 2022, the Township filed its Motion to Intervene. (Doc. No. 370.) In

the Motion to Intervene, the Township argued that it had a “substantial legal interest in any
determination as to whether Moore was not acting in good faith or was acting outside of the scope
of his employment or official responsibilities” at the relevant time(s) in the underlying action. (Id.
at PageID 12701.) The Township requested “limited participation in the trial of this matter.” (Id.
at PageID 12694.) This was because Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.01 and § 2744.07 could require the
Township to pay the costs of Moore’s defense and indemnify him for any compensatory damages
awarded against him. (Id. at PageID 12701.) The Township further argued that § 2744.07 provides
exceptions that would relieve the Township of its duties if Moore did not act in good faith or if he
was acting outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities at the relevant time(s)
in the underlying action. (Id.) The Township argued that the questions of good faith and scope of

employment aligned directly with Gillispie’s claims against Moore that would be addressed at
trial. (Id. at PageID 12701-702.)
On October 11, 2022, the Court granted the Township’s Motion to Intervene, with certain
parameters. (Doc. No. 392.) Aligning with its request (Doc. No. 370 at PageID 1267), the
Township’s participation at trial was limited to questioning, argument, and submitting proposed
jury instructions and interrogatories on the discrete issues of good faith and scope of employment
consistent with Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07. (Doc. No. 392 at PageID 13693-94.) Gillispie and
Moore were also allowed to question, argue, and submit proposed jury instructions on the issues
of good faith and scope of employment. (Id. at PageID 13694.)
On October 13, 2022, in compliance with the Court’s order (Doc. No. 392 at PageID
13693) and Rule 24(c), the Township filed Miami Township Board of Trustees’ Intervenor
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Relief. (Doc. No. 397.) In that Intervenor Complaint,
the Township seeks a declaratory judgment that it does not owe a duty to defend or indemnify

Moore for claims made against him in Gillispie’s Amended Complaint. (Id. at PageID 13763.)
Trial began on November 7, 2022 and concluded on November 21, 2022. (Doc. Nos. 455,
474.) At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found for Gillispie on his two remaining claims against
Moore and awarded Gillispie $45,000,000. (Doc. No. 475 at PageID 15561-63.) The jury further
found that it had not been proven that Moore was not acting in good faith, was acting manifestly
outside the scope of his employment or official responsibilities, or was not acting within the scope
of his employment or official responsibilities. (Id. at PageID 15564-65.)
On December 7, 2022, Gillispie filed the present Motion. (Doc. No. 480.) The Township
filed its opposition on December 23, 2022 (Doc. No. 483), and Gillispie filed his reply on January
6, 2023 (Doc. No. 487). Moore did not file any response to the Motion. The Motion is fully

briefed and ripe for review and decision.
II. ANALYSIS

Gillispie argues that, under both Rule 19 and Rule 24, he has an interest in protecting the
verdict. (Doc. No. 480 at PageID 15580.) Moreover, Gillsipie argues that Moore’s testimony at
trial may prevent him from making the types of arguments necessary to protect the verdict. (Id. at
PageID 15581-82.) For instance, Gillispie argues that Moore denies any wrongdoing and that may
make it difficult for him to fully embrace the jury verdict in order to defend it. (Id.) Finally,
Gillispie argues that Ayers v. Cleveland, 2020-Ohio-1047, 156 N.E.3d 848 (Ohio 2020) presents
no bar to his ability to be joined under Rule 19 or intervene under Rule 24. (Id. at PageID15584-
85.)
a. Ayers v. Cleveland
Gillispie and the Township both raise the specter of Ayers, which hangs over the analysis

