# Peterson v. Johnson

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · March 21, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10382036

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** March 21, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

BRADLEY M. PETERSON, PhD,

Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:22-cv-00276
v. Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

KRISTINA M. JOHNSON, PhD, et al.,

Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter arises on Defendant Kristina M. Johnson’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's
Complaint. (ECF No. 7). For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.
A. Factual Background
Dr. Peterson is a former employee of the Ohio State University’s Astronomy department.
(ECF No. 7, at 2) (ECF No. 11, at 2). Beginning his career at the University in 1979, Dr.
Peterson worked his way up to become Chair of the Department of Astronomy, a position he
held until his retirement in 2015. (ECF No. 11, at 2). Subsequent to his retirement, Dr. Peterson
was granted the title of professor emeritus. (ECF No. 7, at 2). This title “is an honor given in
recognition of sustained academic contributions to the university.” O.A.C. 3335-5-19 (C).
Peterson continued his research after retirement. (ECF No. 7, at 2) (ECF No. 11, at 3). He
also continued his relationship with OSU, returning in 2018 to teach full time. (ECF No. 7, at 2)
(ECF No. 11, at 3). However, during this time Peterson was not classified as part of the normal,
tenured faculty. (ECF No. 11, at 3). His return to the University lasted until 2021. (ECF No. 7,
at 2—3) (ECF No. 11, at 7). During these three years the University began receiving complaints
regarding Peterson. (ECF No. 7, at 2–3) (ECF No. 11, at 3—5). Eventually, due to numerous
complaints, the school launched a sexual harassment investigation into his conduct. (ECF No. 7,
at 3) (ECF No. 11, at 5). Based on the results of this investigation, OSU disciplined Peterson
pursuant to its Sexual Misconduct Policy 1.15. (ECF No. 7, at 3–4) (ECF No. 11, at 8). Peterson

was stripped of his professor emeritus title and OSU terminated any relationship with him. (ECF
No. 7, at 3–4) (ECF No. 11, at 8).
Peterson points to numerous problems with OSU’s investigation. (ECF No. 11, at 5–7). He
alleges that he was not informed of any investigation until after it had already commenced. (Id.,
at 5). Peterson also alleges flaws in the University’s investigation and in its report that resulted
in an unfair investigation. (Id.). Specifically, some of the missteps Peterson accuses the lead
investigator of include “(a) failing to include information Dr. Peterson provided in the

investigation report; (b) failing to investigate if Dr. Peterson treated male employees similarly;
(c) asking for names of or interviewing witnesses to support Dr. Peterson; (d) failing to conduct a
thorough examination to support a finding that there was a long pattern of harassment; (e)
including information that someone warned [Laura Lopez, an Assistant Professor of Astronomy
at OSU, who would later accuse Dr. Peterson of sexual harassment] about Dr. Peterson without
even asking for the source of this warning; (f) either not asking for or purposefully excluding
from the report alleged correspondence documenting the harassment, but relying on it
nonetheless; (g) failing to consider the modifications Dr. Peterson made following the discussion
with the chair in 2018; (h) not investigating if the alleged harassment caused any actual harm;

and (i) not interviewing other individuals who worked with Dr. Peterson during the alleged
period of harassment.” (ECF No. 11, at 6). Aside from these mistakes, Peterson alleges
numerous other investigative flaws. (Id., at 5–7). In sum, Peterson maintains the University
violated his due process rights by “(a) not providing him notice of the allegations against him;
(b) not affording him a fair investigation with neutral and unbiased investigators and decision
makers; (c) not providing him a hearing and the right to cross-examination even though the case
involved allegations of sexual misconduct and hinged on credibility determinations; and (d)

investigating complaints outside the jurisdiction of the Sexual Misconduct Policy.” (ECF No.
11, at 9).
Although the title of professor emeritus does not come with pay, Peterson alleges that the
University’s decision to strip him of the title caused injury, nevertheless. Specifically, Peterson
points to the following “protectable property interests” that the University took from him
“without due process:” (ECF No. 11, at 8)

