# Real Change Program v. Mimms Jr.

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · May 9, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10382327

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** May 9, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10382327

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2 Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
- holding that pro se litigants are “inadequate class representatives”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

LEON A. MORRIS, SR., : Case No. 3:22-cv-208
:
Plaintiff, :
: District Judge Michael J. Newman
vs. :
Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.
:

MAYOR JEFFERY :

MIMMS, JR., et al., :
:
Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff, a frequent filer in this Court1 and a prisoner at the North Central Correctional
Institution, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint and amended complaints in this Court against
defendants Green County Adult Probation Department, Greene County Adult Common Pleas
Court, and Josh Mixon. (See Doc. 5, 20, 27). Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court for a sua sponte review of the complaint, as
amended, to determine whether the complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because
it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 § 804, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); § 805, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

1 See Morris v. Globe Life Ins. Co., Case No. 3:22-cv-199 (S.D. Ohio July 27, 2022); Morris v. Haines, Case No. 3:22-
cv-200 (July 27, 2022); Morris v. Warden, Case No. 2:22-cv-3461 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 16, 2022); Morris v. Huffman,
Case No. 3:22-cv-278 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2022); Morris v. Turner, Case No. 3:22-cv-279 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2022);
Morris v. Small Business Admin., Case No. 3:22-cv-221 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 9, 2022); Morris v. Global Life Ins. Co.,
Case No. 3:22-cv-222 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 9, 2022).
Screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint
A. Legal Standard
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower
judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing
so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed

by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous,
malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324
(1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)(2)2 as part of the statute, which
provides in pertinent part:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,
the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. See also § 1915A(b). Thus, § 1915(e) requires
sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or
malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the
basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

2 Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule
8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands
on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d
502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of
considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for the
defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court holds
pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Garrett
v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2010)
(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits;
“‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors,
482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.
1989)).
B. Allegations in the Complaint
Plaintiff3 brings this action against defendants Mayor Jeffery Mimms Jr., Treasurer John
McManus, and Sheriff Streck. (See Doc. 5). In the complaint, plaintiff alleges that in 2019 and
2020 that the federal government declared Montgomery County, Ohio a national disaster and funds
were provided to help citizens recover. (Doc. 5 at PageID 31; Doc. 27 at PageID 105). According

to plaintiff, defendants “used more funds on lights, on bridges, some road repairs, and refused to
use funds to rebuild blighted properties in those poverty areas of Montgomery County Dayton,
Ohio.” (Doc. 5 at PageID 31). Without factual elaboration, plaintiff asserts that “this is a designed
plan to keep those that live in those poverty areas criminal minded.” (Id.). In his amended
complaint, plaintiff alleges that “[t]he areas that were discriminated against were mainly black,
low income, and poverty ridden.” (Doc. 27 at PageID 106).
As relief, plaintiff seeks for the Real Change Program to have access to twenty million
dollars in order to eliminate poverty and homelessness, as well as to provide community resources
regarding skilled trades and drug rehab. (Id. at PageID 32. See also Doc. 27, Amended Complaint

at PageID 104 (seeking monetary damages)).
C. Analysis
As an initial matter, the complaint should be limited to alleged violations of plaintiff’s own
rights. To the extent that plaintiff has filed a purported class action (see Doc. 27 at PageID 104),
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4) generally does not permit pro se plaintiffs without legal
training to serve as class representatives.” Sanders v. Macauley, No. 22-1502, 2022 WL
16729580, at *5 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 2022) (citing Garrison v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 333 F. App’x
914, 919 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that pro se litigants are “inadequate class representatives”)). Cf.

3 As discussed below, it appears that plaintiff brings this action as a purported class action and seeks to include the
business Real Change Program as a plaintiff to this action as well.
Dodson v. Wilkinson, 304 F. App’x 434, 438 (6th Cir. 2008). In this case, plaintiff has not moved
for class certification or otherwise demonstrated that he would be an adequate class representative.
See Sanders, 2022 WL 16729580, at *5 (finding that where the plaintiff “offered no basis from the
general rule that pro se plaintiffs are not adequate class representatives, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by denying class certification”). See also White v. Kasich, No. 2:12-cv-1125,

2013 WL 941440, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 8, 2013) (Deavers, M.J.) (Report & Recommendation)
(explaining that the reason pro se prisoners are generally prohibited from bringing class actions is
because they are unable to “adequately to represent the interests of the class”), adopted, 2013 WL
1281887 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2013) (Smith, J.); Brown v. Collins, No. 2:07-cv-826, 2008 WL
818793, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2008) (Kemp, M.J.; Frost, J.) (citing Palasty v. Hawk, 15 F.
App’x 197, 200 (6th Cir. 2001)) (same); Marcum v. Jones, No. 1:06-cv-108, 2006 WL 543714, at
*1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2006) (Dlott, J.) (and cases cited therein) (holding that the pro se inmate
“may bring his own claims to federal court without counsel, but not the claims of others”).
Therefore the complaint should be limited to alleged violations of plaintiff’s own federal rights.
Cf. Dodson, 304 F. App’x at 438.

Similarly, it also appears from the face of plaintiff’s complaint that he intends to include
the Real Change Program as a plaintiff to this action. (See Doc. 5, at PageID 29). However, to
the extent that plaintiff claims that defendants have somehow violated the rights of the Real
Change Program or seeks to bring this action on its behalf, plaintiff lacks standing to raise the
claims of others. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (“[s]tanding . . . embraces several
judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition
on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights. . . .”). Cf. Williams v. Slemmer, No. 4:10-cv-
799, 2010 WL 2606128, at * 1 n.1 (N.D. Ohio June 25, 2010) (declining to recognize a corporation
as a plaintiff where it appeared that the corporation was not represented by counsel). Plaintiff may
not assert the rights of others in this case. The Court therefore understands plaintiff to be the sole
plaintiff to this action.
Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim with an arguable basis in law over
which this federal Court has subject matter jurisdiction.