of whether Gillispie has a legal interest in the Township’s declaratory judgment action within the
meaning of Rule 19 and Rule 24.
In Ayers, the plaintiff had been released from prison pursuant to a habeas corpus action
and then filed a civil rights lawsuit against the city of Cleveland and the detectives who had been
involved in his case. Ayers, 2020-Ohio-1047 at ¶ 2. The district court dismissed the claims against
the city of Cleveland, but the plaintiff ultimately obtained a jury verdict against the two officers.
Id. at ¶ 3. After the verdict, one of the detectives passed away and the other filed chapter 7
bankruptcy, but neither detective sought to enforce their right to indemnification. Id. at ¶ 4.
The plaintiff filed a second action against the city of Cleveland, alleging claims of statutory
indemnification under Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07(A)(2), and the case ultimately made its way to

the Ohio Supreme Court. Id. at ¶¶ 6-10. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the plain language of
Section 2744.07(A)(2) requires a political subdivision to indemnify an employee for any judgment
qualifying under the statute. Id. at ¶ 18. However, the court held that the statute “provides that a
political subdivision ‘shall indemnify and hold harmless an employee.’ Thus, the right of
indemnification is personal to the employee.” Id. at ¶ 21 (emphasis in original). The Ohio
Supreme Court further held that, “[b]ased on the unambiguous language of the statute, which
serves only to indemnify an employee and does not vest any rights in third parties connected to
the employee, we conclude that R.C. 2744.07(A)(2) does not permit a judgment creditor to proceed
directly against an indemnitor.” Id.
The court declined to address the issue of third-party standing because it was not properly
before the court. Id. at ¶ 27. However, Ohio’s Second District Court of Appeals has since weighed
in on this very issue. In OTARMA v. Miami Township, 2023-Ohio-733 (Ohio Ct. App. 2023), the
plaintiff, “a political-subdivision risk pool providing liability coverage to Ohio townships,” sought

a declaratory judgment declaring that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the Township in
relation to Gillispie’s underlying federal action. OTARMA, 2023-Ohio-733 at ¶¶ 4-5. In evaluating
the plaintiff’s obligations to the Township, the court held:
Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court has made clear that the statutory right to
indemnification is a personal right held by the employee, not a judgment creditor.
For that reason, a judgment creditor such as Gillispie may not assert an employee’s
indemnification right in an action directly against a political subdivision.

Id. at ¶ 25 (citing Ayers, 2020-Ohio-1047).
Gillispie argues that Ayers does not block his joinder or intervention in the Township’s
declaratory judgment action. (Doc. No. 480 at PageID 15585.) Indeed, Gillispie argues that the
case “confirms that it does not apply to block third-party standing.” (Id.) The Township, on the
other hand, argues that Ayers makes clear an officer’s “right to indemnification related to any
judgment against an employee is personal to the employee and arises specifically out of the
employer-employee relationship.” (Doc. No. 483 at PageID 15692-93.)
The Court agrees that Ayers limits who may bring a claim under Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07
to the employee seeking to be indemnified by a political subdivision. It is apparent that Gillispie
would not be able to bring a claim under the statute directly against Miami Township. Indeed,
Ayers makes clear that § 2744.07 “does not vest any rights in third parties connected to the
employee. . . .” Ayers, 2020-Ohio-1047 at ¶ 21. To go beyond this rationale and hold that Gillispie
possessed the standing to assert and enforce Moore’s indemnification rights as a third party would
expand Ohio law beyond where it presently sits. It is not the province of this Federal Court to do
so. Imperial Hotels Corp. v. Dore, 257 F.3d 615, 620 (6th Cir. 2001) (a federal court must apply
the substantive law of Ohio “in accordance with the then-controlling decision of the highest court
of the State”). Indeed, the holding of OTARMA demonstrates that the Court’s interpretation of
Ayers is consistent with the current state of Ohio law.