“his emeritus status at OSU and all related benefits; (b) his position as
Distinguished Visiting Astronomer at STScI; (c) loss of his large Hubble Space
Telescope science program, which others will now complete and receive the
recognition; (d) loss of his textbook contract with Cambridge University Press after
six months of work on a second edition; and (e) permanent reputational damage
and loss of earnings.”
(Id., at 8–9).
B. Procedural Background
On January 24, 2022, Plaintiff Bradley M. Peterson, PhD., filed a complaint in the Southern
District of Ohio against Defendant Kristina M. Johnson, PhD and Bruce McPheron, PhD. (ECF
No. 1, at 3). Plaintiff sued each Defendant in both their individual and official capacities as
representatives of the Ohio State University. Peterson’s action stems from the University’s
decision to remove him from his position as professor emeritus. Defendant filed the instant
motion to dismiss on April 15, 2022. (ECF No. 7). Plaintiff Johnson responded on May 20.
(ECF No. 11). Finally, Defendant replied on May 31. (ECF No. 12).
C. Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 authorizes dismissal of a lawsuit for “failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To
meet this standard, the complaint must allege sufficient facts to state a claim that is
“plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct.
1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, the Court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party, accepting as true all of plaintiff's factual allegations.
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009).
Nonetheless, the Court must read Rule 12(b)(6) in conjunction with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), requiring a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Ogle v. BAC Home Loans Servicing
LP, 924 F. Supp. 2d 902, 907 (S.D. Ohio 2013). Thus, the pleading's factual
allegations, assumed to be true, must do more than create mere speculation or
suspicion of a legally cognizable claim; they must show entitlement to relief.
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007).
Further, “the tenet that courts must accept a complaint's allegations as true is
inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported by
mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662. As such, while a plaintiff is
not required to set forth detailed factual allegations at the pleading stage, a
complaint must contain a basis upon which relief can be granted; a recitation of
facts intimating the “mere possibility of misconduct” will not suffice. See id. at
679; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
Lloyd v. Pokorny, No. 2:20-cv-2928, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162998 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 8,
2020).
D. Analysis
Defendant Johnson maintains that Plaintiff’s action must be dismissed for failure “to state a
viable cause of action against Defendants for which he is entitled to relief.” (ECF No. 7, at 4).
Defendant makes three arguments. First, Defendant contends the Court must “dismiss Defendant
McPheron in his official capacity from the instant matter,” as McPheron is no longer employed
at OSU. (Id., at 9). Second, “Plaintiff is unable to establish any change to his employment status
with OSU upon which his Fourteenth Amendment claim can survive.” (ECF No. 7, at 7). And
finally, Defendant argues qualified immunity bars Plaintiff’s suit against Johnson and McPheron
in their individual capacities. (Id., at 8). Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains that dismissal is

not warranted. (ECF No. 11, at 2). The Court agrees with Defendant.
a. Substitution
As a threshold matter, the Court will deal with Defendant’s third argument. Defendant
claims the Court must dismiss Defendant McPheron in his official capacity, as he is no longer

employed as Executive Vice President and Provost of OSU. (ECF No. 7, at 9). Defendant is
correct that Defendant McPheron, in his official capacity, is no longer a proper defendant.
However, rather than dismissing the action against McPheron, the Court will simply substitute
him with his successor, Dr. Melissa Gilliam. “An action does not abate when a public officer
who is a party in an official capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office while the
action is pending. The officer’s successor is automatically substituted as a party. Later
proceedings should be in the substituted party’s name, but any misnomer not affecting the
parties’ substantial rights must be disregarded. The court may order substitution at any time, but
the absence of such an order does not affect the substitution.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

b. Fourteenth Amendment
Defendant Johnson maintains Plaintiff’s action must be dismissed because he cannot
demonstrate any deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Johnson
argues Plaintiff lacks a “constitutionally protected property interest in his emeritus status.” (ECF