To the extent plaintiff seeks to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the Court under 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a), the complaint reveals such jurisdiction is lacking. In order for diversity
jurisdiction pursuant to § 1332(a) to lie, the citizenship of the plaintiff must be “diverse from the
citizenship of each defendant” thereby ensuring “complete diversity.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis,
519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996) (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967));
see also Napletana v. Hillsdale College, 385 F.2d 871, 872 (6th Cir. 1967); Winningham v. North
American Res. Corp., 809 F. Supp. 546, 551 (S.D. Ohio 1992). In this case, both plaintiff and
defendants are citizens of Ohio. (See Doc. 5, Complaint at PageID 30). The complaint does not
allege that the citizenship of plaintiff and defendants are diverse. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(1). Therefore,

this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship over any state
law claims plaintiff may be alleging.
In addition, the Court is without federal question jurisdiction over the complaint. District
courts also have original federal question jurisdiction over cases “arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In order to invoke the Court’s federal
question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, plaintiff must allege facts showing the cause
of action involves an issue of federal law. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63
(1987). The undersigned is unable to discern from the facts alleged in the complaint any federal
statutory or constitutional provision that applies to give rise to an actionable claim for relief.
To the extent plaintiff’s complaint alleges defendants violated his right to equal protection,
the complaint fails to state a claim for relief under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. “The Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination by government which either
burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or intentionally treats one differently than
others similarly situated without any rational basis for the difference.” Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Twp. of

Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 681-82 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 395
F.3d 291, 312 (6th Cir. 2005)). To state a claim for discrimination under the equal protection
clause, plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show that a state actor intentionally discriminated
against him because of his membership in a protected class. Simpson v. Ameji, 57 F. App’x 238,
239 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Henry v. Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 1990)).
Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts whatsoever showing that defendants treated plaintiff
differently or denied him any rights because of his membership in a protected class.4 Furthermore,
plaintiff’s conclusory allegations regarding defendants’ alleged spending decisions amounted to a
“designed plan to keep those that live in those poverty areas criminal minded,” is insufficient to

plausibly suggest that defendants intentionally discriminated against him. Plaintiff has not alleged
any facts that show he was treated differently than any other person under similar circumstances.
For these reasons, plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a violation of his equal protection rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Finally, plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state an actionable claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985. (See Doc. 27 at PageID 104). To plead a cause of action under § 1985, plaintiff must

4 In this regard, plaintiff’s sole allegations are that defendants discriminated against people in areas that he describes
as “mainly black, low income, and poverty ridden.” (Doc. 27 at PageID 106). Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he people
living in these areas are left without funding to help them in these unprecedented times and have been force[d] to live
with property that have been blight for 20-25 years.” (Id.). Although plaintiff alleges that the conditions in these
properties violate “plaintiffs’” constitutional rights (see Doc. 27 at PageID 106), as noted above, plaintiff cannot
maintain this action on behalf of others and has otherwise failed to allege facts to suggest that he has been discriminated
against in violation of the Equal Protection Clause or that defendants otherwise violated his rights.
allege that the defendants conspired together for the purpose of depriving plaintiff of the equal
protection of the laws; that the defendants committed an act in furtherance of the conspiracy that
caused injury to plaintiff; and that the conspiracy was motivated by a racial, or other class-based,
discriminatory animus. See Bruggeman v. Paxton, 15 F. App’x 202, 205 (6th Cir. 2001); see also
Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F.3d 509, 518 (6th Cir. 2003) (and cases cited therein). “The complaint thus

must ‘allege both a conspiracy and some class-based discriminatory animus behind the
conspirators’ action.’” Pahssen v. Merrill Cmtv. Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356, 367-68 (6th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Newell v. Brown, 981 F.2d 880, 886 (6th Cir. 1992), in turn quoting Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). In addition, conspiracy claims must be pled with
specificity; “vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient
to state such a claim.” Id. at 368 (quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538-39 (6th Cir.
1987)). Here, plaintiff has not pleaded that any of the defendants were motivated by a racial or
class-based discriminatory animus. Moreover, plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to support
any inference that the defendants were involved in a conspiracy, or in other words, that the

defendants “shared a common discriminatory objective.” See id. (citing Hinkle v. City of
Clarksburg, W.Va., 81 F.3d 416, 421 (4th Cir. 1996)). In the absence of any factual allegations to
support his vague and conclusory conspiracy claim, plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
The complaint otherwise provides no factual content or context from which the Court may
reasonably infer that the defendants violated plaintiff’s federal rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction and for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Finally, insofar as plaintiff is alleging claims under Ohio law (see Doc. 27 at PageID 105)
(alleging a violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 149.43)), the Court should decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. Harper v. AutoAlliance Int'l, Inc., 392 F.3d 195, 210
(6th Cir. 2004) (although the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 is a
matter of discretion, when a court dismisses all federal claims before trial, it generally should

dismiss the state law claims as well).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. The plaintiff’s complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b);
2. Plaintiff’s pending motions (Doc. 4, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 24, 26) be DENIED;
and
3. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing
reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation
would not be taken in good faith and therefore deny plaintiff leave to appeal

in forma pauperis. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir.
1997).

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections
to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served
with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely motion by either
side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of the R&R objected to,
and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party shall
respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy
of those objections. Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit
rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947
(6th Cir. 1981).

May 9, 2023 s/Peter B. Silvain, Jr.
Peter B. Silvain, Jr.
United States Magistrate Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10382327. Public record. Not legal advice.