b. Joinder
Gillispie first moves the Court to join him as a necessary party under Rule 19. “Assessing
whether joinder is proper under Rule 19 is a three step process.” Glancy v. Taubman Ctrs., Inc.,
373 F.3d 656, 666 (6th Cir. 2004). “First, the court must determine whether the person or entity
is a necessary party under Rule 19(a).” Id. (citing Temple v. Synthes Corp., 498 U.S. 5, 8, 112 L.
Ed. 2d 263, 111 S. Ct. 315 (1990)). “Second, if the person or entity is a necessary party, the court
must then decide if joinder of that person or entity will deprive the court of subject matter
jurisdiction.” Glancy, 373 F.3d. at 666 (citing W. Md. Ry. Co. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 960,
961 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). “Third, if joinder is not feasible because it will eliminate the court’s ability
to hear the case, the court must analyze the Rule 19(b) factors to determine whether the court

should ‘in equity and good conscience’ dismiss the case because the absentee is indispensable.”
Glancy, 373 F.3d. at 666 (quoting W. Md. Ry. Co., 910 F.2d at 961). The Court need only address
the first step to decide the joinder issue in this case.
A person must be joined under Rule 19(a) if:
(A) in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing
parties; or
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that disposing of the action in the person's absence may:
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the
interest; or
(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring double,
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19. “The burden is on the moving party to establish that a party is necessary for
purposes of Rule 19(a).” Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, LLC, 443 F.
Supp. 3d 877, 883 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (citing Eagle Realty Invs., Inc. v. Dumon, No. 18-cv-362,
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23121, at *4, 2019 WL 608830, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 13, 2019)). “‘The

moving party may satisfy this burden through the production of affidavits or other relevant extra-
pleading evidence.’” Norfolk, 443 F. Supp. 3d at 883 (quoting Reilly v. Meffe, 6 F. Supp. 3d 760,
774 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (internal quotations omitted)).
i. Complete Relief
Regarding Rule 19(a)(1)(A), Gillispie argues that complete relief cannot be afforded
without Gillispie because the money used to “indemnify Moore must be paid to Gillispie.” (Doc.
No. 480 at PageID 15580.)
Under Rule 19(a)(1)(A), the Court must determine whether complete relief can be accorded
among the existing parties. “‘Completeness is determined on the basis of those persons who are
already parties, and not as between a party and the absent person whose joinder is sought.’” Sch.

Dist. of City of Pontiace v. Sec’y of U.S. Dept. of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 265 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Angst v. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 701, 705 (3d Cir.1996) (citations omitted)). Rule
19(a)(1)(A) is “only concerned with whether [p]laintiff may receive complete relief from this
defendant.” Norfolk, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 884.
As to Gillispie’s argument that complete relief cannot be afforded without his participation,
that is incorrect. In considering whether complete relief can be granted, the Court need only
consider “the ability of the existing defendant to satisfy an award to the existing plaintiff.” Cypress
Creek Equine, LLC v. N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co., No. 5:22-cv-95, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 966, at
*3, 2023 WL 98594, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 4, 2023) (citing Phillips v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of
Canada, No. 1:20-cv-937, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208466, at *6, 2022 WL 16964176, at *3 (S.D.
Ohio Nov. 16, 2022)); see also Bedel v. Thompson, 103 F.R.D. 78, 80 (S.D. Ohio 1984). In this
case, posture of the parties is slightly different, but the core concept remains the same. The
question posed by the declaratory judgment action is, at its most basic level, whether the Township

must indemnify Moore. Complete relief can be granted by answering that question in the negative,
and allowing the Township to go on its way, or in the positive, and requiring the Township to
indemnify Moore for the amount of the judgment against him. While Gillispie may be the ultimate
destination of any indemnification funds, the answer to the question of whether Moore must be
indemnified pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07 (Doc. No. 397) can be answered without
Gillispie.
ii. Claiming an Interest
As to Rule 19(a)(1)(B), Gillispie argues that his interest in the Intervenor Complaint lies in
his “ability to protect the interest he has in the verdict just entered.” (Doc. No. 480 at PageID
15580.) Moreover, Gillispie argues that, due to Moore’s testimony and Moore’s counsel’s tactics