No. 7, at 5). Plaintiff disagrees, arguing that emeritus status is a protectable property interest.
(ECF No. 11, at 11). This issue appears to be one of first impression. The Court could find no
other example of any individual alleging a protected legal interest in their professor emeritus
title. However, despite the lack of fact-specific precedent, *Peterson cannot sufficiently allege
that he was deprived of a protected property interest without due process of law to withstand this

Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
To “prevail on the claim that he was unconstitutionally deprived of his property”
Peterson is required to prove he was entitled to a protected property interest. Gunasekera v.
Irwin, 551 F.3d 461 (6th Cir.2009).1 Without such an interest, the claim cannot survive.
Protected interests, while ensured by the Constitution, are not prescribed by it. Instead, they
usually stem from state law. “Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution.
Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that

stem from an independent source such as state law - rules or understandings that secure certain
benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 1972). Additionally, “constitutionally protected property interests can be created
by either explicit or implied contractual terms.” Ramsey v. Bd. of Educ., 844 F.2d 1268, 1271
(6th Cir. 1988).
Here, Plaintiff does not cite to any state laws naming or implying a property interest in

emeritus status. However, Plaintiff does cite to caselaw, making particular use of Smock v. Bd.

1 Plaintiff must “‘establish three elements; (1) that [he] ha[s] a life, liberty, or property
interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . , (2) that [he] w[as]
deprived of this protected interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, and (3) that the
state did not afford [him] adequate procedural rights prior to depriving [him] of [his] protected
interest.’” Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461 (6th Cir.2009) citing Med Corp. v. City of Lima, 296
F.3d 404, 409 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Hahn v. Star Bank, 190 F. 3d 708, 716 (6th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 1020, 120 S. Ct. 1423, 146 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2000)).
of Regents of Univ. of Michigan, 353 F. Supp.3d 651 (E.D.Mich.2018) and Gunasekera v. Irwin,
551 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2009). In those cases, employment privileges, sabbatical time and a
summer stipend, were allegedly stripped from tenured professors without due process. Id. In
each, courts found that these privileges were protected property interests. Plaintiff uses Smock

and Gunasekera to argue that, like a sabbatical, his emeritus status was an employment privilege,
and therefore a property interest.
Plaintiff’s reliance on these two cases is misplaced, as both are distinguishable from the
issue at hand. The plaintiffs in Gunasekera and Smock were employed by their Universities at
the time of their discipline. “[T]he plaintiffs in Gunasekera and Smock were tenured, employed
faculty with their respective universities at the time they suffered their alleged discipline.” (ECF
No. 12, at 3–4). As a condition of employment, both plaintiffs were entitled to certain privileges.

Smock v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Michigan, 353 F. Supp.3d 651 (E.D.Mich.2018);
Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2009).
The loss of these privileges altered Gunasekera and Smock’s employment relationship
with their universities. Peterson, on the other hand, was not employed, let alone tenured, by the
University at the time he was disciplined. (ECF No. 11, at 2). His loss of emeritus status did not
alter his legal or contractual relationship with OSU in any way. He was retired from OSU before

he was disciplined, and he remained retired after.
Plaintiff’s attempt to argue that emeritus status was a privilege he had earned through his
long service to OSU fails for lack of support. (ECF No. 11, at 12). As Defendant points out,
emeritus status is not in fact a privilege “to which he was entitled… due to his former
employment “as a full-time tenured faculty member who dedicated over twenty-five years of
service to OSU.” Id. Instead, emeritus status is given discretionarily. OSU’s bylaws support
this interpretation. They provide that professors “may request emeritus status upon retirement or
resignation,” not that professors are ever entitled to emeritus status. OSU’s Bylaws & Rules,
Ohio Admin. Code 3335-5-36 (A). Further, even after a professor has requested emeritus status,
he/she is not entitled to the title. Their request could easily be denied. Emeritus status is

“recommended by the TIU head, the dean, and the executive vice president and provost, and
approved by the board of trustees.” OSU’s Bylaws & Rules, Ohio Admin. Code 3335-5-36 (B).
The bylaws also refer to emeritus status as an “honorific,” further cutting against the
argument that it confers some type of employment relationship with the recipient. OSU’s
Bylaws & Rules, Ohio Admin. Code 3335-5-36 (C). Professors with the emeritus title “are not
expected to perform faculty duties… nor do they retain the specific powers of the faculty.”
OSU’s Bylaws & Rules, Ohio Admin. Code 3335-5-36 (C). These bylaws indicate emeritus

status does not confer employment at OSU. As a discretionary honor that is not mandated or
affected by the conditions of his employment, Plaintiff never had a protected property interest in
his status.
Even if Plaintiff did have a protected property interest in his emeritus status, his claim
would still fail. To obtain relief, a plaintiff alleging a due process violation in the employment
context must show that their employment status has been altered. “[T]here must be a substantial,

tangible harm and a material change to an employee's status before the employee possesses a
viable § 1983 cause of action based upon the fourteenth amendment.” Samad v. Jenkins, 845
F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1988). There was no such change here. Plaintiff retired from OSU in 2015
(ECF No. 11, at 2). His employment relationship with the University ended that year. The
University’s actions in 2021, stripping Peterson of his title, did not alter that relationship.
Further,
As Plaintiff never had an entitlement to his emeritus status, Peterson cannot sufficiently
allege that he was deprived of a protected property interest without due process of law to
withstand this Rule 12(b)(6) motion. He cannot show his entitlement to relief. As such,
Peterson’s complaint is DISMISSED.

c. Qualified Immunity
Defendant Johnson maintains Plaintiff’s action against Johnson and McPheron in their
individual capacities must be dismissed because it is barred by qualified immunity. The Court
need not decide this issue as Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state any claim upon which relief may

be granted.
d. Name Clearing
Further, Plaintiff is not entitled to an opportunity to clean his name. A name clearing

hearing occurs “when a ‘nontenured employee shows that he has been stigmatized by the
voluntary, public dissemination of false information in the course of a decision to terminate his
employment.’” Quinn v. Shirey, 293 F.3d 315, 320 (6th Circuit 2002) quoting Chilingirian v.
Boris, 882 F.2d 200, 205 (6th Cir.1989). In such cases, “the employer is required to afford him
an opportunity to clear his name.” Id. Plaintiff is not entitled to such an opportunity here.
Name clearing requires more than reputational damage, it requires a change in employment
or legal status. “[D]efamation alone is not enough to trigger this constitutional protection; rather,

the alleged damage must be tied to ‘[s]ome alteration of a right or status ‘previously recognized
by state law.’” Crosby v. University of Kentucky, 863 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 2017) quoting Quinn,
293 F.3d at 319 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711–12, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405).
“Among the protected liberty interests are ‘[a] person's reputation, good name, honor, and
integrity.’” Kaplan v. University of Louisville, 10 F.4th 569 (6th Circuit 2021) (quoting Quinn v.
Shirey, 293 F.3d 315, 319 (6th Cir. 2002)) (quoting Chilingirian v. Boris, 882 F.2d 200, 205 (6th
Cir. 1989)). “Some alteration of a right or status ‘previously recognized by state law,’ such as
employment, must accompany the damage to reputation” to make out a due process violation. Id.

(quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976)).” Kaplan v.
University of Louisville, 10 F.4th 569 (6th Circuit 2021).
Here, as mentioned above, Peterson’s employment status did not change when OSU stripped
him of his emeritus status. Further, emeritus status does not appear to be recognized by state
law. Finally, as mentioned by OSU’s own bylaws, emeritus status is merely “honorific.” OSU’s
Bylaws & Rules, Ohio Admin. Code 3335-5-36 (C). As such, the loss of an emeritus title is
unlikely to constitute an alteration of a right or status as contemplated by the court in Crosby.

Plaintiff’s claim fails.
E. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED. (ECF No. 7). The Court

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claim without prejudice. Further, the Court SUBSTITUTES Defendant
McPheron, in his official capacity, with his successor, Dr. Melissa Gilliam.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

3/21/2023 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10382036. Public record. Not legal advice.