at trial, his interests will not be adequately represented. (Id.)
Rule 19(a)(1)(B) requires the Court to determine whether disposal of the action in the
absence of a non-party will impair or impede the non-party’s interest. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
19(a)(1)(B); Fort Washington Inv. Advisors, Inc. v. Adkins, No. 1:19-cv-685, 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 70009, at *28, 2021 WL 1345417, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 12, 2021). The threshold inquiry
is whether the non-party has a legal interest in the dispute that requires protection. Sch. Dist. of
City of Pontiac, 584 F.3d at 266. Specifically, a party must explain how it has “‘a legally protected
interest in this case that could be harmed, legally or otherwise, by a judgment in [its] absence.’”
Norfolk, 224 F. Supp. 3d at 884 (quoting Intercept Sec. Corp. v. Code-Alarm, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 215,
219 (E.D. Mich. 1995)); see also Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. State, 11 F.3d 1341, 1347 (6th
Cir. 1993) (holding that the district court did not err where it found Red Cliff and Bad River bands
had a “legally protected interest in the suit”); Tillman v. Apostolopoulos, No. 10-cv-12253, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93660, at *6, 2010 WL 3584294, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 9, 2010) (citation

omitted) (“If the absent party has a legally protected interest in the subject matter of the action—
i.e., he is a party to a contract at issue—he falls squarely within the terms of [Rule 19(a) (1)(B)]”);
Fort Washington Inv., 2021 WL 1345417, at *9-10 (finding that the court must assess whether the
non-party had a legally protectable interest).
Gillispie’s argument that he has an interest in protecting the verdict is flawed for the
purposes of Rule 19(a)(1)(B). Numerous courts across the country have held that a legally
protected interest must be more than a merely financial interest. PaineWebber, Inc. v. Bahr, 97
F.3d 1460 (9th Cir. 1996) (interest must be more than “merely a financial interest”); Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Treesdale, Inc., 419 F.3d 216, 230 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that, under Rule 19, “a party
is only ‘necessary’ if it has a legally protected interest, and not merely a financial interest, in the

action”); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. B & G Fitness Ctr., Inc., No. 4:14-cv-187, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
101749, at *9, 2015 WL 4641530, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Jul. 3, 2015) (“Courts have held that the
financial interest incidental beneficiaries might have in a declaratory judgment action is not a
recognized legal interest that would make the absent party ‘necessary’”); Old Colony Ventures I
v. SMWNPF Holdings, 968 F. Supp. 2d 1422, 1430 (D. Kan. 1997) (“This interest must be ‘legally
protected, not merely a financial interest or interest of convenience’”); Sac & Fox Nation v. Norton,
585 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1304 (W.D. Okla. 2006) (“The relevant inquiry for Rule 19(a) is not whether
the absent person has an ‘interest,’ in the broad sense, in the outcome of the litigation, but whether
cognizable legal rights of the absent person will be prejudiced by the suit’s continuation”); Axiom
Worldwide, Inc. v. Becerra, No. 08-1918, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40214, 2009 WL 1347398, at
*4 (M.D. Fla. May 13, 2009) (Rule 19 requires “a legally protected interest, and not merely a
financial interest or interest of convenience”); Conceal City, LLC v. Looper Law Enforcement,
LLC, 917 F. Supp. 2d 611, 622-623 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (finding that an interest must be more than

a financial interest); Lovell v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., No. 12-CV-00546, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
187215, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Jul. 11, 2014) (“This interest must be legally protected, not merely a
financial interest or interest of convenience”); ACI Worldwide Corp. v. Mastercard Techs., LLC,
No. 8:14-cv-31, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179068, at *10, n. 1 (D. Neb. Dec. 31, 2014) (finding the
non-party did not have an interest, in part, because a financial interest is not sufficient under Rule
19); New Life Evangelistic Ctr. v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:15-cv-00395, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
65132, at *29, 2015 WL 2383499, at *11 (E.D. Mo. May 19, 2015) (“This interest must be legally
protected and not merely a financial interest or an interest of convenience”); Fastcase, Inc. v.
Lawriter LLC, No. 1:17-cv-414, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 243992, at *5, 2019 WL 13210381, at *2
(N.D. Ga. May 13, 2019) (“Many courts, however, have recognized that a mere financial interest

is insufficient under Rule 19(a) to make a party necessary to the litigation”); Crum & Forster
Indem. Co. v. Sidelines Tree Serv., LLC, No. 2:20-cv-01030, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161416, at
*24, 2021 WL 3810178, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2021) (“a party is only ‘necessary’ if it has a
legally protected interest, and not merely a financial interest, in the action”). While the Sixth
Circuit has not directly ruled1 on this issue, at least one court in this district has found that a
financial interest alone is insufficient under Rule 19. Safelite Grp., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55166, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 14, 2005) (“the Court agrees with [plaintiff]

1 In Sch. Dist. v. Sec’y of the United States Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 281 (6th Cir. 2009), Judge Sutton, in a
concurrence, cited the core holding of Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., “that ‘merely a financial interest’ is not enough under
Rule 19(a)(1)(B).” While this is not binding, it corresponds with the large number of courts across the country that
have adopted the same position.
that an interest in the subject of the cause of action must be a legal interest, not merely a financial
interest”).
Indeed, the Court has also found that Ayers presently limits who may bring a claim under
Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07 to the employee seeking to be indemnified by a political subdivision.

Gillispie has no ability to enforce Moore’s indemnification rights and, therefore, he cannot state a
legal interest based on the statute. Ayers, 2020-Ohio-1047 at ¶ 21; OTARMA, 2023-Ohio-733 at ¶
25.
While it may appear odd that a party does not have an interest in an action contained within
its own case, the Court is bound by the confines of Rule 19. Gillispie has not stated a legally
protectable interest in the Township’s action. As the Court has determined that Gillispie does not
have an “interest” in the action for purposes of Rule 19, it is unnecessary to evaluate the remaining
aspects of Rule 19.
c. Intervention
In the alternative, Gillispie moves the Court to allow him to intervene under Rule 24. Rule

24 provides:
(a) Intervention of Right. On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to
intervene who:
(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or
(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject
of the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless
existing parties adequately represent that interest.

(b) Permissive Intervention.
(1) In General. On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene
who:
(A) is given a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or
(B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a
common question of law or fact.
The Sixth Circuit has held that a party seeking to intervene of right must establish four
elements: “(1) the motion to intervene is timely; (2) the proposed intervenor has a substantial legal
interest in the subject matter of the case; (3) the proposed intervenor’s ability to protect that interest
may be impaired in the absence of intervention; and (4) the parties already before the court may

not adequately represent the proposed intervenor’s interest.” U.S. v. Michigan, 424 F.3d 438, 443
(6th Cir. 2005) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 397–98 (6th Cir. 1999)). “The proposed
intervenor must prove each of the four factors; failure to meet one of the criteria will require that
the motion to intervene be denied.” Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 345 (6th Cir. 1989).
“To intervene permissively, a proposed intervenor must establish that the motion for
intervention is timely and alleges at least one common question of law or fact.” Michigan, 424
F.3d at 445 (citing Michigan State AFL–CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1248 (6th Cir. 1997)).
“Once these two requirements are established, the district court must then balance undue delay and
prejudice to the original parties, if any, and any other relevant factors to determine whether, in the
court's discretion, intervention should be allowed.” Michigan, 424 F.3d at 445 (citing Michigan

State AFL–CIO, 103 F.3d at 1248).
The Court will assume, without deciding, that the Motion was timely and turn to the issue
of interest, for purposes of determining whether intervention of right is appropriate. In support of
his intervention, Gillispie argues that he “has a serious legal interest in the Township’s duty to
indemnify Moore.” (Doc. No. 480 at PageID 15583.) He further argues that “Moore cannot be
trusted to zealously advocate that Gillispie be paid for his jury award. . . .” (Id.)
As a general matter, the proposed intervenor must have “‘a significant legal interest in the
subject matter of the litigation.’” Reliastar Life Ins. Co. v. MKP Invs., 565 F. App’x 369, 371-72
(6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jansen v. City of Cincinnati, 904 F.2d 336, 341 (6th Cir. 1990)). For
instance, the Sixth Circuit has held that “a putative intervenor does not possess the requisite interest
where its ‘primary interest’ in the litigation is to preserve a party’s financial viability in order to
protect the intervenor’s own economic interests in the party’s continued solvency.” Reliastar Life
Ins. Co., 565 F. App’x at 372 (citing Blount-Hill v. Bd. of Educ. of Ohio, 195 F. App’x 482, 486

(6th Cir. 2006)). Moreover, “‘circuits have generally concluded that a party may not intervene in
support of a defendant solely to protect judgment funds that the party wishes to recover itself.’”
Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 565 F. App’x at 372 (quoting Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. F.D.I.C.,
717 F.3d 189, 195 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).
Gillispie’s intervention request runs into the same problem as his joinder request. Namely,
Gillispie does not have, for purposes of Rule 24(a), a legal interest in the Township’s action
sufficient to permit intervention. While the Township’s declaratory judgment action exists within
Gillispie’s case and will, presumably, determine who will be required to pay the jury’s award to
Gillispie, that does not mean Gillispie has a requisite “interest” under Rule 24(a). Indeed, courts
in this circuit have found it significant that a proposed intervenor’s “‘rights under his judgment

against [the party] will not in anywise be affected by any judgment or decision of the court as to
the rights and liabilities of the parties to the present action.’” Comtide Holdings, LLC v. Booth
Creek Mgmt. Corp., No. 2:07-cv-1190, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81511, at *12, 2010 WL 2670853,
at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 29, 2010) (quoting Vaughan v. Dickinson, 19 F.R.D. 323, 328 (W.D. Mich.
1955), aff’d Duffy v. Vaughan, 237 F.2d 168 (6th Cir. 1956)). That is the situation here. Gillispie’s
rights under his judgment will not be affected by the Township’s declaratory judgment action. The
declaratory judgment action is to determine whether the Township must indemnify Moore, not
whether Gillispie is entitled to the judgment or to determine the amount of the judgment. (Doc.
No. 397.) As shown above, Gillispie’s economic interests are not sufficient for the purposes of
Rule 24. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 565 F. App’x at 372 (citing Blount-Hill, 195 F. App’x at 486).
In practical terms, Gillispie wants to intervene to “protect judgment funds that [he] wishes to
recover,” but this is an insufficient interest under Rule 24. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 565 F. App’x
at 372 (citing Blount-Hill, 195 F. App’x at 486).

Furthermore, as with joinder, the Court has found that Ayers presently limits who may
bring a claim under Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.07(A)(2) to the employee seeking to be indemnified
by a political subdivision. Gillispie has no ability to enforce Moore’s indemnifications rights. His
rights will not be affected by the Court’s decision in the Township’s declaratory judgment action.
Finally, Gillispie briefly argues that he should be allowed to intervene under Rule 24(b)
“for the same equitable reasons this Court found justified the Township’s intervention in the first
place.” (Doc. No. 480 at PageID 15584.) However, Gillispie’s situation is markedly different
from what the situation was with the Township attempting to intervene in Gillispie’s action against
Moore; as shown in that order, the “Township has a claim or defense that shares with the main
action a common question of law or fact.” (Doc. No. 392 at PageID 13690.) Gillispie has not

even attempted to make the same showing. The Court will not permit Gillispie to intervene under
Rule 24(b).
III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to be Joined as a
Necessary Party or Intervene in the Township’s Action Against Moore Within this Action.
DONE and ORDERED in Dayton, Ohio, this Monday, July 31, 2023.
s/Thomas M. Rose
________________________________
THOMAS M. ROSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10382801. Public record. Not legal advice.